NOTES

CHAPTER 1

1. 1.RAF (2008) ‘Air Publication 1: Ethos, core values and standards in the RAF’, Air Publications, TGDA Media Services.
2. 2.Grint, K. (2006) ‘Followership: The anvil of leadership’, in J. Jupp and K. Grint (eds) Air Force Leadership: Beyond Command, Cranwell, UK: RAF Leadership Centre.
3. 3.Adapted from Ministry of Defence (2014) ‘Joint Doctrine Publication 0-01: UK Defence Doctrine’ (5th edition), The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC).
4. 4.Howard, M. (1996) ‘The armed forces and the community’, RUSI Journal, pp. 9–12.
5. 5.Jupp, J. (ed.) (2009) Leadership: An Anthology, Cranwell, UK: RAF Leadership Centre, p. 32.
6. 6.Bungay, S. (2001) The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain, London: Arum Press.

CHAPTER 2

1. 1.von Clausewitz, C. (ed.) (1992) On War, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
2. 2.See, for example, Grint, K. (2005) ‘Problems, problems, problems: The social construction of “leadership”’, Human Relations, 58(11): pp. 1467–94.
3. 3.See White, R. (2006) Vulcan 607, London: Bantam Press.
4. 4.Wilkinson, D. (2006) The Ambiguity Advantage, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
5. 5.Bourgeois, L.J. (1980) ‘Performance and consensus’, Strategic Management Journal, 1(3): pp. 227–48.
6. 6.Jupp, J.A. (2013) ‘Egalitarian teams in a military hierarchy: A study of the formation of the Royal Air Force Senior Leadership Team’, Cranfield University PhD Thesis.
7. 7.Sir Glenn Torpy in a personal message to John Jupp in 2017.
8. 8.Jupp, J.A. (2013) ‘Egalitarian teams in a military hierarchy: A study of the formation of the Royal Air Force Senior Leadership Team’, Cranfield University PhD Thesis.
9. 9.See, for example, Professor Megan Reitz’s work on mindfulness.

CHAPTER 3

1. 1.Van Creveld, M. (1985) Command in War, Boston, USA: Harvard University Press.
2. 2.Tzu, L. (2019) Tao Te Ching: The Book of the Way, Ancient Renewal (new edition of the original sixth-century work, edited by Dwight Goddard et al.).
3. 3.Deloitte (2012) ‘Human capital trends: Leap ahead’, Deloitte Development LLC. See also MOD (2018) ‘Global Strategic Trends’, Shrivenham, UK: Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre.
4. 4.Collier, B. (1957) Leader of the Few, Peterborough, UK: Jarrold Publishing, pp. 108–9.
5. 5.See Bungay, S. (2000) The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain, London: Aurum Press.
6. 6.See, for example, Bungay, S. (2000) The Most Dangerous Enemy: A History of the Battle of Britain, London: Aurum Press.
7. 7.See, for example, Seddon, J. (2008) System Thinking in the Public Sector, Charmouth, UK: Triarchy Press.
8. 8.Group Captain Leonard Cheshire VC OM.
9. 9.Grint, K. (2005) Leadership: Limits and Possibilities, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. See also Grint, K. (2006) ‘Followership: The anvil of leadership’, in J. Jupp and K. Grint (eds), Air Force Leadership: Beyond Command, Cranwell, UK: RAF Leadership Centre.
10. 10.For the original definition of ‘wicked problems’, see Rittle, H. and Webber, M. (1973) ‘Dilemmas in a general theory of planning’, Policy Sciences, 4: pp. 155–69. An explanation related to leadership thinking for crisis, tame and wicked problems can be taken from Grint, K. (2006) ‘What is leadership? Beyond command, management and contingency theory’, in J. Jupp and K. Grint (eds) Air Force Leadership: Beyond Command, Cranwell, UK: RAF Leadership Centre.
11. 11.MOD (2015) ‘Global strategic trends’, Shrivenham, UK: Development Concepts and Doctrine Centre, p. 11.

CHAPTER 4

1. 1.Orange, V. (2004) Tedder: Quietly in Command, Abingdon, UK: Frank Cass/Taylor & Francis.
2. 2.Ibid.
3. 3.McAllister, D. J. (1995) ‘Affect and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal cooperation in organisations’, Academy of Management Journal, 38: pp. 25–59.
4. 4.Coleman, A. (2009) ‘“I need to be myself”: Authenticity and performance in the everyday and mundane practice of trustworthy leadership – a paradox?’, Lancaster University PhD Thesis.
5. 5.Neville, M. (2009) ‘Leadership under fire – Iraq 2006/2007’, in J. Jupp (ed.) Leadership: An Anthology, Cranwell, UK: RAF Leadership Centre.
6. 6.Cooke, R. (2009) ‘Morale and discipline’, written in 1943, in J. Jupp (ed.) Leadership: An Anthology, Cranwell, UK: RAF Leadership Centre.
7. 7.I am indebted to Seb Cox, the Head of the RAF Historical Branch, for this story.

CHAPTER 5

1. 1.See, for example, Grint, K. (2006) ‘What is leadership? Beyond command, management and contingency theory’, in J. Jupp and K. Grint (eds) Air Force Leadership: Beyond Command, Cranwell, UK: RAF Leadership Centre.
2. 2.RAF (2008) ‘Air Publication 1: Ethos, core values and standards in the RAF’, Air Publications, TGDA Media Services.
3. 3.See Jones, S. and Gosling, J. (2005) Nelsons Way: Leadership Lessons from the Great Commander, London: Nicholas Brealey.
4. 4.Janis, I. (1972) Victims of Groupthink: A Psychological Study of Foreign-Policy Decisions and Fiascos, Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
5. 5.See, for example, Meadows, D. (2008) Thinking in Systems: A Primer, White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing.
6. 6.Burridge, B. (2009) ‘Windsor Leadership Trust Annual Lecture’, November 2003, in J. Jupp (ed.) Leadership: An Anthology, Sleaford, UK: RAF Leadership Centre.
7. 7.See, for example, Adair, J. (2010) Effective Leadership: How To Be A Successful Leader, London: Pan Books.
8. 8.See Adair, J. (2016) ‘Seeds of the future: Leadership today and tomorrow’, in J. Jupp (ed.) Air Force Leadership: Whole Force Moral Component, Cranwell, UK: RAF Leadership Centre.
9. 9.Tuckman, B.W. (1965) ‘Development sequences in small groups’, Psychology Bulletin, 63: pp. 384–99.
10. 10.Morris, R. (2000) Cheshire: The Biography of Leonard Cheshire VC OM, New York: Viking Books.

CHAPTER 7

1. 1.See Goleman, D. (1995) Emotional Intelligence: Why It Can Matter More Than IQ, New York: Bantam Dell.
2. 2.Kakabadse, A. (2017) ‘Lecture to the RAF Strategic Leadership Development Programme’, Cranwell, UK: RAF Leadership Centre.
3. 3.Meadows, D. (2008) Thinking in Systems: A Primer, Lynedoch, SA: Sustainability Institute.
4. 4.Ibid.
5. 5.Ibid.
6. 6.SMART stands for Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant (or Realistic) and Timebound.
7. 7.Tzu, S. (2010) The Art of War, New York: Tribeca Books.
8. 8.Haslam, A., Reicher, S. and Platow, M. (2011) The New Psychology of Leadership, Hove, UK: Psychology Press.
9. 9.Brooke-Popham, R. (2009) ‘Duties of an Officer’, paper written in 1943, in J. Jupp (ed.) Leadership: An Anthology, Cranwell, UK: RAF Leadership Centre.
10. 10.Csíkszentmihályi, M. (2014) Flow and the Foundations of Positive Psychology, New York: Springer.

CHAPTER 8

1. 1.Extract from Burridge, B. (2009) ‘Windsor Leadership Trust Annual Lecture’, November 2003, in J. Jupp (ed.) Leadership: An Anthology, Cranwell, UK: RAF Leadership Centre.
2. 2.I am indebted to Seb Cox, the Head of the RAF Historical Branch, for this story.
3. 3.Haig is a controversial officer: some contend that he is the greatest of all British generals, above even Marlborough, and others that he was incompetent. What is certain is that his achievements were impressive by any standards. No one in Britain had considered leading large armies – the British Expeditionary Force, about 120,000 men, was as big as it had got. Yet Haig presided over the enlargement of the British military presence in France to over four million people and, in 1918, the biggest successes of any British Army and of all armies involved in the First World War.

CHAPTER 9

1. 1.Multiple intelligence theory has been about for many years but was first postulated in the late-nineteenth century. Since then, many authors have played with it – some debunking it, mostly because they cannot find any reliable way of measuring anything but IQ, and some promoting it. Here, I acknowledge that these things may not be measurable, but they are a useful way of thinking about what is important in leadership. I would also note that because something is not measurable does not mean it does not exist or is not important. For example, we cannot measure black holes directly, we can only observe what they do to other things, but that does not mean scientists deny their existence or that they are not important.