chapter 4
What is Organizational Politics?
Few topics generate as much heat and passionate feelings as a discussion of political behavior. Most organizational personnel are quick to condemn politics and their chief practitioners—company “politicians”—as predatory and counter to the interests of the organization. In fact, it is generally impossible to find individuals with even minimal organizational experience who have not had some bad experiences with office politics during their careers. In spite of most managers’ familiarity and experiences with organizational politics, surprisingly little is known about the concept and its true impact on individuals within organizations.
One of the areas where politics is better understood—particularly its impact—is in the process of developing and implementing projects in organizations. A phenomenal amount of anecdotal and case study information exists that strongly reinforces the importance of understanding and effectively utilizing organizational politics as a tool in successful project implementation. Indeed, without an understanding of the role that power and politics plays in project management, the likelihood of managing the successful development of a project will be significantly diminished.
This chapter examines, in some detail, the bases of a project manager's personal power and the concept of organizational politics from the project management perspective, developing some of the more well-acknowledged themes that pervade the topic. No matter what definition of politics the reader uses, the end result is that political behavior is used as a method for dealing with basic organizational conflict. Unfortunately, while the practice of politics is often used to deal with conflict, the irony is that political behavior itself usually becomes a contributing cause of additional organizational conflict [1]. This chapter also presents a comprehensive overview of the power bases of project managers as well as a political framework for organizations, demonstrating the inherent nature of conflict in attempting to implement projects despite of a variety of project stakeholders. The chapter ends with suggestions to project managers on how to effectively operate within the political arena of organizations, not to achieve predatory and self-serving ends, but in an effort to smooth the process by which their systems are adopted.
Power and the Project Manager
An additional discussion of power is warranted here because it is important to understand how power relates to the subsequent exercise of politics. When one examines the options that project managers are able to use in furthering their goals—the successful development of projects—it is both useful and instructive to consider their alternatives in terms of three modes of power: authority, status, and influence. This authority, status, and influence model was proposed by Robert Graham [2] as a way to make clear the methods by which project managers can achieve their desired ends. The model is valuable because it illustrates one of the key problems most project managers have in attempting to develop and implement their projects in corporations.
Authority is the type of power that accrues from the position occupied in the organization—positional power. In effect, if one individual sits higher on the organizational chart than another member of the project team, that person has some degree of positional power over the other. The nature of positional power, however, is extremely problematic within project management situations due to the temporary and “detached” nature of most projects vis-à-vis the rest of the formal organizational structure [3]. Project teams sit “outside” the normal vertical hierarchy, usually employing personnel on loan from functional departments. As a result, project managers have a much more tenuous degree of positional power within the organization. Other than nominal control over their own team, they do not have a corporate-wide base of positional power through which they can get resources, issue directives, or enforce their will. In most organizations authority as a power base cannot be relied upon with any degree of certainty.
Likewise, the second mode of power, status, is often problematic for project managers. Status implies the project manager, due to the nature, importance, or visibility of his or her project, can exert power and control over others in the corporate hierarchy as needed. And while some projects and project managers do, indeed, possess an enormous degree of status due to the importance of their projects (e.g., the project manager for the Boeing 777 program or the project manager for the recently completed Eurotunnel), the vast majority of project managers toil in relative obscurity, working to bring their projects to fruition while receiving little public recognition for their work. Most project managers cannot rely on status as a form of power and control over resources to enhance their project's likelihood of success. Despite obvious exceptions, the reality is very few projects or project managers can depend upon their status as a persuasive form of power.
The project manager's final form of control, influence, is an informal method for gaining compliance [4]. Project managers who use influence in furthering the goals of their project usually work behind the scenes, negotiating, cutting deals, or collecting and offering IOUs [5]. Influence, as a power tactic, is most readily used when managers have no formal positional authority to rely on. Hence, they are forced to use less formal means to achieve their desired ends. Influence is most widely seen as a power tactic in situations in which there is no obvious difference in authority levels among organizational members. To use an example from government, a president who is unsure of his degree of formal power and ability to force his legislative agenda through a recalcitrant Congress is likely to spend a great deal of time making back room deals and negotiating compromises. Dictators have no need to resort to using influence.
What is the implication of the authority, status, and influence model? Graham notes that the nature of project management work, the manner in which project managers and their teams are selected, and the relationship of projects to the formal organizational hierarchy force project managers to rely to a great degree on their ability to cultivate and effectively use influence as a negotiating and power tactic than either of the other two forms of power.
Formal, broad-based authority rarely exists for project managers to use in furthering their project's ends. Likewise, while some projects and/or project managers have the status to gain the resources they need, it is much less likely that the typical project manager, particularly younger members of the organization, will have enough status to affect any sort of change they desire. On the other hand, any project manager can learn to develop the skills to use influence as a power tactic. The key is realizing that influence is a form of corporate political behavior that can be used for the benefit of the project and, ultimately, the organization. To better understand the relationship between the use of informal influence tactics and political behavior, a comprehension of exactly what organizational politics implies is needed.
What is Organization Political Behavior?
Few topics stir up as many sharply voiced opinions and general disagreement as the notion of corporate politics. Writers and researchers usually find that they cannot even agree on a uniform definition of politics, let alone acknowledge the role of politics in organizational life. When one sifts through the material on power and politics, a number of definitions are suggested; each with a varying degree of usefulness. Among the definitions of politics that are currently extant, some important patterns can be discerned which help establish a framework for understanding the concept. For example, one colleague has referred to politics as self-interested behavior with guile. Another definition suggests politics “involves those activities taken within an organization to acquire, develop, and use power to get one's way” [6]. Henry Mintzberg, another well-known researcher in organization theory, suggests politics encompasses modern organizations, referring to “system(s) captured by conflict” [7]. Yet another definition of politics characterizes political behavior as inherently competitive and focused on satisfying self-interests [8]. These and other definitions of the “negative school” generally portray political behavior as essentially malevolent, conflict-laden, self-aggrandizing, and unhealthy. The attitude can be summed up by the following arguments, suggesting that politics is:
Behavior designed to benefit an individual or group at the organization's expense. This idea suggests that political behavior is entirely self-serving, predicated on getting ahead in spite of the possible side effects to the organization as a whole. For example, a manager who continually violates production safety codes in order to increase efficiency and speed of operations may, in the short term, reap the benefits of achieving higher production quotas. However, should workers be injured, due to relaxed safety standards, both the company and the manager could be liable for substantial legal action. The short-term benefits of these acts are usually outweighed by long-term ethical and legal difficulties.
The displacement of legitimate power. “Legitimate” power is defined as the power that accrues to an individual from his or her position within the organization [9]. For example, bosses who rely on the position they occupy as a basis for giving orders are making use of legitimate power. Politics has the capacity to displace legitimate power through machinations designed to circumvent the conventional authority structure of the organization. For example, consider a situation in which a three-person chain of command exists: Sue is at the top, Bob is her subordinate, and Allen is Bob's subordinate. Allen would be exercising a political approach if he habitually found ways to “end run” Bob's authority by going directly to Sue to mediate disagreements, solve problems, or offer advice. Allen could use any of a number of ways to cultivate Sue's help, such as joining the same civic organizations, church, or country club. In an effort to create a personal relationship with Sue, Allen is banking on this relationship as a bulwark against Bob being able to use his legitimate authority. Allen has attempted to displace this authority through political behavior.
The use of means not sanctioned by the organization to attain sanctioned ends, or the use of sanctioned means to obtain unsanctioned ends. This proposition has two elements. First, it suggests political behavior might actually be used in the interests of the organization. This behavior would, however, be widely perceived as unethical or immoral. Recently, the chairman and CEO of Bath Iron Works, a major shipbuilding company with extensive defense department contracts, resigned in disgrace following disclosure he had illegally accepted and made use of photocopied U.S. Department of Defense documents of a sensitive and secret nature which gave his firm an unfair advantage in bidding for new contracts. Obviously, it was in the interests of his company to win those contracts—sanctioned ends. Equally obvious, he violated the law—using unsanctioned means—in gaining this competitive advantage and, following his resignation, his company was forced to pay a substantial fine for his actions.
The second aspect of this proposition suggests that political behavior may involve the use of acceptable means to obtain unacceptable ends. Again, the issue here has to do with the degree to which political actors are willing to “bend” moral or ethical codes in order to gain an advantage. There are many actions an individual or organization can engage in that are legal but may be highly questionable from an ethical perspective. For instance, Johns-Manville Corporation received a great deal of bad press some years ago when, following the ban on the use of asbestos in the United States, it began selling its stockpiles to countries that did not have comprehensive health and welfare policies.
The underlying theme among each of the arguments listed above is the notion that political behavior is, at its core, unhealthy, counter to organizational goals, and essentially predatory. Writers who have taken this view argue with conviction, that the sooner politics is removed from the organizational arena, the better organizations will be in terms of operations and personal relationships.
In recent years, another school of thought has developed to counter the “negative” school. While not denying the potential for abusing the use of politics through self-serving behavior and subsequently damaging organizational relationships, this second school of thought tends to take a more neutral view of the process. This philosophy contends that politics and political activity are a natural part of organizations and must be acknowledged as no different, in essence, than a firm's culture or organizational structure. This argument further suggests that politics can be neither characterized as good nor bad but rather, as natural and, as such, counters previous arguments by suggesting that efforts or calls to eliminate politics are naive. Politics, this school of thought contends, “exists” and must be learned and applied, preferably in a non-aggressive manner [10, 11, 12, 13].
There are six propositions that underscore the neutral or “natural” view of organizational politics. These propositions follow a logical sequence as they develop the argument for understanding the “true” nature of politics.
Proposition 1: Most important decisions in organizations involve the allocation of scarce resources. This statement lays the groundwork under which the context for decision making is established. When decisions need to be made, particularly in the context of group decisions, often they are triggered by some problem or concern. For example, suppose that the operations of a city planning department are fragmented and haphazard. A committee would be tasked with finding ways of reworking operating policies or alternatives for how operations are conducted. The decision they arrive at and, indeed, the decision process itself, is almost always bounded by a number of contingency factors. For example, a short time frame for making the recommendations, a limited operating budget, or the concerns and prerogatives of senior managers may all form a boundary within which the decision must be made. And one of the most compelling boundaries is the scarcity of resources. All organizations, public and private, have limited resources with which to operate. There are limited good jobs to go around. There is only so much money that can be spent. The list is endless. Consequently, any attempts toward arriving at the optimal decision in dealing with a perceived problem are necessarily constrained by the limits of scarce resources.
To take this proposition one step further, not only are virtually all decisions constrained by scarce resources, but the majority of important decisions made within organizations involve, to one degree or another, the allocation or distribution of these scarce resources among a number of competing demands. Departmental budgets are submitted to divide up organizational resources in as equitable and productive a manner as possible. The decision of whether or not to develop and implement a project involves the implicit trade-off between investing in that project and other demands that could be met with the money that was budgeted to initiate the project's development. Consequently, these points give credence to the argument that decision making, particularly important decisions, is in some way bound to the prioritization and distribution of organizational resources.
Proposition 2: The decision process often involves bargaining, negotiating, and jockeying for position. It is likely to come as no surprise that the manner by which many decisions are made is often based less on purely logical decision making processes than on a variety of intervening criteria. Certainly, as James March and Herbert Simon noted over 35 years ago, individuals strive for logic in their decision processes. For a variety of reasons, however, we are often more likely to be influenced by and make use of a variety of extra or additional criteria in arriving at decision choices [14]. One process common within organizations where scarce resources are the rule is to make use of bargaining or negotiation behavior. Bargaining follows one of the most common approaches to dealing with conditions of scarce resources, individuals and department heads make deals or compromises between the variety of competing desires and organizational reality. Since all parties cannot attain everything they seek due to scarce resources, to gain as much advantage as possible, individuals who may be in competitive relationships are forced to compromise or negotiate.
Proposition 3: Organizations are coalitions composed of a variety of self-interested groups. It is important to understand that when we refer to an “organization” it may be a convenient shorthand to use the term in a monolithic sense; that is, that an organization can and will act as a single, purposeful entity. In reality, the term “organization” gives meaning to the truth behind this misperception. In both the public and private arenas, organizations are composed of a variety of groups: labor vs. management, finance vs. marketing, and so forth. These groups, which must be viewed as essentially self-interested, are the sum of what comprises an organization. This proposition will, on the surface, raise some doubts. For example, the notion these groups are basically self-interested implies a willingness to put their own concerns before the legitimate goals and concerns of the organization. Some may object to this characterization as it implies these groups will seek their own objectives even at the expense of what is best for the organization. In reality, while the different interest groups in the organization generally do buy in to the overall corporate goals, they do so to varying degrees and rarely are willing to ascribe to all of the firm's objectives. The reasons for this reluctance to totally subordinate their own desires to corporate-wide objectives are outlined in proposition 4.
Proposition 4: Groups differ in terms of goals, values, attitudes, time frames, etc. In 1967, a landmark research study was conducted by Paul Lawrence and Jay Lorsch [15] that sought to investigate the manner in which roles and attitudes differ among various sub-groups in organizations. They uncovered and introduced a phenomenon they referred to as “organizational differentiation.” The concept of differentiation was used to describe the fact that as individuals enter the organization, joining a functional group such as accounting or marketing, they develop a set of values and objectives that are in accord with that functional group—that is, they begin to ascribe to sub-group values and attitudes rather than strictly organization-wide objectives. The reasons for this phenomenon are obvious: It is in their functional reference group (marketing, finance, R&D, etc.) that individuals are staffed, given task assignments, evaluated, and rewarded. Hence, their allegiance becomes focused on their immediate work group.
The second important finding of Lawrence and Lorsch was that these functional groups usually differ in terms of a number of important criteria: goals, time frames, values, and so forth. To illustrate, consider the situation often found in organizations having separate R&D and marketing departments. Marketing is primarily concerned with making sales to customers; in fact, the reward systems (bonuses, promotions, and incentives) for those who work in marketing departments are usually geared toward sales volume achieved. Given reward systems that value sales volume, it is easy to understand the emphasis marketing personnel place on short-term profitability and “making their numbers.” Compare this value system to that of a typical R&D department where incentives are related to creativity, innovation, and technological development. These activities cannot be regulated in any way that is similar to the approaches used in marketing. Further, the time frames of R&D personnel are often long-term, aimed at achieving technological development. Naturally, the short-term, sales volume goals of marketing not only differ from R&D's long-term focus, but often they actually conflict—that is, in order for marketing personnel to achieve their goals, R&D staff may have to sacrifice theirs.
This is the basic contradiction uncovered by Lawrence and Lorsch that pervades most organizations. Sub-groups within organizations differ due to differences in a variety of criteria: time frames, objectives, attitudes, values, and so forth. The result of this change in goal criteria is why these groups must, to some degree, be characterized as self-interested—feeling most keenly the need to achieve their own departmental objectives first. These differences are important because they shape the types of dynamics that almost always characterize the modern organization.
Proposition 5: Because of scarce resources and enduring differences, conflict is central to organizational life. This proposition forms the underlying rationale behind the political model of organizational life. Because of the essential differences and contradictions that exist within organizations, conflict is not simply a side effect of organizational members’ interaction, it is a natural and self-perpetuating state. Arguments to the effect that conflict must be eliminated from organizations take a simplistic and exceedingly naive view of the manner in which all organizations operate. Rather than focus on conflict elimination, we are better served to acknowledge its inevitability, its impact, and how we can take steps to channel it appropriately.
Proposition 6: Because conflict is inevitable, the use of power and politics becomes a mechanism for resolving conflict situations. Conflict is a natural state within resource-scarce and divergent organizations. Political behavior is an important tool for controlling and resolving conflicts in cost-effective and useful ways. As a result, politics cannot be characterized as malevolent and deviant, but must be seen as a natural consequence of the interaction between organizational sub-systems. This “natural” view of politics refuses to condemn the use of political tactics among organizational members as it views these behaviors as an expected side effect of company life.
Political Tactics
It is important to consider some of the more common political tactics that occur in organizations. These tactics comprise both negative and natural aspects of politics; some are inherently self-serving and predatory, others are aimed at expanding power or influencing decision processes. In either case, the focus is on attempting to gain a measure of power within the organization. The difference usually is in how this power, once acquired, is used by organizational members.
While there are a wide variety of political tactics that are used to varying degrees within organizations [7], we have focused on some of the more well-known activities. Among the common tactics and political behaviors employed are acts to: (1) expand networks and build coalitions, (2) control decision processes, and (3) develop and project expertise. Expanding networks and building coalitions is one of the most common political behaviors seen in organizations. People who understand and use politics well realize the best way to get what they need is to never force an issue to a head; rather, they are much more likely to network with powerful members of the organization who are able to give them their desired objectives.
Politicians have two reasons for avoiding open fights. First, they realize that when an issue comes to a head publicly, it forces them to defend their actions and views publicly. Politicians, as many of us can attest, prefer to remain in the background while maintaining congenial relations with all because it is in such an atmosphere that they are able to achieve their ends more effectively. The second reason why they prefer to avoid open conflict is that political actors are perfectly willing to target any member of the organization as a potential ally for future actions. The last thing good politicians want is open conflict with another member of the organization because it virtually eliminates a potential source for future favors and advantages.
A far better method of achieving their ends involves the politician working to create and continually expand a network of allies and acquaintances who can be called upon to help when needed. Through networking and developing a widespread coalition, politicians are better able to call in favors or influence decisions involving allocating scarce resources. In discussing the process of coalition building, a senior manager at a company made the powerful statement, “Only an idiot waits for a decision to be made at the meeting.” What he was suggesting was that, through networking, a politically savvy individual will have already influenced key decision makers to such a degree that the “meeting” to make the decision is often moot.
Controlling decision processes is the politician's effort to constrain the bounds of a decision in such a way that when the decision is finally made it is in accordance with the politician's wishes. There are several ways to control decision-making processes; some are unethical, others may be considered perfectly legitimate. For example, consider the situation in which a city planning department is planning to purchase a computer system and a member of the department has been tasked with gathering information about various PC-based alternatives. And suppose this individual has a vested financial interest in the selection of one specific vendor. An unethical approach to controlling the decision process would be to present only that information which would validate the politician's choice of computer vendor. In other words, information is held or used selectively in order to guide a decision in a desired direction.
The other method for controlling the decision process is to find ways to influence the meeting agenda or decision-making approaches. For example, suppose the head of a corporate R&D department wished to propose the development of a new, high-technology project. The project's initial investment will be $250,000 and approval for such a project must come from key members of upper management. There are several tactics that could be employed to attempt to influence the decision process. “Sowing” questions, for example, with two or three confederates in the audience during the project proposal, to be asked at key points in the presentation will give the manager the chance to demonstrate knowledge of the system as well as impress the meeting's members with his or her “spontaneous” expertise. And using the meeting agenda itself as an influence tool can be very effective. This process consists of burying a particular issue of concern far down the list of agenda items where it is likely to be quickly dealt with by tired or bored committee members.
The final political tactic is developing and projecting expertise. If others perceive an individual as being an expert on a particular topic, that individual is deferred to and given control. It is important to remember that “expertise” is a perceptual issue. In other words, whether or not an individual truly does have expertise in a particular field is immaterial. What is important is that others believe he or she has expertise. Consequently, a well-known political tactic is to enhance legitimacy and expertise as a method for status. Being the only member of a department to be proficient with the organization's computer equipment guarantees that member a measure of status and power.
An interesting analysis of four megaprojects illustrates the force for good or ill that imagined experts can wield. Two of the projects refer to civil aircraft development (Concorde and Airbus) and two are space agencies (ESRO and ELDO). The two successful projects (Airbus and ESRO) were found to be comparable in terms of organizational features, whereas the two less successful (a euphemism for “disaster”) were similar with respect to their organizational design. In the first two, professional engineers having real expertise were in charge, they had the power to implement decisions and emerged as champions. In the case of the two project failures, top management was seen as more highly involved in internal politics and projected “imagined expertise.” Two quotations regarding the Concorde debacle aptly sum up the analysis, particularly in relation to the success of Airbus.
“Concorde was an entirely political aeroplane: the plane was to show that we were good Europeans”
“After Concorde, an engineer's dream built by politicians, comes Airbus, a businessman's dream built by engineers” [16]
Sir Richard Way
Permanent Secretary, British Ministry of Aviation
Obviously, where engineers succeeded, politicians and illusory “experts” failed. In the successful projects, the respective project managers were fully in charge, with decentralized decision-making authority and an absence of constraining bureaucracy. In the absence of strategic vision, leadership, positive incentives, and rapid decision-making processes, as in the cases of Concorde and ELDO, they are bound to fail [17].