CHAPTER 6: PROTECTIVE SECURITY

6.1 Context

“In business, if we don’t gain insights from foresight, we risk learning from hindsight—and a lot more expensively. The life and death of our business can depend upon it.” – Former US Navy SEAL Commander, Bob Schoultz (1)

This chapter aims to dig beneath the surface of protective security functions; job roles often glamorised and misunderstood by those who have not been privy to the many opportunities presented by the protective security sector. Associated with the more muscular domains of physical security – such as ship security and close protection – the protective security field has become professionalised at a rapid pace across many environments in recent times. Much successful tradecraft within protective security management is discreet, behind-the-scenes planning, and also an increasing reliance on soft skills that are compatible with corporate environments and tasks which may involve de-escalating conflict situations. Several sub-chapters have been devised in order to help the reader understand the planning and protocols that govern this sphere of security operation. These sub-sections are:

6.2  Methods of risk assessment

6.3  How to conduct a person-focused threat assessment

6.4  The ethos and expectations of protective security roles; ‘adaptive practitioners’

6.5  Anti-piracy; market, countermeasures and agencies

6.6  Firearms

6.7  Management of ‘action-oriented’ individuals

6.8  Protective security management standards

6.9  Wrap-up: what can give consultancies the competitive edge in fast emerging markets?

Protective security refers to the domain of security most associated with guarding persons, or assets, of high national or organisational value. The word protection derives from a Latin term meaning cover in front. During their working life, protective security agents can experience a ludicrous diversity of roles. A pal of mine spent the best part of a year accompanying a pop star’s pooch around the world. This was an important role, “because if the dog was happy then the principal was happy”, explained the agent (2). Some jobs can be quite static in nature. Such as maintaining a presence at, or monitoring, various residences. Or spending weeks at sea, guarding valuable cargo. Many females with law enforcement or military backgrounds are particularly well placed to chaperone prominent middle and far eastern families around the world to the most luxurious shopping and financial districts. Protective security roles can often be highly dynamic, kinetic and changeable and demand a large degree of patience, physical fitness and personal discomfort. This is because the job follows the threat, which is usually a highly mobile person, known in security parlance as The Principal. Such severe operational stresses demand that protective security specialists do retain continued situational awareness, adhere to peak levels of self-discipline, and are able to consider, or anticipate, an almost-immeasurable range of risks that may possess the potential to fell any principal. Unlike organisations (which are groups of people and teams that can transfer or tolerate risk), the ultimate safety of one principal human being does mean that much of the close protection operative’s role is about avoiding big risk in the first place. This may appear in contrast to Hollywood, and now Bollywood’s, conveyor belt of depictions about glamorous bodyguards.

Nevertheless, such artistic licence from film-makers, is perhaps a significant plus point for our industry. Such an aura of excitement does undoubtedly help to attract a huge amount of enthusiastic recruits into a growing reservoir of employment and business opportunities. But it does tend to be the more mundane business approaches, including decent research, presentational and networking skills that provide protective security agents with the competitive edge, as we shall read from various interviews conducted and related later in this chapter.

Team leaders and all protective security agents should be well versed in local crime, kidnap and terrorism data. In deciding how to allocate resources, they should be able to distinguish between high-profile media stories that may temporarily seize popular attention on one hand, and the granular ground-truth facts, which may be a whole lot different on sober reflection. For example, although terrorism has been on the increase since 2000, The Global Terrorism Index concludes that the phenomenon is “… relatively small when compared to the 437,000 people killed [globally] by homicides in 2012, this being 40 times greater” (3).

Protective security operatives should know where and what is safe, and where and what is less so, in any domain. Moreover, making sweeping judgements about a locality based upon simplistic, and often dormant, national data, can cause reputational damage for any ill-prepared protective security company. More often than not, expertise and proactivity with the client around managing more mundane risk scenarios, provides the real service value. Knowing local routes to hospitals, airports, train stations … and knowing contacts at each. Or carrying tissues and deodorants, mouth mints, pocket torches, first aid kits, a couple of decent up-to-date newspapers, weather reports, spare phones and chargers … are all handy attributes and items that will endear a security agent to their client. (These plus points will sometimes embarrass the client’s own full-time support staff in the process!) Expertise and prior planning around evacuation and other emergency planning – in order to mitigate big ticket risks, such as severe weather, personal confrontations, political disturbances and natural disasters – is clearly a must-have skill for protective security professionals. The capacity and capability of a security agency to provide calm leadership and viable solutions in a crisis, may well be the very reason that a client has chosen a specific company rather than their main competition. “Reliability and dependability are among the most important attributes of a protective security agent”, says Paul Brown, an experienced UK-based close protection trainer and former Royal Household police bodyguard (4).

Anecdotal accounts suggest that there are more protective security sector jobs, often referred to as close protection, or executive protection, within the private sector compared to public-owned authorities, such as police or military institutions. This pattern has been augmented by wide-scale moves by large government customers to turn to private contractors and consultants in order to provide solutions; often in hostile environments. For example, in Iraq, for the several years that followed US-led military operations, one publication reported that some 30,000 close protection roles were available (6). In the UK House of Commons, then Metropolitan Police Head of Specialist Operations, John Yates, told a Parliamentary Committee that, “Protection cannot be immune from the current fiscal climate”, which could be a pointer that even domestic protective security agencies in some countries will soon be opened up to private sector providers. In the UK, taxpayers were funding budgets of some £130 million per year, for providing official protection to the Royal Family and some high-profile Members of Parliament (7). The UK is not the only country where such increased costs for protective security were said to be becoming unsustainable by many influential police and political leaders.

6.2 Methods of risk assessment

This book will not dwell too much upon hazards that protective security agents and their clients face in the line of duty. Suffice to say, hostile and fragile environments do provide for extremely dangerous working environments. Therefore, anticipating threats and risks posed to workers and organisations in such environments is both business-critical and life-saving. Private security contractors are, at times, under more threats than regular soldiers or armed combatants. Recently in Afghanistan, the Congressional Research Service found that private contractors were 2.75 times more likely to be killed than US armed forces personnel. This figure rose exponentially, to around eight times, for security agents working more ‘mobile’ patterns (8). In many operating environments, political, economic and legal domains can be treacherous too, in addition to the physical security environment. Popular protective security recruitment markets – including Afghanistan (8/100), Libya (15/100), Iraq (16/100), South Sudan (14/100), Nigeria (25/100), The Ukraine (25/100) and Russia (28/100) – fall within the world’s most corrupt operating environments, according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index 2013 (9).^*

Drawing such in-country threats and risks together is an inordinately difficult and long exercise. Certain types of threat-assessment work will also demand that security managers and consultants integrate their own company’s risk analysis with the other pre-existing organisational resilience strategies that may already be firmly embedded by the client, and thus familiar to some of the client or principal’s own team. The merger of different risk assessment approaches can often create the most difficult hurdles for any security contractor who knows what the client has to do to improve security, but is often hitting a cultural wall with the client, or their support team, because the new suggestions destabilise existing resilience structures or emergency plans that a client is comfortable with. Security consultants therefore “should push as much as possible to develop a close and effective partnership with the senior corporate security or resilience director at headquarters level”, says Jon Hill, Managing Director of Operations Group, a UK-based close protection training and deployment company. “It may be that consultants have the local or technical expertise, and would have been specifically recruited for these attributes. But they still must ensure that their proposed risk assessment and mitigation plans are accepted and integrated by the client or principal before an operation. A difficult conversation or two to set out parameters beforehand can save several megawatts of tension and recriminations at a later date, especially after a crisis (10).”

It is this author’s firm view that, at the time of writing, it is impossible to see into the future. Therefore, as a corollary, it remains impossible to predict the size, scale and type of a risk. Despite this rather inconvenient fact, a risk assessment process is the critical ingredient to any successful protective security operation. Security management guru, John Fay, wrote: “A good deal of the analytical input comes from knowing the current nature of the threat, tapping into one’s base of experience and applying good old-fashioned common sense” (11). A plethora of security risk assessment models exist to help us process, and even calculate, Fay’s sound advice. Moreover, the range and ingenuity of so many risk models does rather pay testament to the security industry’s professionalisation in recent times. But now there is also fair criticism from within the industry that some protective security functions are becoming over-planned, or micro-managed, by a surge of well-intended guidance and standards documents on related issues, such as crisis management or organisational resilience. This is a moot point. But, undoubtedly, the kinetic and unpredictable nature of protective security operations does often lead security operators to abandon (or not even begin) the cool-headed, neutral, monitoring and analysis of threats and risks. Time and opportunity for background research may well be scarce but if some do lapse into this unfortunate mode of unthinking ‘autopilot’, then how will they be able to see any major risks emerging and, thus be prepared to put in place various treatments to counter or avoid them?

A further dilemma may be to what extent security consultants, including close protection operatives, should enter the sphere of health and safety operations within their assessments? For the successful functioning of both security and safety remits, it is far better for there to be overlap rather than underlap. Even if this does mean figuratively ‘stepping on a few toes’ within the client and/or principal’s sphere. In the aftermath of a serious safety glitch, such as a principal being caught up in a house fire, or slipping and cutting their head badly, to pithily argue a job demarcation line could well lose a security practitioner the prospect of repeat business!

In order to bring some sense of control and structure to assist in the pre-planning for risk-based scenarios, this book will now outline five simple risk assessment models that seem to be favoured by those interviewed for this publication:

Model 1: HSE five step risk assessment

Step 1: Identify the hazards

Step 2: Decide who might be harmed and how

Step 3: Evaluate the risks and decide on precaution

Step 4: Record your findings and implement them

Step 5: Review your assessment and update if necessary

Source: UK Health and Safety Executive, 2014 (12)

Such a hazard identification process does begin to propel an organisation into a risk consideration culture, without necessarily demanding that the likelihood and severity of risks be much debated or calculated. In environments where risk analysis and risk management approaches may not yet have matured (such as civilian environments, or in some emerging markets), the HSE hazard identification tool may be an ideal starting point to engage local customers. Some security companies have been known to offer a free initial, basic risk assessment.

Model 2: Quantitative risk assessment matrix

Source: The Scottish Government, 2014 (13)

This type of risk assessment matrix enables assessors to allocate simple scored ratings to the likelihood of threats occurring. They then estimate any potential impact that will ‘hit’ the victim organisation. Ratings out of three, five, or seven, are most common-place with quantitative risk calculations. Colour codes are then usually deployed into the matrix, in order to illuminate what risks should be prioritised (or passed over) for treatment. A shade of red will usually indicate a high or major risk. Yellow to amber may indicate a medium/moderate risk. While a light yellow or green background shading often indicates a negligible/low risk. This model provides a more visible and memorable matrix for team members and influential managers/directors. It is, in essence, a scorecard with ratings. But it can lead to internal organisational pontification and sign-off issues, as fellow colleagues sometimes become too absorbed in debating the scoring and challenging the scorers!

Model 3: Qualitative risk assessment matrix

Source: Advanced Diving Systems website, 2014 (14)

Again, with this model, results are colour coded, with green indicating a lower and possibly acceptable risk. Yellow/amber indicates a medium risk which is usually acceptable to an organisation provided that some mitigation measures are put into effect. Red indicates an unacceptable level of risk and tangible action should be immediately taken. This method again provides a clear visualisation of whether additional measures should be taken.

Model 4: Swiss cheese model

Source: Risk Management Magazine, Australia (15)

Each safety barrier, or defence mechanism that is in place to mitigate any particular hazard, is represented by a slice of Swiss cheese. The model was developed by Dr James Reason in order to provide reflective learning evaluation of major accidents. Reason showed, through isomorphic lessons, that crises tended to develop from untreated multiple, smaller failures, leading up to the actual major scenario. Reason’s model is often used in the aviation sector. Reason’s focus was to look at business intangibles – perhaps most crucially – the culture of a workplace and the approach to risk-based activities. According to risk analysis authors, Pearce and Flavell, who also deployed this model: “The Chernobyl disaster in 1987 triggered an acceleration of thinking about the role of culture in managing workplace risk” (16).

Model 5: Bow tie model

The bow tie method is popular within the oil and gas sector and enables users “to conceptualise the interaction of causes, controls and consequences of a risk” (Bow Tie Pro website: 2014) (17). According to an industry website dedicated to bow tie risk modelling, three steps are needed to undertake a risk assessment:

1.   Of all possible consequences resulting from the risk (these are the orange boxes above), identify which is the most foreseeable, as opposed to the worst-case.

2.   Identify the consequence level of the most foreseeable consequence.

3.   Identify the likelihood level of the risk occurring and resulting in the consequence identified in Step 1 (18).

How and why should I choose a particular risk management approach?

There are no hard and fast rules in relation to what risk assessment model to adopt for your project or organisation. There are thousands of methods to choose from, which very much indicates that it is the prerogative of an organisation or individual to either select or devise a system that works best for them. Outlined above are merely the most basic frameworks, provided for the reader as baseline toolkits, in order to help you visualise, or develop, a risk assessment model that may work best for your company, within your operating environment. The core components will tend to be:

•   Research, identify and assess the security threats and risks

•   Calculate the likelihood

•   Record the results in a living document and treat the risks

•   Monitor existing and new threats and risks

•   And so on …

Your risk assessment model, and the calculations imposed within it, can never be perfect. Such written processes are living reports that are designed – as their priority objective – to keep your company, and its clients, safe and secure. In essence, they serve to keep your team warned and informed. They also serve to outline and establish you or your client organisation’s Risk Appetite, which can be defined as the amount of risk judged to be tolerable and justifiable.An organisation’s appetite for risk will be decided by the nature of tasks undertaken and resources available. According to Scott Brant: “Risk management should be embedded within the daily operations of a security project. Through understanding risks, decision-makers will be better able to evaluate the impact of a particular decision or action on the achievement of the organisation’s objectives. Risk management strategy does not focus upon risk avoidance but on the identification and management of an acceptable level of risk” (19).

6.3 How to conduct a person-focused threat assessment

It can be exciting to devise and deliver a risk assessment for a static building or a multi-sited business, using some of the models outlined above. Yet much of the protective security function is related to the security of a moving person, or group of moving people. For any protective security team, it is usually good practice to provide a formal, documented, risk assessment of each location visited by your principal person under protection. Thus, a common-sense approach is advised, whereby regular locations, such as residences and routine journeys, may indeed require their own specific layers of risk assessment and controls.

However, in theoretical terms, just as in the field of surveillance, close protection agents will throw an imaginary ‘net’ around the life of the principal. They will seek to build in different layers of protection at various pressure points and potential points of failure, such as getting into a family car each morning.

Many different approaches to devising a person-focused risk assessment are taught. Common approaches across all decent training courses are that the security team are able to build in planning, adaptability and emergency evacuation options. Agents will seek to ensure that they monitor, review and integrate latest intelligence feeds with existing risk management processes. Despite all of this hard work, a people-focused risk-assessment of the principal/s should be carried out by a protective security team. This will help them to figuratively ‘step into the shoes’ of any adversaries, and to systematically identify, and address, the most likely areas of vulnerability that a protected person may be susceptible to. One assessment method now widely taught in UK close protection circles, and originally outlined by the British Standard BS8507-1-2008, became memorably dubbed as The Seven Ps. The method of risk calculation involves a protective security agent carrying out prior research to compile a Personal Profile of the principal:

At first glance, the model above undoubtedly raises as many questions as it answers. “The key is to not get hung up over purity”, says Jon Hill, managing director of a protective security agency in the UK. “Sure, some threats and risks will overlap, but the Seven Ps are just a very decent way to conceptualise and calculate risk around a person (21).” Ex royal protection officer, Paul Brown, added: “Protecting individuals and groups can become very complex as they often do not behave predictably or even rationally. But the best protective security agents anticipate and map out both risks and responses well before an operation. Otherwise they will become awfully exposed in front of the client”. The demonstration of both strategic and tactical control before any client, during any job, as well as “an uncanny ability to access the most useful intelligence feeds, will also guarantee the competitive edge”, asserts Brown (22).

Case in point: Calculating risk levels under the Seven Ps method

The imaginary football club manager at a UK Premier League team was rated as follows:

Risk Type	Notes	Risk Rating
PERSON	Long serving football manager of League Winners Milkchester United. US National. In Britain’s Top 200 ‘Rich List’. Former national football coach for US and Finland. Very high global public profile.	2/3
PLACES	In UK: attends boxing gym for Boxing and Muay Thai lessons twice per week. Same hairdressers every two weeks. Favourite restaurant with wife weekly in Milkchester City Centre. Daily trips to HQ and training ground. Holiday villa in Sandbanks, Dorset, once per month. Attends St Mary’s Catholic Cathedral Milkchester, every Sunday morning. Outside UK: Visits family burial plots in Boston on average once per month. Visits child cancer charity in Russia every quarter, with wife. This is off-record. Drives 4x4 Range Rovers with tinted windows and generic plates, but refuses security in-vehicle.	2/3
PERSONALITY	Quiet and friendly, sober. Lively after alcohol but rarely drinks. Generous and kind to staff; even those he has sacked remain friendly. Very generous to close staff and friends.	2/3
PREJUDICES	Perceived to be very tribal to the ‘United’ and once called fans of the neighbouring team ‘Nazis’ on a live TV broadcast. Refuses to do BBC interviews, without explanation.	2/3
POLITICAL	Public supporter and donor of the US Republicans. Strong Irish Catholic family heritage and, as a student, was reported to have supported a ‘United Ireland’, although principal is on record as not commenting on domestic politics in UK.	2/3
PERSONAL	Aged 57. Media reports of a mini-stroke, aged 39, but denied as ‘nonsense’ by Principal and Milkchester’s backroom staff. Close friend Anthony Diamond-Everidge (ADE), celebrity lawyer, is principal’s best friend and attorney in UK. ADE was convicted for assault and burglary as a teenager and is a publicly reformed character but is widely reported to have links with serious and organised criminals via various lucrative loophole defences. Principal uses an old mobile phone, has no smartphone, and all social media is conducted through the FC.	2/3
PRIVATE LIFE	On second marriage, to Russian model and TV news anchor, Lydia Lechberg (1999). First marriage ended bitterly in 1995; ex sister-in-law on record as saying principal should suffer a ‘slow and painful death’ after 1995 divorce hearing. Comments retracted in ex-wife’s biography in 1999. One business insolvency – Abercloth Capital Investments – around 1998. One investor, London businessman, boxing promoter, Frank Sherbert, claimed he was owed £1m by principal; but High Court found in principal’s favour (2002). Media sometimes try to get two to clash. Two children with wife, Aleksandr (14) and Katya (12) both attend boarding school in the US. No known behavioural problems. Firearms licences held by principal and wife. Family perceived to be happy and functional. In 2006 secretary-turned-model, Lynn Franks Dietrich, alleged a brief affair with the principal. Media surveillance footage was unclear. Both subsequently called the scenario a ‘media wind-up’. Wife is gadget-obsessed and runs live social media feeds on phone, often publicising upcoming trips.	2.5/3
Overall risk rating		14.5/21*

Overall risk ratings

0-7: Low Risk

8-14: Medium Risk

15-21: High Risk

Personnel profile risk assessments can be enhanced by adding numerical scores into a matrix, see above. Ratings out of three are allocated to each of the seven ‘P’ risk categories. This scoring helps to provide an overall risk rating, but assists agents by highlighting specific pinch-points of vulnerability, where extra controls may be needed, that may never have been considered without carrying out cold, hard, analysis of the principal beforehand. The imagined example, provided above, does show that this risk assessment method is even more dynamic and prone to necessary revision than others, including those shown previously. With all risk assessments, a cut-off point is ill-advised. Risk assessments and the effective updated communication of them, are live operational organisms; the very heartbeat to a successful protective security operation. Moreover, when it comes to protecting high-profile people, you will notice through your research just how much public information is wildly inaccurate in relation to the principal. Seek to corroborate information, particularly from internet sources. A protective security agent’s job is, therefore, far more cerebral than relying on deterrent and muscle power. They seek to understand who the principal actually is, their likes and dislikes, and the nuts and bolts of what they do. Their skills are extended into domains of research and prediction. A security agent needs to quickly understand how others might perceive the protected principal. Understanding the causes of attack enables them to prevent, and evade, the risk in the first place.

Often, close protection operations are spread across more than one high-asset individual or group. Such risk rating systems that we have shown above, do help team leaders and managers to decide upon a fair allocation of resources in what can be very stretched and intractable working conditions. It does show true professionalism and task commitment to carry on with the risk assessment process during times of acute stress or task overload. Former Navy Seal Commander, Bob Schoultz, reminds us that US Navy “SEALs are masters of chaos. They specialise in creating chaos and disruption within the enemy’s organisation, getting inside its strategy and decision-making cycle, anticipating plans and striking where least expected” (23). Close protection officers often must feel that some of their own clients and principals were trained by the SEALS, such can be the nature of orders, counter-orders and disorder on many protective security jobs!

6.4 Ethos and expectations of protective security roles; ‘adaptive practitioners’

Mullins (2008) defined management as “the process through which efforts of members of the organisation are coordinated, directed and guided towards the achievement of an organisational goal” (24). It would be trite to say that ‘no two protective security roles are the same’; often they can be, and work can be extremely dull and monotonous. Conversely, most roles do, at some point, demand a calm head, a great deal of training and operational experience, and an almost innate ability to juggle the management of several competing risks, whilst appearing to regally float like a swan on the surface. Protective security agents can find themselves tracking lost property in foreign airports, shepherding pets or movie stars to far-flung precincts of the world, or trying to enjoy a rest day, yet fidgeting because they don’t quite know when the next call of duty will come in. Those who survive and prosper in this environment are adaptive practitioners. People who can comfortably while away numerous hours during peace time. Yet, they are consistently alert, can activate and organise themselves, or groups, very quickly and can also apply crystal clear logic in any potential crisis.

In corporate domains of protective security management, softer skills, such as deportment, style and attitude, become equally, or more important than certifications in firearms and jiu jitsu. The acquisition of potential agents with so-called soft skills has been a priority for many protective security recruiters and training companies in Europe and the US for several years. This is, in part, due to an increasingly interventionist legal, public health and work safety environment, imposed by national authorities. On protective security training programmes, conflict management modules have become much more about evading and mollifying risk, rather than actively handling a physical risk scenario.

In UK territory, close protection operatives (CPO) are lawfully required to hold security licences, issued by the UK Home Office’s Security Industry Authority. However, many non-UK recruiters, especially in Europe and other more developed security markets, also expect to see this accreditation as a minimum standard to demonstrate a CPO’s employability. At present, the UK SIA requires CPO students to study for a minimum of 138 hours across 14 ‘core competencies’ (which began their life some years ago as National Occupational Standards). An additional two days of conflict management training and first aid (three days) is required. In the civilian sector, the role is unarmed within UK territories, therefore no firearms training is formally required by examination assessors. Neither is a driving licence. The 14 core competencies and conflict management sessions are listed by the SIA as:

SIA close protection specialist modules

•   Session 1: Roles and responsibilities of the close protection operative

•   Session 2: Threat and risk assessment

•   Session 3: Surveillance awareness

•   Session 4: Operational planning

•   Session 5: Law and legislation

•   Session 6: Interpersonal skills

•   Session 7: Close protection teamwork and briefing

•   Session 8: Conduct reconnaissance

•   Session 9: Close protection foot drills

•   Session 10: Route selection

•   Session 11: Close protection journey management

•   Session 12: Search procedures

•   Session 13: Incident management

•   Session 14: Venue security

Conflict management module

•   Session 1: Avoiding conflict and reducing personal risk

•   Session 2: Defusing conflict

•   Session 3: Resolving and learning from conflict

•   Session 4a: Application of communication skills and conflict management for security guarding and close protection (25)

Such a range of skills were designed to provide a baseline of competencies for a lower risk civilian environment, such as the United Kingdom. This view is very much reinforced by former royal personal protection officer and author, Geoffrey Padgham, who goes on to emphasise an array of soft skills that protective security agents should be coaching themselves in if they want to be successful in this area within corporate and/or other civilian environments (26). Additional skills, such as, speaking the language of business, fitting into the client’s corporate culture, a familiarity with any intended operating environment, possessing in-country language and navigational expertise, enhanced defensive driving, first aid proficiency and decent interpersonal and presentational attributes, were all identified as essential in the eyes of private sector close protection recruiters interviewed for this book. One close protection advisory company explained it well when they said: “Personal qualities within the industry are good communication skills and the ability to plan and work well within a team. Good close protection officers [who] can maintain attention to detail perform well under stress at short notice” (27).

My own preferred addition to this expert advice could be summed up in one word: leadership. In the tight-knit, high-pressure environment of close protection tasks, there is a double responsibility that falls upon the shoulders of each security agent. First, an inherent duty for all agents to successfully carry out their own tasks. Yet agents should also be actively and consistently aware of their team’s overall objectives and vulnerabilities. Your survival – either contractual or otherwise – lives and dies with the team. An overdependence on the designated team leader by bodyguards (BGs) and personal escort sections (PES) is unfair and unacceptable. Sulkers, skulkers, slackers and those who prefer radio silence, should beware: there are now more than 13,000 agents licensed with a UK close protection licence, thus contractors and corporations can pick and choose who they hire next time around. Protective security agents are advised to follow Padgham’s advice and develop their own skills portfolio by being mindful of softer, interpersonal requirements from industry. “To be a manager means sharing in the responsibility for the performance of the enterprise”, asserts Drucker (28). But because protective security is so rooted in collective team responsibility, each CPO should take on board this group leadership mindset.

More kinetic and operational drills are embedded to a much greater effect via police and military CPO courses, such as the National Protection Officers Course run by UK police services, or the world-renowned UK Royal Military Police eight-week training at Longmoor. Such career backgrounds will undoubtedly provide reassurance to any client that any attack or evacuation scenario can be handled in the most professional and safe manner. As world champion British boxer, Carl Froch, said about an opponent: “He knows I’m brutal. He’s knows I can punch hard. He knows if I connect on his chin, at any one moment, 12 three minute rounds, he’s going to be in serious trouble. If he’s not on the floor, his legs will do a funny dance” (29). Quite amusing and suitable ringside language. But for all the Kung Fu qualifications in the world, a corporate client won’t want to hear this type of chatter near their business!

6.5 Anti-piracy; market, counter-measures and agencies

Formed in 2009, Washington DC-based maritime security company, AdvanFort, soon became a fixture within global anti-piracy operations. The company produced excellent weekly piracy threat analysis reports for clients and the wider marketplace. Its website news updates are topical and relevant to the whole maritime security community. In October 2013, a crew of 35 (ten civilians and 25 armed guards) aboard Advan’s own vessel, MV Seaman Guard Ohio, drifted slightly in extreme winds. They were arrested and charged by India’s Attorney General for entering territorial waters while being in possession of firearms. Following an exhausting campaign, led by the company’s CEO, Sam Farajallah, 33 of 35 guards were released on strict bail conditions. They were ordered to remain in-country and attend a police station in Chennai each day. The ship’s captain and tactical deployment officer remained incarcerated. Eight months later, in July 2014, all charges were eventually dropped and Advant’s sailors were free to go home (30).

It was the hijacking of US-registered vessel, MV Maersk Alabama, during 2009, which re-established popular awareness of piracy, particularly around the Indian Ocean and Horn of Africa. Four armed teenage hijackers had targeted Alabama using a skiff. They attempted to control the vessel and its 23-strong crew and sought to redirect the ship to Somalia. They failed after the crew retaliated. After the bungled attempt to seize the main vessel, the pirates then kidnapped the ship’s master and took him aboard a lifeboat, hoping to escape. Intervention by the US Navy ended a four-day hostage ordeal for Captain Richard Phillips. Three hijackers were shot dead by US SEALS after they were viewed pointing guns into the captain’s back. The hijacking failed due to the crew’s courage. Moreover, their rigorous professionalism beforehand in carrying out security drills and anti-hostage training had served them well. Captain Phillips, the movie, casting Hollywood A-list star, Tom Hanks, in the lead role, was inspired by the tenacious and calm leadership shown by Alabama’s crew.

This perilous set of events preceded a second tragedy on Maersk Alabama. In 2014, two former US Navy SEALS, who were subsequently working as ship security guards for a US-based maritime security company, were found to be dead in cabins in the Port of Victoria, Seychelles. No external suspects were sought. The case was recorded by Indian police authorities as inadvertent, self-inflicted harm; respiratory problems caused by toxic substances. Family and colleagues rejected the official in-country investigation findings. They point to training and mandatory drug and alcohol tests undertaken by all on-board privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP). The US coastguard’s office launched its own investigation. This was not concluded at the time of writing. This tragic case does, nevertheless, demonstrate a range of undoubted health and well-being risks to personnel in high-risk environments (31). The two individuals had reportedly told friends that “boredom … was the real enemy of the open sea” (32). The 500-foot vessel had successfully repulsed two attacks since the attempted 2009 hijacking. Yet, it appears, all too often human frailties brought the operator an equally stern test to her resilience. At the time of writing, she remains at sea, although her bullet-ridden 5-ton fibreglass lifeboat was donated to the National Navy UDT-SEAL Museum in Florida, US, several years ago.

Case study: Somalia’s pirates

Armed with assault rifles, rocket propelled grenades, pistols and knives, Somalia’s elongated coastline has become one of the world’s most familiar and feared zones prone to piracy. Yet Somali-based pirates cast their net far wider, famously ensnaring leisure sailing couple, Paul and Rachel Chandler, from Royal Tunbridge Wells in England, as they blissfully cruised around the Seychelles in the Indian Ocean, several hundred nautical miles away. Seized from Lynn Rival in October 2009, they were held for 388 days. The following table shows the torrid rise and recent fall of Somali-based piracy; a phenomenon that has subsequently seen European Union Naval Forces (EU NAVFOR), US Navy Seals and the US Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) combine forces in the region, in order to repel and degrade a maritime threat which proliferated gravely between 2009-11.

Source: International Maritime Bureau 2012 and 2013 (33)

Rules and regulatory bodies

The Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG) is a special interest group within the large defence industry association, ADS. SCEG members “represent the vast majority of the UK industry, delivering security in challenging environments on land and at sea” (34). The group is the accepted UK Government’s industry partner for the regulation of private security companies (PSCs) and providers. The group provides a continuous forum for government and industry to exchange views, shape policies, enhance and embrace best practice and regulation. Membership of SCEG is conditional upon signing up to the International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC), and also the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (further details below).

Some 58 private companies originally signed up to The International Code of Conduct for Private Security Service Providers (ICoC) back in 2010, and momentum kicked in soon afterwards. A Swiss Government inspired initiative, ICoC, was established to improve oversight and accountability of private security providers principally operating in ‘complex’ and/or hostile environments (35). By 2013, some 708 companies from 70 countries were ICoC signatories. In the words of ICoC:

“The Code sets-out human rights based principles for the responsible provision of private security services. These include rules for the use of force, prohibitions on torture, human trafficking and other human rights abuses, and specific commitments regarding the management and governance of companies, including how they vet personnel and subcontractors, manage weapons and handle grievances internally.”

The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights refers to the “corporate responsibility to protect human rights” in its 2011 publication and codification. The accompanying guide goes on to say that: “States do not relinquish their international human rights law obligations when they privatise the delivery of services that may impact the enjoyment of human rights” (36).

The Security Association for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) is a business membership organisation for companies working within maritime environments and acts as a “focal point for maritime security matters” (37). Through its forums, training, guidance and events, SAMI works with national and international shipping organisations, flag states, regulatory bodies, insurance and legal professionals, in order to ensure that vessels and private security providers are equipped with the best possible knowledge, networks, technology and training to ensure safe passage for maritime staff and cargoes. On a quarterly basis, SAMI publishes its digital magazine called The Bridge. The organisation’s website carries lots of news and updates on business risks and threats. SAMI’s website, and World Maritime News, a separate publication, provide daily news and information bulletins for risk management practitioners. For example, during 2014, SAMI provided important information and guidance around chartered vessels and the West Africa Ebola outbreak.

International standards and maritime security rules

ISO 9001:2008 sets out the criteria for a quality management system and is the only one of the ISO9000 series that can be certified.

ISO 28000:2007 points out the requirements for a security management system and looks at those aspects that are critical to the security assurance of the supply chain.

ISO/PAS 28007:2012 is an additional set of guidelines aimed at private maritime security companies (PMSCs) who provide privately contracted armed security personnel (PCASP) on-board ships. To be certified ISO/PAS 28007:2012, organisations must show proof of being ISO 28000:2007 certified. At the time of writing, the international maritime authority had not endorsed ISO28007. Yet this has not stopped shipping owners signing a pro-forma contract with PMSC on the rules for the use of force policy (see below).

100 Series: Rules for the use of force (RUF): In 2013, due to concerns of legal and reputational damage for companies, alongside a sense that clarification was needed in the delivery of force interventions at sea, a group of industry associations and influential ‘flag states’ met together to draft an International Model Set of Maritime Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) that became commonly known by the report’s headline: 100 Series. At one point, the Code departs from its measured prose to shout at its readers, using emboldened, red capital letters:

NOTHING IN THESE RULES SHALL BE INTERPRETED IN ANY WAY WHATSOEVER AS LIMITING AN INDIVIDUAL’S RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE AS UNIVERSALLY RECOGNISED AND PROVIDED FOR UNDER APPLICABLE AND RELEVANT NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAWS. (38)

The 100 Series provide for a legal, graduated and proportionate response to a violent attack, or the perception of a violent attack, and are credited with reducing further a number of potentially inflammatory incidents. Under the rules, the ship Master’s authority under SOLAS, The International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, remains absolute. The Master can order the cessation of firing by PCASP at any point. Under SOLAS (Chapter V ‘Safety of Navigation’, Regulation 34-1) the “Master’s discretion in decision making [must] not be compromised” (39). SOLAS was inducted in 1974 after previous incarnations, which dated back to the aftermath of the 1912 Titanic disaster. SOLAS requires that flag states ensure that their vessels comply with minimum safety standards in construction, equipment, navigation and operation.

According to Jason Layton (2014), a maritime security specialist interviewed for this book, “many organisations such as SAMI, ICoC, ASIS, Baltic International Maritime Company (BIMCO) and The Maritime Security Committee of the International Maritime Organisation (IMO), are all involved in multiple certification schemes to create a level of oversight and legitimacy within the maritime security sector. Sadly, it is clear that in spite of these efforts, regulations will not be effective until they are clearly defined and enforced by legitimate authorities” (40).

The International Maritime Organisation, a United Nations agency, was founded in 1959 and adopted SOLAS, which the IMO describe as “the most important of all treaties dealing with maritime safety” (41). According to the IMO, shipping is one of the world’s most dangerous industries. Following the United States’ 9/11 terrorist atrocities, and increasingly audacious terrorist and piracy attacks (principally around the Horn of Africa), a more comprehensive and obligatory “security regime entered into force … which contains detailed security-related requirements for governments, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section”, known as the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code. The ISPS Code, Section A, is a series of non-mandatory guidelines. Section B relates as to how best to meet these requirements (42). The Code is implemented through the 1974 SOLAS treaty (Chapter XI-2).

In 2011, the IMO produced guidance for private ship owners who deploy private security contractors with firearms into high-risk areas, such as off the Horn of Africa. In this region particularly, the fusion between piracy and sub-state terrorism became almost endemic during the noughties. The UN and IMO are keen to note that such guidance is not an endorsement of private companies turning to private sector armed guards. But the regular physical threat to crew and cargo from attacks consisting of, sometimes, dozens of armed pirates travelling at speed in attack boats (skiffs), has ensured that a raft of practical advice for private companies has now been issued and this book can only really skim the surface of it all. In 2014, the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency produced a Code of safe working practices for merchant seamen. The UK Government say: “the UK COSWP is of a safety-critical nature. You’re strongly advised to refer only to the official Maritime and Coastguard Agency version” (44). Copies should be made available to all on-board, and specifically the master, safety officer and any members of a safety committee.

Thought to be the world’s largest membership association representing ship owners who cover a large chunk of the world’s seafaring tonnage, the Baltic and International Maritime Council (BIMCO) is a leading stakeholder and contributor to international maritime training and regulations. Linked to BIMCOs’ website is the popular Shipmaster’s Security Manual, a must-have read for most maritime security professionals (45). BIMCO has also produced guidelines to help ship owners, and their employees, with security risk management in the form of its Ship and Voyage Specific Risk Assessment Guide.

From the early 1990s, based from Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the International Maritime Bureau (IMB) has run a 24-hour Piracy Reporting Centre, and acts as a first point of contact for the ship’s master to report any type of potential piracy incident. According to the IMB, the central function of the reporting centre is two-fold:

1)    “To be a single point of contact for ship masters anywhere in the world who are under piratical or armed robbery attack. The information received from the masters is immediately relayed to the local law enforcement agencies requesting assistance.

2)   The information received from the ship master’s is immediately broadcast to all vessels in the Ocean region – thus providing vital information and increasing the master’s domain awareness (46).”

In partnership with the International Chamber of Commerce, the IMB’s Reporting Centre has become increasingly sophisticated. It produces a Live Piracy Map, which over recent years have shown the world’s piracy prone hotspots to be found around South East Asia and the Indian subcontinent, East Africa and the Red Sea, including the Horn of Africa, West Africa, and South and Central America and the Caribbean waters (47).

Led by the Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa, with several other influential signatories and endorsers, a coalition of groups produced the Best Management Practices for Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy – Version 4. This is a powerful set of voluntary guidelines which detail advice for private security companies operating in high-risk areas. This guide provides readers with risk assessment procedures, threat identification advice, ship protection measures, what to do if pirates ’take control’, and advice ‘in the event of military action’ (48).

Most flag states also produce their own national guidance. Some do formalise extant domestic legal obligations that security practitioners should ensure they are up to date with. For example, the US Coastguard Office, an agency of the Department of Homeland Security, issues Security Directives to American-flag vessels. One notable and helpful guide for consumption is the 2012 Guidelines for US Vessels in High Risk Waters (49).

6.6 Firearms

The use and carrying of firearms are governed by national and, in some countries, sub-national laws. This can restrict or empower private security contractors in a variety of ways depending on the domain. In some environments, and perhaps when off-duty, or off-site, protective security agents may not be eligible to carry firearms. In many environments, where firearms ownership can be said to be more liberal, it follows that security agents might actively seek to be carrying in order to achieve a sense of reassurance, or to be equipped with a practical tool for survival, for both self and client. The purpose of this section is to highlight some common legal vulnerabilities and risks that may regularly interface with the conduct of security tasks. Moreover, we shall explain and embed the critical importance of human rights laws, firearms legislation and the compliance to such fundamental rules of civil liberty, by way of case studies and isomorphic learning.

Incidents that cause risk to principals, organisations and protective security personnel, are not merely confined to deliberate, pre-planned, plots of assassination, extortion or terrorism. In countries and cultures where access to firearms is easily obtained, scuffles and celebrations can also quickly morph into lethal threat scenarios. For example, in trying to suppress a troublesome gang, an armed security guard drew fire and seriously injured a woman in a McDonald’s restaurant in Washington DC in 2014 (50). In September 2013, Wazir Akbar Khan, the main diplomatic quarter of Kabul, Afghanistan, experienced a full-scale security alert when an outburst of crackling gunfire was heard nearby. The noise spread alarmingly. Afghanistan’s national football team had beaten neighbouring India 2-0, to qualify for the 2014 FIFA Football World Cup (51). The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention raised concerns about celebratory gunfire in Puerto Rico where two citizens are killed, and some 25 injured, each year, “from celebratory gunfire on New Year’s Eve” (52).

The way that laws are written and interpreted can vary massively between jurisdictions in scenarios related to self-defence. Indeed, judges and juries within those jurisdictions can fundamentally disagree on interpretations when the stated law can appear relatively straightforward. Some famous cases involving firearms related offences do provide some important lessons for protective security professionals. We observe a few here:

Famous cases: Firearms and the law

Although verdicts from each of these cases became controversial, readers are asked to suspend any value-judgements that they may have about each case. Instead, security practitioners are requested to absorb the clear lessons that we can derive from looking at each of the five cases below:

Case 1: In 2014, South African athlete, Oscar Pistorius, discharged several shots through his bathroom door, killing his girlfriend. The judge found that Pistorius was ‘negligent’ but that he had shot his partner by ‘mistake’ in the genuine belief that an intruder lurked behind the door. Pistorius was found guilty of culpable homicide (manslaughter). His actions were therefore ‘negligent’, but the judge found no proof of an ‘intention’ to kill. In South Africa, such a conviction carries a maximum sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment (53).

Case 2: Tony Martin, a farmer and isolated lone resident, in Norfolk, Great Britain, shot two burglars in August 1999 with an unlicensed pump action shotgun at his premises. The younger perpetrator, 16 year-old, Fred Barras, died of his wounds at the scene. Shooting into the dark, as the two attempted to escape out of Martin’s home, the elderly farmer later found himself convicted (10-2) by a jury for murder and sentenced to life imprisonment, a minimum of nine years. He claimed to have been burgled up to ten times previously, including by the same pair. The prosecution claimed, however, that Martin had in fact laid in wait for the perpetrators. Martin was also charged with attempted murder upon Barras’ accomplice, Brendon Fearon. For this, he was sentenced to a ten-year term, to run concurrently. On appeal, Martin’s murder conviction was reduced to manslaughter, due to being diagnosed with paranoid personality disorder caused by depression. Thus, the Appeal Court had again rejected his main plea, which was that he acted out of self-defence. Martin’s prison sentence was reduced to five years. He served three years before being released in 2003. It was subsequently reported that Martin lives in hiding with, reportedly, a £60,000 bounty upon his head. By the time of the infamous 1999 burglary, Fearon and Barras had dozens of convictions between them. Fearon was later jailed for a subsequent burglary on Martin’s farm, whilst the farmer served his prison term, and also for illegal drugs dealing a couple of years later (54).

Case 3: During September 2007, in Nisour Square, Baghdad, private security contractors from a US-owned company, Blackwater, were chaperoning a convoy. A Kia sedan car, driving erratically on the wrong side of the road, travelled towards them. Ignoring the policeman’s whistle, and subsequent warning shots, a female driver and her adult son continued to make a beeline straight toward the Blackwater convoy. Believing the car to be a vehicle borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), some Blackwater security guards began to discharge lethal fire. The car kept moving. An Iraqi policeman ran across to the vehicle but was gunned down too. A firefight between Iraqi police officers and Blackwater contractors broke out. The PSCs believed that – as was sometimes the case in Iraq – they were under sustained armed attack from Iraqi insurgents disguised in official police uniforms. They radioed the phrase enemy ‘contact’ several times. One contractor, however, kept to a sustained level of firing, despite colleagues ordering him to ceasefire. 17 Iraqi civilians were killed and 20 wounded. The following day, Blackwater’s licence to operate in Iraq was reportedly revoked. After several official investigations, including a condemnatory 2007 UN report, and legal cases brought against some of the PSCs by the US military and FBI, four Blackwater employees were convicted in a US Federal court: one for murder. Another three were indicted for voluntary manslaughter and firearms offences (55).

The 2007 UN report criticised the US military for allowing PSCs to carry out military tasks, which was a breach of the 1989 UN Mercenary Convention, although the US is not a domestic signatory to this piece of international law. The Convention prohibits the use of private sector individuals taking part in ‘hostilities’ for ‘private gain’ (56). The Report noted: “The trend toward outsourcing and privatising various military functions by a number of member states in the past ten years has resulted in the mushrooming of private military and security companies” (57). This may not be bad news for security contractors seeking jobs and contracts in emerging markets but the tight oversight of the UN, and domestic law-enforcement and media agencies, does mean that risk management consultants, and their employers, must be absolutely clear on precisely what the parameters of local laws allow or prohibit.

Case 4: The arrest in 2013 by Indian police officers, of 35 crew members (including 25 security contractors) on vessel MV Seaman Guard Ohio, owned by AdvanFort security company in Washington DC, was touched upon earlier in this chapter. The crew were seized for carrying semi-automatic guns and 5,000 rounds of ammunition, allegedly within Indian waters, but without necessary licenses. Their plight more than exemplifies the difficulties and huge disruptions that can emanate by involving the necessary firearms provision within your security capability. After months of legal wrangling, AdvanFort’s team were released and cleared (58). The maritime security threat in India is judged as severe. Particularly following the 2008 terrorist atrocities in Mumbai, which saw a team of Lashkar-e-Taiba-trained Pakistani militants travel by boat and dock at Colaba, before causing carnage during a four-day murderous siege.

Case 5: Trafficking firearms in between international borders can also be legally perilous. Especially for former British SAS officer, Captain Simon Mann. He was seized after being, reportedly, double-crossed by airport border officials in Zimbabwe’s capital, Harare. Mr Mann was supposedly co-ordinating the transfer of $180,000 to pay for an arms cache and leading a 60-strong mercenary group. The team was tasked to accompany Mr Mann into neighbouring Equatorial Guinea in order to topple President Teodoro Obiang Nguema. Mann was jailed for three years by Zimbabwe’s courts, before being extradited to Equatorial Guinea to serve a very lengthy prison sentence. After confessing guilt and regret, Mr Mann was pardoned by Nguema after just one year. On his return to the UK, Mann subsequently appealed against his Zimbabwe conviction. He argued that he was employed by a South African company which did possess a license to deal with firearms in Zimbabwe (59). However, as with all of these cases, most of the damage had already occurred and was irreversible.

UK police provisions in use of force and firearms

Private companies and workplace domains will undoubtedly need to have their own strict protocols and procedures if they require tasks to be carried out that may involve firearms. Nevertheless, a decent written example of legal, moral and operational guidelines is provided by the UK National Policing Improvement Agency and the Association of Chief Police Officers. Therefore, a thorough read and comprehension of the 2011 Manual of Guidance on The Management, Command and Deployment of Armed Officers is advised, even for private sector contractors engaged with use of firearms (60). This booklet serves well as a blueprint for any security contractor or services provider wishing to develop the highest professional and ethical approaches which are absolutely essential when dealing with firearms.

Fundamental to sensibly handling and deploying firearms, is a pro-active appreciation of civilian human rights obligations. Across European signatory states, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) enshrines each human being with the ‘right to life’ (Article 2). ECHR upholds “the prohibition of torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment” (Article 3). ECHR provides for the “right to a fair trial” (Article 6) and underlines the “respect for family and private life” (Article 8). “When determining whether the level of force used in any particular instance was lawful, the courts will take account of the ECHR provisions”, states the ACPO/NPIA manual (61). In the UK, the ECHR was enshrined into the Government’s 1998 Human Rights Act, and is therefore considered statutory law.

Personal responsibility is paramount when utilising firearms: The manual states that: “All [police] officers have an individual responsibility for ensuring that they are aware of relevant legislation and are informed about the extent of their legal powers and the context within which those powers can be properly exercised. Forces should constantly identify any relevant legislation for the continued professional development of firearms commanders and AFOs” (62). In private sector domains, such rules, as well as the embracing of a human right’s ethos, should be similarly viewed as essential.

Legal provisions: Use of firearms and force

Other legal provisions related to the use of firearms and force for UK companies include the 2007 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act and also the 1974 Health and Safety at Work Act, outlined in more detail in this book’s Chapter 3: Security Legislation and Regulations, and Chapter 8: Safer Business Travel.

In the UK legal system, from which so many other judicial systems originate, the right to self-defence, as it relates to the use of force and firearms, is provided for both in common law and by the 1967 Criminal Law Act (63):

A person may use such force as is reasonable in the circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.

Common law provides that a person may use necessary or reasonable force to protect themselves or another. One case (Griffiths in Beckford v The Queen, 1998) upheld that a person does not need to wait to be attacked: “circumstances may justify a pre-emptive strike” (64).

The law was clarified by Section 76 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008, following concerns that many victims of burglaries and assaults were, themselves, becoming indicted, when attempting to defend themselves and family members. Subsection 5(a) permits householders to use “disproportionate force when defending themselves against intruders in the home”. Taken into consideration is the “personal circumstances of the householder” and the “perceived threat” to them (65). In other words, did they sincerely believe that they, or others, were under grave physical threat?

The 2014 UK Home Office Guide on Firearms Licensing Law states that “gun ownership is a privilege, not a right”. This is in stark contrast to the United States which declares that “the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed” in its Constitution’s Second Amendment and the 1791 Bill of Rights. Within Europe, similar constitutional rights are conferred upon Swiss citizens. The Czech Republic, Italy, France and parts of Eastern Europe are also regarded as quite lax permit regimes, although this does appear to be changing. Firearms cultures in some of these nations are similar, but somewhat lighter versions of the liberal US and Switzerland pro-gun environments; where a fear of marauding ‘big government’, and also a love of hunting, tend to thwart various civil society attempts to more tightly regulate firearms ownership.

The UK’s gun ownership laws, where most types of firearms, including shotguns and rifles, require a licence, are generally held to be among the toughest in the world. Handguns are altogether banned. At present, UK police forces are the licensing authority for firearms certificates. Each constabulary decide upon whether somebody is a threat to public safety and if they have a “good reason to own a firearm” (66). This ‘reason’ does not stretch to a ‘self-defence’ argument. As one UK Home Office guide states: “In general, applicants should be able to demonstrate that they ‘use’ their firearm on a regular, legitimate basis for work, sport or leisure (including collections or research)” (67). The guide clarifies the 1968 Firearms Act in many areas and emphasises that it should be fully understood and absorbed by UK-based practitioners. As should any relevant domestic in-country laws, or impending legal changes, that apply to international readers of this book, operating beyond UK shores.

International dimensions and protocols

With gun crime and terrorism much more visible, and a risk from mass casualty attacks using firearms methods generally on the increase, it is possible that previously quite relaxed domestic arms control regimes – such as those in Italy and France – do become tightened. It is mission critical, therefore, to stay abreast of related news items and possible impending legal changes in any country; radical alterations to law can often be enacted into local and national laws following big headline-grabbing atrocities. According to EU Home Affairs Commissioner, Cecilia Malmström, during 2011, more than 5,000 murders within the EU (about 20%) were committed using firearms (68). France is just one major EU state that is under pressure to further tighten gun ownership rules, following a series of massacres and attempted mass casualty gun killings in urban environments. Recent atrocities include the Lille Theatre and Bertry Nightclub shootings (2012), Mohamed Merah’s Jewish school shooting rampage in Toulouse (2012), and the execution of workers by terrorists at the Paris-based satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, in January 2015.

Although, at the time of writing, it remains principally within the power of national governmental authorities to set the legal criteria for acquiring and selling firearms, the EU has established two Directives to address the inconsistent level of national controls. This is a big challenge given the EU’s fundamental reason-for-being: to guarantee an ‘internal market’ based upon a core ‘freedom of movement’ principle (69). According to EU law expert, Theresa Papademetriou, Directive 2008/51/EC “requires EU Members to ensure that any firearm or part thereof is marked and registered prior to entering the market”. It also requires EU members “to establish a register of firearms, to which only designated authorities will have access. Dealers are also required to maintain a register of firearms” (70).

A second Directive (91/477/EEC) deals “with the transfers of firearms for civilian use within the EU territory” (71). It transposes into European law, some clear and unequivocal provisions set out by governments to counter intractable and very harmful small arms proliferation, articulated within the 2001 UN Protocol Against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms. More than 50 countries are now signatories to this UN Protocol and have enshrined, either partially or fully, its provisions into domestic law (72).

To be clear then, civilian-sector-use firearms and ammunition, or their parts and components thereof (including dual-use parts), do not enjoy the privileges of free movement under either EU provisions. Domestic laws within member states, such as the UK’s own Export Control Act (2002), which governs the international transfer of UK-based weapons, do also usually provide for very clear rules. They also empower prosecutors by equipping them with severe legal sanctions for offenders. These include jail terms and/or extensive fines and reputational damage for those convicted. Those accused of illegal arms trafficking are likely to also be extradited to overseas jurisdictions. Ignorance as to the intended end-use of such equipment is not tolerated by any legal domain, as evidenced in the case of British businessman, Christopher Tappin. Mr Tappin’s company reportedly sold zinc/silver oxide reserve batteries to Iran; allegedly for use in an air-defence missile system, according to US prosecutors. The directors were extradited to the US and jailed in 2012 (73). In conclusion, declarations at borders, and to all necessary public authorities, remain an order of the day. As does the conduct of rigorous due diligence checks around all paperwork, and monitoring the end-use of any exported firearms equipment. For the security management team who find themselves legally responsible for picking up the pieces of any shoddy background work, anything less could be more hazardous than the equipment itself (74).

Wrap-up lessons

•   Know the law: A thorough understanding and education in firearms-related legislation, including rules around carrying, national and international human rights laws, and arms export licensing, should be provided by employers to everyone expected to hold arms – not just the team leader.

•   Cost benefit analysis of carrying: Cases involving security personnel and the discharge of firearms are matters of heightened public interest in any domain. As such, cases are of acute interest to media organisations. Security contractors caught up in such controversies seldom feel that cases are covered in a fair and balanced manner. Nevertheless, becoming convicted of firearms breaches, or merely facing allegations, could be ruinous to your reputation and imperil your future viability as a security contractor. Therefore, think very carefully before you decide to carry or ask others to do so.

•   Life on hold: Do expect prosecutors and official authorities to take many years, possibly decades, in order to carry out investigations and inquiries related to firearms incidents.

•   Respect human rights – lead by example: Profoundly understand and ensure respect for individual human rights at all times, both for self, and in your conduct with other colleagues.

6.7 Managing people in protective security environments

“When we are recruiting, we are looking for a sense of self-discipline …” – Jon Hill, Close Protection Operative trainer and manager (75)

Protective security environments are often highly kinetic, involve close team work, and tend to bring together individuals who may well share similar action-oriented attributes. Notwithstanding, the same hum drum human resource-related issues extant in other industry sectors do also crop up within security management realms. Such as, how to carry out a fair recruitment process? How to resolve conflicts and rivalries? How to break down silos? Alternatively, in some environments, organisations might need to constrict the flow of information and communication; how can this be carried out fairly and lawfully?

Within protective security domains, it is essential for all team members to possess very decent interpersonal communications, including conflict management skills. Particularly so, for team leaders. After all, a mistake in approach or timing can lead to tragic consequences in protective security scenarios. For instance, over-caution could delay an essential evacuation. Conversely, an over-reaction, perhaps by a PES team intervening in too robust a manner, could cause significant personal harm to an innocent victim who was merely caught up in the wrong place at the wrong time. Maybe a jogger or smartphone-obsessed teenager, who accidentally passed within close proximity to a heavily guarded principal, might be straying into danger if they crossed the path of an over-exuberant CPO.

In precincts where firearms ownership is liberal and private security guards may be armed, conflict resolution skills using non-violent means does become even more crucial for the health and well-being of all those around. “When we are recruiting, we are looking for a sense of self-discipline, innate balance, and also a clear indication of potential ability for our agent to instinctively take control in a deteriorating situation”, asserts Jon Hill (76).

Resolving conflict situations

Although timescales on many protective security projects may be shorter-term, and perceivably more intense than many other work cultures, looking out for personal and organisational psychological well-being issues is just as important to the security enterprise as the actual service delivery function.

The excuse that ‘we didn’t have time’ to sort out a row between A and B will ring hollow if, a couple of weeks later, a communications gap between those very same two sulkers leads to loss of high-value assets or human life. (See the later Charge of the Light Brigade case study.) The University of California, who specialise in HR management, via their HR management company, Berkeley HR, publish advice around resolving conflict situations. “To manage conflict effectively you must be a skilled communicator”, states Berkeley, which has published useful guidance on all related matters (77).

Avoiding an issue or clash of personalities, which can turn into a living sore within the team and spawn a conflict in the first instance, is a modus operandi that serves healthily functioning protective security teams well (80). Harvard professor, Robert Fisher, a lawyer by profession, who then became a globally respected negotiator and political advisor, found modest fame through one of his final books, Getting to Yes, co-authored with Bill Ury (81). Fisher and Ury emphasised four core approaches to avoiding misunderstanding. These are:

1)   Active listening: Understand the other person/side as well as you understand yourself. Keep close attention to what they are saying. If necessary repeat back what you think they have said, this shows you are seeking to understand them (though, not necessarily agreeing with them).

2)   If possible, speak directly to the other person. Avoid being diverted and distracted by others.

3)   Use ‘I’ statements, rather than ‘You’ statements, to speak about situations. For example, ‘I felt exposed and isolated on that street the other night’, rather than ‘you left me like a sitting duck near that slum gang the other night’. (There may have been a very good reason why they didn’t appear to help you at that given time.) ‘You’ messages are automatically accusative and will prompt defensiveness, and possibly a deterioration in dialogue.

4)   Speak for a purpose: too much communication can appear like a rant, excessive self-interest, a demonstration of poor focus or prolonged defensiveness. The line from Shakespeare’s play Hamlet (1602): “The lady doth protest too much, methinks …” rings true several centuries later (82).

Resolving communication gaps

A fun way to underline the difficulty of team and organisational communications is to conduct a version of the telephone game. Organise for a team member to receive a simple set of instructions via the telephone. Then, without writing them down, convey these instructions to the next colleague, and so on, along a chain of individuals. The end-result is often very much at odds with those original orders.

Book author and communications expert, Naomi Karten, writes: “A common misconception is that communication gaps are caused by too little communication. Some are, certainly. Often, however, the problem is the reverse: too much communication. Often, too, the problem isn’t simply the quantity of communication but the kind: Gaps are frequently caused by misdirected, one-way, poorly timed, or badly worded, communications” (87). In a world of rapid, and possibly much more public communications, poor written communications can wreak a lot of damage upon workplace relationships and the overall process of team and organisational communications. Brianna Davis, an author for the popular Lee Hopkins communications sector blog, describes a sensible remedy: “Taking a minute to review your work can save you tons of apologising time later” (88). Nevertheless, this is easier said than done. A layer of peer reviews upon important communications is advised.

Using or avoiding certain types of body language is also critical in avoiding or defusing conflict. Body language expert, James Borg, states that: “More communication is conveyed through the eyes than any other part of the body” (90). Borg points out that the lowering of eyes might be perceived as untrustworthiness or submissiveness. Conversely, over-zealous eye contact may appear aggressive or even convey sexual attraction. Unfocused and flitting eye contact – particularly repeated glances over the shoulder, to the wrists (where a watch may be), or towards a phone – explicitly suggests a lack of focus and attention to the person and conversation in motion. This is not a good message to convey if one is trying to engage, motivate, or even pacify an aggressive or hostile person.

The seminal work of Dale Carnegie, How To Win Friends And Influence People, is literally an encyclopaedia of business protocols. The book has an enduring and pervasive relevance to most, if not all, business activity. One passage will serve entrepreneurs and business managers very well indeed:

Why talk about what we want. That is childish. Absurd. Of course, you are interested in what you want. You are eternally interested in it. But no one else is. The rest of us are just like you: we are interested in what we want.

So the only way on earth to influence other people is to talk about what they want and show them how to get it. (91)

Chapter 6: Wrap-up

In closing this chapter on Protective Security, we reflect on some of the approaches and attributes that will help your company gain the competitive edge. These include:

1.   Lives and livelihoods depend on protective security contractors. Such severe operational stresses demand that protective security specialists do retain continued situational awareness, adhere to peak levels of self-discipline, and are able to consider, or anticipate, an almost-immeasurable range of risks facing the Principal.

2.   It does tend to be the more mundane business approaches, including decent research, presentational and networking skills that provide protective security agents with the competitive edge, as we witnessed from various interviews conducted in this chapter.

3.   Ex British Royal Family protection officer, now a private sector CP contractor, Paul Brown, added: “Protecting individuals and groups can become very complex as they often do not behave predictably or even rationally. But the best protective security agents anticipate and map out both risks and responses well before an operation. Otherwise they will become awfully exposed in front of the client”.

4.   In corporate domains of protective security management, softer skills, such as deportment, style and attitude become equally, or more important than certifications in firearms and jiu jitsu. The acquisition of potential agents with so-called soft skills has been a priority for many protective security recruiters and training companies in Europe and the US for several years.

5.   Know the law when it comes to everything security-related, but even more so with the use of force and firearms. A thorough understanding and education in firearms-related legislation, including rules around carrying, national and international human rights laws, and arms export licensing, should be provided by business owners to everyone expected to hold (or come in to contact with) firearms – not just the team leader.

6.   Talk about what your customer wants, not about what you want, says management guru, Dale Carnegie.

References

(1)   Schoultz, B. and Richardson, M., (2013), Risk Management Online, ‘Managing Risk like a Navy Seal’, accessed and downloaded on 02/12/2014 at: www.rmmagazine.com/2013/08/27/managing-risk-like-a-navy-seal/

(2)   Interview with an UK-based Close Protection Operative, carried out in London on 27/11/2014.

(3)   Institute for Economics & Peace (2014), ‘Global Terrorism Index 2014’, accessed and downloaded on 26/11/2014 at: http://economicsandpeace.org/research/iep-indices-data/global-terrorism-index

(4)   Author interview with Paul Brown conducted on 11/11/2014

(5)   Information accessed and downloaded on 25/11/2014 at: www.militaryphotos.net/forums/showthread.php?238405-China-paramilitary-police-use-PT709-pistol&p=7200050#post7200050

(6)   Close Protection website (2011), information accessed and downloaded on 25/11/2014 at: www.close-protection.org/Resources.html

(7)   The Telegraph (2010), ‘Met Police spends more than £350,000 a day on VIP protection’, accessed and downloaded on 27/11/2014 at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/7986977/Met-police-spends-more-than-350000-a-day-on-VIP-protection.html

(8)   Nobes, F., (2011) ‘Licensed To Be Killed: The hidden cost of war’. INSS Dynamic Dialogue. [online], p.8. Accessed and downloaded on 27/11/2014 at: http://inssblog.wordpress.com/2011/07/05/licensed-to-be-killed-the-hidden-cost-of-war/

(9)   Transparency International (2013), Corrupt Perceptions Index 2013, accessed and downloaded at: www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results

(10)   Author interview with Jon Hill, Managing Director at Operations Group, London, conducted on 11/11/2014

(11)   Fay, J., (2006), ‘Contemporary Security Management’, – Second Edition, Oxford: Elsevier

(12)   Health and Safety Executive (2014), ‘Five Steps to Risk Assessment’, and ‘A Brief Guide to Controlling Risks in the Workplace’, accessed and downloaded on 01/12/2014 at: www.hse.gov.uk/risk/controlling-risks.htm

(13)   The Scottish Government website (2014), ‘Planning and Priority Setting’, accessed and downloaded on 01/12/2014 at: www.scotland.gov.uk/publications/2005/09/27134643/46478

(14)   Advanced Diving Systems website (2014), Risk Assessment, accessed and downloaded on 01/12/2014 at: www.advanceddivingsystems.com/RiskAssessment.aspx

(15)   Pearce, A., and Flavell, D., (2013), Risk Management Magazine Australia online, ‘Risk culture, all talk and no action?’ Accessed and downloaded on 01/12/2014 at: www.riskmanagementmagazine.com.au/opinion/risk-culture-all-talk-and-no-action-126516.aspx

(16)   Pearce, A., and Flavell, D., (2013), Ibid.

(17)   Bow Tie Pro website, ‘Frequently Asked Questions’, accessed and downloaded on 02/12/2014 at: www.bowtiepro.com/btp_faq_Simple.asp

(18)   Ibid.

(19)   Brant, S., (2013), ‘Risk Management Assessment Model’, accessed and downloaded from Bucks New University Certificate in Security Management Journal (13/11/2013)

(20)   Interviews with Jon Hill and Paul Brown, Close Protection trainers, conducted on 11/11/2014. BS 8507-1-2008 can be accessed at:

(21)   Ibid.

(22)   Ibid.

(23)   Op. Cit., Schoultz, B. and Richardson, M., (2013).

(24)   Mullins L.J (2007), ‘Management and Organisational Behaviour’ – Eighth Edition, Harlow: Pearson

(25)   Security Industry Authority website (2014), Close Protection Training, accessed and downloaded on 08/12/2014 at: www.sia.homeoffice.gov.uk/pages/training-cp.aspx

(26)   Padgham., G., (2006), ‘Close Protection – the softer skills’, Cambridge: Entertainment Technology Press Ltd.

(27)   Close Protection.org website (2014), accessed and downloaded on: 08/12/2014 at: www.close-protection.org/Resources.html

(28)   Drucker, P., (1974), ‘Management: Tasks, Responsibilities, Practices’, New York: Harper and Row.

(29)   Froch., C., Accessed and downloaded on 08/12/2014 at: www.mightyfighter.com/carl-froch-quotes/

(30)   AdvantFort press release (11/07/2014), ‘Charges Against MV Seaman Guard Ohio Crew & Guards Quashed by Indian HC’, accessed and downloaded on 10/12/2014 at: www.advanfort.com/Charges-against-MV-Seaman-Guard-Ohio-Crew-Guards-Quashed-by-Indian-HC.pdf

(31)   CNN (20/02/2014), Police ID 2 Americans Found Dead on Maersk Alabama – ‘Captain Phillips Ship’, accessed and downloaded at: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/02/19/world/asia/seychelles-maersk-deaths/

(32)   New York Times (25/02/2014), ‘Hired to Fight Pirates, but Doomed by Boredom’, accessed and downloaded on 14/12/2014 at: www.nytimes.com/2014/02/26/world/africa/hired-to-fight-pirates-but-doomed-by-boredom.html?_r=0

(33)   IMB (1 Jan. to 30 June 2012), ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships’, London: ICC International Maritime Bureau, and also, IMB (2013), ‘Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, London: ICC International Maritime Bureau’

(34)   Security in Complex Environments Group (SCEG), accessed and downloaded on 09/12/2014 at: www.adsgroup.org.uk/pages/24204653.asp

(35)   International Code of Conduct for Private Security Providers website, accessed and downloaded on 10/12/2014 at: www.icoc-psp.org/About_ICoC.html

(36)   Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011), ‘Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect’, ‘Respect’ and ‘Remedy’ Framework’, Geneva: United Nations Office of the High Commissioner, accessed and downloaded on 09/12/2014 at: www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/GuidingprinciplesBusinesshr_en.pdf

(37)   Security Industry for the Maritime Industry (SAMI) website, and ‘The Bridge’ Digital Magazine was accessed and downloaded on 09/12/2014 at: www.seasecurity.org/

(38)   The Hundred Series Rules: An International Model Set of Maritime Rules for the Use of Force (RUF) (2013), was accessed and downloaded on 09/12/2014 at: https://100seriesrules.com/uploads/20130503-100_Series_Rules_for_the_Use_of_Force.pdf

(39)   SOLAS Regulations, accessed and downloaded on 09/12/2014 at: https://mcanet.mcga.gov.uk/public/c4/solas/solas_v/Regulations/regulation34_1.htm

(40)   Written interview conducted with Jason Layton, Maritime Security Specialist, conducted on 09/12/2014

(41)   International Maritime Organisation (IMO) website, ‘Maritime Safety’, accessed and downloaded on 10/12/2014 at: www.imo.org/OurWork/Safety/Pages/Default.aspx

(42)   International Maritime Organisation (IMO) website, ‘Maritime Security and Piracy’, accessed and downloaded on 10/12/2014 at: www.imo.org/OurWork/Security/Pages/MaritimeSecurity.aspx

(43)   Ibid.

(44)   Her Majesty’s Government (2014), Code of safe working practices for merchant seamen, accessed and downloaded on 15/12/2014 at: www.gov.uk/government/publications/code-of-safe-working-practices-for-merchant-seamen-coswp

(45)   BIMCO website, security section, was accessed and downloaded on 10/12/2014 at: www.bimco.org/Security.aspx

(46)   International Maritime Bureau (IMB), ICC Commercial Crime Services website, accessed and downloaded on 10/12/2014 at: www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre

(47)   IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Map 2014, was accessed and downloaded on 10/12/2014 at: www.icc-ccs.org/piracy-reporting-centre/live-piracy-map

(48)   Maritime Security Centre Horn of Africa (2011), Best Management Practices for Protection Against Somalia Based Piracy (Version 4), accessed and downloaded on 10/12/2014 at: www.mschoa.org/docs/public-documents/bmp4-low-res_sept_5_2011.pdf?sfvrsn=0

(49)   U.S. Coastguard Office (2012), ‘Guidelines for U.S. Vessels in High Risk Waters’, accessed and downloaded on 10/10/2014 at: www.maritimedelriv.com/Port_Security/USCG/USCG_Files/FR_Guidelines_US_Vessels_High_Risk_Waters.pdf

(50)   NBC Washington (20/10/2014), ‘Woman Accidentally Shot by Security Guard During Scuffle at McDonald’s’, accessed and downloaded on 06/01/2015 at: www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/Woman-Accidentally-Shot-by-Security-Guard-during-Scuffle-279702422.html

(51)   Hudson, G., (2014), ‘Celebratory gunfire and its impact in Kabul, Afghanistan’, Buckinghamshire New University Department of Security and Resilience (Restricted)

(52)   Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (24/12/2004), New Year’s Eve Injuries Caused by Celebratory Gunfire, accessed and downloaded on 12/02/2014 at: www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5350a2.htm

(53)   BBC News Africa (12/09/2014), ‘Oscar Pistorius found guilty of culpable homicide’, accessed and downloaded on 09/01/2015 at: www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-29149581

(54)   The Telegraph (27/07/2003), ‘Tony Martin is “going to get it”, warns cousin of the boy he shot, accessed and downloaded on 09/01/2015 at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1437256/Tony-Martin-is-going-to-get-it-warns-cousin-of-the-boy-he-shot.html

(55)   New York Times (22/10/2014), Blackwater Guards Found Guilty in 2007 Iraq Killings, accessed and downloaded on 12/01/2015 at: www.nytimes.com/2014/10/23/us/blackwater-verdict.html?_r=1

(56)   USA Today (17/10/2007), US Rejects UN Report, accessed and downloaded on 12/01/2015 at: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/2007-10-17-3392316246_x.htm

(57)   Ibid.

(58)   CBS News (18/10/2013), ‘India Arrests 35 from U.S. Security Firm Advan Fort’s well-armed anti-piracy mother ship’, accessed and downloaded on 12/01/2015 at: www.cbsnews.com/news/india-arrests-35-from-us-security-firm-advanforts-well-armed-anti-piracy-mother-ship/

(59)   The Telegraph (26/01/12), ‘Simon Mann appeals against Zimbabwe gun conviction over Equatorial Guinea plot’, accessed and downloaded on 12/01/2015 at: www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/equatorialguinea/9042303/Simon-Mann-appeals-against-Zimbabwe-gun-conviction-over-Equatorial-Guinea-plot.html

(60)   National Policing Improvement Agency, ACPO & ACPOS (2011), Manual of Guidance on The Management, Command and Deployment of Armed Officers (Third Edition), accessed and downloaded on 09/01/2015 at: www.acpo.police.uk/documents/uniformed/2011/201111MCDofAO3.pdf

(61)   Ibid. pp.16-17

(62)   Ibid.

(63)   Her Majesty’s Government website, accessed and downloaded on 12/01/2015 at: www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1967/58

(64)   NPIA/ACPO Op. Cit., p.14

(65)   Crown Prosecution Service Online, ‘Self-Defence and the Prevention of Crime’, accessed and downloaded on 12/01/2015 at: www.cps.gov.uk/legal/s_to_u/self_defence/#Reasonable_Force

(66)   Home Office (October 2014), ‘Guide on Firearms Licensing Law’, accessed and downloaded on 08/01/2015 at: www.gov.uk/firearms-licensing-police-guidance

(67)   Ibid. P.103

(68)   Malmstrom., C., EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Speech at the Conference on the Fight Against Arms Trafficking: Where Do We Stand? at 2 (Nov. 19, 2012), http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-12-841_en.htm

(69)   Her Majesty’s Government Report (2014), ‘Review of the Balance of Competences between the United Kingdom and the European Union: Single Market: Free Movement of Goods’, London: Crown Copyright, accessed and downloaded on 13/01/2015 at: www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/288194/2901479_BoC_SingleMarket_acc5.pdf

(70)   Papademetriou., T., (2013), Firearms Control Legislation and Policy: European Union, Washington D.C.: Library of Congress: accessed and downloaded on 13/01/2015 at: www.loc.gov/law/help/firearms-control/eu.php

(71)   Ibid

(72)   United Nations website, accessed and downloaded on 13/01/2015 at: https://treaties.un.org/pages/viewdetails.aspx?src=ind&mtdsg_no=xviii-12-c&chapter=18&lang=en

(73)   The Guardian (01/11/2012), ‘Christopher Tappin pleads guilty to selling batteries for Iranian missiles’, accessed and downloaded on 13/01/2015 at: www.theguardian.com/law/2012/nov/01/christopher-tappin-pleads-guilty-extradited

(74)   Her Majesty’s Government website, Export Control Act, briefing and full text accessed and downloaded on 13/01/2015 at: www.gov.uk/export-control-act-2002

(75)   Author interview with Jon Hill, Managing Director at Operations Group, London, conducted on 11/11/2014

(76)   Ibid.

(77)   Berkeley HR (2014), Resolving Conflict Situations, accessed and downloaded on 06/01/2015 at: http://hrweb.berkeley.edu/guides/managing-hr/interaction/conflict/resolving

(78)   Ibid.

(79)   Ibid.

(80)   Burgess, H., (2013), Beyond Intractability: Misunderstandings, accessed and downloaded on 05/01/2015 at: www.beyondintractability.org/essay/misunderstandings

(81)   Fisher, R., Ury, B., (1981). Getting To Yes: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In. Boston: Houghton Mifflin.

(82)   Ibid.

(83)   British Battles.com, Crimean War/Balaclava, accessed and downloaded on 19/03/2015 at: www.britishbattles.com/crimean-war/balaclava.htm

(84)   Ibid.

(85)   Ibid.

(86)   Copping, J., (20/04/2014), The Daily Telegraph: New accounts emerge of Charge of Light Brigade, accessed and downloaded on 06/01/2015 at: www.telegraph.co.uk/history/10776275/New-accounts-emerge-of-Charge-of-the-Light-Brigade.html

(87)   Karten, N., (2013) ‘Mind the Gap: Communication Gaps and How to Close Them’, accessed and downloaded on 05/01/2015 at: www.informit.com/articles/article.aspx?p=2122831

(88)   Davis, B., (2014) ‘Top Ten Communications Mistakes – A Guide for Gen Y’, accessed and downloaded on 05/01/2015 at: www.leehopkins.net/2011/11/14/top-ten-business-communication-mistakesa-guide-for-gen-y/

(89)   Ibid.

(90)   Borg, J. (2008), ‘Body Language’, p.28, Harlow: Pearson

(91)   Carnegie, D., (1936), ‘How To Win Friends And Influence People’, p.37, Chancellor Press, ISBN 1 85152 576 9

 

^* To explain, the bracketed marks above indicate a score out of 100 based on ‘how corrupt their public sector is perceived to be’. 100 is the highest possible score for public finance probity. Denmark came the closest with 91/100. A zero score would illustrate the highest possible level of corruption. Somalia, achieving just 8/100, was perceived to be the most corrupt state in the world out of 177 countries measured overall.

^*Please note that it is recommended that these highly personalised details would be encrypted and key identifier phrases should be codified to protect the identity of the principal, other key individuals and organisations.