5.2.1. Apocalyptic techno-visionary futures related to nano

While nanotechnology was perceived as a seemingly risk-free field for a long time, the situation changed radically in 2000, following the famous essay by Bill Joy “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us” [JOY 00]. Positive utopias of nanotechnology were converted into horror scenarios, which will be briefly mentioned in the following, in spite of the fact that these stories of the future might sound strange today [SCH 06, Chapter 5].

Grey Goo is a doomsday scenario in which nanoscale robots self-replicate out of control. These robots could produce unlimited copies of themselves consuming all available material. Ultimately, they would leave a planet of nothing other than waste. This dystopian scenario was already mentioned by the early futuristic of Drexler:

“Tough, omnivorous ‘bacteria’ could outcompete real bacteria: they could spread like blowing pollen, replicate swiftly, and reduce the biosphere to dust in a matter of days” [DRE 86, p. 172].

While most of the scientific community considers this to be science fiction, others have argued that it is a possible outcome of unregulated nanotechnology making use of concepts of self-organization [DUP 04, DUP 07]. The public perception of nanotechnology was frequently influenced by arguments using the grey goo scenario to call for greater caution in scientific and technological progress. This scenario reminded many people of the large apocalyptic fears that were brought up in the 1970s based on technological innovations and that motivated Hans Jonas [JON 84] to coin his famous imperative of responsibility. Thus, the negative vision motivated the call for more responsibility in research and innovation which was among the origins of the overall RRI movement [GRU 14a].

The Prey Scenario is built on the same basic idea, i.e. self-replicating nanobots, which was initially invented to describe a positive utopia expected from nanotechnology. Nanobots could, according to this vision, invade the human body in order to act there as an improved health maintenance system [DRE 86]. Bill Joy [JOY 00], however, drew a completely different picture and argued that nanotechnology in relation with biotechnology and information technology could indeed lead to the possibility of intelligent nanobots. His concern was that humans might easily lose control over these armadas of nanobots. Instead of being servants to human needs, nanobots could start acting independently of human orders and even gain control over the world. The completely technical civilization which could emerge from such a development would no longer need humans. Losing control over technology is an old stimulus for social thought about technology. The more capabilities are given to technology, the greater the fears in this respect [NOR 04, GRU 07a]. Accordingly, it is not at all surprising that scenarios of an increasingly autonomous technology will accompany future debates (Chapter 6). The conclusion of this techno-visionary narrative is converging with the above-mentioned one: be careful and responsible in your use of autonomous technology, again an early leitmotif of the RRI debate.

The Cyborg Scenario considers the situation that nanotechnological visions repeatedly contain elements that blur the boundary between what human beings are and what they create as a result of technical achievements. Futuristic visions include the possibility of the technological storage of human consciousness and the creation of artificial brains within the next few decades [CAU 02]. An entire spectrum of anthropological and ethical questions follows from this which might be summarized by the metaphorical question:

“When God fashioned man and woman he called his creation very good. Transhumanists say that, by manipulating our bodies with microscopic tools, we can do better. Are we ready for the great debate?” [HOO 04].

The idea of cyborgs is not a new one. Starting with the science fiction literature of earlier periods (see, for example, the figures and stories of Golem and Frankenstein), there has been an ongoing debate on the relationship between humans and technology and on the border between them. The technicalization of humans, on the one hand, and the growing capabilities of autonomous robots (Chapter 6) on the other are apparently posing challenges to traditional convictions. Cyborgs lead to issues of control between humans and machines which are relevant to medical devices, especially active or neural implants.

These three dystopian narratives on techno-futures with nanotechnology seem to be speculative and fuzzy from today’s perspective. However, about 15 years ago, they were debated with great seriousness, even involving Nobel laureates [SMA 01]. We could therefore ask why those debates were conducted so intensively at that time, what this fact could tell us about that time and what we could learn from this story for techno-debates which may be approaching in a comparably early stage of development (section 5.5).

5.2.2. Threats to human health and the environment

Beyond the futuristic elements of nano mentioned above, a second and more down-to-earth branch of the risk debate on nanotechnology emerged from about 2002 [SCH 06, Chapter 5]. It focused on the question of possible harm to health and the environment caused by synthetic nanomaterials. Newspapers put nanotechnology in the category of risky technologies. Reinsurance companies quickly became aware of the possible risks posed by nanomaterials and of related governance questions [MUN 02, SWI 04]. One specific item was the question of a possible analogy to asbestos. The example of asbestos showed what could result from the intensive use of materials if a careful impact analysis had not been performed [GEE 02]. Some voices pointed to possible analogies of synthetic nanoparticles to asbestos:

“Some people have asked whether the ultra-small particles and fibers that nanotechnology produces, such as carbon nanotubes, might become the new asbestos” [BAL 03].

In fact, there are only few analogies in a physical or chemical regard or with respect to the size or shape of asbestos fibers and today’s synthetic nanoparticles. The relevance of asbestos to the nanoparticle risk debate originated above all in the dramatic case of what could happen if no or few precautions were taken. The miraculous engineering properties of asbestos had led to a rapid growth in its exploitation and use. Although adverse health effects (asbestosis) had been observed rather early and led to some workplace regulations in the 1930s, other relevant pieces of knowledge (concerning lung cancer and mesothelioma caused by asbestos fibers) had, however, been ignored or even suppressed. There was no comprehensive collection and assessment of data prior to the 1960s [GEE 02]. The story of asbestos, especially the severe health and economic disasters associated with it, served as strong motivation to demand a more precautionary approach in the field of nanoparticles [GRU 08b].

The emergence of this specific risk issue, in combination with the fact that there was practically no knowledge available about the side effects of nanotechnology on human health and the environment, led to severe irritations and to a kind of helplessness at the early stage of that debate. Statements from that time varied between an optimistic “wait-and-see” strategy [GAN 03] and strict precautionary and sometimes “alarmist” approaches:

“The new element with this kind of loss scenario is that, up to now, losses involving dangerous products were on a relatively manageable scale whereas, taken to extremes, nanotechnology products can even cause ecological damage which is permanent and difficult to contain. What is therefore required for the transportation of nanotechnology products and processes is an organizational and technical loss prevention program on a scale appropriate to the hazardous nature of the products” [MUN 02, p. 13].

The analogous position on nanoparticle regulation that is among the most famous statements on how to deal with nanotechnology is the postulate of the ETC group for a moratorium (see also some years later Friends of the Earth [FRI 06]):

“At this stage, we know practically nothing about the possible cumulative impact of human-made nanoscale particles on human health and the environment. Given the concerns raised over nanoparticle contamination in living organisms, the ETC group proposes that governments declare an immediate moratorium on commercial production of new nanomaterials and launch a transparent global process for evaluating the socio-economic, health and environmental implications of the technology” [ETC 03, p. 72].

The ETC work gave a significant push to debates about nanotechnology regulations in many countries, including broader governance issues [KAI 10]. They also increased the fears of nanotechnology researchers of a broad public front of rejection and protest analogous to that in the histories of nuclear power technology and biotechnology.

A completely different, but also far-reaching, recommendation aims at containing nanotechnology research. It would imply a secret and strictly controlled nanotechnology development that seems to be unrealistic and unsafe as well as undemocratic. Furthermore, this recommendation is irritating regarding the ideal of an open scientific community:

“CRN has identified several sources of risk from MNT (molecular nanotechnology), including arms races, gray goo, societal upheaval, independent development, and program of nanotech prohibition that would require violation of human rights. It appears that the safest option is the creation of one – and only one – molecular nanotechnology program and the widespread but restricted use of the resulting manufacturing capability” [PHO 03, p. 4].

All of these different proposals have enriched (and fueled) public and scientific debate. Seen from today’s perspective, these proposals are documents of a very specific situation. Nanotechnology found itself, more or less suddenly, as the subject of a public debate about risk. The situation was characterized by severe challenges: while high expectations of benefits were still dominant, no reliable knowledge about the possible side effects of nanotechnology was available. This observation again supports the diagnosis that nanotechnology might be regarded as the original model of a NEST field becoming the subject of an RRI debate [GRU 11b, GRU 14a]. Above all, however, it illustrates very clearly which intellectual effort was necessary to be able to consider nanotechnology soberly in view of, or despite, its visionary components.

5.2.3. Philosophical characterizations

Early on, nanotechnology stimulated interpretations that extended far beyond the horizons of technology as such [GRU 12b, Chapter 2]. In particular, diagnoses of the contemporary situation were proposed that were philosophical in nature, including perspectives for the future of man and human civilization facing technology. The first one considers nanotechnology as the triumph of homo faber and Baconism [SCH 93a, OTT 13]. Some of the commentaries on nanotechnology clearly describe the return of optimism about shaping the future, even a return to a renewed claim to control and dominate nature:

“We are in the transition from being an amateur chess player to becoming a grand master, from observer to master of nature […]. The age of discovery is coming to a close, and that of domination is beginning” [KAK 98, cited in SCH 08].

These ideas regarding feasibility are fed by atomic reductionism, according to which all activity in the world can be traced back to causal processes at the level of atoms. If nanotechnology were to offer the possibility of controlling these processes technically, then man would so to speak have control of the roots of all causal chains and could thus practically control everything. This interpretation envisages man’s ultimate triumph, namely, that armed with nanotechnology man could begin to manipulate the world atom-by-atom according to his own conceptions, which is ultimately the consummation of Francis Bacon’s thoughts [SCH 08]. Control of the atomic dimension then also would mean control of the spheres of living and social phenomena. Although this vision of shaping the world atom by atom [NNI 99] is profoundly incredible – “because it is exceptionally difficult and it would not be particularly efficient to create first molecules and then the entire world atom by atom” – it appears throughout nanotechnology as if it were a leitmotif [NOR 07b, p. 220ff.] for humans being the creators and controllers of these developments:

“The aim of this metaphysical program is to turn man into a demiurge or, scarcely more modestly, the ‘engineer of evolutionary processes.’ […] This puts him in the position of being the divine maker of the world” [DUP 05, p. 13].

Objections to naïve atomic reductionism come from philosophical epistemology (Chapter 2) [SCH 06]. Nanoscientists frequently talk about atoms and molecules as if they were Lego^® blocks, which they can image, view, describe and combine into larger complexes [SCH 06]. This view disregards, however, constructive elements that are essential for nanotechnological operations at the atomic level. One of their examples is the notion of the “fat and sticky fingers” [SMA 01] with which we and our equipment operate. These are said to prevent completely deterministic work with atoms, analogous to building with Lego^® blocks, because the interaction between manipulator and manipulated object cannot be disregarded. According to epistemological arguments, atomic reductionism cannot be maintained because atoms are not (in contrast to Lego^® blocks) units independent of theory and cannot (in contrast to macroscopic building blocks) even be thought of independently from the roles of the producers and operator.

A second line of interpretation considers a huge increase in uncertainty. It begins, initially quite innocuously, by viewing nanotechnology as an enabling technology (starting with Fleischer [FLE 02]; see also section 1.3). This means that nanotechnology’s core consequences are to be expected less from its direct inclusion in technical products, procedures and systems. Instead, far-reaching advances from nanotechnology can be expected in many fields of technology in a more indirect manner (e.g. in electronics, energy technology and medicine) in many fields of application. This enabling property can appear at numerous levels: certainly at the level of new products using nanomaterials, particularly at the level of established key technologies such as information technology, communication technology and biotechnology, and even more so by opening entirely new directions for technology, such as NBIC convergence [ROC 02]. In this manner, nanotechnology contributes substantially to the multiple production of uncertainty, for example with regard to conceptions, intentions, consequences and ontology [SCH 08]. Its openness toward being used in different applications means that we cannot know as much about nanotechnology’s consequences for man and society as we would about those of familiar technologies. In contrast, from the enabling point of view, the goals that nanotechnology is developed for remain largely in the dark. Promotion of nanotechnology thus becomes an end in itself: people blindly promote the enabling property without knowing what precisely is to be enabled. In complete opposition to the assertion mentioned above about the return of thinking in terms of control and domination, the image here is of a development whose course cannot be predicted because of the enabling property of nanotechnology. Precisely because everything is possible, this development escapes our influence. Anticipations can range from paradise to apocalypse [GRU 07a, LAU 06] (see also Chapter 3).

A third perspective considers nanotechnology as a cipher of the future [GRU 06], as a void phrase allowing for different assignments of meaning according to different contemporary diagnoses and different pictures of the future¹. It proceeds from the observation of the contrasting interpretations mentioned and specifically addresses the opposition between them:

“Yet while the statements of nanovisionaries express an optimistic technological Baconism, the nanofacts and their consequences suggest rather characteristics of uncertainty” [SCH 08, p. 2].

The increased contingency of the conditio humana being a quality of nanotechnology [GRU 07a] is thus seen as both an extension of uncertainty and an expansion of the opportunities for shaping the future. The transformation from passively accepting something given to considering it to be manipulable is a general feature of technological progress. To the same extent that the human ability to control is increased, new space for visions and shaping the future will appear, which will then give rise to increasing uncertainty about how to deal with these new techno-visionary futures. Thus, nanotechnology perspectives toward the future of man and society are a placeholder for a discussion of society’s and man’s future of considerable scope. In this sense, nanotechnology is one of today’s ciphers of the future. Some other prominent symbols of this kind are demographic change, climate change, the precautionary principle [VON 05] and sustainable development [GRU 07c]. Each of them takes a look at different aspects of the future: for sustainable development, e.g. issues of fairness and the limitedness of natural resources; for climate change, the vulnerability of man’s way of doing business and lifestyle; and for demographic development, above all, reproductive and migratory behavior. A common feature is their catalytic function in the context of the search for orientation in today’s world via the (placeholder) route of deliberating about visions of the future – which directly relates to the hermeneutic perspective on nanotechnology as a NEST (see Chapter 3).

5.4.1. Looking back: the development of nanotechnology’s meaning

The reconstructions and descriptions in this chapter have made it clear that an intensive international debate over an adequate understanding of nanotechnology took place in the years from 2000 to about 2010. As in the classical debates over technology, this understanding was related, on the one hand, above all to opportunities and risks. These were discussed in the form of highly diverse technology futures concerning nanotechnology or concerning a society with a developed level of nanotechnology, and these discussions led to sometimes far-reaching visionary debates (section 5.2). On the other hand, there was also a dispute about understanding the scientific and technological peculiarities of nanotechnology with numerous suggestions for its definition and characterization (section 5.3). While the first debate was aligned with the consequentialist paradigm and considered the possible applications of nanotechnology and their consequences, the latter looked at the then-current daily routine in the laboratory, at the theories formed at the time, and at the position of nanotechnology in scientific theory, which was outside the classical disciplines. Connections between these two lines of searching for the meaning of nanotechnology were occasionally seen in the NEST concept, but even more in that of technoscience [NOR 08]. It is precisely this characteristic that makes the consequentialist pattern of reflection so difficult, if not impossible (Chapter 3).

Overall, the structure of the debate on nanotechnology in the period from the end of the 1990s until today has been one of hype. At the beginning, extremely high expectations extending to solutions to all of mankind’s problems, paired with grim anxieties that were apocalyptically oriented, quickly produced international hype around the public debate. Applied ethics [MNY 03, ALL 07], STS research [SEL 07], technology assessment [PAS 04], philosophy [BAI 04, FIE 10], ELSI studies [NAN 04, TEN 07] and scientific communication rapidly took up the topic, leading to hype in the reflective sciences. Several years later, toward the end of the first decade of the new century, this interest declined. Defuturization took place [LÖS 10], resulting in slack in the visionary debates. The focus of the debate shifted to the EHS studies (environment – health – safety) [COL 03, ENR 10], while public interest dwindled and has now largely disappeared. I interpret this development as normalization [GRU 10b, GRU 11b].

This normalization was already hinted at in the hype phase. The contradiction between the eschatological expectations and anxieties on the one hand and the reality of nanotechnology on the other hand were occasionally a topic of lectures or at coffee breaks but were not developed systematically. Part of the reality of nanotechnology at the time consisted of new materials for automobile tires, toothpaste and sun creams. These are not exactly products that exude revolutionary and disruptive force. Toothpaste as the “ultimate catastrophe”, as nanotechnology was described in some diagnoses [DUP 07], draws attention to this crazy contradiction. While the debate over nanotechnology wavered between salvation and doom, the real developments were about new materials for everyday life⁴.

Materials science is, however, a familiar field, including the risks possibly associated with the new materials. New materials might be revolutionary in their technical details and also in some applications, but usually not in their societal perception and not in debates on the meaning of materials research. There is much societal experience in dealing with new materials, and a long-lasting debate on how to deal with their risks and how to understand the meaning and significance of materials research. Society is familiar with this issue: we embed hundreds or thousands of new chemicals into our technical surroundings every year, and usually this develops well, but sometimes there are adverse experiences, as the asbestos story tells us [GEE 02]. Approaches to risk assessment, risk management and precautionary thinking are available which can be adapted to the field of nanoparticles [GRU 08b, JAH 15]. Thus, the type of problem is not new to society – while the advent of nanobots in society [DRE 86] really would have been a radically new challenge involving new questions for the meaning of this advent for future society. Nanotechnology has become a quite normal field of technology showing quite normal problems of possible hazards to human health or the environment.

5.4.2. Hermeneutic work on nanotechnology

An obvious question is whether the normalization described above would have taken place anyway, for instance as the result of a lack of novelty, of society becoming accustomed to it or of fatigue among the participants, or whether the intensive work on meaning during the hype contributed to it. There are good arguments supporting the second view that the work on meaning contributed to the constructive course of normalization. This thesis can, of course, hardly be validated because of the many factors that influence both our perception and the attribution of meaning to new technology in society. I can only attempt to make it plausible.

For this purpose, I will refer above all to the years from 2002 to about 2006. During these years, there was a widespread fear that technology – similar to nuclear power and genetics – might be headed for the next communication disaster at the interface between technology and society. The apocalyptic dangers posed by nanotechnology and, in contrast, the hopes for salvation were topics of discussion in newspapers and magazines. In Germany, this was initiated by the publication of the essay “Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us” [JOY 00] in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, which is one of the most influential newspapers in Germany. This publication caused a flood of further articles and heavily influenced public debate [MAR 08]. Shortly later, a second wave of risk debate occurred in a more down-to-earth fashion. Toxicologists such as Vicki Colvin [COL 03] pointed to the complete ignorance about possible adverse side effects of nanoparticles [PAS 04] and expressed concerns – which quickly led to the famous postulate of a moratorium on nanotechnology published by the ETC Group in early 2003 (section 5.2.1). Thus, there was a widespread feeling among nanoscientists, managers and policy makers that a wave of opposition and rejection of nanotechnology could occur at short notice.

However, nothing in that direction has happened. The situation at the interface between nanotech and the public remained more or less constructive, even in the face of critical manifestos [FRI 06]. Though the debate on possible risks of nanoparticles is now going on for more than 10 years, it did not lead to far-ranging rejection or protest. Seemingly, it has widely been accepted (1) that “zero risk” is an inadequate postulate in the first place, (2) that, instead, we should take care of a “responsible” management of risk, (3) that technological advance is inevitably related to risk and uncertainty and (4) that performing extensive research on nanotoxicology is an adequate response to the situation of little knowledge being available. It seems plausible that the extended deliberation of the meaning of nanotech and related activities have contributed to this “relaxed” development in the following way: in the field of nanotechnology, there have been a lot of activities in recent years which make it clear that dealing responsibly with risk is seen as part of scientific advance and its political shaping, funding and regulation. ELSI activities, toxicological research and debates on regulation are major examples, but there are also ethical, philosophical and other activities to achieve a better understanding of nanotechnology. In this way, trust has been generated – and trust is a major issue in avoiding communication disasters [GRU 10b].

That the process of social appropriation of nanotechnology took place constructively in the manner described above could theoretically be a coincidence. The comparison with other technology debates in which intensive and open work on meaning did not take place provides, however, arguments against this idea. For instance, in the history of atomic energy, there was no broad hermeneutic controversy [RAD 13]. There were practically no attempts to hermeneutically understand the different and rapidly completely diverging perspectives of the proponents and opponents. Instead, fundamentalist enmity led in many countries to an inability of the extremes to enter into a dialogue that has continued until today. This observation – and something similar is true for the early period of debate over genetically modified organisms for food production in many countries – supports the thesis that the intensive work on meaning, particularly also including possible negative aspects and risks of nanotechnology, led to this constructive course of events.

In particular, the early emergence of ethical reflection on nanotechnology [MNY 03, KHU 04, GRU 05] may have been of special significance for the constructive course of the normalization. At the beginning of this debate, it was less about concrete ethical issues in the sense of applied ethics [GRU 10a] than about a hermeneutic penetration of the field of nanotechnology, which appeared so radically new at the time. Instead of providing orientation for concrete action (which was thoroughly criticized as speculative ethics [NOR 07a]), the ethical reflection led to a conceptual and thematic analysis of the field. Another result is that most of the ethical questions are not new; they appear in familiar challenges but with new accents [GRU 12b, Chapter 6]. Yet, this was also a form of appropriation: the transformation of something that initially appeared radically new into something that is ultimately only incrementally different from familiar ethical issues. This facet of the RRI debate on nanotechnology may also be characteristic for other fields of NEST in which the task is first to understand what it is really about.

This leads us to the primary interest of the book, namely, to reach the origin of the RRI debates (their “spring” in the upstream metaphor) and to ask how the objects of reflection in RRI are constituted (Chapter 2) and why they have been constituted in this specific way. By means of early and in part speculative analysis, we can learn something about and for us today: “What do these visions tell us about the present, what is their implicit criticism of it, how and why do they require us to change” [NOR 07a, p. 41]? The more speculative the consideration of the future consequences, the less they can serve as orientation for concrete (political) action and decisions. Conceptual, pre-ethical, heuristic and hermeneutic issues then become more significant. The primary issue is then to clarify what is going on in the speculative developments considered, what is at issue, which rights might possibly be compromised, which images of man, nature and technology are formed and how they change, which anthropological issues are involved and which normative models for society are implied in the projections for the future [GRU 10a]⁵.

A fact that also appears important for the constructive course of the nano debates is that the hermeneutic efforts to grasp the concept and understanding of nanotechnology, as well as the latter’s relationship to current and future societies, did not take place among an isolated panel of experts but in dialogue in a double sense. First, these efforts took place in dialogue with nanotechnology itself, such as in groups of interdisciplinary experts [SCH 06, TEN 07]. Second, this clarification of meaning, which was quite controversial, was conducted transparently in the framework of a public debate. An abundance of dialogue formats, public lectures and workshops, media contributions and interviews led to the hermeneutic process of social appropriation and of the related normalization being perceived throughout society. This in turn had corresponding consequences for a constructive course of events.

Finally, I would like to point out that the pluralization of nanotechnology, the shift toward “nanotechnologies”, i.e. the abandonment of a monolithic definition in favor of a characterization (section 5.3) bearing traces that were extensional and narrative in nature, certainly contributed to this normalization. In the attempts to reach a definition, it ultimately became clear that it was impossible to agree on a hard definition starting from the level of science and technology. Nanotechnology rather represents an umbrella term for many lines of development that are either only rudimentarily or not at all linked. The disentanglement [NOR 07b] is an expression of this pluralization which documents a departure from the grand stories about nanotechnology and the turn to the many details.

5.4.3. Lessons learned for RRI debates

If the presumption is at least partly true that the efforts to define nanotechnology through the use of techno-visionary futures, definitions and characterizations contributed to a constructive course of communication between nanotechnology and society, then something should obviously be learned for other RRI debates. In a previous analysis of the consequences and impact of the ethical, reflective and hermeneutic debate on nanotechnology, I assumed that, while the high-flying expectations for a constructive molding of nanotechnology had not been reached, part of the debate’s impact was precisely its successful embedding of nanotechnology as a “normal” technology in society:

“What STS studies, TA, ethical reflection, and risk studies achieved is, that they helped nanotechnology to become embedded in society in a way that it otherwise would not have” [GRU 11b].

This history gives us cause to grasp the hermeneutic efforts with regard to nanotechnology as a complementary extension of the objects of RRI debates. Instead of reflecting on possible but distant and more or less speculative future developments, the hermeneutic analysis asks for the meaning of those techno-visionary futures today, as demanded in Chapter 1. Even in this regard, the debate over nanotechnology is paradigmatic for an RRI debate [GRU 14a].

The extension of this question concerning responsibility to the creation and distribution of techno-visionary futures (Chapter 2) is evident: the futures of nanotechnology have strongly molded the debate. Yet, it is difficult to answer the question of what accepting responsibility means in this connection. It makes little sense, for example, to ask whether Eric Drexler’s Engines of Creation [DRE 86], Bill Joy’s Why the Future Doesn’t Need Us [JOY 00] or the visionary promises of human enhancement [ROC 02] are responsible or irresponsible acts of communication. They, at any rate, represent interventions in the respective social constellation and have had consequences, some massive in nature, so that the question as to responsibility is justified at least for action theory (according to Chapter 2). It is difficult to imagine, however, how something like a code of conduct for the creation and dissemination of techno-visionary futures could be developed⁶. At this point, it appears more reasonable now to view responsibility as being distributed among various actors. It is then, for instance, sensible to refer to the responsibility of technology assessment, philosophy, ethics and STS studies, first to take on these futures effectively portrayed by certain actors, second to critically examine them with regard to their meaning and premises, and third to do this in the medium of a dialogue both with nanotechnology and society. This might be the essential lesson for us to learn from the debate over nanotechnology and, at the same time, a lesson for other RRI debates on NEST developments.

This brings the line of argument back to the original motivation of this book: to employ hermeneutics to facilitate self-enlightenment in ongoing technology debates (Chapter 1). Hermeneutic analysis should make a contribution by helping us to understand processes such as we have seen in nanotechnology from the inside. This improved understanding should take place at the same time as these processes are taking place in the real world in order to provide orientation for the processes themselves and for the democratic debate in particular.