The example of climate engineering, which has been an object of discussion for several years, refers to how we handle climate change and is therefore very different in character from the other fields of RRI presented in this book. Nonetheless, climate engineering exhibits similar challenges for the RRI debate because of the relevance of temporally far-reaching and thus extremely uncertain technology futures. If the debate over responsibility is conducted in a consequentialist manner with reference to the presumable consequences of climate engineering, it too is threatened by epistemological nirvana (Chapter 3). Consideration of the technology futures of climate engineering from a hermeneutic perspective leads to a corresponding result.
For decades, climate change has been a major topic in scientific, philosophical, public and political debates. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change and the regular international climate change conferences, most recently that held in Paris in 2015, are their most visible expression at a global level. The diagnoses of the causes, the attributions of responsibility, suggested solutions and problems of implementation have become a regular component of social conflict at the national, regional and local level. From today’s point of view, it is possible to distinguish three phases of the climate debate [GAR 10a]:
Climate engineering has thus attracted a great deal of attention in light of expected major global problems that are generally thought to be caused by climate change. Again and again, it is stated that “tipping points” may exist in the climate system with potentially catastrophic consequences. The conclusion has been drawn that humankind should prepare itself and develop strategies to counteract climate change by active interventions into the climate system aiming at cooling effects. Many scientists, however, dismiss climate engineering because of unpredictable, dangerous and irreversible side effects and also argue against research commitment and funding that is too high [ROB 08]. Politics is interested in the suggested concepts because they could be adapted to fit national and international strategies of environmental and climate policies. Prerequisites to take up climate engineering as an acceptable tool would be safety, economic viability and public acceptance.
“However, we are facing an unfortunate reality. The global climate is already changing and the onset of climate change impacts may outpace the world’s political, technical, and economic capacities to prevent and adapt to them. Therefore, policymakers should begin consideration of climate engineering research now to better understand which technologies or methods, if any, represent viable stopgap strategies for managing our changing climate and which pose unacceptable risks” [GOR 10].
The nature of this argument, given its references to highly uncertain knowledge about consequences in both directions – for and against climate engineering – and the high relevance attributed at the same time to decisions on climate policy make orientation, on the one hand, urgently necessary but, on the other hand, also difficult if not impossible to achieve in a consequentialist manner. Climate engineering is consequently a suitable case study for this book’s propositions (see Chapter 1).
Lurking behind the three-stage history of the climate debate are different expectations placed on technology. In general, the relationship between technology and sustainability is ambivalent. Technology is one of the factors causing sustainability problems such as climate change, yet great hopes are also placed in technology as a solution to those problems. Technology is equally a cause of the problems as it is a solution to them [GRU 12d]. The views of technology as a solution have differed in the three stages of the debate:
This chapter briefly presents, first, in contrast to the possible limitations of the previous approaches (section 8.2), the technical options offered by climate engineering (section 8.3). Then the opportunities and risks posed by climate engineering measures are considered in the conventional consequentialist mode (section 8.4), whose limits can be quickly recognized. This is the motivation for the question regarding the shift or extension of the object of responsibility (Chapter 3) in the RRI debate over climate engineering. In fact, we see that the debate about climate engineering itself – and not just concrete technological measures – has consequences that are or could be relevant even in the present. It is therefore important for them to also be made a topic in the RRI debate (section 8.5). This opens the hermeneutic dimension of climate engineering, which in conclusion provides the reason to subject the imperative of responsibility [JON 84] to a reinterpretation in situations of this type.
Since the industrial revolution, mankind has interfered in the climate system to an increasing degree, especially through the discharge of carbon dioxide from the use of fossil fuels, but also through the emissions of methane in agriculture and other greenhouse gases. Since the emissions of greenhouse gases that are caused by man are the primary cause of global warming [IPC 14], the therapy appears to be obvious: to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases, for example, by using more efficient technology, by replacing fossil energy carriers with renewable energy and by living a more sustainable lifestyle. Admittedly, our previous success has been modest, at best. Worldwide, the emission of greenhouse gases continues to increase (by 5.8% in 2012). This trend will continue for a long time even if mitigating measures should have an impact on a larger scale. Significant reasons for this are the continued strong global growth in population, economic growth in large portions of the world that leads to a higher consumption of energy and to more emissions, insufficient efforts at mitigation in many industrialized countries and the partially rapid economic development in the emerging economies of countries such as China, India and Brazil as well as in many developing countries1.
In the meantime, the fact that adaptation strategies are necessary has been accepted as a matter of course. The point is to live with climate change, i.e. to make preparations for an increase in sea level and for an increase in the number and dramatic nature of extreme meteorological events. Today, it almost appears noteworthy that a good 10 years ago it was not politically correct in Germany to even talk in public about adapting to climate change. It was feared that this could undermine a systematic implementation of mitigation strategies [STE 08].
Yet, there are limits to adaptation strategies should climate change exceed certain thresholds. In view of the sluggish political steps in the last few decades2, the inertia of the switch to non-fossil sources of energy at the global level, economic growth in the emerging economies that gives little consideration to ecological interests and the continued growth in the Earth’s population with an increasing hunger for energy, concerns are increasing that dramatic consequences of climate change are becoming more probable. The climate could tip, as some fear. Developments that are dangerous and hard to predict could take place, such as:
Such developments that could occur if the climate exceeded tipping points (assumed but not proven) could make adaptation increasingly difficult if not impossible. Positive, i.e. self-reinforcing, feedback effects could lead to a world in many parts of which the climate conditions would no longer be comfortable for humans, to put it cautiously.
The debate over climate engineering [BUN 09, ELL 10, GAR 10b] cannot be understood without being aware of the growing skepticism that the strategies of mitigation and adaptation may not suffice to keep the climate in a range that is hospitable to life and humans. Even though this is just a matter of concern and not reliable prognoses or even just plausible scenarios, it is comprehensible and perhaps even morally imperative for us to undertake precautionary considerations to search for further possibilities for dealing with the consequences of climate change.
Climate engineering was introduced into the debate as a possible measure of last resort to intentionally influence the climate system for the purpose of cooling the Earth. It is supposed to be developed as a last chance (ultima ratio) should all other efforts to contain climate change fail [CRU 06]. This is precautionary argumentation. Measures for climate engineering are to be studied and developed in order to be prepared for emergencies in climate change. Accordingly, climate engineering is only to be employed in such emergencies. Otherwise, the efforts to mitigate and adapt should be continued and intensified. Climate engineering is supposed to be, one could say metaphorically, something like a fire extinguisher that is hanging on the wall for an emergency and whose availability of course does not make fire prevention measures obsolete.
Climate engineering differs from mitigation and adaptation in its fundamentally different perspective on the climate system. It is seen with the eyes of an engineer as an entire system which could be managed by engineering intervention. While climate change has so far been an unintended consequence of industrialization and economic growth, the objective is now to identify intentional interventions to counteract climate change. Features are being sought that can be adjusted, just like a set screw, in order to be used technically to achieve an impact on the climate in order to cool the Earth. There are two conceptually differing approaches:
These options differ greatly in many regards. What they have in common is the high degree of unawareness and uncertainty about their use and possible consequences. CDR measures would have to be employed on a large scale and would nonetheless work very slowly. By the time we could know whether and how well they were working, it might be too late if there were an emergency in the development of the climate. Most thought has therefore been focused on modifying the composition of the atmosphere in a targeted manner so that a cooling effect would occur as rapidly as possible. The topic that is most commonly mentioned is the sulfur option, which was already noted by Crutzen [CRU 06]. A role model is nature itself in view of the observation that there was a measureable reduction in global temperatures for several years as a consequence of powerful volcano eruptions, which are linked to the discharge of sulfate aerosols into the upper atmosphere [LEI 10, p. 28ff.].
First model calculations show that the insertion of approximately a million tons of sulfate aerosols into the upper layers of the atmosphere could achieve a significant cooling effect. This would occur practically immediately, making this option appear destined for use in a climate emergency. Gravity, however, would gradually pull the aerosols down to the ground so that they would have to be reinserted after a certain period, which is calculated to be several years. The extent of the desired cooling could be regulated by adjusting the concentration of the aerosols. This would then even make it possible to fine tune the global mean temperature.
The aerosols could be spread by a fleet of airplanes. Initial very rough calculations of the costs run to several billion dollars a year, which would be downright little compared to the estimated costs of adaptation to climate change. An implementation of this option would be significantly more difficult because of unresolved legal issues. It is uncertain at which political level a decision could be made about a technology with such an undoubtedly global impact and how diverging interests should be handled [WIE 10].
Viewed superficially, the sulfate option seems to be – in terms of technology and economics – an astonishingly simple solution to climate change. If greenhouse gases caused by humans lead to the warming, the sulfates could in the same way be an appropriate antidote that uses a cooling effect to compensate for the warming. To use the metaphor of the fire extinguisher: if a fire starts despite all the preventive measures, then you need a rapidly working fire extinguisher. In case the avoidance strategies are not sufficient to keep the climate in a range that is compatible with human life, or in case unforeseen systemic effects occur that could trigger a substantial acceleration of climate change, a rapidly working measure from climate engineering could possibly prevent or help to mitigate catastrophic developments, at least for a limited period. It would therefore be good, according to this argumentation, to have climate engineering technology at our disposal in order to be able to employ them in an emergency.
In addition to this central argument for the development (not the use) of climate engineering technology [CRU 06], other arguments have also been given [BET 12a, BET 13, OTT 10, SCH 96]. Climate engineering will increase the number of options for dealing with climate change, providing more options for the coming generations. The “lesser evil argument” operates under the assumption that climate engineering itself is the lesser evil than unchecked climate change, even if it were to have unintended consequences of its own. Climate engineering, especially the aerosol option, would ultimately constitute a response that is economically much more efficient and easier to implement than painstaking and economically expensive strategies of mitigation and adaptation, a reorganization of the economic system or even a change in lifestyles. Adopting this last option would, however, depart from the line that Crutzen [CRU 06] takes that climate engineering may only play the role of an emergency technology. In contrast, intended technological interventions in the climate system are considered a genuine substitute for mitigation and adaptation in this argumentation [BET 13]. This concludes the small set of narratives concerning the potential of climate engineering.
The fundamental motivation for reflecting on climate engineering is fed by concern about the possible failure or inadequacy of mitigation and adaptation (see section 8.2) and is ethically legitimate on the basis of precautionary arguments. Yet even if the ultima ratio arguments are taken seriously, the risks have to be analyzed carefully and integrated into an overall assessment. The ultima ratio argument does not create blanket legitimation for climate engineering but solely legitimation for it to be taken into account. Considering the possible negative effects and balancing them with the benefits are necessary prerequisites.
The fundamental ambivalence of technology has been generally acknowledged for several decades. In particular, the manifestation of unintended and often problematic side effects in the environmental sphere was one of the factors motivating the establishment of technology assessment [GRU 09a]. Similarly, climate change can also be interpreted as an unintended consequence of the techno-economic progress of the last 200 years. Carbon dioxide, the most important greenhouse gas, is inevitably generated during the utilization of fossil energy carriers whose use is central to the global economy. While the point of mitigation is to reduce the unintended consequences and thus go to the root of the problem, climate engineering addresses the symptoms of climate change at the end of the causal chain. Historically, a belated repair of damages that have already appeared is not unusual. New types of technology are often employed to cope with the unintended consequences of older forms of technology. History shows that as a rule, these new forms then also have unintended consequences [GRU 09a]. One of the driving forces of technological progress is for new technology to cope with the unintended consequences of earlier technology.
Thus, with climate engineering, there are also questions as to the unintended consequences and risks, as to their specific characteristics and as to their possible extent. Even if we often cannot make a final judgment on this due to our inadequate knowledge, it is possible to distinguish the following areas of risk (for example the aerosol option) [BET 13, OTT 10, GRU 11d, ROB 08]:
These stories of risk do not represent secure or even reliable knowledge, but are speculative. They can be regarded as expression of the ethical obligation that we must consider the distant effects of our actions [JON 84]. However, the results of these efforts cannot be qualified epistemologically. It is unclear how plausible, to be expected, or probable the chances and risks are. The attribution of quantitative probabilities of occurrence and the amount of damage is clearly not possible due to the deficits in our knowledge. Balancing the chances and risks fails because of our insufficient knowledge of the consequences. The consequentialist view does not provide orientation for action but leads to perplexity (Chapter 3) or ideology.
Perplexity can be carried to extremes. On the one hand is the ultima ratio argument. Let us assume that the previous and future measures for mitigation and adaptation cannot keep the climate within tolerable limits. The opposite of this assumption can at any rate not be proven. Accordingly, it would be a moral obligation to study climate engineering and to make it applicable. Forgoing climate engineering would endanger the continued existence of a humane form of life on the Earth and would thus violate Hans Jonas’s categorical imperative [JON 84].
The above-named risks can, however, also lead to the opposite conclusion. Let us assume that climate engineering measures were developed. The development would result in a reduction in the efforts to achieve adaptation and mitigation. Climate change would hardly be slowed down, and it could in fact lead to dramatic developments. Climate engineering would then be employed as a form of emergency technology. Yet if after some time there were dramatic side effects for ecosystems, then the only alternative would be to abandon it, risking the increase in temperatures that might follow, or to accept the risk of serious and further escalating ecological consequences. In both cases, the entirety of human life on the planet Earth would be endangered, which must be avoided according to Jonas. It would thus be a consequence of the categorical imperative to not develop climate engineering [JON 84].
The result of this is a typical aporia. To act in accordance with the imperative of the ethics of responsibility demands at one and the same time the development of climate engineering as well as the refusal to pursue this development. Taken to an extreme, this represents the collapse of consequentialist argumentation (Chapter 3).
Currently, it is impossible to resolve this aporia. We lack the empirical and the modeling knowledge about the possible technical options, their conditions of use and their consequences. Viewed in this light, additional research in engineering, natural, social and legal sciences appears to be a legitimate task, if not one that is prescribed, to enable us first of all to assess the technical options. As long as this is not possible in view of the speculative nature of the statements about chances and risks, our only alternative is to ask about other forms of orientation.
One possibility for searching for orientation consists of asking whether climate engineering has a meaning that goes beyond technology and its immediate application. Uncovering such meaning could support the RRI debates without having to argue in a consequentialist manner (section 8.5.1). Furthermore, in accordance with the idea of extending the subject area of responsibility (Chapter 2), we can ask about responsibility for current communication (section 8.5.2).
Controversies that go far beyond this type of technology resonate in the debate over climate engineering. Climate engineering appeals to techno-visionary futures, climate futures, even Earth futures and the futures of the relationships between man and technology and between man and nature, which have one thing in common: they address very fundamental issues. The explication of these issues and the determination of the meaning of the controversial answers contribute to the transparency of the debate. It is thus an element of the self-enlightenment of these debates. In the following, this is presented exemplarily with regard to the discussion about the role of technological progress in achieving an environmentally friendly development.
The relation between technological advance and solving the environmental crisis is ambivalent. On the one hand, overcoming the major environmental problems of the present day seems to be inconceivable without further technological progress and the utilization of its results. On the other hand, however, climate change is largely attributable to the technological progress of the past 250 years. As early as in 1984, Hans Jonas’s prime concern regarding the ethics of technology was not for technology that does not work and, e.g., leads to serious accidents. His diagnosis instead was that major problems were caused by technology in full working order: namely, through the unintended, in part unexpected side effects which are often felt only much later and more gradually. Our situation today reads like a confirmation of this diagnosis: climate change is the result of technology that works, e.g., in the form of combustion engines or fossil power plants. However, different conclusions may be drawn from this observation, following an analysis by Ehlers/Kerschner [EHL 14] on different types of technophile, technophobe and technocrat perceptions of the role of technology (following the interpretation by Grunwald [GRU 16d]):
In the debate of the last few decades, different expressions and emphases of the second and third position have largely prevailed, while the first position outlined above has virtually disappeared from view, at least in public debate. The main idea is that by significantly boosting the efficiency of technology, it would be possible to reduce the consumption of resources as well as environmental pollution [VON 09].
Recently, the Ecomodernist Manifesto [MAN 15] made a strong claim in this debate in favor of the role of technology. It did not mention climate engineering explicitly but it is easy to imagine what the authors might think about it. The designation “ecomodernism” adopted for their statements is highly appropriate. The “eco” prefix points to the fact that the dramatic ecological problems of the present day are indeed taken seriously when it comes, e.g. to climate change. The “modernist” tag refers to the fundamental way in which the environmental crisis may be overcome. This happens entirely within the framework of traditional modernist notions of progress that in the last resort go back to David Hume and Francis Bacon and might be called “Baconism” [SCH 93a, OTT 13]. A most comprehensive emancipation and decoupling of human civilization from nature should be achieved by consistently pursuing this program of enlightenment. According to the authors, the environmental crisis illustrates that this emancipation has not been fully accomplished to date. Instead of reaching the conclusion – like the majority of the European environmental movement has done – that it is necessary to turn back from the path of classical modernity, the ecomodernists’ message is that humankind should not grind to a halt and then turn back at the halfway point but should move forward emphatically and indeed at a faster rate.
This position conflicts sharply with many present-day analyses that in fact regard the basic premises of classical modernity as one of the causes of the environmental crisis. They claim that a purely instrumental understanding of nature, great trust both in the problem-solving capacity of technological progress and in aiming at gaining full dominion over nature have led to the irresponsible exploitation of planet Earth. Hence, continuing to advocate a classical modernist approach would be the wrong conclusion [MEY 84]. Modernist-critical analyses going at least as far back as the “Dialectic of Enlightenment” [HOR 47] have resulted in a call for fundamental corrections to the traditional modernist model, e.g. in the model of “reflexive modernization” [BEC 92] or “alternative modernity” [FEE 95]. At the core of those theories is the diagnosis that the classical modernity shows inherently produced, dialectic, self-destroying consequences among which the environmental crisis is one example.
The Ecomodernist Manifesto takes a contrasting position and looks for the solution of the environmental problems within the paradigm of classical modernity [GRU 16d]. The authors point out that technological advances achieved to date have already led to a significant reduction in per capita nature consumption (e.g. the area required to provide sustenance for a human being). Hence, it would be misguided to reverse this trend (e.g. through alternative extensive agriculture requiring more land); instead, it would need to be speeded up. The ideal expressed in the Manifesto is that of a human society that becomes largely emancipated from the natural world and organizes itself independently of natural resources:
“Intensifying many human activities – particularly farming, energy extraction, forestry, and settlement – so that they use less land and interfere less with the natural world is the key to decoupling human development from environmental impacts” [MAN 15, p. 7].
Without a doubt, climate engineering is in line with the Ecomodernist Manifesto. Viewed from a higher level, climate engineering is also an act of technological emancipation from nature. Accordingly, we should no longer be dependent on the climate but determine what our climate should be by using technological means. Confidence in technological feasibility is unbroken in this approach.3 Consequently, climate engineering is, in the sense of Baconism, an expression of a conviction that expects technological progress to provide the solution to all of our problems. If this does not succeed immediately, then – these authors are convinced – this should not let us doubt the sense of technological progress but motivate us to further accelerate it. Thus, climate engineering of course also belongs to the developments whose confidence in technological progress leads them to bet everything on one card and thus get caught up in the accusation of being moral gamblers [GRU 16d].
Already Hans Jonas [JON 84] has warned against making “the whole” the stake in a bet, yet this is precisely what the ecomodernist position does [GRU 16d]: it relies utterly on technological progress, thus making the future development in the Anthropocene entirely dependent on this reliance on technological progress being justified and opening up the path to a sustainable future. Yet, in the case that this hope is not fulfilled – and this is indeed a possibility following the experiences of unintended side effects of technology – grave problems would be possible or indeed probable. “The whole”, according to Hans Jonas, would come under threat. The conclusion in this context is that the ecomodernist position relies on unjustifiable premises and takes them further still by calling for the acceleration of technological progress. In the last resort, ecomodernism is the position of a moral gambler who bets everything on one horse.
Considered in this light, climate engineering is only one example of the more in-depth debate on the sustainable development of mankind and on a reflected relationship between man and nature. The debate on climate engineering could signify a return of optimistic technology fantasies of achieving nearly complete control over global nature. Climate engineering would be anything but a gentle intervention in natural processes; at least according to the SRM options [ETC 10], it would be a massive, large-scale technological intervention. Climate engineering contrasts modest life “in accordance with nature” [MEY 84] with the greatest possible control of nature, expressed here in the form of the climate system. A possible return of man’s power and control fantasies in the context of the Bacon project entails the danger that the lessons learned from previous experience [e.g. VAN 99, GRU 09a] with attempted but unsuccessful control are lost again and may possibly have to be learned anew in a painful manner.
The chances and risks of climate engineering are largely speculative, but what is anything but speculative is that a scientific and political debate over climate engineering is already taking place [ROY 09, COR 10, CAV 14]. This debate operates with techno-visionary futures, regardless of the chances or the risks, and is already having real consequences, even if they may not already be fully apparent. At any rate, research programs have already been established, such as a focus program of the German Research Foundation (DFG). This topic has also already reached the debate on climate policy [IPC 14].
It is thus entirely in the sense of an expansion of the subject area of responsibility (Chapter 2) to ask which consequences can be expected from the debate taking place today or perhaps can already be observed. They are not consequences in an epistemological nirvana of the chances and risks posed by climate engineering but the consequences of the mood of today’s debate. And the question must be asked what this means for responsibility. At this point, we must first draw attention to the dimension of the consequences of today’s communication that are not the consequence of applied technology but refer to the consequences of a still very speculative debate over climate engineering, namely, what is called the “moral hazard argument” [COR 10, OTT 10, BET 13].
Communication about climate engineering, especially the hopes tied to it, could lead people to become less serious in their pursuit of avoidance strategies. In the worst case, the consequence could be an attitude of “more of the same” or “continue business as usual” with regard to the utilization of fossil energy carriers. Change strategies for establishing a sustainable energy supply could be thwarted. Different psychological and socio-economic mechanisms could contribute to undermining other climate protection measures. Curing the symptoms (here climate change), for example by using the sulfate option (section 8.3), appears much more comfortable than fighting the causes of climate change, which would ultimately mean a transformation of entire economies and setting other priorities in politics and lifestyles. Resources that will be made available for research on climate engineering could no longer be assigned for the study of other climate protection measures. The financial support of climate engineering could even create interest groups that reject mitigation measures [BET 13]. If, however, the measures for climate engineering would not satisfy the expectations placed in them or have unacceptable side effects, a threatening situation could arise quickly. With reference to section 8.5.1, it could be feared that the greatest risk, going beyond the climate problem, posed by communication about climate engineering might possibly be to motivate a renewed lack of concern resulting from a blind confidence in technological solutions, out of which there would at some point have to be a rude awakening.
It is difficult to answer whether this too amounts to purely speculative anxieties or whether the communicative interventions of the climate engineering debate have already initiated a backing away from mitigation and adaptation. Apparently, this has not been openly discussed yet. However, during coffee breaks at the relevant conferences, precisely this can be heard over and over again, in particular from industry and business representatives. Admittedly, this is only an anecdotal observation without any claim to empirical validity. Scientific sensors for detection of such possible shifts in perception at an early stage are lacking.
This communication on climate engineering should be conducted in a responsible manner due to its character, as intervention in ongoing developments on climate policy is trivial from an ethical perspective (Chapter 2). There is the question, however, concerning what responsibility can mean here and which consequences follow from reflection on the ethics of responsibility. Finally, the consequences in this regard also range from uncertain to speculative. It is not as if the mere possibility that climate engineering could obstruct mitigation could remove the validity of an ultima ratio argument. Apparently, the imperative that the debate is to be conducted in a responsible manner also does not lead to clear orientation regarding action, with one exception. According to the demands of a transparent debate, it is necessary to clarify the premises and intentions, the diagnoses carried out in them, the value judgments contained in them and much more. This can, for example, take place by philosophical analyses of the argumentation and discourse [BET 12a] and would be aligned with the “old European” line of argumentation of this book to view self-enlightenment as both valuable and necessary as well as possible.
At this point, I will only briefly mention a topic whose inclusion here would go beyond the scope of this book. It has often been noted that the imperative of responsibility [JON 84] rides on precisely the same aporia that was identified above for climate engineering. In the texts “The Heuristics of Fear” and “Prevalence of the Bad over the Good Prognosis”, Jonas [JON 84] considers the pure conceivability of action A having catastrophic consequences as being sufficient to raise a demand for a cessation of action A. This, however, regularly results in aporias of the same type. The low threshold represented by pure conceivability can as a rule lead to thoughts about consequences according to which both the execution of action A and its rejection might result in catastrophic consequences. Action A is therefore supposed to be carried out as well as rejected. This consideration obviously does not lead us any further.
The reason for this is that the pure conceivability of the consequences of future actions does not constitute a suitable basis for drawing conclusions. Purely conceivable considerations of consequences are arbitrary and do not suffice as a basis for deriving orientation (see also Chapter 3). The question is whether this argumentative weakness in the imperative of responsibility could be overcome through the inclusion of a hermeneutic perspective.
At the very least, the present book shows in several examples that something can be learned from technology debates, techno-visionary futures and controversies over definitions and characterizations of new fields of technology even in the absence of knowledge about their consequences. The proposal that the subject area of reflection on responsibility should be extended (Chapter 2; on climate engineering section 8.5) could contribute to overcoming the restriction of the imperative of responsibility to the distant impact of new forms of technology and to asking about the responsibility for the course of today’s debates and decision-making processes. This would constitute contributions to self-enlightenment and orientation in present-day debates, not more and not less. It is still expected that this will lead in the medium term to a responsible implementation and use of future forms of technology.