Chapter 6

Exploring the role of apology
in Cambodia's reconciliation
process

Angel Ryono

As impersonal and legal systems of social control proliferate … apologies may loom even larger than they have in the past as voluntary and humane means for reconciling personal and collective differences

Tavuchis, 1991

Thirty-five years after the genocide, Cambodian nationals and individuals from diaspora communities express varied opinions about forgiveness and reconciliation.¹ Some believe that forgiveness may not be possible for a crime as serious and massive as genocide. Some Cambodians think that deeper reconciliation will become a reality with the future generations. Preliminary research of news reports and references related to peacebuilding and transitional justice in Cambodia, from 1979 to today, reveal that public apologies have been delivered by at least three Khmer Rouge senior leaders since the fall of Democratic Kampuchea (DK).² These apologies received much attention and have generated energetic discussion within Cambodian civil society. Particularly, the well-publicized apology delivered by S-21 prison director, Kaing Guek Eav, also known as “Duch,” in 2009 has become a lightning rod for public discourse. Cambodian community forums and even television programs have evaluated the attitude, admissions, and emotional displays in Duch's apology. The interest in evaluating the sincerity and impact of public apologies is evidence that the Cambodian people have expectations for what is a meaningful and effective apology. The emerging interests hint at potential for apologies to elicit forgiveness and reconciliation. While the three publicly delivered apologies have engaged the masses, the role of apology in Cambodia's reconciliation process has not been formally discussed.

Cambodia shares a similar history with many other developing states, which emerged from independence movements during decolonization and the era of national self-determination. Cambodia's modern national identity formed out of nearly a century of French imperialism, being situated amid destabilizing regional conflict, and surviving and recovering from a horrific genocide. Cambodia's long and winding road to sustainable peace reflects characteristic struggles of post-colonial nations transitioning out of intrastate and regional conflict. In 1975, racked by years of heavy fighting between Lon Nol's regime and armed revolutionary groups, Vietnamese military incursions into Cambodia, and a severe US bombing campaign precipitating from the Vietnam War, Cambodians saw the victorious Khmer Rouge's arrival into Phnom Penh as a sign that the years of instability and foreign occupation might come to an end. Originally, Cambodian citizens and other revolutionary factions surrendered in cooperation. They believed that supporting an indigenously led government was the solution to national cohesion. However, they soon realized that the Khmer Rouge-led DK was a horrific experiment in radical communism.

A Vietnamese-backed regime composed of exiled and refugee Cambodians brought an end to the DK era in January 1979. The Khmer Rouge retreated into remote provinces in Cambodia, continuing to wage violence and recruit soldiers until the late 1990s. Public pressure on the Cambodian government to provide effective remedies for past abuses increased as civil society grew and Khmer Rouge violence waned. In 1997, the coalition government led by strongman Hun Sen of the dominant Cambodian People's Party (CPP)³ and Prince Ranariddh formally requested the UN to assist with establishing a criminal tribunal for the Khmer Rouge genocide. Duplicitous motives underlying the government's initiative to establish a hybrid international criminal tribunal resulted in years of “foot-dragging” negotiations with the UN (Doung and Ear 2009: 26).

Before the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC) held their first Khmer Rouge criminal trial in 2008, Linton's (2004) survey reported that a majority of the Cambodian respondents favored justice as a means of redress for past abuse. Respondents’ prioritized retributive, legal justice over other forms of truth-finding and justice mechanisms, reflecting a need to address a history of abuses that occurred during the Khmer Rouge regime as well as the ongoing corruption and culture of impunity by the current government. Cambodian nationals are equally as concerned with leaving a positive legacy of justice for future generations as they are about retroactive justice.

As victim-survivors and a broader range of Cambodian citizens participate or engage in the first Khmer Rouge trial, their opinions about justice and reconciliation inevitably shift. The results of this study also aim to shift away from a reliance on legal justice to a transitional justice framework⁴ that adopts a comprehensive or holistic approach to reconciliation. This requires integrating peacebuilding concepts with transitional justice, to broaden backwards-looking and retributive justice outcomes, in order to facilitate fundamental change in the relationship between victims and perpetrators as well as civil society and government. A transitional justice framework guided by peacebuilding concepts will also require cultivating indigenous capacities and voices that can result in enduring peace (Lederach 1997). Fundamental change in human relationships within a fractured society is both an important goal for peacebuilding and an essential definition of reconciliation (Mani 2005).

Transitional justice literature is dominated by theories and hypotheses about what activities, mechanisms, or collection of mechanisms might contribute to reconciliation (Thoms et al. 2008). How theories and hypotheses correlate with what people experience on the ground requires an understanding of the specific post-conflict context. History, culture, political currents, and the specific psychology of a post-conflict society should be studied along with the transitional justice and peacebuilding mechanisms implemented in that society (Mani 2005; Linton 2004; Thoms et al 2008; Towner 2010). Apology's place in Cambodia's post-conflict context is investigated through a holistic research strategy. This chapter intends to contribute to bridging the discourse and scholarship about a small human act and the more complex goals of reconciliation after genocide.

There is consensus among scholars that reconciliation achieved at the individual level supports or enhances national reconciliation goals (Mani 2005; Linton 2004). Thus, this chapter aims to explore the role of apology in Cambodia's post-genocide reconciliation process. Evidence gathered from interviews will be combined with discussion of public records, and an understanding of how Cambodia's cultural, social, and political structures were impacted by violent and unjust policies through history. Furthermore, this chapter will articulate connections from relevant and/or current research on the place of apology in reconciliation processes. The findings are intended to contribute to increasing knowledge about the healing of the traumatic memories and unresolved feelings from the period of mass killing.

Background

From April 1975 to January 1979, an estimated 1.7 million people in Cambodia perished under Khmer Rouge-led DK and its brutal policies to return Cambodia to a pure agrarian state (Owen and Kiernan 2006). During the Khmer Rouge genocide, the entire society was reorganized and subjected to a culture of fear and deadly purges. The majority of the urban population was displaced to rural provinces. Families were divided, men were separated from women and children, and some forced to marry or remarry. Traditional arts, culture, and religion were banned. Some schools were transformed into prisons and education was replaced with propaganda. All Cambodian people worked and existed in a structure of oppressive and disorganized labor practices. Those who were unable to escape were subjected to torturous interrogations, arbitrary arrests, detention without due process, mass killings and death from starvation, disease, and work exhaustion. During the genocide, all external communications were cut off or controlled by the Khmer Rouge.

In 1979, a Vietnamese-backed regime composed of defected Khmer Rouge cadres and Vietnamese-trained socialists waged a successful military campaign against an imploding political system. As the bipolar politics of the Cold War came to a close in the late 1980s, Southeast Asian nations interpreted the Vietnamese-backed Cambodian government – the People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) – and the continuing Khmer Rouge violence as potential threats to regional security. It was during this period that the international community began to focus its attention and humanitarian efforts on Cambodia.

Today, Cambodia is governed by a unique blend of monarchy and multiparty parliamentary system and is increasingly open to changes brought about by modern globalization. But, there remain core strands of socio-political traditions and psychological aspects of violent conflicts that reflect Cambodia's complex past: reverence for patriarchal kingship, proliferate Buddhist practices and institutions, multi-generational family households, a culture of impunity, government corruption, trauma from chronic civil war and genocide, a significant wealth gap between the elite and poor, and culture of distrust and fear of government systems.

Cambodia's modern independence emerged from violence

Some enduring aspects of Cambodia's culture, social institutions, and spiritual beliefs were formed at the beginning of the Christian era, influenced by India and China, largely through commerce (Chandler 2008). India “provided” Cambodia with language, religion, and concepts for constructing “social hierarchy” without colonial imposition (Chandler 2008: 17). Later, incursions from other kingdoms, namely those from Vietnam and Thailand, and waves of Chinese immigration introduced economic and political pressures that further shaped Cambodia's eclectic culture.

French colonial rule in Cambodia from the mid 1800s to mid 1900s caused “deleterious effects on [Cambodian] lives [and] their durable institutions” (Chandler 2008: 168). While the authority and wealth of the royal family were preserved during colonization, Buddhism, family traditions, land ownership tied to agriculture, and channels for communicating between socio-political groups suffered under France's broader administrative programs and profit-making goals in Indochina. Cambodia's independence movement enjoyed a very short period of relative peace. After World War II, the rise of French and Vietnamese educated socialist and communist revolutionaries in Cambodia clashed first with Sihanouk's government and then more severely with Lon Nol's regime. The struggle for new leadership involved years of civil war. Internal conflict deepened as Cambodia became victim to micro-power plays between the US and communist countries during the Cold War. Following the 1970 civil war, Cambodian people endured four years of destructive policies and genocide. Again, culture, social structures, and the desire for peace were challenged. The Khmer Rouge regime violence caused a near-complete setback to the progress of independence and nation building.

Culture of distrust, impunity, and psychological trauma

From the early 1960s to 1997, bombing campaigns, armed revolutionary movements, civil war, genocide, and residual Khmer Rouge violence exacted a tremendous human cost on Cambodia. Each wave of conflict involved forced conscriptions or recruitment of civilians by abusive regimes and guerrilla groups. Chronic civil wars and domestic conflict caused multiple periods of famine in Cambodia. Further, landmines and other unexploded ordinances are a hallmark of the Indochinese conflict, and today, Cambodia remains on the list of the most heavily mined countries (E-Mine n.d.). Years of internal warfare leave a significant percentage of the current adult Cambodian population to bear permanent physical scars and deep psychological wounds (Margolis 2007).

Authoritarian regimes and revolutionary groups grappling for power form the basis for today's culture of distrust. Many individuals who served as officers in the armed forces or revolutionary groups are recycled back into positions in government, law enforcement, and local administrative offices. During first years of PRK rule, and the peacekeeping intervention by United Nations Transitional Authority (UNTAC), victims of the genocide experienced former Khmer Rouge cadres returning to their communities to act as village chiefs, police, administrators, and officials in central government (Gottesman 2003; Brown and Zasloff 1998).

Cambodia currently enjoys relative peace, albeit with persistent structural violence⁵ and serious elements of social injustice. Since UNTAC assisted Cambodia with a national election in 1993, the Cambodian People's Party (CPP) dominates national politics and is reported to engage frequently in violent exchanges, corruption, and bullying of rival political parties (A sudden outbreak 2006). Cambodia's transition from a socialist government in the 1980s to a liberal democracy, without strong oversight and regulation of corrupt political behaviors, removes government responsibility for equal distribution of resources. This change has introduced a yawning gap between the rich and the poor. A corrupt political system maintains this socio-economic divide and fuels new human rights problems such as illegal land grabbing and mass evictions of the poor.

Moving towards peace and reconciliation

From 1988 to 1991, representatives of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and UN initiated a series of proximity talks⁶ with Cambodian factions. They solicited the opinions and potential terms for a comprehensive settlement agreement⁷ from the various leaders of armed factions, including prime minister Hun Sen of PRK, King Sihanouk, and Khmer Rouge senior leaders. The 1991 Paris Agreement presented a top-down strategy for peace, security, and democracy. The major conditions of the agreement were: 1) a power-sharing between Cambodia's armed factions; 2) cease-fire and disarmament; 3) Vietnamese commitment to end occupation; and 4) support for UNTAC to organize a democratic election. Brown and Zasloff (1998) describe the whole of the agreement process as ever frustrating to peacemakers – many attempts were made by leaders of armed factions to thwart Cambodia's transition to democracy. In spite of elites undermining the path to democracy, Cambodian civil society responded spiritedly to international support, leading to significant voter turnouts in the first two elections. Within the past decade, Cambodian civil society has demonstrated growth in political strength and citizens are beginning to question and openly voice opinions about issues of good governance (Downie and Kingsbury 2001).

The important seeds for participatory democracy and peace were planted in the 1980s and 1990s (Brown and Zasloff 1998; Downie and Kingsbury 2001). The democratic transition in Cambodia sees successful outcomes because citizens inherently want peace and security (Siv 1998). Non-violent interchanges between citizenry and government contribute to stability, which is also important to furthering reconciliation. Cambodian civil society is slowly developing along the structural avenues created by UNTAC and a combination of domestic initiatives ending Khmer Rouge violence. Prior to international intervention, Cambodian citizens existed in political systems with zero tolerance for dissent. Even to this day, many Cambodian people fear violence and retaliation from local or national government in regard to exercising political choice. In the past, non-militarized, non-elite sectors of Cambodian society engaged in mass emigration or collective refusal to cooperate as passive and non-violent forms of dissent or disagreement with government policies. New avenues for civil society to engage in national politics contribute to political healing/reconciliation between the majority of Cambodians and elites in government.

The ability of Cambodian citizens to openly question and pressure the government regarding issues of institutional reform and fair distribution of resources will be one important element in determining the sustainability of Cambodia's peaceful progress. For post-conflict reconciliation, a strong citizens’ voice can contribute to advocating for government- or donor-sponsored compensation, village-based reconciliation projects, or human services to assist in the psychological recovery of a large number of victims-survivors. In fact, Heather Ryan from Open Society Justice Institute stated that local and international non-governmental organizations have taken on a lion's share of ECCC's task of providing outreach, education, transportation, and support services for civil party members and victim-survivors (personal communication 18 June 2009).

Public apologies and apologies delivered by former Khmer Rouge

Decades after the Khmer Rouge genocide, apologies – or even a show of remorse – from Khmer Rouge leaders and former Khmer Rouge cadres are rare. In 2009, Duch delivered a widely publicized apology. To everyone's surprise – including his defense council – during the last days of his trial, Duch demanded release from prison because he believed his cooperation during the trial should absolve him of a prison sentence. Back in 1999, news reporters prodded Khmer Rouge senior leaders, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, to apologize upon their return to Cambodia. In the same press conference, Khieu Samphan was asked about whether he would be standing trial in the future; he responded saying, “let bygones be bygones” (Asia: How Sorry? 1999).

This study

The purpose of this study is to bring forth evidence from qualitative research data to better understand the role of apology in furthering reconciliation in Cambodia. The act of apology in Cambodian culture likely occurs in cases of minor infractions. As the stakes grow higher for both victims and offenders – meaning the harm done to victims is more severe and the offenders risk greater transgressions and loss of a positive self-image – apologies as a means for reconciliation remains a rare practice in Cambodian culture. If there is no appropriate authority to distribute justice, mediate and reconcile, then there are few accepted cultural practices that Cambodians can draw on to mend broken relationships between victims and offenders. The social norm in Cambodia for offenders is to hide shame, save face, and deny wrongdoing. Inazu's (2009) discussion on the importance of individual reconciliation helps to explain Cambodia's dilemma on apology – less serious crimes reside on the lower end of a scale of reversibility and apologies for less harmful mistakes have an increased potential to elicit forgiveness. Thus, apology is more forthcoming. Linton's (2004) survey shows that Cambodian people tend to invest their hopes in criminal trials, particularly to one that is overseen by the international community, to resolve great loss, anger, and pain caused by massive crimes such as genocide.

However, the type of justice operating at the ECCC is based on a system that is adversarial, highly procedural, and positivistic (Seng 2010). This type of justice does not attend to or prioritize highly the need for moral reparations, restorative justice, and improved relations between victims and perpetrators of genocide. The Victim's Unit of the ECCC web page states that victim applicants accepted by the court to a particular case, meaning individuals who are direct victims of a particular subset of crimes committed during the genocide, have the right to request moral reparations (Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia [ECCC], 2009). ECCC (2009) defines moral reparation as symbolic, which affirms the view that the kind of legal justice applied in Cambodia's reconciliation process holds procedure, judgment, and the building of material evidence as more important tasks than improving and restoring relations. Moreover, ECCC (2009) does not list apology as an example for moral reparation and neither have the judges or co-prosecutors announced explicitly how the court would facilitate a meaningful or effective apology from accused persons or witnesses who are former Khmer Rouge cadres.

Since the court began basic operations, public records report increased dissatisfaction with the legal justice process in relation to reconciliation (Muddell 2003; Khmer Rouge Tribunal Monitor [KRT Monitor] 2009; Thomas 2008; Roughneen 2010). Causes for dissatisfaction range from the court diminishing the participation of the victims at various stages during Duch's trial, to the lack response from the court in regard to addressing victims’ requests for reparations, limited opportunities for the greater body of victims to benefit from the justice process, and the poor outreach and support for future victim applicants (Thomas 2008; Rith 2010; ICTJ 2009). The public perception of trials as the most effective means for reconciliation is dwindling and experts agree that the Khmer Rouge Tribunal is not a “cure-all” (Kimseng 2010). This study considers the current shift of public perceptions of justice in relation to reconciliation and examines the role of apology in this context.

Method

The method and interview questions chosen for this study are a modified and adapted from the research conducted by Mellor et al. (2007) on the dilemma of apology and forgiveness with aboriginal and non-aboriginal Australians. Whereas Mellor et al. (2007: 19) explore the “twin process” of reconciliation, this study acknowledges the precondition that apology is not commonplace in Cambodian culture. Yet, the desire for a meaningful and effective apology from perpetrators of genocide is a growing phenomenon. Therefore, this study will focus on understanding the role and utility of apology alone.

Participants

Eleven Cambodian nationals, two diaspora Cambodians and one non-Cambodian were interviewed for the study. Adult male and female respondents make up equal parts of this group. The sample of participants was obtained through convenience and selected individuals from grassroots level of civil society. For the purpose of this study, participants are defined as key informants, meaning a significant portion of their responses are derived from professional interaction with victim-survivors, and general Cambodian population. A translator was provided for participants who spoke limited English. Participants’ personal backgrounds contribute additional perspectives: persons born after the genocide, former Khmer Rouge combatants, community counselors, local NGO workers, researcher, monitors of KRT, Cambodian citizens, and Cambodian diaspora. All participants currently reside, or at some point in their lifetime lived, in a household with survivors of genocide.

Materials

Semi-structured interview questions were provided in print, both in English and Khmer. The interview included questions about whether an apology is desired or important, what should be contained in an apology, which individuals or groups should deliver an apology in regard to the genocide, and whether the process of apology within Cambodian society can promote deeper reconciliation. In Mellor et al.’s (2007) study, the questions contained permissive prompts, or structured follow-up questions. This study is exploratory and intends to achieve a general survey of civil society views about the role of apology. Thus, the questions were simplified, which excludes the concept of permissive prompts. The interview questions are presented in Table 1.

Procedure

The interview takes into account the participants’ expertise and work with the general Cambodian population and victim-survivors. Questions are open-ended, promoting liberal discussion on the role of apology in Cambodia. Participants were invited to draw from personal experience, work experience, and observations in order to form their responses. The investigator visited Phnom Penh and Siem Riep, Cambodia and Long Beach, California to conduct the interviews. Participants were invited through phone or email, with a summary of the study and interview questions attached with the written communication.

Participants granted permission for an interview through a multi-step process:

•  individuals confirmed participation after reviewing the invitation and attached materials;

•  investigator greeted participants with a phone call requesting a face-to-face interview;

•  participants and investigator met at mutually agreed locations and participants signed a written consent to interview.

Throughout the permission process, the investigator attended to communicating about the purpose of the study, developed collegial rapport with potential participants, and answered any questions or concerns about the interview procedure. Understanding that the interview process might trigger personal feelings or memories about past traumas, the investigator took concerted efforts to inform participants that they should feel free to disengage from the study at any point throughout the permission seeking or interview process. Responses were either recorded using a digital audio recorder or by note taking. Audio recordings were transcribed and the data were analysed in text form.

Results

Codes ranging from P1 to P14 were assigned to participants.⁸ Interview responses were analysed for patterns. Two patterns emerged after reviewing the entire data set using two strategies. First, common views and thoughts regarding reconciliation shared by a majority of the interview participant were lifted and analysed for coherent patterns or themes. This approach resulted in an emerging order of importance, which rates the various transitional justice and reconciliation processes that have occurred or could potentially occur in Cambodia. Second, a search was conducted for phrases and sentences that contained the term apology. Phrases and sentences that contained the term apology were grouped and arrange under additional themes. The discovery of both theme and order departs from Mellor et al.’s (2007) results, which concentrate on data containing language about apology and forgiveness. Participant responses collectively maintain that trials are necessary for closing the book on a negative past, thus this study reports that criminal trials are an important element in Cambodia's reconciliation process. The interview responses show that a victim-survivor or civil society's definition of a meaningful and effective apology was often presented as an antidote to the unsatisfactory statement of remorse made by Duch. Further, a majority of the participants consider a meaningful and effective apology as an important form of moral reparations to be gained from criminal trials. The overall message is that apology is considered supportive in the national reconciliation process, but it increases in importance as the discussion about reconciliation moves towards the individual/community level.

Related phrases from the interviews were grouped and given a coherent theme title. The themes were then arranged in the emerging order. The order reflects a “meta-story” about the significance of existing and potential concepts or activities that contribute to reconciliation in Cambodia. It also reflects how the participants tended to form their thoughts about the role of apology within the current context of the Khmer Rouge trials, their professional experience with victim-survivors, and indigenous understanding of Cambodia's history, transitioning from violence to peace. The result of this study is considered a “snapshot of grassroots thinking on the issue” of the role of apology in a specific cultural and social context (Mellor et al. 2007: 23). Because a small sample size was used, the findings cannot be generalized to represent all members of Cambodian civil society. However, this study reports themes and patterns that reflect significant concordance across the participant responses in the sample.

The trials are important for reconciliation

Participants agreed that trials are an important part of moving forward from genocide. However, participants also listed problems associated with the ECCC and Duch's trial that they believe hinder reconciliation. A male director of an NGO in Siem Reap, participant P2, believes that the Cambodian government interferes with the trial by seeking to limit the number of trials and accused persons: “Hun Sen and the government don't want any more trials to happen.” Operating the court for the Khmer Rouge trials is an expensive and long process, which led to a few participants expressing concern or resentment regarding whether the investment in transitional justice mechanisms would interfere with the current human and economic development needs in Cambodia. Participant P2 stated that “the money should go to help the rest of Cambodia” instead of the trials, and that the government and UN are “spending money for liars.” Participant P4, a male Cambodian-Australian human rights advocate working in Phnom Penh, mentioned that victim-survivors like Chum Mey – who is frequently sought by the press – said that he was treated well and received adequate support throughout the trial process. In contrast, participants P5, a researcher at a genocide archive in Phnom Penh, P7–P11, community counselors working with victim participants in Duch's trial, and P12, a young female peace worker remarked that the court generally treats victim-survivors poorly or disrespectfully. Nearly all participants stated that the most desired outcome for victim-survivors engaged in the justice process is to obtain material reparations. However, Participant P6, a male Buddhist monk, stated “the court cannot help” with providing material reparations to victims.

Criminal trials have less meaning for victim-survivors living in more remote communities in Cambodia or in diaspora communities. Participant P1, an American male working to support a de-mining organization in Siem Reap, stated: “Cambodian people don't know about the trial, some don't care” and P14, a director of a Cambodian community center in Long Beach, commented: “We, the diaspora community still think poorly about the trials … the trials communicate nothing to diaspora Cambodians.” Participant P12 provided a middle-ground view of the criminal trials: “I think the trials help to reconcile in just some parts, but not all because only academic and legal scholars appreciate it. But grassroots level don't appreciate it.”

There are other reconciliation activities besides trials and signals that Cambodia is reconciling

Participant P12 mentioned that one of the most successful reconciliation activities was the Buddhist march that occurred in the early 1990s. “People really believe in religion” and “thousands of victims, former Khmer Rouge march[ed] together. It was very successful. Refugees found their relatives. It brought people together” (P12). Participant P6 believes that the first democratic election was evidence that Cambodian people were moving forward and stated that it was the “first time Cambodian people generate a new policy and mobilize reconciliation for the sake of a joint nation.” Several participants noted that the absence of physical violence, victims and perpetrators participating together in events, forums, or documentary projects are indicators that Cambodians are moving forward in the reconciliation process.

Four interview participants, P1, P4, P5, and P14, presented some evidence that touches on the need for reconciliation in more specific communities or groups of genocide survivors:

•  psychologists are needed to work with many individuals who still suffer trauma;

•  although victims and perpetrators in some villages show less physical aggression and anger towards each other, they often exist uncomfortably in the same community space; and

•  individuals in diaspora communities do not have the same opportunities to “vent” or process their loss and anger, in some cases, leading to “a lot of screaming and yelling” during a conference in Oregon (P1, P4, P5, and P14).

Crucial roles of apology

Participants generally agreed that a meaningful and effective apology plays a supportive role by providing moral reparations for victim-survivors especially because they cannot obtain material compensation for their suffering. Participant P4 stated: “When you do give victims something, even at a symbolic level, you are starting to address the issue and acknowledge their needs.” Participant P10 and P11 mentioned that the civil parties, or victim groups, requested that Duch deliver the apology again in public and show remorse, but judges did not respond to the request.

Participants P6 and P14 believe that a meaningful and effective public apology will help with the anger and resentment that is experienced by a large number of victim-survivors who are not qualified to participate in the Khmer Rouge trials or who are living abroad. Participants P5 and P12 believe that reconciliation by way of apology might have a bigger impact in local areas or villages where perpetrators and victims are still living side-by-side. Participant P12 provided a narrative from a former client about the impact of apology at the individual or community level:

“There was a Khmer Rouge soldier who went to a woman's house in the same village to ask for forgiveness after the village [desired] to take revenge on all existing Khmer Rouge soldiers. This soldier told the woman: ‘I know you want to kill me, but I just want to say sorry and ask for forgiveness.’ The victim could not kill. It affected her. We have to learn from this communication and we need this for going on to peace.”

P12

Evaluating Duch's apology

With one exception, the participants did not recall public apologies given by Khmer Rouge senior leaders, Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea. However, the apology delivered by the prison director, Duch, in the first Khmer Rouge trial was well publicized and all the participants contributed their thoughts and opinions. Participants overwhelmingly criticized Duch's apology as not sincere, meaningful or effective. Participants P1, P2, and P3 show sympathy for Duch by pointing to a moment in the trial proceedings when he expressed sadness due to guilt. The following lists a range of descriptive phrases evaluating Duch's apology:

•  Not remorseful.

•  He displays too much confidence.

•  He sounds a bit ruthless.

•  Duch continues to uses the same rhetoric as the leaders did during the DK era bolstering his past actions with nationalism or chauvinism: “They say they love the country” or he claims to be “obeying Angkar's policies.”⁹

•  He does not accept punishment.

•  Duch asked to be released.

•  He used Christian concepts to demand for forgiveness, which is foreign to the majority of Buddhists in Cambodia.

•  Duch winked at a victim in the audience.

•  He smiled during the same trial session he said sorry.

What should be avoided in delivering an apology?

Interview questions related to both the content of a meaningful and effective apology and what attitudes or sentiments apologists should show resulted in participants responding in the form of “dos and don'ts” of delivering an apology. Participant P13, a young female psychologist in training, stated that a meaningful and effective apology “cannot be one word.” Participant P13’s opinion correlates well with Participant P4’s description of the “vague” and reluctant apologies delivered by a former Khmer Rouge medic and senior leader, Nuon Chea. The reluctant apologies seem to be delivered by those who were forced or obliged to do so, which relates to participant P6’s opinion that apologies should “not be forced” and “should be voluntary.”

Participants P7 to P11 expressed concerns about a particular intention behind insincere apologies, stating that they “cannot be to erase or dismiss victims’ memory.” One criticism about Duch's apology is that he fails to deliver a sincere apology, as he is not humble. Duch, Khieu Samphan, and some political figures have demanded rather than asked for forgiveness from victims. These visible leader figures tend to instruct victims to move on rather than to demonstrate their desire to restore trust.

Participants all reported that perpetrators of genocide or of specific crimes during the genocide are aware that they actively participated in something deeply disturbing and should be accountable for their involvement. Participants P7 to P11 presented several stories about how some villages were saved from mass killings because some Khmer Rouge commune chiefs chose not to follow orders from the Central Committee. “Even if it is an order from above, you have to take responsibility for yourself and be a human being. These people made a choice to kill, so they should apologize for the choice they've made” (P4). An apology should not continue to defer responsibility to “orders from the top” or place all the blame on others – such as Vietnam, China, or United States.

The content of a meaningful and effective apology

A meaningful and effective apology “should make an impact on individual victims, should contain language addressing individual victim's loss” (P4). The Khmer Rouge cadres should “apologize for the loss of lives, the destruction of the country” (P13). A number of the participants mentioned that key elements of an apology are honest admission of guilt and remorse as well as a direct and explicit acknowledgment of victims’ suffering. Attitudes and emotions desired in a meaningful apology are compassion and respect for the victims (P6, P13, P12).

A few participants underscored the importance of truth-telling in the act of apology that can help the perpetrator to explain to the victims why perpetrators made the choices to kill, torture, or carry out the atrocities. Participants P4, P6, and P12 mentioned that, today, victims still ask why such educated and privileged Cambodians would harm their own people in such a devastating way.

Many participants referred to the apologist offering to “do something” to indicate they are committed to change and repairing the relationship. Desirable apologies will contain offers of material reparations, behavioral changes, and willingness to “go to jail” if criminally convicted.

Who should deliver the apology?

Participants all agree that senior leaders of the Khmer Rouge regime need to provide an apology. Participants P3, a deputy director of an NGO in Siem Reap, P2, and P5 believe that the current government will not apologize and perhaps should not apologize. Although some former Khmer Rouge members currently serve in government positions, many defected from the Khmer Rouge and believe they are part of the regime that helped to bring the genocide to an end. Most participants do not feel that lower-level perpetrators are required to give a public apology, however, depending on the case, it may be necessary to apologize to direct victims. There are varied responses in regard to which non-Cambodians should deliver the apology. Participant P12’s view is that the Khmer Rouge was ultimately the regime in direct control of Cambodia and should be responsible for choosing to commit mass violence.

Conditions for the delivery of a meaningful and effective apology

Responses from Participants P2, P4, P5, and P12 formed the basis of this theme. There was significant discussion about how lower-level perpetrators and direct victims can come together to achieve reconciliation at the community level. It is important to recognize that “it is difficult to say who is a ‘wrongdoer’ or a purely innocent victim” (P2). But, “bring[ing] victims and perpetrators together under the banner of a bigger cause” is a road to reconciliation in the local villages (P2). Participant P12 brings professional experience to the discussion of the conditions in which a meaningful and effective apology can be accomplished. The space created has to be “appropriate and safe for both victims and perpetrators,” and perpetrators “must not feel that by stepping forward, delivering apology, that they will be retaliated against” (P12).

For survivors, it is very important to, it's important for former Khmer Rouge leaders and soldier to make a move in the reconciliation process and the forgiveness process for them to start saying sorry and do something, but not to expect the victims to say, ‘Okay, I forgive you.’ It would help the victims to feel good for the process to start this way.

P5

What remains to be reconciled in Cambodia in regard to the genocide?

“Everybody's experience of the Khmer Rouge is localized” (P4). “Some people ask how Cambodian people can cope knowing perpetrators are still out there or living in their community?” (P12). Further, “People still hold strong grudges towards Khmer Rouge” (P1). “There are certain pockets of former Khmer Rouge stronghold along the Cambodian-Thai border … I feel these people should be reached out to more” (P5). “There should be more discussion in the community to gain trust” (P12).

Two of the participants are from diaspora communities. Both participants mentioned that truth and reconciliation among the diaspora groups should be an important goal. Like many other survivors of mass violence who move abroad, the painful memories and feelings are put aside or suppressed in service of adapting to new cultures and environments. However, repressed memories and psychological trauma means that diaspora Cambodians do not engage in constructive processing and/or release of their painful feelings. They have “attitudes [that are more] black and white about former Khmer Rouge,” thus impacting their overall emotional health and progress of moving forward (P4).

Participant P4 reflected on Chum Mey's participation as a civil party member in Duch's trial and concluded the following:

It seems like the healing process started as he was preparing and participating in the trial … But, the question is, what got him to this stage? Was it his attendance at the trials? Was it his [counseling] sessions at TPO, was it his face-to-face with Duch? We don't know, but all of these things are important to bring together and make it understandable to people … You can't force these activities … on people. You can only provide all the opportunities and let them chose. However, if you don't provide the opportunities, people won't heal.

P4

Discussion

The study of apology, as a speech act under the umbrella of interpersonal communications, grows in relevance when members of communities transitioning out of conflict desire for individualized or inter-group reconciliation through improving trust between individual victims and perpetrators of violence (Towner 2010). Beginning in the 1990s, the role of apology has expanded in Western cultural and international relations discourses as public figures or state actors seeking to mitigate or absolve negative effects of past behaviors turn to public apologies as a solution (Lazare 2004; see also Dodds’, Chapter 7). However, as this ordinary human act takes a bigger stage, aiming at resolving victim-survivors’ anger and feelings of loss from large-scale abuse and mass violence, the need to understand what sincere and effective apology means to victim-survivors and civil society becomes important to inform research and practitioners interested in vehicles that advance reconciliation.

In summary, the interview responses resonate with Tavuchis’ (1991) conclusion about the paradox of apology – perpetrators of genocide delivering apologies cannot change or reverse what occurred, they can only account honestly for the crimes they commit. When apologists attempt to circumvent that fact, they tread into the realm of disrespecting and re-offending the victims. However, the interview respondents believe that sincere and voluntary apologies can provide symbolic and moral reparations, thus contributing to reconciliation. The themes in this study enumerate factors that increase the value and function of apology in advancing reconciliation, which affirms what Lazare (2004: 9) names as the “price of an effective apology”: “adequate acknowledgment of offenses,” genuine remorse, offers of reparations, and “commitment to make changes.”

Participants underscore the fact that reconciliation is a process and that Cambodians have already taken some steps towards it. Some respondents pointed out that the future of Cambodia's reconciliation lies in building trust and the improvement of relationships between individual members of civil society. Genocide perpetrators who were lower on the chain of command and victims likely share similar psychological wounds and experienced the same destructive policies (McNair 2011). According to Linton (2004), survivors of genocide continued to withstand injustices – the PRK regime following the genocide, composed of Khmer Rouge defectors, pushed innocent people off their land to gift it to Khmer Rouge rebels who volunteer to give up arms. Thus, restoring or establishing a shared sense of trust among all survivors, especially in local communities where former cadres who engaged in killing and victims live as neighbors, is believed to be the next, imperative step in the reconciliation process. Participants’ support for personal reconciliation agrees with Inazu's (2009) thesis that personal or individual forgiveness has an important place in transitional justice.

Considering that the Khmer Rouge trials are bounded by technical and procedural constraints, the results of this study show that participants maintain that trials accomplish some broad strokes towards national reconciliation. Cambodians are especially invested in criminal trials to hold top Khmer Rouge leaders accountable for their criminal policies. Nevertheless, a majority of the participants are aware of the limits of the Khmer Rouge trials. Some participants express frustration, commonly shared by critics of legal justice as a solution for reconciliation and peace, over the high cost and cumbersome aspects of trials (Crocker 2006; Keeva 1999). In very important ways, the Duch trial did not serve to fully acknowledge the personal suffering of victim participants, empower victims in the justice process, or provide adequate reparations. Given how negatively the participants of this study evaluated Duch's apology, the court ruled, without regard to victims’ perspectives, his apology as sincere and effective enough to be a mitigating factor in reducing his prison sentence.¹⁰ The court largely ignored the negative effects of Duch's unexpected demand for an acquittal. Instead judges gave him credit for being cooperative in providing information about his role in S-21 prison. The court also neglected to address victim participants’ requests for reparations.

The above examples represent the impersonal effects of legal justice (Inazu 2009; Tavuchis 1991; Crocker 2006). The results of this study ask for transitional justice to strike a better balance between obtaining legal justice and providing for the broader needs of a post-conflict society still experiencing transition. The data demonstrates that participants view a meaningful and effective apology as possibly helping to mediate the impersonal effects and restore the sense of moral balance for the victims. Tavuchis (1991: 3) touches on the need to address “the violation of an unstated, but consequential, moral rule whose binding force [has] little to do with legal remedies or considerations.” Participants’ reflections on how apology contributes to reconciliation recognize that apologies alone cannot produce national reconciliation. Rather, apologies reach areas of a fractured society that trials cannot. While trials help to reconcile the abuses of past governments and regimes and set national standards for what is right and wrong, it is a morally reconciled and unified civil society that is capable of accessing and promoting the rule of law.

Conclusion

Some Cambodians hope that time and future generations will usher in a full reconciliation. But, first-generation survivors can contribute significantly to that reality by engaging in successful exchanges of apology and forgiveness. This study demonstrates that Cambodian participants are aware of sincere and effective apology as a catalyst for equitable “transfer of power and respect” between victims and offenders, dissolving rooted distrust and fear and potentially triggering forgiveness (Lazare 2004: 19). The terms of apology provided in this study can guide future projects that bring low-level perpetrators who are willing to apologize to sit together with victims in a safe community space for a negotiated reconciliation. As mentioned by a few participants in the study, there are remote, rural villages where former Khmer Rouge cadres remain loyal to regime ideologies. This means that the trials held in the capital of Phnom Penh might not have a direct impact in these communities. Thus, these communities might find justice based on a series of progressive, non-violent dialog. Individuals who are willing to step forward to apologize can precipitate reconciliation. Fundamentally speaking, participants believe that public apologies should come from the Khmer Rouge regime leaders and individuals who were most responsible for carrying out crimes against humanity. One participant explained that it does not matter as much whether other countries involved in Cambodia's conflict should apologize, the Khmer Rouge regime independently chose violence and destruction as the means to maintain power.

The growing number of societies transitioning from regional and intrastate, armed conflicts moves scholarship to consider reconciliation as “social and dynamic,” a process that is mutually constructed by victims and perpetrators (Andrews 2000: 75). Following this new definition for reconciliation, “[t]here is an evident social demand for apologies” (Teitel 2006: 102). Cross-cultural and contextual understanding is needed to determine how negotiated reconciliation and apologies can be realized. The interview data suggests that participants are open to a reconciliation process that is bilateral, requiring dialogue between perpetrators and victims. Apology, in such a process, is a necessary component to mending the relationship between the offenders and offended (Towner 2010). Participants’ responses regarding conditions for the delivery of a meaningful and effective apology point to a willingness to set terms for a process that would be safe and beneficial for both victims and perpetrators. Examples of victim-perpetrator encounters were given which showed that apologies have proved to support a non-violent, sometimes transformative, interaction.

As “[d]ecisions about transitional justice are too often made without consulting the population affected,” there is an appeal for peacebuilding and transitional justice work to be cognizant of when foreign intervention becomes an interference, preventing civil society from taking up the responsibility and the work to promote lasting peace (Lambourne 2009: 28). The UN and donor nations can afford to be more perceptive to when top-down intervention programs should end and when the support for local capacities for reconciliation and peace should begin. Projects and programs that promote groups of victims and offenders to restore relations on their own terms, to apologize and to forgive, leave a powerful legacy and begin a new, positive memory. Non-judicial reconciliation can enhance the level of cooperation among Cambodian citizens, which is needed to strengthen civil society's political voice. In order to honor the spirit and the true goals of reconciliation, it is crucial for Cambodian government, donors, and the international community to provide real opportunities for reconciliation to occur at the community level.

Notes

1  This chapter is a reporting of the author's fieldwork and a portion of a complete case study on the subject of the role of apology in Cambodian's post-genocide reconciliation process (Ryono, 2011).

2  Democratic Kampuchea is the official name for the Khmer Rouge regime government.

3  People's Republic of Kampuchea (PRK), during the late 1980s negotiations for the comprehensive settlement agreement, renamed the party Cambodian People's Party (CPP).

4  Transitional justice is a term for a framework of understanding post-conflict transitions and refers to a collection of legal and appropriate non-legal mechanisms implemented in post-conflict communities to provide remedies for past abuses, contribute to reconciliation, strengthen the rule of law, and build local judicial capacities (Bickford 2004).

5  Structural violence is a term for elements of political or social systems that are unjust, oppressive, or abusive towards members of the society (Galtung 1976).

6  Proximity talks are diplomatic processes that involve neutral representatives acting as facilitators and transmitters of potential terms for agreement between groups who are unwilling to meet face-to-face.

7  An ideal comprehensive settlement agreement, as opposed to the more common concept of political settlement, would involve victims, representatives of civil society, or non-militant groups. In Cambodia's case, the strategy for negotiations leading up to the 1991 Paris Agreement largely accounted for the interests of elite and armed groups.

8  This is the same coding system used by Mellor et al. (2007) in their study on apology.

9  Angkar refers to the elite group or the official organization of Democratic Kampuchea.

10  The Judgment for Duch's trial, Case 001 of the Khmer Rouge Tribunal is available on the ECCC website: http://www.eccc.gov.kh/