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Zia Barani: Good Sultan and Ideal Polity

Himanshu Roy and Muzaffar Alam

Zia Barani¹ (1283–1359) was the most important political thinker of the Delhi Sultanate, particularly during the reigns of Alauddin Khalji, Muhammad bin Tughlaq and Firoz Tughlaq. He represented the idea of political expediency in the Islamic history. His Fatawa-i-Jahandari (AD 1357), written as nasihat (advices) for the Muslim kings, is a classic work on statecraft which can be compared with Kautilya’s Arthashastra and Machiavelli’s Prince. For his emphasis on following the Shariat (laws of the Quran and the Prophet’s tradition) (Advice II) and his views on the Hindus (Advice XI.2), however, he has been called a conservative, a fundamentalist and a bigot as compared to relatively liberal thinkers like Abul Fazl. Ironically, in the earlier days he was mocked upon by the mullahs and others for not following the Quranic principles and for calling himself an Indian rather than a Turk. Later in life, when he adopted a politically hard line for governance, he was dismissed from the court at the age of 68 (1351 AD)² and lived in penury on the outskirts of Delhi. But taking into account the totality of the circumstances, both personal and political, his views on religion at the ripe old age of 74 (1357 AD) was more in the nature of a political tool for consolidating and expanding the state, which he identified with the Muslim ruling elite.

He advised the kings, nobility and other grades of administrators to follow the Shariat in personal and political domain, which he felt as desirable, but he equally emphasized the formulation of Zawabit (state laws) (Advice XIV) in the political domain and conceded flexibility in not following the Shariat (Advice II) in their private spheres. For him, the most important aspect was achieving the objective, the end; and the end was strengthening the state whatever the means. Laxity in not following the Shariat both in personal and political domains was tolerable till it began to affect the stability of the state. Suppressing the rebellious elite, both Hindus and Muslims, banning education to the under-privileged and nondescript people including Muslims (Advice XI), ‘welfare’ of the subjects, etc. were all intended for consolidating the powers of the Muslim rulers. He knew that, philosophically, monarchy is anti-Shariat (Advice IX.2), yet he accepted it on the grounds of reality. This reveals his intentions of treating the Shariat as a means for political ends.

Politically, the monarchy along with the nobility had yet to stabilize themselves, as they were in a flux in terms of class composition³ and in their wider acceptance by the Islamic and non-Islamic sections of the nobility and by other segments of the dominant class.⁴ Since the Islamic following was still restricted to a very narrow section of the population, Barani felt it necessary to widen the Islamic base for political obligation towards the monarchy. In the absence of civil society, religion was an important means for the said objective; perpetuation of tyrannical behaviour towards the rebels was another. The peasant revolt of 1330 AD in the doab comprising mainly of Hindus and led by their local elite must have haunted him like a recurring nightmare from the viewpoint of the security of the state. Yet he was not anti-Hindu per se. His antipathy was largely directed against the traders, shopkeepers, money lenders, and other dominant sec-tions—rais, ranas, rawats (Advice Xl.3)—who used to pass on their tax burden to the reza riaya,⁵ or defraud the people creating canditions for a rebellion against the state. From them, he felt there was a threat to the Sultanate. He, therefore, advised the king to either ban such sinful professions or deal with them ruthlessly. People who plied such trade and were to be treated ruthlessly included Muslims too who were engaged in these profession. Essentially a conservative aristocrat in his world outlook who treated even banya-buqqals as low-born, Barani looked upon the Shariat, Hindu, etc. only as generic terms, as the term Hindu was to Marx for Indians.

Theory of Kingship

Ideal Sultan

Barani made a distinction between the personal life of the Sultan and his political role (Advice II). In both aspects, however, he envisaged in him an ideal person—noble born, preferably belonging to the family of the monarch, having an innate sense of justice, wise enough to understand the deception and conspiracies of the wicked (Advice XXIV), understanding the importance of his time and dividing it judiciously between his personal needs and political requirement (Advice X) and following the path of the Shariat, which laid down that he was an agent of god on earth to do the ‘welfare’ of the people. The Sultan was expected to reflect supplication, helplessness, poverty and humility (Advice XXIV) to compensate for the existence of monarchy which was contradictory to the principles of Islam. As far as following the Shariat was concerned, Barani conceded that in the personal realm the Sultan may choose to be lax but he opposed the idea of laxity in the political sphere as it might lead to disease in the administration, for the ideal polity and the political avatar of the Sultan were intertwined. However, what seems initially as Barani’s emphasis on following the Shariat in the political domain acquires flexibility as we proceed further in the Fatawa. In the section under the Zawabit, he advised the formulation of new laws where, in the changed circumstances, the Shariat was unable to serve the purpose of the state. Though he cautioned the formulators to be guided by the Shariat’s intention, it was more verbiage than anything else. It was just like his arguments that monarchy, in the given circumstances, was to achieve the principles of Islam when he knew that Islam was opposed to the system of monarchy. In fact, he argued further; he advised the Sultan to achieve the objectives of Islam and possess the attributes of terror, prestige, pride, high status, domination and superiority. Anyone’s ascendancy over him meant the loss of his superiority (Advice XX). Courage to react to any idea or anyone’s wishes at the appropriate time was to be the essential ingredient of his political existence. Nonetheless, he must desist from five mean qualities such as falsehood, changeability, deception, wrathfulness and injustice (Advice XXIII). Similarly, differentiation between the determination in the enterprises of the government and tyranny/despotism (Advice IV) was necessary to command faith, fear and prestige among his friends and foes. High resolve, lofty ideals, fair administration, distinctiveness from other monarchs, obligation over people, etc (Advice XV) were the other required characteristics to influence people to lend their ears or be warned.

As people were influenced by the character and actions of the monarch, it was necessary for him to maintain all the regalities associated with kingship. Counsellors, and army and intelligence officers were indispensable parts of these royal functions. Their selection, gradation, etc. were obviously the duty of the Sultan and required careful attention. It was on the basis of their advice and reporting, either on policy matters or about conspiracies, corruption, the condition of people, etc. that the administration could function harmoniously. It was the king’s responsibility to protect the old political families, to check their possible usurpation of power and to ensure they are not left to live in material deprivation (Advice XXII). Penury and removal from power a potent combination, created a condition for rebellion. Barani’s intimate knowledge about such affairs, and the fact that he was himself a victim of such circumstances, might have compelled him to pen down such advice.

The supremacy of the Sultan and the safety of his Sultanate, however, couldn’t have been secured without delivering justice to the subjects. ‘The real justification for the supremacy of the kings and of their power and dignity’, Barani had remarked, ‘is the need for enforcing justice’ (Advice V). Accordingly, the first act had to be the appointment and gradation of judges, with the king himself being at the apex, and the functions delineated for them were ‘protection of money, property, women and children of the weak, the obedient, the helpless, the young, the submissive and the friendless’ (Advice V). Further, it was to ‘prevent the strong from having recourse to oppression in their dealings with people’ (Advice V) without which ‘there would be a complete community of women and property’ (Advice V), leading to anarchy in the ruling class.

While delivering justice, ‘however, the king should know … the appropriate occasions for both forgiveness and punishment ’ (Advice XII). Punishment to the rebellious, cruel, mischievous, etc. had to be combined with mercy and forgiveness for those who accepted their sins and were repentant (Advice XIII). Similarly, things like recognizing the rights of the people, refraining from minute enquiries and fault-finding, and not inflicting upon subjects impositions beyond their power of endurance were to be essential aspects of justice. However, in all these deliberations on justice, one aspect was conspicuous by its absence, i.e., the deliverance of justice was to be according to the religious practices of the subjects, though Barani nowhere mentioned separate kinds of justice for Hindus and Muslims. Yet, it may be argued that when justice based on the Shariat was favoured by Barani, then justice based on religion was already implicit in it. Moreover, his proclamation for all-out war against zimmis made his intention clear. But, as observed earlier, the growing redundancy of the Shariat in the changed circumstances and the corresponding importance of Zawabit, emphasized by Barani himself (Advice XIV), explicitly nullified the existence of any Islamic religious justice as state policy of the Sultanate. Moreover, Barani’s recognition that Sultans in India behaved moderately towards the zimmis (Advice XI.3) recognizes the existence of customary justice during the Sultanate period. The word zimmi refers to followers of polymorphous religions, like Hinduism.

The important point to be noticed here, however, is that Barani’s conception of justice was strongly tilted in favour of the rich and powerful. His hatred against the ganwaran and underprivileged and bias in favour of the noble-born speaks volumes about the basis of his justice. In fact, the very paradigm of the Fatawa was based on the consolidation and expansion of the elite in the Sultanate⁶; and like any other element of feudal society to be used as an instrument for the perpetuation of monarchy, justice was meant to be a facade for maintaining the serenity of the Sultanate. At panchayat and community levels, nevertheless, caste and religion did influence the judgements but the state did not generally adopt the policy of religious discrimination.

The Fatawa, however, was not bereft of any positive idea to the theory of statecraft. The notable features were, firstly, the distinction made between the personal and political domains of the king, and between nobility and others of the ruling elite; secondly, the espousal of the concept of political obligation, individual and collective, towards the monarch and his administration in the form of loyalty; thirdly, the recognition of rights of the people which essentially meant the right to life and property; and, finally, the emphasis on Zawabit which ultimately led to the formulation of incipient secular state policies reflected either in the context of justice or revenue collection or trade and commerce, etc. All these aspects were not new to the Indian political society as we find them in the Arthashastra tradition of political theory also, but Barani’s emphasis on such elements at a time when rulers of a different religion had acquired political power is really important. In the pre-civil society his emphasis, for example, on public policy rather than on personal life is worthy of a thinker.

Nobility

The nobility was the second component of the monarchy. The nobles were the chosen individuals whom the Sultan assigned ‘the right to levy the revenue in particular territories’⁷ which was known as iqta. It was the basic unit of landed property whose holders formed the main class of landed proprietors. The iqtas were frequently transferred from one person to another, which made them non-hereditary. The revenue resources created from the appropriation of the surplus produced by the peasant were distributed among the ruling classes of which the iqtadars were the principal component.⁸ They were also part of the royal consultative council which advised the king on policy matters. Since the basic function of the Sultanate was revenue collection, for which the entire paraphernalia of administration existed, and which could not have been performed by the king alone, a set of people existed to collect the revenue and advice or formulate administrative policies for it. The selection of such people by the Sultan, therefore, was of crucial nature for which Barani set certain guidelines, and advised the king to be careful. The criteria were two fold; first, the people to be selected should be noble-born with loyalty, both personal and political, towards the Sultan; and second, they must possess the quality of sound political judgement and render advise to the monarch while taking into account the prospects and contradictions of the impact of the policies to be undertaken (Advice XIX). While the first was explicit, he prescribed nine conditions (Advice III) for the second to test the political quality of the counselors. From fear of god, knowledge of history, lack of greed to practical knowledge of state affairs, all must be present in the advisers. Further, he prescribed eleven criteria (Advice III) to judge a policy, which the monarchy planned to undertake, in order to formulate the right one. Barani suggested an additional seven conditions to be provided to the advisers once they were selected. Some of these conditions were the security of their lives and tenure, environment for free expression of opinion, etc. Finally, he suggested the grading of nobility as per their birth and merit.

These advices, however, must be seen in the social context of the time in order to understand their import. In AD 1351 just six years before Barani penned down his advices, there was a severe political crisis created by the rebellion of a large section of the ruling class, and the sweeping changes in their composition. There was ‘large-scale recruitment of foreigners, still greater recruitment from the lower strata of the Indian population and from the Hindus, and an attempted wholesale destruction of the older, chiefly military elements (represented by the cavalry officer-crops, the admiran-i-sada).’⁹ With the accession of Firuz Tughlaq in the same year major concessions were granted by the Sultan to his officers. Iqta, which was transferable and non-hereditary, as mentioned earlier, became more or less, non-transferable and semi-administrative offices had to be passed on to the sons of previous incumbents. The nobility, mainly urban in character with no social base due to the nature of the iqta, was wholly dependent on the Sultan. Thus it was in such a social milieu that Barani expressed himself in favour of noble birth and personal loyalty, about the security of life and tenure of nobility, of their gradation, etc., to keep the ‘upstarts’ at the lower echelons of bureaucracy, to check them from the intricacies of the administration,¹⁰ etc. Besides, the anti-Hindu stance and the Shariat were the other potent cementing forces between the royal slaves of the nomad Turkish origin, Indianized Turks, Indian slaves and foreign immigrants who were, because of their internal contradictions, destroying each other. The fear of takeover by the Hindus, who were recruited in considerably large numbers by Muhammad Tughlaq, might have been the other but equally important factor that led him to express his opinions strongly against the Hindus. As the nobility occupied one of the crucial positions in the state structure, Barani prescribed tough conditions for their selection.

Ideal Polity

Laws

As said earlier, Barani categorized laws into two kinds, the Shariat and the Zawabit. While the Shariat meant the teachings and practices of the Prophet and of the pious Caliphs, the Zawabit were the state laws formulated by the monarch in consultation with the nobility in the changed circumstances to cater to the new requirements which the Shariat was unable to fulfill. It was ideal for the king, nobility and the personnel of administration to follow the Shariat, both in personal domain and in public policies. The state laws, however, were also to be formulated in case of the inability to follow/apply the Shariat. But, he cautioned simultaneously that the lawmakers must take into account the practices of the past and contemporary socio-political conditions while formulating the laws. The Zawabit, he said, must be in the spirit of the Shariat and enumerated four conditions (Advice XIV) for its formulation as guidelines. First, the Zawabit should not negate the Shariat; secondly, it must increase the loyalty and hope among the nobles and common people towards the Sultan; thirdly, its source and inspiration should be the Shariat and the pious Caliphs; and finally, if at all it had to negate the Shariat out of exigencies, it must follow charities and compensation in lieu of that negation. Thus what he envisaged in the Zawabit was an ideal law which could cater to the needs of the state without offending any section of the nobility in particular and the masses in general.

Since the conquest of northern India by the Ghorians and their establishment of the Sultanate, the application of the Shariat as state-policy engaged the minds of the administrators and theoreticians as the new rulers were of a different faith (Islam) from that of their predecessors.¹¹ As a personal belief of the people, no doubt, Islam had existed in India since the beginning of the eighth century when Muslim traders and others began to settle down in the coastal regions, but then it had no political importance. The revenue settlement of the new rulers with the defeated aristocracies for the collection of the kharaj (tribute) in the initial years, the subsequent evolution of the new iqta system and its assignment to different individuals for collection, the centralization of power in the hands of the Sultan, growth of trade and commerce, production of cash-crops, collection of revenue in cash, etc, created a piquant situation in which the application of the Shariat became difficult. Consequently, the formulation of a new policy which was called the Zawabit became imperative for the new ruling class. The changing composition of the ruling class, the rebellion of their different sections for power or status quo, etc., were the other factors that led to the requirement of new policies. It was in this context of political flux that Barani argues for charities, compensation and protection for those who were deprived of their power, prosperity and political clout. Since the iqta was transferable till Firuz Tughlaq’s time, there were frequent changes in the fortunes of political families. In such flux the Shariat was the only potent force to keep them united vis-a-vis the rais, ranas, rawats, etc., who professed a different faith. Although defeated, they had the potential to pose problems for the Sultanate if a situation providing them with such opportunity arose. The peasant revolt of 1330 AD in the doab led by such rais must have been at the back of Barani’s mind. Thus the search for laws which served the interests of the state and the ruling nobility without offending the masses or any section of the defeated nobles was his prime concern.

Army

After the Mauryas, the Sultanate was the largest (in terms of territorial extent) and most powerful state (in terms of centralization of power) in India. Obviously, the administration played varied roles, from revenue collection to maintaining law and order, and from public works to dispensing ‘justice’. Out of the three main pillars of the administration, the army was the preeminent one which was organized on the decimal system and based on the Turkish-Mongol model.¹² It was divided into four parts,¹³ viz., infantry (foot soldiers or payaks), cavalry (horsemen), war-elephants and auxiliary, viz., boats, engineers, transporters, scouts, spies, etc. The cavalry was further divided into three wings, viz., mumattab, sawar, and do-aspah, which respectively meant a soldier without horse, a soldier with a single horse, and a soldier with two horses.¹⁴ The rank and file such as khan, malik, amir, sipahsalar¹⁵ etc. (Advice VII) which were composed of Turks, Tartars, Rajputs and others were paid either in cash or were assigned the revenues of different villages¹⁶ as per their grades. As the Sultanate ultimately rested on the power of the army, whose basic functions were the security and expansion of the state, Barani advised the king to take greater care in its efficiency, checking corruption and conspiracies within it and so on. The monarch also maintained personal troops called qalb for his safety and ultimate reliability in case of rebellion occurring from within the nobility. The army, apart from performing its above mentioned roles, acquired importance for another reason as well. It acted as facilitator in the expansion of Islam since the ruling class of the Sultanate came as invaders and immigrants and it needed a large support base. Already defeated in their homeland they were forced to flee. So, on the one hand, they were conquerors while on the other they were political losers. Psychologically placed in a bind, they compromised with the local aristocracy but the feeling of being a conqueror made them contemptuous towards the local inhabitants. This feeling existed at least among a section of the intelligentsia and nobility. At the same time, insecurity haunted them like a nightmare.¹⁷ The question of their existence, if they lost political power in India as well, was therefore uppermost in their thinking. So the only alternative left, in their perception, was to consolidate and expand, which was possible either through converting the local aristocracy into Islamic faith or annihilating them. Barani, representing such perception, found in the army, the ultimate bastion of physical power and performer of such tasks. However, being a realist, he could perceive the other views prevalent among the majority of the nobility and intelligentsia. These people who were compromised and co-opted the local aristocracy into the structure of the Sultanate, including the army and bureaucracy and against them Barani expressed himself both explicitly and implicitly. But whatever may be the different perceptions, the army, nonetheless, commanded respect from every quarter as it was the ultimate bastion of state power and in its absence the very foundation of the Sultanate would have become shaky.

Bureaucracy

The bureaucracy was another necessary component of the Sultanate whose basic function was to measure the land and fix and collect the taxes for its disbursement among its beneficiaries; and in its absence the very existence of the ruling class would have become redundant and neither would have the army sustained itself. It operated at three levels, viz., centre, province and village. The Diwan-i Wazarat headed by a wazir (the head of revenue and finance, also known as the prime minister) and assisted by a naib, Musharif-i-Mamalik, Mustawfi-i-Mamalik and dabirs, was at the apex of the revenue department.¹⁸ Corresponding to it at the provincial level, the administration was headed by muqtis or walls¹⁹ Below him was the Diwan (ministry of revenue) provincial wazir, counterpart of the central wazir, but more or less with independent charge, who was accountable to the central wazir. In the initial and latter parts of the Sultanate, the walis became considerably independent in collection, expenditure, audit and accounts of their revenue. But in the middle phase (Khaljis and early Tughlaqs), however, they had to route the balance sheet to the king’s treasury²⁰ through the Diwan/provincial wazir. At the local (sarkar, pargana, village) level were the Muqaddam (the headman of the village), Chaudhari, etc., who were in charge of the collection and fixation of revenue with the patwari as the village accountant and keeper of records.²¹ The revenue was collected on the basis of the estimate prepared for each locality, based on their revenue-paying capacity; and the salary of the staff was paid from this revenue as per their status. Almost throughout the Sultanate, the revenue amount collected was half of the produce of the peasants which was levied separately on their land holdings. The tax was fixed and collected on each unit of the area irrespective of the produce of the current year’s harvest. It was paid both in cash and in kind. Alauddin Khalji preferred to collect it in kind and it was later on commuted into cash at market prices thereby placing the cultivators at a disadvantage. ‘Besides the land revenue, other burdens were also imposed upon the peasants; in particular, the tax on cattle or grazing tax.’²² Thus, overall the tax burden was heavy, particularly, for the lower strata (balahar, the village menial) upon whom the upper strata (khot, the large village landholder) passed on their own burden as well. Barani’s passage in this context on forsaking severe exactions (Advice XVI), checking corruption, recognising the rights of people (Advice XIII), etc., acquires clear meaning when he discussed dispensing of justice to subjects or advised kings to protect weak against strong. How far was he heeded to may well be guessed from the fact that the three-tier structure of the revenue bureaucracy, which was highly centralized in spite of its vast spread in terms of territorial extent, played the same stellar role, along with the army, throughout the Sultanate period without much changes either in the percentage of revenue collection per cultivator or in checking the tax burden being passed on to the weaker elements by their superiors. The advice could not have been heeded to because of the structural limitation of the ruling nobility in the pre-capitalist society. The only possibility, at best, was to provide temporary relief to the raiyats either under pressure of social discontentment or natural calamities. To Barani all these were means of dispensing justice towards which we now turn our attention.

Justice

Justice was the third essential element of the administration, which to Barani was all encompassing, from remission of land tax to supply of commodities to buyers at production cost and from dispensing civil and criminal cases to granting monetary help to the needy from the state treasury. For instance, he advised the king to ‘settle before his own throne the prices of all things according to the principle of production cost’ (Advice IX) and suggested that the Diwan-i-Riyasat, the controller general of the market, the Shahana-i-Mandi, the superintendent of the grain market, and other officials should control irregularities in the market such as checking the weight and measures, deliberate hike in prices, hoarding etc.²³ The reasons behind this suggestion were two fold; first, a hike in the prices of commodities would affect the army, particularly the subaltern rank, directly, and, second, it might have led to discontentment among the general populace. As the prices of the commodities concerned everyone, a hike without a corresponding increase in the income of the people, particularly of the lower strata of society, and of army personnel who were paid salary in cash might have created discontentment leading to problems for the state. As revenue exactions were already severe, there was no further possibility of its enhancement. Consequently, an increase in the salary of the army personnel was ruled out. Further, at the existing rate of revenue payment to the treasury there was no scope for savings on the part of the peasantry who could not cope with increased prices. As a result, an increase in prices would affect a vast section of the population both civilian and military which could have posed a threat to the security of the Sultanate from within and without either in the form of popular revolt or in military mutiny, desertion, etc. Thus an increase in the prices had the possibility of cascading and far-reaching implications for the Sultanate. Therefore, in order to avert it, the need for such justice was imperative.

Another aspect related with justice and consequently with the security of the state was remission of taxes. At least during calamities, Barani suggested, the king should remit or reduce taxes and extend monetary help from the treasury till the time it was possible and necessary. Failure of crops, with consequent increase in prices coupled with the continuation of revenue collection in the same proportion as during normal harvest seasons might have created discontentment among the populace. Aware of the heavy surplus appropriation from the peasantry, frequent changes in the iqta-holders and the double burden of tax payment on the lower strata made him suggest forsaking severe revenue exaction, protecting the rights of people both plebian and iqta- losers, checking corruption, etc, which he considered as a part of dispensing justice. But all these suggested measures did not emanate from any philanthropic reasoning—rather these were the articles of advice of a realist concerned with the security of the state.

To dispense justice the courts were divided into civil and criminal categories and they operated at central and provincial levels. The judges were to be appointed by the king, with himself at the apex of the judicial structure, and the fountain-head of justice and highest court of appeal. Below him were Quazi-ul-Quzat (Chief Judge), Sadr-us-Sadur or Sadr-ul-Mulk (Provincial Judge) Amir-i-Dad-Bek-i-Hazrat (Central Judicial Officers), Qazj, Amir-i-Dad (Judicial officers at provincial level) Muhtasibs (municipal officers and moral censors) and so on²⁴ in the respective order. The king in dealing with the religious cases was assisted by the mufti and the Sadr-us-Sadur while in secular cases he was assisted by Qazi-ul-Quzat.²⁵ As the Sultanate was mainly urban in character, the organization of justice was obviously limited to the main administrative centres. The panchayats continued with their customary modes of dispensing justice based on status, caste, property, etc. They were free from formal organizational encumbrances of the Sultanate, and the laws related with it.²⁶ Justice, thus, had two operational levels: one, operating in rural areas, another, operating in the urban-administrative centres. But in both cases there was one common factor—there was no discriminatory justice rather it was differential justice based on the merits of the cases and on the religion of the individuals.²⁷ Although Barani emphasized following the Shariat wherever possible, the very possibility of its operation was marginalized by the changing composition of the rulers and military-bureaucratic, quasi-judicial personnel of the administration and greater incorporation of Hindus and Indianized Turks into it. The economic basis of the Sultanate necessitating revenue collection and leading to compromises with the local aristocracy was the second factor that annulled the operation of the Shariat. The third factor was the vast population of Hindus inhabiting the rural areas surrounding the miniscule population of the Muslims living within the restricted urban-administrative centres who could not have been antagonized at the cost of jeopardizing the security of the state. We, therefore, find the adoption of a liberal attitude on the part of the Sultanate ruling class towards the Hindus for which Barani complained but also simultaneously emphasized the formulation of the Zawabit. Barani’s theory of justice thus essentially emanated from the perspective of the security of the state. Firstly, using religion he attempted to consolidate the Muslim population and various factions of the ruling class and tried to link the two; secondly, through the Zawabit he tried to solve the grievances of the Zimmis, and other social problems which remained unsolved by the Shariat; and finally, he used ‘justice’ as an instrument to expand the basis of political obligation of the subjects towards the state. But the contradictory aspect of his theory was his hatred and contempt towards the nondescripts which nullified his political use of religion for the purpose of linking the underprivileged with the rulers. Here, however, one must be careful in analysing the conditions of poor Muslims. Economically, they might have been poor and weak vis-à-vis the rulers, but psychologically they might have professed the thought of being superior to the Hindus of the corresponding stature by virtue of professing the same faith as the Islamic rulers and sharing their common ancestral homeland. For this reason, a feeling of being the conqueror and ruler might have existed in them²⁸ with the tendency of looking down upon the Hindus with contempt in the same way as an economically poor Brahmin looks down upon individuals of the lower castes of corresponding economic stature regarding himself superior to them. Barani might have tried to use these feelings among the poor Muslims for the benefit of the ruling class and the state. Being a realist and an opportunist, he tried every means to achieve the political objective of the Sultanate and the expansion of its social base. Ironically, he never represented the dominant ideology of his class in context of religion (co-opting and compromising with the Hindus) and neither did he identify himself with the changing composition of the rulers (plebianisation of nobility), yet his Fatawa acquired prominence in history. There lies his enigma.

Conclusion

Barani’s eminence lies in his theory of history and its constant application in different aspects of society of his time resulting in his theory of statecraft which made him unique and enigmatic. In fact it won’t be wrong to say that he marshaled all his knowledge and experiences from the past and the events of his time to serve the interests of the Sultanate. The prominent elements of his theory were his belief in the hereditary status of the nobility, espousal of political expediency on the part of monarchy and nobility, and contempt for the downtrodden. While the last element was the corollary of the first, the second element was intended to serve the purpose of consolidation and expansion of the Sultanate and consequently of the ruling class. To this end all means, such as religion, despotism, benevolence, annihilation of the Hindus etc. were to be employed. He was not against the Hindus per se as it has been alleged but against the Hindu elite from whom he feared potential threat to the Sultanate. Conversion or annihilation of the Zimmis essentially meant the conversion/annihilation of the elite among them. He knew that the conversion or annihilation at mass level might lead to uncontrolled conflagration. Zawabit rather than the Shariat therefore finds more prominence in his theory. Moreover, Shariat was only the tool to be used for the benefit of the Sultanate; and for the same purpose he suggested judicious mixing of benevolence and despotism in order to enhance the power prestige and wealth of the Sultanate. Justice likewise was intended to serve the pecuniary interests of the state rather than to fulfill the politico-economic needs of the masses. It was meant to expand the social base of political obligation towards the monarchy.

He consistently upheld the interests and values of the traditional Muslim (Turk) aristocracy who he thought were intrinsically superior to any other section of society. It acquired such prominence that purity of birth became the parameter of judgement for every appointment of personnel in the organs of government. They were to be judged on the basis of an appointee’s hereditary status. Further, his status was to be hierarchical and graded. His contempt for lowborn was so strong that even those who moved into the realm of nobility were looked down upon. He went as far as to suggest the banning of education among the lower classes in order to check their individual mobility; for education acted as catalyst in providing opportunity to individuals in their vocations. The changing composition of the ruling nobility which consisted mostly of former plebians incensed him. Even the changes that he suggested, for example, for formulating the Zawabit, which emanated from new necessities, was essentially geared to serve the overall interests of the Sultanate.

Thus the entire theory of Barani had a definite interest. On the surface, his Fatawa or Tarikh may look like a bundle of contradictions, but beneath it lies the consistency of his interest—the protection, consolidation and expansion of the Sultanate, the methods applied to achieve these aims notwithstanding. Essentially a conservative aristocrat in his outlook, he craved for stability²⁹ but was surpassed by the changing circumstances of his time, and sidelined by the class whom he desired to represent.