PART II
Quantum Negotiation Tools

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Negotiation and Leadership Development.

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Participants will walk away with a tool set of negotiation and leadership skills.

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Understand and apply the essentials of cognitive, social and emotional elements in negotiation strategies.

Apply a deeper level of self and other awareness to improve interaction and negotiation strategies.

Use “power with” approaches for a more complete understanding of the interests and goals of all stakeholders.

Learn to style-shift while maintaining your own identity and values.

Use field analysis to optimize real life negotiation situations.

Illustration of Power of Understanding—Preparation Framework.

Figure Tools A.1 Power of Understanding—Preparation Framework.

© 2015 Quantum Negotiation

Illustration of Negotiation Behavior—Guidelines and Checklist.

Figure Tools A.2 Negotiation Behavior—Guidelines and Checklist.

© 2015 Quantum Negotiating

Illustration of Quantum Negotiation Tools: Push and Pull.

Figure Tools A.3 Pull–Push–Move Away Energy in Negotiation

Illustration of Quantum Negotiation Tools: Process Behavior (Push).

Figure Tools A.4 Push Negotiation Energy Examples

Illustration of Quantum Negotiation Tools: Negotiating Behavior (Pull).

Figure Tools A.5 Pull Negotiation Energy Examples

© 2015 Quantum Negotiation

Illustration of Quantum Negotiation Tools: Disengaging.

Figure Tools A.6 Move Away Negotiation Energy Examples

© 2015 Quantum Negotiation

Handling Hardball Tactics

This guide will cover how to deal with the most common hardball tactics:

  • Belly‐Up
  • Boulwareism
  • The Bully
  • Dog and Pony Shows
  • Forced Agreement
  • Good Guy/Bad Guy
  • Limited Authority
  • Mad Max
  • Passive‐Aggressive Behavior
  • Personal Attacks
  • Phony Facts
  • Silence and Patience
  • Threats and Promises
  • Uproar

DON'T BE A VICTIM—be anchored and buoyant!

Belly‐Up

  • These negotiators “acknowledge” the superior competence of those with whom they interact and say that they will place themselves in the hands of their fair and proficient opponent.
  • Negotiators who encounter a belly‐up bargainer tend to alter their initial position. Instead of opening with the tough “principled” offer they had planned to use, they modify it in favor of their pathetic adversary, who praises them for their reasonableness, but suggests that his client deserves additional assistance.
  • Belly‐up bargainers are the most difficult to deal with, as they effectively refuse to participate in the process. They ask their opponent to permit them to forego traditional auction bargaining due to their professed inability to negotiate. They want their reasonable adversary to do all the work.

Action

  • You must force them to participate and never alter a planned strategy in an effort to form a solution acceptable to such pathetic souls.
  • When belly‐up negotiators characterize initial offers as unacceptable, opponents should make them respond with definitive counteroffers.
  • True belly‐up negotiators often find it very painful to state and defend positions they espouse.

Boulwareism

  • Boulwareism is associated with best offer first or take it or leave it bargaining. Insurance company adjusters occasionally try to establish reputations as people who will make one firm, fair offer for each case. If the plaintiff does not accept that proposal, the company will go to trial. Also called TAKE IT OR LEAVE IT tactic.
  • Negotiators should be hesitant to adopt Boulwareism. The offering party effectively tells the other party that he knows what is best for both sides. Few parties are willing to accord such respect to the view of the opposing side.
  • Boulwareism deprives the opponent of the opportunity to participate meaningfully in the negotiation process.

Action

  • Negotiators presented with take it or leave it offers should not automatically reject them simply because of the paternalistic way in which they have been extended.
  • You must evaluate the amount being proposed. If it is reasonable, accept it.

The Bully

  • Such conduct is usually intended to have an impact similar to that associated with anger. It is supposed to convince an opponent of the seriousness of one's position. It can also be used to maintain control over the agenda.
  • Those who try to counter an aggressive bargainer with a quid pro quo response are likely to fail, due to their inability to be convincing in that role.
  • Negotiators who encounter a particularly abrasive adversary can diminish the impact of his techniques through the use of short, carefully controlled interactions. Telephone discussions might be used to limit each exchange. Face–to‐face meetings could be held to less than an hour. These short interactions may prevent the opponent from achieving aggressive momentum.

Action

  • A few aggressive negotiators try to undermine their opponent's presentation through use of interruptions. Such behavior should not be tolerated. When negotiators are deliberately interrupted, they should either keep talking if they think this will discourage their opponent, or they might say that they do not expect their opponent to speak while they are talking.

Dog and Pony Shows

  • Some negotiators try to enhance their bargaining posture through printed brochures or video presentations. Brochures are often accorded greater respect than verbal recitations, due to the aura of legitimacy generally granted to printed documents.
  • Those presented with dog and pony shows should not accord them more respect than they deserve. Negotiators should treat written representations just as they would identical verbal assertions.

Action

  • If negotiators are provided with brochures before the first negotiating session, they should review them and prepare effective counterarguments, which they can state during discussions.
  • Negotiators should not allow their adversary to use printed materials to seize control of the agenda. Where appropriate, they may wish to prepare their own dog and pony show to graphically depict their view of the situation.

Forced Agreement

  • This technique can occasionally be used against win/lose opponents who do not evaluate their results by how well they have done, but by an assessment of how poorly their adversary has done.
  • They are only satisfied if they think the other side has been forced to accept a terrible burden.

Action

  • Although adroit negotiators may induce a careless, vindictive opponent to provide them with what is really desired, they must recognize that such a device will generally not work against a principled adversary.
  • A typical win/win bargainer would probably accept the other party's disingenuous representations and provide them with the unintended result they have professed to prefer over the alternative that has been renounced.

Good Guy/Bad Guy

  • In the Good Guy/Bad Guy routine, a seemingly reasonable negotiator professes sympathy toward the “generous” concessions made by the other party, while his partner rejects each new offer as insufficient, castigating opponents for their parsimonious concessions.
  • Single negotiators may even use this tactic. They can claim that their absent boss suffers from delusions of grandeur, which must be satisfied if any agreement is to be consummated.

Action

  • Negotiators who encounter these tactics should not directly challenge the scheme.
  • Those who interact with Good Guy/Bad Guy negotiators tend to make the mistake of directing their arguments and offers to the unreasonable participant to obtain approval, when it is often better to seek the acquiescence of the reasonable adversary before trying to satisfy the irrational one.
  • It is always important when dealing with unreasonable opponents to consider what might occur if no mutual accord is achieved. If the overall cost of surrendering to such an adversary's one‐sided demands would clearly be greater that the cost associated with not settling, the interaction should not be continued.

Limited Authority

  • Many people like to indicate during the preliminary stages that they do not have final authority from their company about the matter in dispute. They use this technique to reserve the right to check with their company before any tentative agreement can bind their side.
  • Bargainers who meet opponents initially claiming they lack the authority to bind their company may find it advantageous to say they also lack final authority. This will permit them to “check” with their own absent people before making any final commitment.

Action

  • Negotiators who suspect that an adversary might use this technique may wish to select the one or two items they would most like to have modified in their favor. When their opponent requests changes, they can indicate how relieved they are about this, because their own company is dissatisfied. Then they can offer to exchange their items for those their adversary seeks. It is fascinating to see how quickly the opponent will now insist on honoring the initial accord.
  • The limited‐authority situation must be distinguished from the one where an opponent begins a negotiation with no authority. This adversary hopes to get several concessions prior to actual negotiations with an authorized decision maker.
  • Negotiators should avoid dealing with a no‐authority person, as he is trying to induce them to bargain with themselves.

Mad Max

  • If negotiators become angry, they are likely to offend their opponent and may disclose information that they did not wish to divulge. Negotiators who encounter an adversary who has really lost his temper should look for inadvertent disclosures which that person's anger precipitates.
  • Negotiators often use feigned anger to convince an opponent of the seriousness of their position. This tactic should be used carefully, as it can offend adversaries and induce them to end the interaction.
  • Some negotiators may respond with their own retaliatory diatribe to convince their adversary that they cannot be intimidated by such tactics. A quid pro quo approach involves obvious risks, as a hostile exchange may have a deleterious impact on the bargaining.

Action

  • Negotiators may try to counter an angry outburst with the impression that they have been personally offended. They should say that they cannot understand how their reasonable approach has precipitated such an intemperate challenge. If they are successful, they may be able to make the attacking party feel guilty and embarrassed, shaming the person into a concession.

Passive‐Aggressive Behavior

  • Instead of directly challenging opponents' proposals, passive‐aggressive negotiators use oblique but highly aggressive forms of passive resistance.
  • They show up late for a scheduled session and forget to bring important documents. When they agree to write up the negotiated terms, they fail to do so.

Action

  • Those who deal with a passive‐aggressive opponent must recognize the hostility represented by the behavior and try to seize control.
  • They should get extra copies of important documents just in case their opponent forgets to bring them. They should always prepare a draft of any agreement themselves. Once passive‐aggressive negotiators are presented with a fait accompli, they usually execute the proffered agreement.

Personal Attacks

  • The other side may use verbal or nonverbal communication to make you feel uncomfortable. They can comment on your clothes or your appearance.
  • They can attack your status by making you wait for them or by interrupting the negotiations to deal with other people. They can imply that you are ignorant.
  • They can refuse to listen to you and make you repeat yourself. They can deliberately refuse to make eye contact with you.

Action

  • Recognizing these tactics for what they are will help nullify their effect on you, and mentioning them explicitly will probably prevent a recurrence.

Phony Facts

  • The oldest form of negotiating trickery is to make a knowingly false statement or misrepresentation of the facts.
  • A practice of verifying factual assertions reduces the incentive for deception, as well as your risk of being cheated.
  • Don't call the other party a liar, and don't allow him to treat your doubts as a personal attack. Rather, make the negotiations proceed independent of blind trust in the facts.

Action

  • Deliberate deception is quite different from not fully disclosing one's thinking. Good faith negotiation does not require total disclosure.
  • The use of a neutral third party as a confidential sounding board can often determine whether there is a zone for potential agreement without having to fully disclose sensitive information.

Silence and Patience

  • Many negotiators fear silence, because they are afraid that they will lose control of the transaction if they stop talking. The more they talk, the more information they disclose and the more concessions they make. When their opponents remain silent, such negotiators often become even more talkative.
  • When negotiators have something important to say, they should say it and then keep quiet. A short comment accentuates the importance of what they are saying and provides the other party with the chance to absorb what was said.
  • This rule is crucial when an offer or concession is being made. Once information has been disclosed, it is time for the other side to respond.

Action

  • Patience can be used effectively with silence. When the other negotiator does not readily reply to critical representations, he should be given sufficient time to respond. If it is his turn to speak, the first party should wait silently for him to comment. If the first party feels awkward, he should look at his notes. This behavior shows the silent party that a response will be required before further discussion.

Threats and Promises

  • Threats are intended to show recalcitrant parties that the cost of disagreeing with offers will transcend the cost of acquiescence.
  • Pressure often accomplishes just the opposite of what it is intended to do; it builds up pressure the other way. Instead of making a decision easier for the other side, it often makes it more difficult. The question changes from “Should we make this decision?” to “Shall we cave in?”

Action

  • Good negotiators rarely resort to threats, as there are other more effective ways to communicate the same information. If threats are to be effective, however, they must be believable.
  • Instead of using negative threats that indicate what consequences will result if the opposing party does not alter its position, negotiators should consider affirmative promises that indicate their willingness to change their positions simultaneously with the other party. The classic affirmative promise, the “split the difference” approach, has been used by most negotiators to conclude a transaction. One side promises to move halfway if only the other side will do the same.

Uproar

  • A few negotiators try to obtain an advantage by threatening dire consequences if their opponent does not give them what they want.
  • For example, a board in negotiations with an employees' union might say that it will have to lay off one‐third of the employees due to financial constraints. It will then suggest that it could probably retain everyone if the union would accept a salary freeze.

Action

  • Negotiators confronted with such predictions should ask themselves two crucial questions:
    1. What is the likelihood that the consequences will occur?
    2. What would happen to the other party if the consequences actually occurred?
  • In many cases, it will be obvious that the threatened results will never happen. In others, it will be clear that the consequences would be as bad or worse for the other side as for the threatened party.
  • Bargainers occasionally may have to call an opponent's bluff. If union negotiators were to indicate that they could accept the layoffs if the board would only raise salaries for the remaining employees by 30 percent, the board representatives would probably panic. They know the company could not realistically function with such layoffs. They were merely hoping that the union would not come to the same realization.
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