5
European Innovation and Production Ecosystems

As we have seen, clusters are an emerging form of organization within market economies. The trend toward the geographic concentration of public and private actors in one location is particularly strong in Europe. From a company perspective, this means that firms already integrated into a cluster will aim to grow, increase the economic benefits of the location and attract new members. These forms of organization may thus be considered as growth factors and forces of attraction.

Moreover, they form an integral part of the Europe 2020 strategy, which aims to transform the EU into a “smart”, “sustainable” and “inclusive” economy, on the basis of knowledge and innovation, more efficient and more ecological in the use of resources and with improved levels of employment and social and territorial cohesion.

Europe is home to a multitude of these organizational forms, not all of which are innovative. The European Cluster Observatory has identified more than 10,000 regional clusters, classifying them using a star-based scoreboard, with one point allocated for each of the following criteria: the level of employment in an industrial cluster within a region, the level of specialization and the centralization of employment within the region on the cluster. On the basis of these criteria, 150 regional clusters have three stars, 500 have two and 1,300 have one star.

The number and variety of clusters raises significant challenges in terms of public authorities. The transformation of a theoretical interpretative grid into an operational political concept is no easy matter. In more general terms, actions by public authorities need to be planned with precision. Clusters cannot be created by public intervention, and public actions can even hinder their competitiveness; however, the influence of public authorities is far from being entirely negative, particularly in the context of “Cluster initiatives”.

In this chapter, we shall focus on three main points. The first stage is to specify a framework for cluster analysis, enabling us to define their nature and role. Second, we shall present a case study of the Cambridge science and technology cluster, a perfect illustration of the articulation between a knowledge-intensive industry and the services offered by companies in the cluster, which constitute inputs into the innovation process of client companies. The third stage concerns the analysis of cluster policies and the trend toward a strategy of smart specialization.

5.1. The cluster analysis framework

Our presentation is intended to fulfill two roles: (1) to highlight the analytical foundations for these forms of organization and (2) to illustrate the degree of compatibility between the presence of clusters and an understanding of the community as an ecosystem of generalized innovation.

5.1.1. Clusters: a reality more than a concept

Our approach aims to analyze clusters as existing organizations within regional economies. The arguments presented are not specific to the European economy. Moreover, they draw on different disciplines (geographic economics, the economics of knowledge and innovation, institutional economics, etc.), which come together to highlight the advantages of proximity. A text published by the European Commission groups these advantages into three categories:

  • – “advantages based on regional external economies of scale and agglomeration. These include enhanced productivity arising from localization of production systems, which generates opportunities for greater specialization, division of labor and inter-firm linkages. Agglomeration also provides a basis for enhanced local skills supply and a pool of localized knowledge that is shared between firms;
  • – advantages associated with social networks. These are linked to the significance of interpersonal relationships in generating trust within business networks, which is believed to create a social capital that transcends the boundaries between firms and institutions;
  • – advantages derived from regional innovation systems and local knowledge exchange. These ideas emphasize the significance of local learning processes that include access to local tacit knowledge and its value in generating competitive advantage” [COM 13, p. 14].

This analysis considers clusters in terms of their concrete form, that is, “as phenomena in the economic landscape of regions” [COM 13, p. 13], highlighting their role as agents of change, which results in increased productivity and a consequent increase in salaries. The data collected by the European Cluster Observatory for a sample of 2,000 clusters confirm the existence of a positive correlation between the presence of clusters1 and an increase in salaries within the region [KET 15]. The author takes account of the quality of the economic environment: the cluster effect on salaries is stronger in regions with a favorable economic environment. It is important to note, too, that a clear statement of the advantages involved also demonstrates the existence of the geographic concentration processes, which have the potential to affect business competitiveness. The explicit aim of these clusters, according to the European Commission, is to improve the performance of member companies. This is shown in Table 5.1.

Table 5.1. Nature, mechanisms and expected effects of clusters

(adapted from [COM 13, p. 16])

Productivity and innovation are key elements of competitiveness
Multiple factors influence productivity and innovation
Importance of proximity and local spillovers
Critical role of localization factors
Need to reach a critical mass
External effects through shared infrastructures and input markets
Groups of companies operating in related industries
Improve the performances of a set of linked companies

This table raises a number of points. The emergence of clusters is principally explained by the existence of localized externalities (Marshallian externalities), which lead to increasing returns to scale. However, the dynamics of externalities and agglomeration economies will only emerge if a significant number of companies are present in the location. We also see that the existence of these clusters is a consequence of multiple successful entrepreneurial initiatives [DAH 06]. Local creation of new companies plays a vital role in cluster growth. The entrepreneurs in question come from within established companies (see Klepper’s analysis, cited above). More specifically, successful entrepreneurial initiatives depend on the number of existing firms and on inputs into the cluster. New companies spring up in the vicinity of those which “created” the entrepreneurs in question.

The dynamic presented in the table does not necessarily contribute to regional or national growth. We see that high regional levels of GDP per capita are not dependent on the presence of individual clusters, but on the number of clusters present within a region that have the potential to reach a critical mass (in terms of the number of companies, volume of employment, etc.).

The influence of social characteristics on performance in terms of productivity is widely recognized. The text published by the European Commission discusses the formation of social networks and social capital, which fosters innovation and entrepreneurship within a local environment, in detail alongside the contents of the table. The effect of social relationships strengthens the agglomeration effect and reinforces the advantages of proximity. The same is true of institutions that do not appear, as such, in the table. However, the accompanying developments refer explicitly to the notion of the “Triple Helix” and to the structuring effects of triangular relationships (between universities, businesses and public actors) in cluster growth, notably for knowledge-intensive structures. These relationships have a favorable knock-on effect on the innovation process, breaking down the walls between different participants.

The EC report also stresses the fact that the evolution of these forms of organization forms part of a lifecycle (derived from an analysis of product lifecycles), which is split into four stages: emergence, growth, maturity and decline. These phases are associated with modifications that affect knowledge intensity, the density of inter-firm relationships and the beneficial effects of localization. In this respect, the analysis differs from that set out in Chapter 1, which took an explicit account of legitimization processes and the quality of social relationships in defining sustainability thresholds and the phase of decline.

In addition to this analysis, it would be interesting to consider the resilience of these organizational forms during periods of crisis. Research carried out on a sample of French companies involved in export activities [MAR 13] indicated that exporting companies belonging to a cluster were more likely to continue exporting than other firms. However, this advantage was considerably lower in 2008–2009: the situation is highly dependent on the position and performance of the leading firm. This shows that the network structure, focused on a central point, has a significant influence on results.

Instead of completely abandoning the theoretical approach and considering clusters as observable “phenomena” [COM 13], it would also be interesting to adopt a realistic position, taking account of other arguments for improving understanding and increasing the competitiveness of clusters [KET 12]. Innovation ecosystems are groups of actors, interconnected by various links. This organization centers on companies that generate innovations and are subject to competition. Research centers and universities have a part to play in this structure via the production of new knowledge, which is often fundamental in nature. Educational establishments reinforce the quality of human capital, and funding bodies (business angels, venture capital funds, banks etc.) have the capacity to validate company projects. Finally, public authorities implement decisions concerning investment in infrastructure, education and so on, which govern the innovation process. In this context, it is necessary, but not sufficient, for clusters to attain a critical mass (as shown in Table 5.1). The intensity of relationships between actors and the possibilities that they create in terms of mobility of both resources and skills strongly affects the innovation pathway and the development of competitive advantages.

Clearly, as the authors note, this chapter describes an ideal situation that differs from reality, as the dialog between actors is often imperfect. Relationships between small to medium-sized firms and big businesses, in particular, can take a long time to establish and even longer to result in effective decisions. Big businesses are often more liable to look to experienced international suppliers than to patronize small local companies2. These smaller companies struggle to benefit from the knowledge produced by universities and research centers, as their capacity for absorption is limited by their low R&D budgets. Researchers are often more interested in perspectives of academic publication and peer recognition than in commercializing new discoveries. Moreover, in Europe, particularly during the current period of limited growth and budgetary austerity, it is difficult to persuade banks to invest in innovative projects. The venture capital market is not yet at a sufficient stage of development, due to its fragmentation across different European economies.

This all results in under-exploitation of the potential of clusters, principally due to low levels of interaction between actors3. Gaps have emerged between cluster sub-systems, resulting in insufficient knowledge production, weak network structures, differing standards, attitudes and visions, the absence of a shared language, low confidence and negative motivations. The roads to innovation are scattered with obstacles that hinder the process.

These problems affect competitiveness as well as innovation. As we have seen, the under-exploitation of cluster potentials also stems from the weakness of entrepreneurial initiatives, a significant factor in the strength of US clusters. Potential entrepreneurs often lacking technological and market knowledge need to clearly assess opportunities. This problem is magnified by the absence of efficient, structured networks, leading to a failure to organize collaborations and coordinate action.

The shortfall in cluster performance in relation to potential, in terms of innovation, may be expressed as an equation [KET 12]: knowledge shortfall + network shortfall + collaborative shortfall = innovation shortfall.

This is the reason for the dominance of cluster organizations included in “Cluster initiatives” (see Box 5.1): these initiatives enable bridges to be built between actors, foster knowledge transfer and connect clusters to global markets and international value chains. These actions are all more effective in a favorable macro-economic context.

The EC’s treatment of cluster competitiveness also needs to be considered. These remarks are equally applicable to a number of other projects carried out on clusters. Malmberg and Power [MAL 06b] indicated that this research makes use of an implicit model, which, in the European Commission text, may be written as follows:

image

As the authors note, we appear to be in a situation of circular reasoning. The clusters in question are presumed to lead to increased competitiveness; however, at the same time, they are defined on the basis of their competitive success, because they are productive and innovative and because localization factors produce a favorable effect once a critical mass has been reached (but how is this to be measured?) The combination of theoretical (that which is) and normative aspects (that which could be), to use Gaétan Pirou’s terminology, creates confusion. Competitiveness forms part of the definition of a cluster, and those which are not competitive are considered to be weak clusters (few assets and limited capabilities) [COM 13, p. 27], that is, as forms of organization which cannot be defined as clusters. Following this line of reasoning, it is difficult to know what to think of emerging clusters, linked only to potential markets, still at the structuring phase, and in which agglomeration and social interaction effects have yet to be observed. The same is true of technological developments, which have yet to reach a point of stability.

5.1.2. Toward a generalized ecosystem of innovation

A briefing produced by the European Parliament [REI 16] considers that “the innovation process occurs in an ecosystem in which companies, public research institutions, financial institutions and government bodies interact through the exchange of skills, knowledge and ideas”. The analysis of innovation models highlights the role of networking models, particularly in terms of extending these models toward an open innovation approach. The hypothesis according to which innovation is a distributed process, mobilizing different actors who must interact in order for the process to be sustainable, leads to the representation of a generalized ecosystem at the European level, which goes beyond that of national innovation systems. Within this ecosystem, actors are considered as sources and receivers of flows. Innovations are produced by companies (small and medium-sized companies, start-ups and big businesses) which benefit from financial and knowledge flows, notably those emitted by research and technology organizations, working under contract for big businesses.

However, this representation of Europe as a global innovation ecosystem raises certain questions. The design and implementation of policies affecting training, the quality of the economic environment and knowledge production and dissemination requires a high level of interconnection between different decision levels – European, national, regional and local – if only because innovation policies need to be adapted to national and local contexts in order to be fully effective.

Considering the case of a European research and innovation zone, there is no single solution suitable for adaptation to all of the countries involved. To attain a federal dimension, there is a need to develop research agendas in connection with problems considered to be essential and to support community research programs. This is the aim of the Flagship Initiative Innovation Union, which identified major lines for innovation support within the Europe 2020 Strategy. Given the fragmented nature of European economies, the document invited member states to reform their research and innovation systems so as to “enable interoperability at the European level”. This would be no mean feat.

We also need to address the operation of this generalized ecosystem, and its potential for articulation with a configuration of industries or activities in a cluster form. Nothing prevents us from considering that this “meta-ecosystem” might be broken down into ecosystems specific to industries, connected by complementarity flows, and to the groups of companies involved. A factor for homogenization can notably be found in the existence of strong connections between clusters, reinforcing competitiveness. As Malmberg notes [MAL 03a], empirical research indicates that “there tend to be modest commercial relations between firms within spatial clusters” and that “other types of collaboration are more common locally, but such relations extend well beyond the borders of narrowly defined regions” [MOL 03a, p. 153]. This is explained by the fact that commercial transactions (input/output) and formal collaborations tend to follow the organization of the value chain and to become increasingly global.

However, the articulation between these two levels of analysis raises two questions. First, component ecosystems must be assigned objectives, which, if not shared, need to be compatible within the context of a broader ecosystem, for example, increasing regional GDP per capita or producing goods or services for the global market (and, implicitly, increasing competitiveness), or relate to a level above and beyond GDP, including economic, social and environmental aspects4. The ultimate aim is to develop a positive culture of innovation, articulating the research and innovation processes with the values, cultural attitudes and expectations of European societies. This can be seen in the direction taken by the European research project, which first introduced the concept of RRI, responsible research and innovation [REI 16].

It is important to note that European societies have a somewhat mixed attitude to innovation. In the case of France (and of certain other countries), we find “a truly schizophrenic vision of innovation, which values the production of new knowledge without wishing to profit from its applications. Innovation is not seen as the transformation of ways of thinking and acting, with consequences, which inevitably lead to de-classification of products, processes and a necessary re-assignment of skills to sources of creativity. It is, above all, seen as a process of growth and preservation, taking the form of scientific progress supported by public R&D spending, and the creation of knowledge-intensive jobs, which validate the country’s areas of excellence” [GUI 13].

Second, we need to consider the factors involved in the emergence of component ecosystems. Is it better to prioritize entrepreneurial initiatives, following a smart specialization approach, or to count on the motivating power of public authorities? Once again, clear fault-lines are apparent across Europe. These questions will be considered in greater detail in the third part of this chapter.

5.2. The Cambridge science and technology cluster

There are two reasons for our choice of this cluster. First, the growth pathways of the economies in question are particularly interesting. The technological wave centering on ICT (particularly on the Internet) and its diffusion has resulted in a shift in the center of gravity of industrial economies, producing changes in the order of priority for productive resources with the transition toward a knowledge-based economy. The turning point occurred during the 1980s, marking the end of the mass production paradigm based on a Fordist mode of organization. While remaining progressive, this shift indicated that the immaterial or intangible assets of an economy (human capital, R&D expenditure, patents, the organizational capital of enterprises, etc.) play a non-negligible role in the operation and dynamics of a new growth regime. Specifically, we observe a modification in economic skills:

“The technology and product innovations are now market-facing systems that are complicated and have to be designed and managed in a way that reflects the essential differences between machines and products, on one hand, and people and services, on the other. Technology is being applied to help people performing services do them better, which involves complicated emergent applications and systems, rather than well-behaved deterministic machines that do what people tell them to do. Part of this transition involves a world in which, increasingly, much what is needed to make progress is intangible in nature” [MAC 09, p. 11].

A fault line thus appears between the material basis of an economy (the production of goods and services, through processes which make intensive use of technical capital) and the immaterial basis of the same economy, focused on applications, services and the transformation of economic and social practices.

The knowledge stock of advanced economies is “enriched by the successive contributions made by economic and social actors, in either a formal manner (in the form of statements) or an informal manner (knowledge, cooperation, communication skills, etc.). Inter-organizational relations notably allow firms to access external knowledge, which may be combined with knowledge modules created in-house” [GUI 12, p. 18-19]. Certain organizations play a key role in the process of creating and transmitting knowledge to other economic agents. These organizations are notably to be found within the service sector; the contributions of this sector to innovation are analyzed, here, within the framework of an ecosystem made up of companies providing R&D services to other organizations under contract. Firms which provide intellectual services with high added values are referred to as Knowledge-Intensive Business Services Firms (KIBSF) [GUI 04].

The purpose of KIBS is to create, accumulate and sell knowledge, providing:

  • – intangible products, sources of information and knowledge for users (such as databases);
  • – services for the management of certain environments in which the company operates – for example, legal, fiscal and financial or social services;
  • – services in the form of intermediary technological inputs, allowing users to process information (in the case of ICT services) and/or to create knowledge (R&D services).

These activities include R&D, design, technical engineering, ICT services, training in new technologies, software and more “traditional” services such as marketing and PR, legal services and accounting.

Second, our analysis is based on a slightly different approach to that used for American clusters. Rather than considering the operation of innovative clusters, this case study focuses on an earlier stage in the innovation chain. More precisely, it concerns the provision of intermediate services to companies with innovative aims. The Cambridge science and technology cluster is currently considered as one of the best examples of entrepreneurial activity springing up around a major European university. The study’s authors [PRO 11] also aimed to balance the analysis of cluster development; previous examples had concentrated on financial aspects, notably the role of venture capital in business creation. The influence of R&D service providers, in contrast, was significantly under-estimated. This case study highlights the extent of their contribution in structuring and extending innovation ecosystems.

5.2.1. Knowledge-intensive services and innovation

KIBSFs are consulting firms, brought in to solve a problem by providing (i) a knowledge-intensive service and (ii) strong interactions with the client business. However, the notion of knowledge-intensive services needs to be more precisely defined. In the case of the services mentioned above, particularly R&D services, knowledge transfer requires modes of knowledge treatment and creation, which specifically concern the form or structure of knowledge. The relationship between KIBSFs and their client companies is illustrated in Figure 5.1.

image

Figure 5.1. Relationship between knowledge producers and users

(source: [MUL 01, p. 1504])

The authors break the relationship down into three stages: the acquisition of tacit or codified knowledge, knowledge recombination within KIBSFs (knowledge generated by interactions with clients is combined with existing knowledge, permitting the creation of new knowledge) and knowledge transmission to client firms. Knowledge creation is based on interactions between the supplier and the client, and this representation is thus perfectly suited to R&D services. External knowledge can only be appropriated by firms, enriching their knowledge bases, through long-term processes of interaction and information exchange, articulating the provision of complementary input with highly localized skills and knowledge.

It is important to note that the codification which underpins this schema is a complex operation, involving high fixed costs in connection with information technologies and with the processes required to create messages, build models and develop languages (concepts and vocabulary) [COW 96].

“Codification has consequences, notably the reduction of the costs involved in knowledge acquisition, reducing informational asymmetry, modifying spatial organization, and examining the division of labor. The cited authors note that knowledge appears to follow a general law of evolution, passing from a tacit form to a more systematic form which may be transmitted at lower cost. In this context, all knowledge can potentially be codified and thus transferred (producing externalities). Restrictions do not relate to the intrinsic transferability of intellectual assets (the complexity of knowledge), but rather to the fact that only economic agents in possession of the appropriate code have the ability to extract value from codified intellectual assets” [GUI 04, p. 67].

There are therefore certain hindrances to the use of codified knowledge, which must, among other things, be adequate. The innovation process is highly complex and uncertain. The results of R&D may, even after codification, be difficult to interpret and hard for a company to use. The codification of knowledge is only one of the elements involved in conditioning its transmission; the beneficiary’s capacity for absorption, assessed in terms of “necessary institutional support”, is also crucial [JOH 02].

A study carried out between 1995 and 1997 involved empirical investigations of interactions between KIBSFs and small to medium-sized companies in five regions (Alsace, Gironde, Baden, Lower Saxony and Saxony) [MUL 01]. The total sample featured 1,903 small-to-medium manufacturing businesses and 1,144 KIBSFs. Of them, 1,393 companies indicated that they had made innovations in terms of products or processes over the course of the three preceding years. Of this total, 543 small-to-medium businesses and 493 KIBSFs innovated simultaneously and underwent growth during the same period.

Client firms were active in the food and farming industry (9.1%), textiles (7.8%), wood and paper (16.3%), chemical (17.1%), machinery and equipment (17.4%) and electrical equipment sectors (13.8%). The investigation raised three significant points:

  • – interactions between producers and users have a stimulating effect on the innovation capacities of small-to-medium businesses: 76.6% of the businesses working with KIBSFs introduced innovations during the period in question, compared to 60% for those working without KIBSF support;
  • – firms operating in connection with KIBSFs had a higher rate of cooperation with “technological infrastructure institutions” [MUL 01, p. 1509], that is, universities and research centers. Existing interactions thus resulted in a lowering of “the cooperation barrier” between companies and institutions. KIBSFs act directly on small-to-medium companies and indirectly by promoting relationships with non-industrial organizations;
  • – the final result confirms the role of the interaction process: 73.1% of KIBSFs could be seen to have contributed to innovations made by their client firms, while also innovating within their own structures.

From this perspective, KIBSFs strongly contribute to productivity in their sectors of activity. These service providers are considered to be the most innovative actors; moreover, the knowledge they produce has a wider and, to a certain extent, systemic impact [PRO 11]. This is due, first, to their operational position, at the frontline of innovative practices. Second, they assist in the “translation” of ideas and concepts produced by fundamental research into practical and marketable knowledge, which may then be used by other companies [TET 08].

Overall, the role played by KIBSFs, both in producing services and as interface agents, is significant. This provides elements of a response to Arrow’s question regarding the ways in which a firm may become more efficient in acquiring information [ARR 84, p. 145], given that the dispersion of knowledge modules may increase coordination costs for the firm using them. In essence, the grouping of specialized service providers within an organized ecosystem can lead to gains in efficiency and real savings.

Furthermore, a number of research projects have shown that KIBSFs have a high propensity to geographic concentration, notably around big cities. These companies form a network structure, with the smallest entities found at the local level. However, “high-tech KIBS show a regional commitment in that they are often created as spin-offs of enterprises already operating in the area. Moreover, the social ties of the entrepreneurs to their home district are strong in all kinds of KIBS”. [TOI 04, p. 100]. Finally, as Probert et al. indicated, the spillovers from the interactions described contribute strongly to the reinforcement of regional capacities. The co-localization of users, the availability of complementary resources, notably human capital, and pre-established collaborations are important in determining the demand for knowledge-intensive services.

5.2.2. The Cambridge cluster: structure and development5

The Cambridge science and technology cluster is one of the biggest in Europe. High-tech activity represented 14.5% of total jobs in Cambridgeshire in 2006, reaching 25.4% for the South Cambridgeshire area. From the outset, the companies involved adopted a business model on the basis of contractual provision of R&D services rather than standard product development.

The authors identified KIBSFs and connected companies operating in the region for more than 30 years6. The sample featured 10 consulting companies specializing in technological development, with a turnover depending almost exclusively on the provision of services to other firms. The four largest companies within the sample were Cambridge Consultants (CC), PA Technology Centre, TTP Group and Sagentia. Their clients were distributed across several countries, with markets in existence for more than 20 years, and more than 50 years in the case of CC. The latter, founded in the early 1960s by graduates from the University of Cambridge, “can be regarded as the origin of this type of business in the Cambridge area” [PRO 11, p. 11]. These four companies employ more than 300 people, and the other six have approximately 100 employees each.

5.2.2.1. Key characteristics of the cluster

The most significant aspects of the growth and operation of this ecosystem include:

  1. 1) Contribution to innovations made by client companies requires the firms to manage uncertainty. The central capability of KIBSFs lies in providing expertise to create a new product using “novel, high-risk technologies”, even when the market demand is poorly defined.
  2. 2) The highly specific characteristics of services mean that scale economies are difficult to achieve. Porter, analyzing the conditions of demand, noted that the sophistication of this demand is more important than the size of the market. In order to supply these services, KIBSFs have adopted a non-hierarchical form of organization on the basis of collaboration, team working and multi-disciplinary approaches. High-level human capital is made up of experienced senior staff and junior staff with backgrounds in scientific disciplines (physics, biology, mechanics, electronics and software engineering). Projects are handled by multi-disciplinary teams, and staff need to be highly mobile. The flow of contracts modifies resource allocation, enabling both the development of new technologies and rapid response to market needs. The ecosystem is dependent on the rhythm of growth and particularly on the changes in demand.

    Once the developed technologies have diffused into the field of application to the point where suppliers have entered the market, KIBSFs re-orient their activities toward other applications, recomposing project teams. The cornerstone of this system is the existence of “a pure market in skills” [PRO 11, p. 16] based on the high professional mobility of junior staff, who develop their skills through systematic learning of sales techniques, project leadership and team management. In this context, networks develop around project managers, who seek individuals with technological skills, and these individuals themselves, who possess the relevant knowledge and aim to identify project managers who might employ them.

  3. 3) Under these influences, the innovation ecosystem becomes increasingly dense. Companies can split and develop a whole range of internal activities. In other cases, new firms are created through a spin-off process. In cases where a technological domain is abandoned, this creates an opportunity for qualified personnel to find their own spin-off company, aiming to create a product from their accumulated experience. The authors cite the example of a reduction in demand for semiconductor design projects as the sector reached technical maturity; this development resulted in the creation of Cambridge Silicon Radio as a spin-off of CC;
  4. 4) Project-based organizations offer the ideal context for progressive accumulation of skills, combined with market intelligence. Market intelligence enables the company not only to focus its effort on domains likely to result in new contracts, but also to participate in avoiding strategically irrelevant design decisions. The specificity of this ecosystem lies in close relationships between producers and users (demand is an input for production). This proximity “enables exploratory development, where new ideas, techniques and solutions are tried out in a relatively risk-free manner for both sides” [PRO 11, p. 17].
  5. 5) The legitimization process comes into play when companies are involved in new projects, which expand the marketplace. As their credibility and reputation grow, companies take on increasingly complex projects, and opportunities also increase due to frequent and repeated contact with users. KIBSFs diversify their activities, developing technologies for an application then considering the possibilities for other applications of these technologies. It is important to note that sophisticated R&D technologies (computational capacity, digital simulation, 3D) “replace empirical approaches centered on learning by doing with deductive modes of problem solving, which give rise to theoretical models, principles, algorithms and so on. However, the process also results in the translation of knowledge into more general categories (or formats), removing its idiosyncratic character. When the problems in question involve fundamental knowledge (chemistry, pharmacology, etc.), concern the potential for combining technologies (materials) or relate to the development of process architectures (engineering etc.), technology producers have an incentive for increased de-contextualization, featuring the extraction of general principles, which may be used in different applications” [GUI 04, p. 73–74].
  6. 6) The ecosystem in question becomes denser when KIBSFs adopt relative specialization strategies. This notion means that knowledge producers also become industrial producers. A case study of TTP showed that in responding to demand from pharmaceutical companies, TTP engineers obtained the knowledge required to manufacture a final product. As the client firms did not have the capacity to manufacture this product themselves, TTP also took over the production element, acting as a sort of industrial sub-contractor.

5.2.2.2. Cluster operations

KIBSFs play an essential role via their direct and indirect influence over technological change. They make a significant contribution to job creation, if we consider both the direct employment of skilled personnel (engineers and scientists) and the number of jobs created in spin-off companies. Some of these new companies became considerably larger than their parent firms in just a few years. The four main companies in the study (CC, TTP, PA Technology and Sagentia) have produced tens of other companies, the largest of which employ more than 5,000 people. The main spin-offs of CC alone directly employ more than 3,500 staff.

The contribution of KIBSFs is not measured in terms of job creation alone. It can also be measured in terms of the added value produced by concepts, ideas and product architectures incorporated into final production by client enterprises, although this is difficult to quantify.

Furthermore, the study’s authors note that KIBSFs contribute to reinforcing social capital in a region in two main ways. First, they create a pool of competent companies and experienced managers. Second, they attract venture capital funds, which put down roots in the area to support business creation projects linked to the extension of the ecosystem. The largest service providers have created their own venture capital funds, accompanied by business angels who act at a very early stage in the creation process.

Finally, KIBSFs have structured and dynamized the labor market by attracting skilled personnel and “creating a virtuous circle around entrepreneurial activity” [PRO 11, p. 26].

Relationships between KIBSFs and academia are less significant than we might think. The University of Cambridge was, clearly, behind the emergence of this cluster; the decision to create a science park and an innovation center enabled researchers to pursue the development of their innovations. However, the university has contributed very limited resources to companies. It produces a steady flow of science and technology graduates, but few of these graduates go on to take up posts locally. The labor market is based mostly on recruitment from outside the region. This may appear to be an anomaly, but can be explained by re-considering the causal mechanism generally associated with spillover theory [CAS 13]. Technological knowledge is likely to flow from universities toward the regional environment when there is a sufficiently structured network of contacts between academics, on the one hand, and the engineers and scientists working for the companies in question, on the other, orienting knowledge flows from institutions toward application sites. The implication of university laboratories within company research structures would increase research capacities and further the practice of open science.

Finally, while the Cambridge cluster may be considered as a success, the model in question cannot realistically be generalized; it is far from being “applicable in every industrial sector, innovation cluster or innovation system” [PRO 11, p. 30]. The nature of the cluster is eminently specific. The growth of entrepreneurial firms is based on private R&D contracts, that is, on national and international demand, which varies widely in both volume and composition. Furthermore, the creation of companies independently of the university, and its knowledge transfer office raises questions as to the strong articulation of all components within an ecosystem. From a cluster analysis perspective, we once again see that the motor for growth is dependent on the behavior of the principal anchor tenant or tenants, that is, the most important R&D service providers.

5.3. The foundations of cluster policy

In this section, we shall focus on two main points: the analysis of policy content, with the lessons to be learned from this content, and the trend toward strategies of smart specialization.

5.3.1. Content and contribution of cluster policies

These policies focus on three main aspects: targets, the choice of tools and levels of intervention [COM 13, p. 23 ff].

The main focus is “on improving the competitiveness and economic performance of a specific cluster or group of clusters as a regional agglomeration of economic activities” [COM 13, p. 24]. The chosen criteria include vitality, assessed in terms of market performance, and importance within a regional economy from a perspective of employment and economic activity. Not all clusters necessarily satisfy these criteria, and the future potential of emerging clusters is taken into account. Possible interventions target either specific actors or cluster categories (such as R&D intensive clusters).

The tools which may be used are classified into three categories:

  • – funding for platforms or CIs organizations;
  • – support for collaborative actions;
  • – upgrading the business environment of a cluster by funding the creation of a research institute or a workforce development program.

Actions may be carried out from a variety of levels. Local, regional, national and EU authorities have developed specific programs. There is a significant variation in levels of expertise and skills between countries, according to their degree of decentralization, the nature of political decisions and the capacity for intervention at different levels. Actions carried out in Europe highlight the main dimensions of these policies:

  • – regional interventions prioritize employment levels and value creation in established clusters, without neglecting emerging clusters;
  • – national programs, designed to support the efforts of regional clusters, have a more selective and better-defined character and may be oriented toward strategic activities (innovation) or actors (such as smaller businesses);
  • – actions in support of national programs follow selection and funding criteria (as in the case of competitiveness poles)
  • – support programs aim to create ad hoc structures with the purpose of providing tools and technical instruments for use by cluster organizations;
  • – programs targeting specific sectors or networks do not have a specific geographic dimension. They are not centered on clusters, but may involve clusters as partners.

The analysis of these policies is puzzling. The existence of economic gains, in the form of higher than average salaries, employment levels or increased exports, is undeniable. These variables are generally assessed at the regional level, with the hypothesis that clusters are associated with these results. Furthermore, the overarching architecture does not appear to correspond to a well-defined guiding principle. The number and variety of targets and eligibility criteria, along with the presence of multiple levels of decision, limits the intelligibility and effectiveness of interventions.

This raises a number of questions. What level of flexibility is permissible with regard to unsatisfied criteria? How can we evaluate the emergence potential of a cluster? Do the productive asymmetries within the European space affect the possibilities for action at EU level? How can national efforts, which are fragmentary by their very nature, be harmonized in order to avoid duplication and wasting public resources? Have existing policies led to more efficient allocation of productive resources (human capital, research infrastructures, the provision of innovation-specific services) and increased regional integration in Europe?

Policies often refer to improving the cluster business environment, but the notion of a business environment itself remains fuzzy. It may be considered as a useful umbrella term, used to cover a highly varied set of factors, in which case it is difficult to see what types of actions could be taken to modify it. Furthermore, competitiveness, seen in terms of performance or as a result, is simply a symptom, not the root of the problem. “Put differently, improving an outcome such as competitiveness cannot be a sufficient justification for a policy” [DUR 11, p. 6]. We need to identify the mechanisms which lead to increased competitiveness and which may serve as anchor points for public policies, which would thus become specific to each ecosystem.

Horizontal policies, targeting sectors or sub-sectors, indistinctly target a number of clusters. The eligibility criteria used are debatable. There is a risk of creating modes of access to public resources, notably at EU level, involving a form of implicit “subscription desk”. This situation involves a “sunk cost bias” or “sunk cost fallacy”, which expresses the tendency of [decision makers]7 to continue with a project following every initial outlay of resources in terms of effort, funding or time [WOR 15]. These rigidification factors are strengthened by pressure from national political lobbies. However, project cancellation may entail the recognition that effort and resources have been wasted. Many examples of EU policies show an unambiguous, progressive engagement to a “failing course of action” [WOR 15, p. 185]. The European Commission itself recognizes that “if public funding is sustained even when performance benchmarks related to real market success are not met, this creates waste and distorts competition” [COM 13, p. 26].

This general view is shared by many authors, who put forward other arguments:

“Cluster policies at regional level are likely even to accentuate strongly mimetic programs of local and national industrial development – resulting in fostering knowledge base standardization, wasteful duplication and the dissipation of the potential agglomeration economies at system level – as a multiplicity of imitative local government authorities compete to attract the small finite pool of mobile capital, management and knowledge resources. The resulting duplication, unproductive uniformity and lack of imagination and vision in setting R&D and cluster priorities can be expected to produce poor results at the EU level; with most regions remaining unattractive and unable to compete with other territories to attract high value resources and to retain their best resources” [FOR 13, p. 14].

These remarks illustrate the need to look for other foundations for cluster policies.

5.3.2. A new approach based on the smart specialization strategy8

Our aim in this section is to provide a broad outline of smart specialization strategy (S3) and to analyze the ways in which it may be used to renew the foundations of cluster policies in Europe.

5.3.2.1. Challenges involved in S3

The first “pillar” involved in S3 is that of specialization: “even in the information age, the logic of specialization is intact” [FOR 13, p. 5]. This is structured around notions of scale, scope and spillovers from knowledge linked to R&D and innovation activities. More precisely, the approach is built upon the role played by scientific, technological and economic specialization processes in the extension of comparative advantages and in the impetus given to economic growth. The idea of specialization in R&D stems directly from Arrow’s axiomatics [ARR 84]. Knowledge production is subject to indivisibilities, and resources should therefore be concentrated on a small number of points of application (focusing devices).

The technical indivisibility of R&D is linked to the fixed costs of equipment and infrastructure. We also find forms of organizational indivisibility, expressing the fact that knowledge production takes the form of a collective activity oriented toward the creation of specific resources. This analysis is further strengthened by the nature of the output: the same elements of knowledge are not produced on a large scale, and there are no scale economies to be made, but once it has been rendered, both abstract and general, an element of scientific knowledge may be applied to different contexts. It is thus possible to speak of division of labor in knowledge production, concentrating on the potential applications of a fundamental element of knowledge created elsewhere.

The choice of specialization thus obliges most private and public actors to identify domains in which they have or may develop comparative advantages, and which may be developed by exploiting new opportunities and markets.

The second pillar of S3 involves a more vertical logic of public intervention, distinct from the indiscriminate horizontal policies used in the past. Vertical priorities relate to technologies, domains and activities. They require the choice of technologies and of the firms or groups of firms with the capacity to implement them, alongside the identification of new opportunities and markets. They also require us to consider the activities that may result from these new technologies, that is, potential applications.

It is important to note that the notions of domain, application and field of application of a technology have been clearly defined in the case of General Purpose Technologies, or GPTs (ICT, nanotech, biotech, bio-computing and AI). The field of application of a technology covers the usages that become possible when the technology is incorporated into a product or service. The extension of applications shifts the boundaries of possibilities for innovation when entrepreneurs are involved in the co-invention of applications, increasing the variety of initial production.

The third pillar relates to attribution sharing. The process does not involve a top-down approach, activated by a planner and guided by industrial priorities, ignoring the knowledge that entrepreneurs may bring to the table. For the cited authors, this category includes company founders, innovators within existing companies and inventors from the academic sphere and research institutions. Their knowledge is synonymous with invention and innovation, in that an entrepreneur may be the only person to envisage a specific element. The productive opportunity relating to a new application is therefore merely a subjective and cognitive category, only existing in the mind of the project leader. Following this line of reasoning, “entrepreneurial activity …. must be extraordinary, idiosyncratic, unusual and/or peculiar” [JAC 05]. Entrepreneurs exhibit different behaviors, linked to the nature of their project, their intended position in the value chain and the constraints under which they operate; the common denominator of entrepreneurial situations is found in “the difficulty of convincing the rest of the world that the entrepreneurial vision is correct” [JAC 05, p. 3]. Other entrepreneurs need to be persuaded to reinforce the initial effort by triggering a sequence of inputs through imitation: the first stage in a cluster-grouping process.

S3 is based on a discovery or entrepreneurial discovery process. This provides the starting point for an interactive process in which entrepreneurs detect market opportunities on the basis of new technological applications and produce information. Public authorities evaluate this potential and motivate actors with the capacity to actualize them. According to Foray, “Priorities will be identified where and when opportunities are discovered by entrepreneurs”.

The process is triggered by the market; however, in this case, the meaning of “market” has changed, becoming a locus for knowledge creation and learning from mistakes (Foray speaks of a process of trial and error); it is no longer simply a mechanism for resource allocation within a static efficiency framework. Coordination mechanisms are created both from information held by entrepreneurs concerning possible opportunities and in relation to the need to acquire new knowledge, particularly in R&D. Entrepreneurs create imbalances, revealing needs in terms of training and research, which public authorities then attempt to satisfy. The market-centered dynamic allows us to understand the emergence of novelty and to promote knowledge-based growth: new market opportunities image new technological applications image new requirements in R&D and innovation image new products and services obtained through diversification.

Events which entrepreneurs consider to be meaningful lead them to acquire and extend new knowledge, which then serves to nuance developments. These actors possess instrumental – that is, scientific and technological – knowledge, alongside knowledge relating to management or to new organizational principles. They also have interpretative knowledge, which helps them to define situations, establish representations and give meaning to future productive activity. Interpretative knowledge is also important for public decision makers, particularly in defining possible activities.

The fourth pillar of S3 is public funding in support of entrepreneurial activities. Financial resources are directed toward spaces, which do not have the necessary mastery of fundamental knowledge. They do not target companies or sectors, but rather the launch and growth of new activities. Foray gives the example of the application of nano-composites to the wood pulp and paper industry in Finland: the identified target was not the sector, but “the activity involving the development of nanotech applications for the pulp and paper industry” [JAC 05, p. 6]. Finally, the aim is to promote entrepreneurial attitudes with the capacity to create complementarity on four different levels:

  • – in terms of innovation between a technological application and a traditional sector;
  • – between newly created businesses and the existing structures of production;
  • – along the value chain, between the new company and the possible arrival of suppliers and distributors;
  • – between horizontal and vertical policies. Coordination is needed in the horizontal organization of complementary activities and in assigning public funding accordingly. However, this also requires the definition of shared objectives, which are compatible with entrepreneurial initiatives, the creation of public–private partnerships and regional and inter-regional development strategies9.

S3 is intended to trigger structural change within a regional economy. Structural modifications are the result of a diversification process, which may take the form of:

  • – a transition, characterized by the appearance of an emerging domain;
  • – modernization, when new technologies improve the efficiency and quality of existing production;
  • – diversification, in the narrow sense of the term, by increasing synergy between an established activity and a new activity.

These different declinations lead us to distinguish between simple innovations and discoveries, which offer the potential for the development of new activities and new possibilities of specialization. It is thus impossible to define operational limits, that is, the perimeter of complementarity relationships between companies, as innovation extends the field of possibilities and may lead to a structural process of diversification, in the broad sense of the term.

Finally, we must consider the space targeted by S3. For the authors, this space does not take the form of a sector or a region; spatial configuration does not enter into their definition. S3 essentially targets the production of industrial commons (collective R&D, engineering, manufacturing capabilities, etc., to support innovation) within spaces that do not correspond to existing administrative areas. Intangible resources are, by definition, mobile, and knowledge and skills may be transmitted to regions characterized by the rarity of certain factors of production. Furthermore, external resources may assist in the development of new activities and in creating complementary functions, which may be exercised by companies situated up or downstream from those created by local entrepreneurs. The spatial dimension is simply an attribute of an industrial dynamic propelled by new activities.

5.3.2.2. Combining cluster policies with smart specialization strategies

Various research projects have illustrated the possibility of applying S3 to regional spaces [MCC 15]. By increasing the capacity for knowledge creation and learning, this strategy promotes a place-based approach. However, we come up against a fundamental difficulty, as the cluster concept has not been analyzed in theoretical terms by the European Commission. In this context, cluster policies are not calibrated in relation to mechanisms considered to be faulty. Work on this point, notably by Duranton [DUR 11], has shown that the concept is based on three theoretical pillars: a spatial dimension (cluster size, coordination problems, etc.); the structure of production (input–output relationships, labor market, etc.) and the mobility of goods, services, labor and knowledge (hypothesis of perfect mobility of firms and skilled labor).

However, approaching clusters as factual entities rather than from a theoretical perspective, the combination of these two approaches raises several issues. The entrepreneurial search process is stronger in central regions, due to existing infrastructures and the presence of well-developed social networks. Moreover, the presence of multiple actors and the variety of technological combinations result in a de facto increase in the degree of connectivity between different technological domains, enabling knowledge transfers within these locations and influencing the creation of innovative businesses [COL 16]. Technological variety is higher in the most developed regions, often around major cities, which act as the center for a network of sophisticated production facilities and service provision centers (KIBS), which are themselves linked to centers for innovation and scientific knowledge production [COO 10]. Compared to a cluster policy, which aims to cover multiple territories, there is a risk that peripheral regions may not have the assets needed to promote cluster growth based on S3.

Furthermore, S3 appears to assess entrepreneurial opportunities on the basis of existing production assets and the innovative impetus of those responsible for exploring opportunities. In the analysis provided, the weight of “historical factors of change” is not really taken into account in the processes of “cumulative causation”, in “the technological and organizational antecedents of economic activity” [WIN 16]10. This perspective is rarely encountered in the available texts, despite the fact that historical factors, according to Winter, condition the cumulative generation of opportunities. They are “in large part extra-economic” and connect the actions of entrepreneurs with the contemporary historic and social context [WIN 16, p. 31].

The mobility of human capital also constitutes a potential stumbling block. In cases where public decision makers are able to detect and evaluate market opportunities in connection with new technological opportunities, there is no guarantee of balance in supply and demand in the medium to long term. The development of human capital, through training programs and learning processes, creates new opportunities for employment and thus increases the mobility of labor between regions. There is therefore a risk that any gains made by a location by attracting intangible resources from outside the region will be lost again, following a migration of skilled labor toward knowledge-intensive sites. Spending on training may be linked to under-investment in knowledge assets between different innovation ecosystems, leading to a lose–lose situation. Those clusters which are net exporters of human capital, in terms of the sums invested and lost in the process, tend to invest less in training and learning, and the clusters that benefit from the movement tend to act in the same way, relying on investments made by other ecosystems. The logic of attracting skills and of intellectual expatriation of qualified staff may work against S3 and prevent the achievement of its target, that is, structural change. In Chapter 1, we noted a number of possible asymmetries between dynamic clusters and “feeder clusters”, which act as pools of qualified labor. The same remark may be applied to ecosystems based on S3.

Moreover, no consideration is given to macro-economic constraints within Europe with the potential to affect the entry and agglomeration processes generated by entrepreneurial discoveries. From the moment the Euro was adopted as a single currency, the removal of risks associated with exchange rates resulted in a reconfiguration of the productive specialization of different countries, accelerating the de-industrialization process in certain regions [ART 11]. According to these authors, the simultaneous effects of multiple constraints (fixed parities followed by valuation of the euro against the dollar, globalization of companies, the restrictive monetary policy of the ECB11) pushed European countries “to exploit their comparative advantages, develop very different productive specializations and implant their activities in areas of maximum efficiency, with no risk of their efforts being undermined by variations in the exchange rate, interest rate or inflation…” [ART 11, p. 70].

The productive specialization triggered by the single currency may accentuate the divergence of economic trajectories and hinder the arrival of extra-regional resources in an emerging cluster. The northern EU member states were able to strengthen their traditional comparative advantages in industry and to increase them through exportable services, notably knowledge-intensive services. The south of the EU, on the contrary, prioritized non-exportable services and construction. France and Italy swung worryingly between the two poles, without ever reaching either extremities. In this case, the technological applications of General Purpose Technologies to industries, even traditional industries, have a stronger chance of emerging in regions where knowledge assets and the spillovers they generate have already reached a certain level of intensity. The homogenization/differentiation dialectic may thus be expressed in full. The homogenous space resulting from monetary unification increases the heterogeneity of productive structures, which may lead to a reinforcement of clusters in the most developed regions or put a stop to the growth process in regions with few competitive advantages.

Finally, the adoption of S3 involves demanding conditions in terms of public policy. The detection and evaluation of opportunities uncovered by entrepreneurs and the definition of vertical R&D and innovation policies, intended to accelerate structural changes, requires a high level of coordination between local, regional, inter-regional and EU authorities. If this requirement is satisfied, then “smart specialization offers a tool kit of policy interventions to address coordination and market failures at regional level while mobilizing general purpose technologies to help scale up activities or accelerate the transformation and modernization of economic activities in clusters” [OCD 13, p. 21]. In our opinion, the major strength of S3 is that it attracts attention to continuing “more of the same” type behaviors, which consist of increasing the modest funding assigned to research budgets and often involve duplication of financial efforts.

5.4. Conclusion

The developments presented in this chapter highlight the specificity of European clusters. The fragmentation of European economies, the number and variety of ecosystems, the multiplicity of implemented policies and the accrual of different levels of decision make it difficult to analyze clusters, which, moreover, are not all focused on innovation. However, with the available statistics, it is not possible to isolate only innovative clusters within the sample.

Despite these reservations, we began by presenting a framework for the analysis of European clusters, considering the possibilities of implementation within a generalized innovation ecosystem at European level. We then described the main features highlighted by a study of the Cambridge science and technology cluster, which is particularly interesting in two respects, as mentioned in Chapter 1: first, in terms of the weight of the anchor tenants, and second, in terms of the decomposition of stages in the chain of innovative practice, where a distinction is made between the formulation of R&D problems (requiring knowledge recombination by KIBSFs) and the solving of problems, requiring close interactions between the producers and users of knowledge.

Paradoxically, the operation of this cluster highlights the minor role played by university institutions, at least in recent years. Finally, we identified the foundations of cluster policies, stressing the multiplicity of levels of decision-making and the contradictions they may generate. One possibility for reconfiguration is found in S3. The reservations that we have expressed, notably in terms of the difficulties of realization and the need for coordination, are not intended to mask the promising nature of S3 for increasing the efficiency of policies designed to promote innovation and production ecosystems.

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