Chapter 1
1 See O’Brien (2016).
2 See Bergbrant, Campbell, and Hunter (2014).
3 See Adler and Dumas (1984).
4 See Pettit (2003).
5 This hypothetical scenario is adapted from Godfrey and Espinosa (1996).
6 See Pringle (1991).
Chapter 2
1 The Finning scenario is described in Millman (1990).
2 The Western Mining Company case is in Maloney (1990). Also see Dhanani (2003).
3 See O’Brien (2010).
4 For further analysis of competitive FX exposure, see O’Brien (1998, 2010), and the references therein, plus Shapiro (1975) and Friberg and Ganslandt (2007).
5 See Adler and Jorion (1992).
6 See Oxelheim and Wihlborg (1995).
7 See Garner and Shapiro (1984).
Chapter 3
1 See Bates, Kahle, and Stulz (2009).
2 In academic corporate finance circles, business value is sometimes called the operation’s unlevered value, whereas enterprise value is called its levered value. Following the famous capital structure theory of Miller and Modigliani (1963), the tax shield value of debt interest was a standard theme in academic corporate finance. This theme prevailed even after Miller’s (1977) extension that debt tax shield values are likely to be lower than originally theorized.
3 Even if we considered debt tax shield value, there does not need to be a “tax term” in the levering/unlevering equation (3.2). Justification is in Miles and Ezzell (1980).
1 Bonini et al. (2012).
2 An example is the British mining company in Dhanani (2003).
Chapter 5
1 See Bartram, Brown, and Minton (2010).
2 See the survey by Graham and Harvey (2001).
3 See Allayannis and Ofek (2001); Kedia and Mozumdar (2003); and Keloharju and Niskanen (2001).
4 See McBrady, Mortal, and Schill (2010). The UIRP condition is covered in detail in O’Brien (2016).
5 Aabo, Hansen, and Muradoglu (2015) find that Danish firms prefer to hedge FX accounting exposure over FX operating exposure.
6 The Vulcan Materials case is in Garner and Shapiro (1984).
7 See Dufey and Srinivasulu (1983) and Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1994).
8 See Lewent and Kearney (1990).
9 For useful discussions, see Maloney (1990) and Allyannis, Ihrig, and Weston (2001).
Chapter 6
1 For further discussion of inefficiencies and arbitrage in the currency swap market, see Usmen (2004).
2 See Munro (2011).
3 See Kester and Allen (1991).