Footnotes

1The shift in the denomination of the field is intentional. While in North America Communication is perceived as being one discipline and is usually not explicitly qualified as a science but rather listed among the arts, despite its strong social sciences component, in continental Europe the field is more often perceived as multi-disciplinary and its component disciplines are often qualified as sciences: hence Communication Sciences.
2Cf. The original version in French states: “La société n’admet aucune communication concernant, soit l’origine du langage, soit la creation d’une langue universelle”.
3Cf. J. Barkov, L. Cosmides, J. Tooby (1992).
4Cf. M. Hauser, N. Chomsky, T. Fitch (2002).
5Cf. D. Bickerton (1981); J. Hurford (2012).
6In evolutionary theory, a saltation, also known as abrupt speciation, is a discountinous change in a lineage provoked by a mutation that gives rise to a new species.
7Cf. P. Gardenfors, M. Osvath (2005).
8Cf. D. Bickerton (1981); T. Deacon (1997).
9Cf. D. Bickerton (1981, 2000).
10Cf. M. Corballis (2010).
11.Cf. P. Carruthers, A. Chamberlain (eds.) (2000).
12Cf. P. Lieberman (1984); P. Lieberman (1996).
13Cf. M. Hauser (1996); K. R. Kluender et al. (1987); W. T. Fitch (1997).
14Cf. HCF (2010: 33).
15Cf. C. R. Gallistel (1990); D. Dehahene (1997).
16Cf. J. Hurford (2007); T. Fitch (2010).
17Cf. D. Bar-On (2013: 343).
18For the philosophical concept of bullshit, see Frankfurt (1986).
19Cf. R. Dunbar (1997).
20Cf. C. Darwin (1871: 57).
21.Cf. P. Grice (1957).
22Cf. Grice (1982).
23For the hypothesis of Macchiavellian Intelligence or Social Intelligence, cf. W. Byrn & A. Whiten (1988).
24For an analysis of metarepresentations, cf. D. Sperber (ed.) (2000).
25Cf. F. Warneken & M. Tomasello (2009).
26Cf. R. M. Seyfart & D. Cheney (2003); M. Tomasello (2008).
27According to Ruth Millikan (1984), who first advanced this idea, the “proper function” of an item is the function to perform which it has historically selected for (independently of its “actual” function: for example, I can use a screwdriver to clean my nails, but the function for which it was selected for is to turn screws).
28The precise nature of the straw man created through the equivocal parallelism between guns and people taking the Agentive role remains, of course, strategically vague. One construal of the straw man that avoids the more patent incongruity of having the non-human guns taking the role of agents would be a denial of the alleged standpoint that weapons are the efficient cause of the killing.
29In the former case, to read means “to reconstruct the phonetic form and retrieve the meaning of a written text”; while, in the case of the word processor, it means “to process symbols stored on a permanent storage device”.
30That John moved2 the picnic table means that John performed an action which caused the table to move1.
31While the observations advanced in this chapter generally apply both to speaking and writing, for convenience and because most of the examples of language discussed are from written texts, reference will only be made to the “writer”.
32These lexica have been compiled using both human annotation and computational data mining mechanisms. Predictably there is considerable discussion and debate about how best to construct such dictionaries of attitudinal meaning. See Devitt and Ahmad (2013) and Tabaoda et al. (2011) for further discussion.
33WordNet, for example, indicates that the verb fabricate has two senses: 1. “put together out of component parts” and 2. “make up something artificial or untrue”. The lexicon of attitudinal terms might tag such a term as both “negative” and “neutral”.
34The search used parts-of-speech identifiers to search for the term as an adjective occurring before a noun.
35See Crismore (1989).
36See for example, Chafe and Nichols (1986).
37See for example, Lyons 1977; Palmer 1986 or Coates 1983.
38See the many publications emerging from the NWO Vici project, 2008–2013: Bridging the gap between psycholinguistics and computational linguistics: The case of referring expressions: http://bridging.uvt.nl/
39Translated from French by Louis de Saussure.
40In Kerbrat-Orrechioni (2005b) we discuss an authentic example of this very type: Customer – Je voudrais un petit bifteck (I would like a small beefsteak). Butcher – Un gros? (A big one?). Customer – Moyen! (Medium!).
41Original:
D – […] elle était avec sa cousine en Espagne. Et alors, elle dit, ils voulaient acheter du beurre. Alors [rire] y a sa cousine qui lui dit, elle parlait pas un mot d’espagnol, mais elle lui dit « moi je parle italien, italien et espagnol c’est pareil », alors
O – Oh là là! Oh là là!
D – Alors elle entre dans le magasin, puis elle dit ‘burro’. Et alors, [rire] alors tout le monde regardait, et alors burro, ça veut dire l’âne.
O – Oh! [rire]. Ça veut dire l’âne. Elle voulait du beurre! Burro. [rire] Ça joue des tours, hein?
42For the distinction between rational and reasonable see van Eemeren (2008). Being rational involves in his view using the faculty to reason; being reasonable refers to doing so in an appropriate manner. Cf. Perelman’s (1979) view.
43Just like any other communicative and interactional act, argumentation can be used improperly. Instead of being reasonable, arguers may, for instance, be primarily interested in making a favourable impression on an audience, as when two political rivals are engaged in an electoral debate. However, if their discussion with each other is to be taken seriously by others, they need to act reasonably or maintain at least the appearance of being engaged in a reasonable discussion (van Eemeren et al. 2014).
44Toulmin (1976), one of the founding fathers of modern argumentation theory, distinguished among three conceptions of reasonableness: 1. an anthropological conception, which starts from what is considered reasonable by the members of a certain communicative community and generally results in a rhetorical model for argumentation; 2. a geometrical conception, which is aimed at preserving certainty and developing a model of argumentation providing universal standards for assessing the truth of standpoints; 3. a critical conception, which boils down to adopting a dialectical procedure for testing systematically the tenability of standpoints.
45First, various kinds of coherent replies to first pair parts do not fit the category of a second pair part. Second, the concept of an adjacency pair relation does not provide an adequate basis for identifying pairs: There is no principled way of identifying which pair parts should be paired together and which not. Third, the adjacency pair analysis cannot explain what types of utterances can and cannot initiate an adjacency pair. Fourth, a sequencing rule model offers no principled way of determining what utterances can and cannot be structurally subordinate expansions. Fifth, there is an apparently limitless diversity of sequential expansions. As a consequence, no taxonomy of patterns can ever encompass all possible patterns (Jacobs & Jackson 1989: 161).
46In this way Jackson and Jacobs’s work in discourse analysis has developed closer to the pragmadialectical perspective of van Eemeren and Grootendorst, with whom they co-authored the monograph Reconstructing argumentative discourse (van Eemeren et al. 1993).
47Among a substantial group of European researchers, particularly those based in the French-speaking world, a descriptive approach to argumentation is traditional. Some of them continue the linguistic approach started in the 1980s by Jean-Claude Anscombre and Oswald Ducrot (1983). Others, such as Plantin (1997) and Doury (1997), build on this approach but are also – and often more strongly – influenced by conversation analysis and discourse analysis.
48Doury’s descriptive approach is strongly influenced by Christian Plantin’s work on a dialogical model of argumentation including elements of classical rhetoric. In this model, the argumentative situation is characterized as an interaction between a speaker advancing a point of view which he needs to defend and an interlocutor expressing doubt for which a burden of proof is also incurred. For a more elaborate account of this model, see Plantin (2005).
49In principle, the pragma-dialectical “code of conduct” for reasonable discussants in which the rules for critical discussion are summarized provides all the standards pertinent to resolving a difference of opinion on the merits and therefore covers all fallacies that can be committed in argumentative discourse. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 93–217 Verify the number of pages because 93–217 seems too much.
50As a consequence of continued critical questioning, the protagonist’s argumentation can become complex and the structure of the argumentation may vary. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992: 73–89) and Snoeck Henkemans (1992).
51.The category of the usage declaratives is introduced in van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1984) as a specific subcategory of Searle’s declaratives.
52It is important to note that in argumentative practice a great many speech acts in the discourse are performed implicitly or indirectly, so that in the analytic component of the research program it needs to be determined whether they can be reconstructed in terms of the moves pertinent to conducting a critical discussion.
53The reconstruction is pragmatic since argumentative discourse is viewed as an exchange of speech acts taking place in an actual communicative and interactional context; it is also dialectical since the exchange of speech acts is viewed as aimed at resolving a difference of opinion on the merits by means of a critical discussion. See van Eemeren et al. (1993).
54In non-interactional communicative approaches to argumentation in which argumentation is not put in the broader context of a critical discussion aimed at resolving a difference of opinion on the merits but treated “as a claim and reasons that support it” (Blair 2012), such as informal logic, three standards are generally employed in evaluating argumentation: relevance, acceptability, and sufficiency.
55For a discussion of the distinction between emic and etic perspectives on language use, see van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs (1993: 50–52).
56See Genette (1992), however, on the error of attributing the trio of literary genres to Aristotle specifically
57Bakhtin’s work was originally published in Russian in 1979 but was written in 1952–53, according to the editors of the English-language edition cited here. Some of the ideas were originally formulated with Vološinov in the 1920s (Vološinov 1986).
58For example, Powell (2009: 1) singles out three “popular confusions” addressed within his book; namely, 1. “the illusion that the purpose, origin, and function of writing is to represent speech” (original italics), 2. “the common supposition that writing comes from pictures”, and 3. “the misapprehension that writing necessarily evolves toward the goal of finer phonetic representation”.
59Weingarten (2011) conceives of writing systems as pairings between a particular language and a particular script, such as Amharic-Latin versus Amharic-Ethiopic, referring, respectively, to the Amharic language written in the Latin script and the Amharic language written in the Ethiopic script. Although the interpretation of writing system differs somewhat from the one adopted here, the basic proposal of identifying the language-script pairing has merit and is, therefore, adopted in Section 3.
60Coulmas (2013: 17–18) also acknowledges a secondary sense in referring to “the specific rules according to which the units of the system are interpreted in a given language”. That is essentially the sense underlining my customary usage of the term of Japanese writing system (i.e. Joyce 2002; 2011; Joyce, Hodošček and Nishina 2012; Joyce, Masuda and Ogawa 2014) to refer to the unique mixture of scripts (kanji, kana, alphabet) that together constitutes a single orthographic system.
61Indicative of the huge obstacles to be overcome, however, Powell (2009: xv) also remarks that he knows “of no other humanistic topic more distorted through the careless use of categories and terms, so that things “everyone knows” are illusions”. A little later on, he also suggests that “the misuse of three words more than any others have harmed the study of the history of writing: “pictogram,” “ideogram” (or ideograph), and “alphabet”” (p. 3), but, arguably, the list could be much longer. In briefly commenting on the synonyms of pictograph and ideograph, respectively, from the perspective of Japanese kanji, Joyce (2011) stresses that, although the terms have some merit in the very narrow senses of referring to two principles of kanji creation, clearly neither principle can underpin a full writing system.
62For instance, while largely excluded in the interests of brevity, the comprehensive typology of writing systems would undoubtedly also benefit from paying more attention to the issues of tone orthographies (Roberts 2011).
63Powell (2009) does not ignore the larger issue, because just prior to providing his definition of writing, he also comments that the “relationship between the sounds of human speech and graphic material symbols that represent such sounds in lexigraphic writing is a central problem” (p. 13).
64Anderson’s (1992: 322) comments about typologies of language succinctly capture the ideal; “We can conclude that the parameters of a typology ought to be ones from which something follows: that is, they ought to identify groups of properties that co-vary with one another, so that knowing how one things works entails knowing about others as well, as a direct consequence of whatever it is that motivates the typological labels”. In contrast, Sampson’s (in press: 2) comments allude more to the difficulties of characterizing the dominant principles; “in classifying scripts it is necessary to define a range of ideal types, and to bear in mind that real examples rarely or never perfectly exemplify the type under which they are categorized”.
65Sampson (1994) has subsequently stressed that, rather than arguing for the existence of such systems, his intention was conjectural in nature (as the dotted line in his (1985) figure sought to indicate) and merely speculating on “whether there might ever be a semasiographic system comparable in expressive power to a spoken language” (pp. 119–120). Within a glossary entry, Rogers (2005) defines “semasiographic writing” as an “alternative name for semantic writing system” (p. 297); the term he uses. Rogers (2005) argues for the existence of one semantic writing system in Bliss symbols (Bliss 1965), which he discusses at some length, although Sproat (2010), who also discusses Blissymbolics in detail, stresses the limitations of Blisssymbolics as a writing system.
66Given Powell’s (2009) remonstrations against the confusions surrounding writing and, in particular, the first popular one cited in footnote 1 above (namely, “the illusion that … function of writing is to represent speech” (p. 1), his definition of lexigraphy is all the more perplexing!
67.Taylor (1883) proposed one of the earliest classifications of writing systems. It consisted of 1. pictures, 2. pictorial symbols, 3. verbal signs, 4. syllabic signs, and 5. alphabetic signs, where (1–3) were referred to as ideograms and (4–5) as phonograms (as cited, for example, in Daniels 1996, 2001; DeFrancis 1989; Diringer 1962; Hill 1967; Trigger 2004),
68As Sproat (2010: 183) comments, it is “most unfortunate” that the Unicode Consortium adopted the term ideograph to refer to Chinese characters.
69In contrast to the phonological analysis of words within cenemic writing systems, Hill (1967) astutely notes that the analysis of word meaning for pleremic writing systems naturally settles on the morpheme; the smallest element of linguistic meaning.
70Daniels’ (1990, 1996, 2001, 2009) justifies his proposals of abjads and abugidas by claiming they solve the problem of traditional classifications, such as Gelb (1963) which zealously presented the alphabet as telos (for further discussion of Gelb’s classification, also see Coulmas (1996), Rogers (2005), Sproat (2000) and Trigger (2004)).
71Of the six writing systems singled out by DeFrancis and Unger within the middle area, Finnish is located furthest towards the pure phonography extreme, with French and English progressively closer to the center, while Chinese is positioned furthest towards the pure logography side, with Japanese more central than Chinese and then Korean more central still.
72In fairness, it may be noted that, despite an extensive literature on the related notions of orthographic depth or orthographic transparency, practical methodologies for measuring and cross-linguistic comparison of principle consistency are still largely under development. For example, Neef and Balestra (2011) propose a method for calculating graphematic transparency for phonemic (alphabetic) writing systems that yields a graphematic transparency value (g-t value).
73The main thrust of writing reforms, or script engineering, efforts by the People’s Republic of China has been the simplification of Chinese characters in terms of their stroke counts (Coulmas 2013; Mair 1996; Sproat 2010).
74However, one serious problem that is frequently missed from general introductions of Chinese is the increasing use of Chinese characters in transcribing foreign names and foreign words entering the Chinese language. From the perspective of writing systems, the blurring of the morphographic and syllabographic principles is likely to have more serious, far-reaching consequences for Chinese than character simplification or limitation issues. Mair (1996: 201) provides one example and comments on the confusion potential, as follows: “Thus, because of semantic interference, readers frequently misinterpret such expressions as 特納廣播電台Tènà Guǎngbó Diàntái as ‘Special Acceptance Broadcasting Station’ instead of as ‘Turner Broadcasting Station’”.
75Through the historical process of borrowing and adapting Chinese characters for the Japanese language, kanji have come to be associated with two separate lexical stratums; Native-Japanese and Sino-Japanese. Thus, for example, 書write is associated with the Native-Japanese pronunciation of /ka/ in the verb citation form of 書く/ka.ku/ to write, but the Sino-Japanese pronunciation of /sho/ is generally used when the kanji is a component of Sino-Japanese compound words, such as 書道/shodō/ write + way = calligraphy.
76According to personal communications from two Korean research colleagues, this basic tug-of-war is also at the heart of the orthography divide between South and North Korea.
77.Firstly, notwithstanding Sandler and Lillo-Martin’s (2001) assertion that sign languages have been recognized as bona fide linguistic systems since at least the 1960s, it should be stressed that ASL is not a gestural system related to the English language. Rather, ASL refers to the sign language used predominantly by the deaf communities in the United States and English-speaking regions of Canada. Secondly, I accept that referring to ASL-SignWriting as a language-script pairing is not totally consistent with the adopted definitions. More accurately, SignWriting refers to a writing system in the sense of the set of potential symbols that can be created from the component elements, of which only a subset (script) might be utilized in presenting a particular sign language. According to its website, SignWriting is used in more than 40 countries to represent different sign languages.
78Even though the discussion of typology of writing systems in Section 2 focused primarily on categories and terminology issues, a considerable number of important typologies were noted, albeit only fleetingly in most cases. It is, however, particularly noteworthy that none of them attempt to incorporate writing systems for sign languages within their classifications. Although van der Hulst and Channon’s (2010) discussion of notation systems for sign languages has a section on writing systems, far from proposing a typology, their main focus appears to be make distinctions between writing, transcription and coding systems.
79While readily acknowledging that my familiarity with sign languages is extremely limited, attempts to draw parallels between the internal structures signs and phonology – which, from Sandler and Lillo-Martin’s (2001) chapter on natural sign languages, appear to be fairly common practice – only seem to invite confusion. For instance, as evident in the following comment from van der Hulst and Channon (2010: 11): “SignWriting might at first appear to be a (word- or morphemebased) semagraphic system, but it is actually phonographic: the graphs depict aspects of the phonological form of signs”.
80Although the direction of writing in SignWriting was initially according to the left-to-right and top-to-bottom convention of English text, it seems that the community of SignWriting users find the top-to-bottom and left-to-right direction more natural (Hopkins 2008; SignWriting).
81This article draws on existing publications by the author. Paragraphs and formulations have been reproduced from the following papers without explicit cross-references: Perrin, Daniel (2013). The linguistics of newswriting. Amsterdam, New York et al.: John Benjamins. | Perrin, Daniel & Grésillon, Almuth (2013). Methodology. From speaking about writing to tracking text production. In Daniel Perrin & Eva-Maria Jakobs (Eds.), Handbook of writing and text production (Vol. 10). New York et al.: De Gruyter.
82There is little agreement about the language that should be used to denote this particular type of social interaction. In earlier literature (e.g., Herring 2001), “computer-mediated communication” had gained disciplinary support yet today it has lost considerable prominence due to its failure to capture the breadth of electronic devices that may now mediate human interaction. For a more comprehensive discussion of this debate regarding terminology, see Herring (2013).
83As noted by Schegloff (1990), the sequential position of utterances is a critical resource by which participants in interaction establish (and maintain) coherence (cf. section 3.4).
84For a discussion of “reported speech” in the context of co-present interaction, see Buttny 1998, Holt & Clift 2007 or Tannen 1995.
85It is worth noting that the authors conclude by posing the question of whether CMC-related registers should be considered a register all their own (separate from oral or written), since “computer mediated writing does not remain stable over time … its extremely rapid rate of change poses a true challenge to researchers in this field” (p. 1712).
86Conversation analysts have also shown that speakers may expand these basic activities beyond a two-part series of “moves” to more complex courses of action (for instance, see the discussion of pre, post, and insert expansions in Schegloff 2007; for a broad picture, see this volume, chapter 9).6 cf. Heritage 1984 for a similar discussion of intersubjectivity in interaction, whereby participants check their recipient’s understanding through evidence provided in their subsequent response (or lack thereof).
87In addition to universal semantic primes (undecomposable “atoms of meaning”) NSM research has uncovered several dozen universal (or near-universal) “semantic molecules” (Goddard 2010, 2012; Wierzbicka 2011). These molecules are meanings composed of the primes but integrated into units which function as integral parts in the meanings of other, semantically more complex words. Some semantic molecules are highly culture-specific (e.g., ‘God’, ‘money’ and ‘paper’ in English and many other languages), some, however, are universal or near-universal. Examples of the latter include ‘man’, ‘woman’, ‘child’, ‘be born’, ‘water’ and ‘fire’. The meanings discussed in this paper rely almost exclusively on semantic primes. The only semantic molecule which briefly appears on the scene is ‘be born’, in the section of “The Yolngu theory of person”.
88As I am finalising this section, Australian newspapers report on the trial of a serial rapist, Adrian Bayley, accused recently of assaulting and killing a Melbourne television journalist. The victim’shusband is reported as saying at the trial: “I think of the waste of a brilliant mind and a beautiful soul at the hands of a grotesque and soulless human being” (The Australian, June 12, 2013, p. v).
89In some cases, some elements of ‘local currency’ are convertible into the currencies of neighbouring or otherwise closely related countries. For example, the English word art is convertible into the languages of other European languages, whereas the word mind is not.
90The semantic history of the Geek word psykhe awaits a thorough investigation, based on a rigorous semantic methodology. Bruno Snell’s pioneering study The Entdeckung des Geistes (1946), translated into English as The Discovery of the Mind (1953), is rich and fascinating, but hardly precise or rigorous. Snell’s claims that before the 5th century BC, Greek had no word for body are not supported by methodical semantic analysis, and the same applies to his overall interpretation of the early Greek ethnopsychology.
91For the notion of ‘cultural keywords’ see Wierzbicka (1997).
92While the French word personne and the English word person carry with them meanings that are not fully cross-translatable either (cf. Wierzbicka 2002: 68–74), they are very close to the universal concept ‘someone’, which is cross-translatable. So if we sometimes use words like personne and person as convenient reference points in cross-cultural research (bearing in mind that what we really mean is ‘someone), not much harm is done. This is not the case, however, with the English word mind, which is profoundly culturally shaped and has no equivalents in other languages, not even European ones.
93The author would like to thank Eline Busck Gundersen, Timothy Chan, Anders Nes and two anonymous referees for helpful comments on a draft of this paper. The opinions here and remaining mistakes are the author’s own.
This paper was written at CSMN, University of Oslo, and the author’s research is supported by the Research Council of Norway (project 213068/F10: The Reflective Mind).
94See Laurence 1999 for an overview of work on misunderstanding in communication science.
95Weigand (1999: 764–765) calls these ‘planned misunderstandings’.
96There is an interesting parallel with the received view of knowledge in philosophy. It is generally accepted that it is not enough for a belief to be true for it to be knowledge; it must also have been reached in the right way or be held for good reason. See Steup 2005/2014 for an introduction.
97A slightly different distinction is between misunderstanding of the utterance itself, and other misunderstandings that may attend conversation or other verbal communication.
98This example is from Peter Handke’s The Goalkeeper’s Fear of the Penalty: “She was about to sit down at a place where there was no chair and Block exclaimed: ‘Look out!’, but she had only crouched and picked up a coin that had fallen under the table when she was counting the money,” (Zaefferer 1977: 30, fn. 3, trans. Zaefferer, modified by Allott).
99For example, Schegloff uses the phrase “misunderstandings that occur between persons” (1987: 203) in a context that suggests that this (very broad) category is a focus of research in the CA tradition.
100There is interesting work on misunderstanding in this broader sense, e.g., Perkins & Simmons, 1988.
101Zaefferer’s paper is an interesting attempt to treat linguistic misunderstanding in a decision-theoretic framework (1977). It does not belong to any of the bodies of work noted in the introduction or the conclusion, and seems to have been something of a theoretical dead end.
102.Conversely, Laurence (1999) argues that studying misunderstanding has occupied too central a place in much work on communication.
103Errors in encoding and decoding should also be on the list, pace Zaefferer.
104Schegloff (1987: 209) gives an attested example of misunderstanding of illocutionary force, where a description is misunderstood as a criticism or complaint.
105A question which has received too little attention is whether intended contextual assumptions are part of what the speaker intentionally and overtly conveys (Sperber and Wilson 1986: 194) or whether while essential to understanding what the speaker means, they are not themselves part of utterance content (Recanati 2004: 48–49).
106Not all repair is correction of misunderstanding: other-repair often targets problems with hearing, and self-repair is often aimed at problems with speaking. See Schegloff, Jefferson & Sacks 1977: 361, 379–80.
107One reason for the neglect of statistical analysis might be Schegloff’s (1993) view that it is premature to attempt quantitative work in this area.
108In this case B overtly fails to observe the maxim of Relevance by providing an epistemically motivated piece of information from which (2) can be inferred. In Grice’s terms, B is liable to have flouted the maxim of Relation (that is, B has ostensively failed to observe this maxim) in order to make explicit his reasons for believing (2), thereby ensuring that the maxim of Quality is observed.
109Note that it is possible to specify two distinct senses of non-cooperation within Grice’s model. On the one hand, overt non-cooperation (see example (1) above) denotes the situation in which the speaker ostensively fails to observe a maxim. This type of non-cooperation is instrumental to the derivation of meaning. Non-ostensive cooperation, on the other hand, i.e. the covert failure to fulfil a maxim, is non-cooperative in a deceptive sense, since the speaker is not making it manifest that maxim nonobservance is at play (but see Oswald 2010: 61–96 for an extensive discussion).
110See section 2.5, Oswald (2010) and Galasiński (2000) for more extensive discussions.
111As Jacobs et al. (1996) observe, IMT is one of the first research efforts which tries to make connections between linguistic pragmatic principles and the nature of deceptive message design.
112See e.g., http://www.bbcamerica.com/anglophenia/2011/12/infamous-british-political-scandals-spingate/ for the story.
113For instance, the transformation of ‘The cat caught the mouse’ in the passive voice may yield either ‘The mouse was caught’ or ‘The mouse was caught by the cat’. Both sentences are grammatical, and even if their focus is different, they can both be said to correspond to the sentence in the active voice.
114Such an interdisciplinary toolkit, where various approaches with diverse and possibly conflicting epistemological assumptions and backgrounds co-exist, raises issues which are not yet settled. For a discussion of interdisciplinarity within CDA see Chilton (2005b) and Oswald (2010: 154–179).
115See Hart 2010, chapters 3, 4 and 5 for an extensive overview.
116Transcript of President Bush’s address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, Sept. 20, 2001. Available online at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010920–8.html. (last checked, 17. 02. 2014)
117.See Hansen & Pinto 1995, Part I, for a historical overview, and, e.g., Copi & Cohen 1994 or the website http://www.fallacyfiles.org for a standard list of different fallacies that have been studied over the years.
118I am very grateful to the two editors of this volume as well as to the two anonymous reviewers for their interesting input and for their encouragement.
119A useful overview of developments in scholarly approaches to interpersonal communication skill is found in Spitzberg and Cupach (2011).
120By the same token, by restricting the focus to oral communication skills, I shall not endeavor to address issues of writing skills.
121Even so, much of what follows can be seen to apply to skill acquisition among other populations.
122See Greene (1988) for an extended discussion various measures of cognitive processing involved in speech production.
123As in other studies employing this experimental paradigm, novel sequences for organizing message content were employed in order to eliminate effects of prior experience and to ensure that skill acquisition was being observed from its inception.
124“Effective” in this context should be understood to reference multiple distinct learning outcomes that don’t always co-vary (that is, conditions of practice that facilitate certain outcomes may actually impede others; see Greene 2003). At minimum we can distinguish: 1. short-term acquisition of skills, 2. long-term skill retention, and 3. transfer of skills from the training/learning context to “real-life” situations.
125See Greene (2003) for a more detailed exposition of these points.
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