A look at nanotechnology in the developed and developing world is given. Although some countries, such as Mongolia and Montenegro, still have no discernible nanotechnology activity, it is visible in at least a hundred countries in the world, both commercially and academically. South Korea emerges as the world's leader in nanotechnology. One of the most striking features of the global distribution of nanotechnology activity is that some less developed and developing countries have the highest proportion of nanotechnology, measured as the ratio of the number of published articles dealing with nanotechnology to the total number of scientific and technical articles. This supports the idea of disequilibrium forcing technical advance.
Publications; Exchanges; Developing countries; Disequilibrium; Economic growth
Although we live in an era of globalization, and although science has always been global in spirit, there are nevertheless huge differences in the degree and history of technological development of different countries. This chapter explores some of those differences in activity—nanotechnology in a global manufacturing context.
The nanotechnology research paper outputs of the leading countries are compared in Figure 17.1. The comparison may be considered to be misleading because it takes no account of the different sizes of the countries. Figure 17.2 compares the output of research papers per capita. The ranks are very different. Most remarkable of all is the position of South Korea. The Korea Nanotechnology Initiative was only launched in 2001; according to the master plan for the initiative's second phase spanning the decade from 2006 to 2015, Korea aimed to become one of the world's top three nations in global nanotechnology competitiveness by 2015. Competitiveness is not yet defined by a standardized procedure, but according to Figure 17.2 it was already in first place by 2009! The country is no less advanced industrially, producing some of the most advanced electronic devices in the world. Nor is the initiative driven by empty platitudes, but by a visionary coherence that sees such aspects as the unity and generality of principles, nanotechnology as the ultimate technology for material and system production, and as the most efficient length scale for manufacturing as powerful motivations for attaining excellence in the field. Remarkable in a different way is Germany, which achieved almost the same rank (according to the publications) without any grand overarching national initiative (the main instrument is an “Innovation Initiative”), and the same for France (although the Académie des Sciences has recommended initiating a “vast program”). Perhaps two centuries of state investment in science and technology (cf. Section 13.3) are finally yielding dividends! Japan and Britain are perhaps slightly disappointing, given that they really initiated nanotechnology (Japan in 1974, see Figure 1.1, and Britain in 1988 with the first nanotechnology initiative, but it only lasted five years and nothing immediately followed it). Russia must rank as very disappointing, especially since some important early discoveries were made there (e.g., carbon nanotubes observed but not identified in electron micrographs in 1952), and despite the vast sums poured into the RusNano initiative (nominally at least, about $1010 from its creation in 2007–8 to 2012–3). China is apparently doing better than India (although a citation analysis might change this assessment). Korea's success seems to be strongly dependent on government rather than private funding, again apparently belying the analysis in Section 13.3, but there is no space here to carry out the more thorough analysis that would be needed to draw firm conclusions. At any rate the sums are impressive: in 2012 $600 million was put into graphene research, development, and innovation in South Korea, compared with about $80 million in the UK (the National Graphene Institute that has been built in Manchester).
Table 17.1 updates these figures to the present and presents data on the number of companies and research institutes engaged in nanotechnology, without any indication of their sizes. The earlier indications are broadly confirmed; South Korea's lead has increased even further, but most of the other countries have declined. China and India, on the other hand, have also markedly advanced; China is now almost level with the UK [1].
Table 17.1
Nanotechnology involvement by country
Country | Population/106a | Share of papers (%)b | Share per capita | No companiesc | No res. institutesc | No patentsd |
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
China | 1388 | 34.1 | 25 | ? | ? | 262 |
France | 65 | 3.9 | 60 | 38 | 40 | 396 |
Germany | 81 | 5.8 | 72 | 197 | 176 | 687 |
India | 1343 | 8.1 | 6 | 32 | 43 | 28 |
Italy | 60 | 1.4 | 23 | 17 | 39 | 109 |
Japan | 126 | 7.0 | 56 | 47 | 63 | 1983 |
Russia | 143 | 1.4 | 10 | 11 | 7 | ? |
South Korea | 51 | 6.0 | 118 | 20 | 29 | 1114 |
Switzerland | 8 | 0.6 | 75 | 42 | 55 | 156 |
UK | 66 | 1.7 | 26 | 54 | 142 | 142 |
USA | 326 | 16.3 | 50 | 929 | 694 | 13,947 |
a 2017 data from http://www.worldometers.info/world-population/population-by-country/ (accessed 30 June 2017).
b The share of 151,352 articles (9.5% of all articles) concerning nanotechnology indexed by the Web of Science up to 31 December 2016, from http://statnano.com/report/s29 (accessed 30 June 2017).
c From http://www.nanowerk.com/nanotechnology/research/nanotechnology_links.php (accessed 30 June 2017).
d From H. Chen et al., Global nanotechnology development from 1991 to 2012: patents, scientific publications, and effect of NSF funding. J. Nanoparticle Res. 15 (2013) 1951–1971.
The foremost countries are of course those included in Figure 17.1, to which Switzerland should be added because of its intense research and spin-out activity. Within those countries, it is not necessarily the case that a handful of institutions are producing the overwhelming bulk of the exploratory research; important innovations may be widespread [2]. Sheer size plays a rôle; a small university may only achieve international prominence in one small niche area. Where spin-out activity is strong, as in Switzerland, the technology may already be in the commercial realm by the time it gets reported and an end-user may find it more expedient to collaborate with the spin-out company rather than the university research group in which the technology initially originated. Many micro companies have a single highly innovative product protected by a key patent.
The general level of technological infrastructure plays a vital rôle beyond the lowest levels of technological achievement. For this reason Russia is not a prominent player because, although new ideas might still be originating there, it is not possible to take them very far without overseas collaboration. The biggest unknown quantity is China (that is, wholly Chinese enterprises rather than joint ventures with or subsidiaries of foreign companies). There is undoubtedly a tremendous volume of nanotechnology work going on there at both research and development levels [3], but it is less certain whether reliable supply partners can be found.
The most prolific institutions in the world are umbrella organizations comprising many individual institutes: the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the Russian Academy of Sciences, and the Centre National pour la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS) in France, in places 1, 2, and 3 respectively for producing the most nanotechnology papers in 2005 [3]. France is relatively outstanding: the comparable Consiglio Nazionale per la Ricerca (CNR) in Italy only produces about two thirds of the output (and appears in rank 13). Position 4 is occupied by Tsing Hua University in China, and the next three positions by Japanese universities (Tohoku, Tokyo, and Osaka). The list is indeed dominated by the Far East. The most prolific institution in the USA is the University of Illinois (rank 17); there are only two other US universities (Berkeley and Texas) in the first 30. The only European university is Cambridge (rank 24); the Indian Institutes of Technology (another umbrella organization) only appear at rank 28.
In 2016 the five world-leading institutions in terms of numbers of publications were, in ranked order, with the numbers of articles in parentheses [4]: Chinese Academy of Sciences (8205); Russian Academy of Sciences (2778); the US Department of Energy (DoE) (2647); the multicampus University of California System (2396); and the Islamic Azad University (Tehran) (2029). The prominence of the DoE presumably reflects the growing interest and hopes being placed in batteries for storing the electricity produced intermittently by solar panels and wind turbines. Iran has enormously increased its activity in nanotechnology since the previous edition of this book was published.
Nowadays, with an unprecedented level of global networking and the highly efficient dissemination of knowledge (thanks to excellent communications), it is not a difficult problem to find a laboratory capable of carrying out almost any kind of nanotechnology research. Many, many universities in similar academic institutions are carrying out some work on nanotechnology. Facilities might be a limiting factor—even today, no single institution appears to have all that is required to undertake any kind of nanotechnology work, but if money is no obstacle equipment can be acquired, and specialized technical expertise is mobile [6].
Within the UK, the obvious (private) centers of excellence for nanotechnology include the BAE Systems Advanced Technology Centre (ATC) at Filton and Qinetiq Advanced Microsystems Engineering at Malvern. Many universities are conducting some kind of nanotechnology research; the top four universities with respect to patenting activity are Cambridge, Oxford, Glasgow and Imperial College (part of the University of London).
Globally, leading nanotechnology companies (i.e., large companies that have made a serious commitment to nanotechnology, which may nevertheless only represent a very small part of their current product portfolio) are typically military (e.g., Raytheon, Lockheed Martin) or IT (e.g., IBM) in the USA. In Europe, chemical companies are very active in the development of nanomaterials (e.g., BASF in Germany). In Japan, engineering, electronics and chemical companies are all actively carrying out nanotechnology research (e.g., Toyota, Toshiba, Mitsubishi).
Although the nanotechnology research community is very healthy, judging by the tremendous amount of publishing activity (one might even say overhealthy, because there is insufficient coördination, leading to duplicated effort and the neglect of gaps), the same cannot be said of the nanotechnology industry. There are numerous companies offering nanomaterials (overwhelmingly nanoparticles), mostly in the USA and China, but these materials are in no sense standardized and buyers are likely to have to pay a premium price because of the difficulty of comparison (absence of real competition and no widely used mechanism of price discovery). A significant milestone was the launch in 2010 of the Integrated Nano Science and Commodity Exchange (INSCX), based in the UK but active globally, which offers trading services in nanomaterials and nanodevices akin to the well-established exchanges for commodities such as metals and grains (cf. Section 13.4). This exchange is expected to transform the way nanomaterials are sourced. Among other effects, it is likely that the price of many nanomaterials will fall to a level at which their use can be contemplated (whereas at present, although there may be a clear technical advantage in employing them, they are simply too expensive).
According to the Civilization Index (CI) [7], the countries of the world can be grouped into four categories:
Category I comprises the wealthiest countries of the world. They are active in nanotechnology, have a high level of scientific research and technical development in most areas, and have a good level of higher education. We would expect that countries in this category are leading in at least one branch, both scientifically and in developing innovative products.
Category II comprises some countries of the former Soviet Union, which had highly developed scientific research activities for much of the 20th century but since 1991 have fallen on hard times, together with countries that historically had strong traditions of technical innovation (for example, until around the 17th century China was well ahead of Europe) but failed to sustain past momentum (for reasons that are not understood) and, perhaps more significantly, failed to develop a strong science to parallel their technology; this subgroup within the category also has a large rural, barely educated population. Nevertheless, with their generally highly centralized nature they have been successful in concentrating resources sufficiently to be effective.
Category III comprises countries with a lower level of civilization that have acquired vast riches in recent decades through the export of raw materials found within their territories, especially mineral oil. They have manifested little interest in supporting the global scientific community; what technology they have is mostly imported.
Category IV comprises countries with an apparently lower level of civilization—according to Western ideas—that might require centuries of development before reaching the attainments of Category I (see Section 17.5). Regarding “centuries of development”, it should be borne in mind that there is nothing absurd or inconsistent in the traditional world-view that tends to be found in these countries—but it is intolerable to the modern, “scientific”, mind.
Up to a few years ago it could be said that essentially all the nanotechnology-active countries were in Category I, but in recent years some category II countries, most notably Iran, have made enormous strides. Furthermore, the sheer size of China and India make them prominent on the international scene. Besides, there is a huge diaspora of scientists from these countries working in category I countries.
An oft-debated issue is whether developing economies (the “Third World”) can disproportionately benefit from adopting nanotechnology in order to shortcut the laborious path of technical development that has been followed by the “old” economies. A key idea is that for many products much less capital investment is required to set up nanofacturing than to set up conventional production (computer hardware need not be included in the manufacturing portfolio because high-performance chips are anyway available practically as commodities nowadays).
In other words, nanotechnology is prima facie very attractive for poor, technology-poor countries to embrace because it seems to require less investment before yielding returns (other than nanoscale semiconductor processing). Furthermore, nanotechnology offers more appropriate solutions to current needs than some of the sophisticated Western technologies available for import. Water purification using sunlight-irradiated titanium dioxide nanoparticles would be a characteristic example. Are these propositions reasonable?
Alas, the answer may have to be “no”. One of the greatest handicaps countries in Category IV face is appallingly ineffectual government; precisely where direction would be needed to focus local talent there is none, and most of these governments are mired in seemingly ineradicable venality. The situation nowadays in many African countries is apparently considerably worse than half a century ago when, freshly independent, they were ruled with enthusiasm and a great desire to develop a worthy autonomy. Zimbabwe offers a very sobering illustration: the country had a good legacy of physical and educational infrastructure from the past era, but today, after the government has bent over backwards to distribute land to the landless, would-be farmers have shown themselves incapable of stewardship and agricultural output has plummeted.
The doubtless well-meaning efforts that have resulted in the foundation of institutions such as the new Library of Alexandria and the Academy of the Third World also seem doomed to failure, for they are rooted in an uncritical admiration of sterile “pure” sciences in the Western tradition which, while superficially glamorous in a narrow academic sense, are incapable of taking root and growing—nor would such growth be useful to their environment.
Having said that, if a country wished to focus all its resources on one area, nanotechnology would probably be the best choice, because its interdisciplinary nature would ensure that the knowledge base had to be broad, while the immediacy of applications would ensure rapid returns. The criterion of success will be for a country to achieve leadership in some subfield of the technology: this will show it has crossed the sustainability threshold, which is unlikely to be achievable merely by imitating leading Western scholarship. To some extent this is already happening, as shown by the data in Table 17.2.
Table 17.2
Proportion of nano-articles to all articles published by each country in 2016 (ranked by proportion)
Country | Proportion (%)a | Numberb | (GDP/N)/current USDc |
---|---|---|---|
Iran | 22.9 | 8351 | ? |
Saudi Arabia | 18.1 | 2742 | 20,028 |
Singapore | 17.7 | 2381 | 52,960 |
India | 17.1 | 12,268 | 1709 |
China | 16.8 | 51,668 | 8123 |
South Korea | 15.7 | 9127 | 27,538 |
Russia | 12.5 | 4885 | 8748 |
Taiwan | 12.0 | 3122 | ? |
Japan | 9.6 | 7568 | 38,895 |
Germany | 8.1 | 8753 | 41,936 |
France | 7.9 | 5851 | 36,855 |
Italy | 6.5 | 4297 | 30,527 |
USA | 6.1 | 24,649 | 57,466 |
UK | 5.2 | 5539 | 39,899 |
Canada | 5.0 | 3312 | 42,158 |
a Data for 2016. Source: http://statnano.com/news/57105 (accessed 30 June 2017). All these countries are among the top twenty, ranked by the absolute number of articles dealing with nanotechnology.
b Data for 2016. Source: http://statnano.com/report/s29 (accessed 30 June 2017).
c Gross domestic product divided by population N. Data for 2016. Source: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (accessed 30 June 2017).
An attractive feature of promoting “nanotechnology in the jungle” (or in the desert), as we might call it, is its potential to benefit the overall economy through the promotion of disequilibrium, as advocated by Hirschmann [8]: the technological demands of having any success at all in an advanced system of production necessarily force the rest of the economy (other parts of which must inevitably supply the ultrahigh technology part) to develop in its train.
It would be greatly encouraging if any country launching a focused nanotechnology effort would avoid the pitfalls of “standard empiricism” (see Chapter 19) and make a fresh start with aim-oriented science, and from the beginning encourage healthy, open criticism. At the same time, good use should be made of the global (for such may it be considered) scientific legacy, by sending scholars to a variety of foreign centers of excellence to learn. It would be futile to await handouts from international funds (IMF, World Bank, and the like) for such a purpose—they are not interested in promoting independent science. In most countries, the leaders could well afford to fund, out of their private wealth—often said to be misappropriated from public resources—appropriate scholarships for undertaking doctoral degrees (for example) abroad. These returning scholars would be seeds of immense growth potential.
Despite their problems, these countries have two great advantages compared with the developed world. One is that they have practically nothing to dismantle first, which represents such a big obstacle to the introduction of new ways of thinking [9]. The other is that their natural resources are mostly still relatively unexplored and unexploited; looking at them from the bottom upwards is almost certain to yield new knowledge, leading to new avenues for wealth creation.