2.2.1. Participation of stakeholders

It seems as if research requirements have encountered those of the PTA. In fact for more than 30 years now, European countries keep on including “ordinary citizens” in assessment experiments with very diverse audiences. RRI formulations by the EC sometimes talk of stakeholders and, at other times, of citizens. These audiences are not the same and their responsibilities are also different; this shall be illustrated at the end of Chapter 3. The majority of PTA experiences most often appeal to citizens. Concern for more inclusive stakeholder participation is not new; particularly, in the case of technology assessment (TA) [REB 05a, REB 05b, REB 06b, REB 06c, REB 10c, REB 11b, REB 11]. RRI can provide a solution to this preoccupation by including not only the affected public and ordinary citizens, but also all the stakeholders⁴. We shall discuss in Chapter 5, which focuses on the governance of the RRI, the possible choices to make with regards to institutional design to organize this participation. The whole idea of TA is not new. National parliaments, for example, have long since adopted offices for the evaluation of scientific and technological choices. However, the turbulent history of the first parliamentary office for the evaluation of scientific and technological choices of the US Congress sums up the difficulties inherent in the search for a proper articulation between science and policy, or even a more inclusive, participatory or deliberative policy. The Office of Technology Assessment (the OTA) was created to anticipate the potential benefits and harm of technologies and of their applications. However, this office was closed in 1995 under the presidency of Bill Clinton, revealing how an organization can be poisoned due to the unwieldy boundaries between politics and science, especially in providing long-term forecasts that are technically driven and unbiased, intended for legislative bodies, because the latter operate in the short term. These bodies are supporters of, and largely motivated by, political considerations. The fate of the OTA illustrates some of the key issues related to how very cleaved political groups may use forms of expertise in the regulation of scientific matters within parliamentary or federal agencies and even in courts.

If we have to resist the ease of the statement “technical democracy” or “environmental democracy”, it is nonetheless true that participation, particularly in the form of PTA, played a core role in European research programs entitled “Science and Society”. The transition to a new title, “Science with and for Society”, is significant. It also accompanies the transition of ethical considerations of emerging technologies to RRI. Many institutions are preoccupied with this participation issue. It is the case with the French National Public Debate Commission (CNDP)⁵. It can rely on the substantive law in Article 2 of the law of 2 February 1995 and its implementation order of 10 May 1996 which is its base, as well as its extension by the law of 27 February 2002 on local (proximity) democracy. It falls within the French tradition of public inquiries, which can be traced back to 1810, and enquiry commissioners, after repeated entries relating to the recognition of public participation in various laws as from 1976. However, it is worth mentioning that the CNDP owes its genesis to the import model of the Quebec environmental public hearings office (Bureau d’Audiences Publiques sur l’Environnement, BAPE).

This might seem surprising but very formal assessment bodies such as the CNDP have often implemented PTA experiences without attempting to establish their legitimacy, as well as not knowing the exact target. This was recognized with candor by one of the leading CNDP officials: “After ten years of existence, we know how to conduct these public debates. We can now ask ourselves why.”

Even though it is true that creativity was needed in order to organize this participation, it was broken down in many forms: not less than 50 procedures as we shall see.

Participation plays a vital role in the relationship between science and democracy. Yet, the PTA as well as RRI do not mention democracy. However, this is the approach that is most often used implicitly. But again, democracy is not evident. Indeed we have to consider its various institutionalizations over time and national circumstances. Changes in the way we operate are most often slow and difficult even for minor choices. Participation for such different worlds especially those as scattered as science and society, or simply research and innovation require a lot of energy and creativity in order to be effective.

Let us also listen to the voice of those who believe that we should not pilot research, or disrupt scientific work that is already highly exposed to international competition and strangled due to supervisory administrative requests and highly supervised conduct of research projects. Perhaps it might be countered that if a researcher must address not only scientific outcomes relating to their proper disciplines but also to society and the economy, why not also consent to a broader responsibility? This concern also had precedents, demonstrated through the development of organic products while respecting fair trade. It could also be estimated that these expectations avoid from going too far into the innovation process and reaching the commercialization of products that finally encounter high resistance and result in heavy financial losses. In Chapters 3 and 4, we will propose some ways to delimit the responsibilities of scientists or innovation actors, in order to prevent them from collapsing due to excessive constraints, without denying their commitment with respect to the rest of society.

The legitimacy of the participation is not so obvious. This issue has rarely been raised because focus was based on a rather vague democratic legitimacy. Why can we not ask these questions directly to citizens in case of public technological controversies? We can, but how many citizens can we encounter? Must they be demographically or legally representative? These two adverbs indicate two problems. The first will require a great number that can quickly become counter-productive in debates. How can such a large number participate? The second immediately shows that these citizens are not more legitimate than others, let alone the elected. Without ever directly answering these questions, nearly 30 years were dedicated to “risky” sociopolitical experiences in the evaluation of controversial technologies. It has often been done in the symbolic strongholds of political discussions like national or European parliaments.

On several occasions, participation has been promoted in recent decades to address issues as diverse and as vital as democratic deficit and defiance, assessment of controversial technologies or forms of more sophisticated and interactive polls. Far from engaging in a criticism rejecting participation, on the grounds that it is demagogic, we suggest that it is only preliminary. Its formatting as well as assessment comprise issues to be addressed, some of which are theoretical and have not been solved [REB 16a]: for example, how do we proceed with an interdisciplinary collective assessment? It is far from sufficient to brandish participation as a solution to problems as diverse as those mentioned above. A proceduralist preoccupation has often been the most important concern of the organizers of these experiences. Fair cooperation rules had to be provided within the procedures. If this cooperation is necessary for participation, it does not yet mean anything for evaluation. It is therefore important to ask questions like “why” and “how” do we participate? In order to achieve “what quality”? It is not because we have more than 30 years of PTA experience, mainly in Europe, that theoretical problems are solved.

Things moved much faster with participation. We will also reach the same conclusion in section 2.3., during our analysis of academic literature on RRI. It is time to examine it based on a new responsibility concern. This request is not only a researcher’s warning, but if we want to promote and recognize participation to institutionalize it, the time has come to put aside experiments that are sometimes hazardous and ineffective.

Perhaps it might be countered that if a researcher must address not only scientific outcomes relating to their proper disciplines but also to society and the economy, why do they not also consent to a broader responsibility? One of the main reasons for this broad participation is ethical. Ethics must be supported throughout the process; it should not just be announced. It is also this ethical preoccupation that should motivate wider concern for the secondary evaluation of experiences that often go along with democratic cooperation criteria. In order to better understand the issues of participation, so as to fill this theoretical gap relating to participation requirements, a continuation of the chapter will present some of the dimensions of the theories of deliberative democracy, a body of literature largely neglected by the current RRI conceptions, which may be relevant in implementing responsibility.

2.2.2. Gender equality

Here, again, entire bookcases, dating back to suffragists and feminist theories, could be mobilized to innervate the discussions and knowledge on how RRI could benefit from gender issues. For example, let us think of actions and research on European Center for Women and Technologies⁶. The EC intends to promote greater equality in the composition of research groups and assuming responsibilities in them. This equality could be a constraint on participation. It is a determined measure that could include the establishment of a participant quota to a voluntarist correction. There is no getting away from the facts that numerous studies show the evidence of gender inequality with regard to women, from their presence in certain disciplines, to salaries and hierarchical responsibilities. But the establishment of quotas, 50% if we wanted perfect equality, was the topic of debates (for example, in the United States in affirmative action policies). On one hand, quotas can force conventions and the eventual prejudice from employers; on the other, they are sometimes considered as an infringement to equal treatment, from the moment one can assert a difference (of gender) in order to be easily recruited before another candidate with the same profile and capacities.

The second aspect of this pillar is more substantial. It demands that gender issues be taken into consideration in the choices of research. This can move from types of questions, for example illnesses or discomforts that are peculiar to women, to the consideration of the differences in sexes when making the designs for crash-tests dummies for cars. This example is given in one of the reports recommended for this pillar by the EC [SHI 13].

It is the EC’s credit to promote gender equality, both procedurally and substantially. However, one could be surprised to see, for example, that the EC office that handles ethical issues is called “Ethics and Gender” (Directorate General for Research and Innovation, Directorate B – European Research Area – Unit B.6. - Ethics and Gender). The two terms are not equal and are not situated at the same level. The term ethics is a bigger concept.

A last question that comes up is that of knowing why we should stop there. Are issues of justice in other domains (based on other socio-demographic or cultural criteria), and sustainable development, to only mention these perspectives, less legitimate?

The last example of the report on gender [SHI 13] shows that the approach is differentialist and medical, emphasizing the consideration of the physical and psychological differences between males and females. Even in essays and feminist work, differentialists and universalists assert their disagreements.

Finally, this pillar appears to reduce gender to sex. If we have not read anything on RRI works which ventures into the conflicting terrain of gender theories, the EC documents make a distinction and even separate sex and gender. These gender works also envisage orientation choices and change of sex; they go as far as demanding the neutral gender. One already anticipates the struggle that such debates can have in Europe, by the French manifestations like marriage for all.

This gender equality pillar, laudable in numerous aspects, brings up its own questions in terms of interpretation and arbitration. It also deserves to be anchored in a most developed theoretical framework, sensitive to contemporary controversies on the subject, to avoid it becoming a fashion label, void of normative content and without any transformation power.

2.2.3. Open science

The conception of open science can take many forms, from the limited sharing of knowledge, especially for research financed by public funds, to collaborative innovation.

For example, European projects endeavor to develop a valorization policy with the public, stakeholders, policy makers and the general public. All types of means can be mobilized, from information and communication technologies ICTs to conferences or films. Each project develops its website and reflects on its durability.

All types of open archives on line move in this direction. Nevertheless, the problem of the survival of scientific publishers comes up.

The communities that militate for free access (the rights and/or the cost) to software (open access software) or platforms are part of this demand⁷. But some of them move further like European officer and philosopher René von Schomberg in his definition of RRI as a transparent process [VON 13]. Yet, transparency can have its limits, in the case of collaboration with private enterprises, that can protect some of their knowledge to ensure their durability and enable them to return to investment. The patents, which are limited in time, are forms of this protection which go with intellectual property.

Other types of considerations arise where transparency can be seen as a brake, or a hindrance to certain research. This is the case of this project by the Institute of Sciences and Sports of the University of Lausanne, which is supposed to contribute to the fight against doping and the study of the training of cyclists. Although supported by the International Cyclist Union (ICU), the reception of this project and the transparency it could bring to recapture the title of a national newspaper. Represented by their lawyers, some big teams asked the researchers not to publish their works⁸.

Amendments to the specifications of the various partners could also be brought in to defend what could benefit from the protection and what, on the contrary deserved transparency. Of course, this experience is about three years old. But this shows that although it is behind the last demands of the lawyers of three big international cyclist teams, there is also the balance of powers between the organisers of the various competitions of substantial media coverage, with the related broadcast rights, and influence in the ICU.

That said, and since there is competition, research remains above all a collaborative process. This collaboration is international; it exists among researchers across the whole world. In addition, one of the roles of scientific newspapers is to circulate each other’s results. Publication does not have a primary goal to validate these ones and valorize the influence of this or that researcher. publishing “the best reviews”, which are also submitted to classification. Even if the ranking between reviews, or universities or the competition of the type of attribution of the Nobel prize⁹, in some disciplines, is a part of reputation or national “vainglory”, a good number of researchers favor cooperation instead of competition with their peers. Part of European projects also aim at encouraging collaborative research between institutions of various countries hence participating in creating a European research era. And that, even if the sentiment that dominates, at least for the universities is still national, instead of European, while this is not the case with big countries like the United States.

Collaborative research solicits various partners, sometimes informed amateurs, beyond the domain of researchers. Let us think of the compendium and botanical pictures, bird counts, waste or planktons sampling in the seas by private sailors, following research projects such as Tara¹⁰, which organize expeditions on a schooner since 10 years to study and understand the impact of climate change on our oceans.

Communities are developing tools from the entire range of ICTs to encourage this collaboration, let us call to mind of the New Generation Internet Foundation¹¹.

Today, types of cooperation for innovation are coming up that call for a sharing in the costs of research and development, which contributes to opening science.

This pillar is therefore already put in practice and followed up in several different ways.

2.2.4. Scientific literacy

The English word used by the EC is “literacy”. It could be understood as “education”, “sensitization”, “popularization” or better still “dissemination” of the current scientific and technological research, and even the future ones. This activity is not only considered by teaching, the media or the museums; part of the researcher’s job is being handed down to this cause more and more. It also gives room for assessments by various academic institutions, of course with a less important weighting, compared with research, its animation and teaching.

This pillar seems to go beyond that of open science, since it aims at facilitating the understanding of the scientific interest of research. One easily understands that it is a prerequisite for RRI to know the ins and outs of this or that research. Nevertheless, scientific education promoters can have the weakness of thinking that if public opinion is opposed to some research, it was due at the best to lack of information, at the worst biased information. The first citizens conference in France, on Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in agriculture and food claimed “to bring back public debate to the right footing” [REB 11a].

Yet, first, a distinction should be made between those who do not know anything about the technologies concerned and those who have an idea. The latter when they are opposed, hardly change their opinion and doubt the fact that research on which they have an opinion can be presented differently, be it nuclear power or GMOs. Second, if science usually arrives at robust consensus, it also progresses thanks to controversies. These are not only internal but can develop publicly, usually causing questions of risk assessment for health. Specialized works have taken the analysis of controversies into consideration [ENG 87, RAY 03, BER 07, REB 11], as they take learned society into consideration¹². With the concern of scientific education, we should not only be contented with presenting or communicating on new technologies and praising the expected hopes, but also consider these controversies. These should not also be an excuse by perplexity to end everything, but should be documented as correctly as possible, at the epistemological and normative levels.

If numerous task forces exist in the domains of public understanding of science and the sociology of science and technique, the problem of scientific learning appropriate to RRI remains open. Let us recall here that this knowledge should, in this case, not only enable understanding with regard to scientific and technological terms for the cases considered, but equally enable ethical education. This is understood here in the context of ethics and the argumentation modalities mentioned in Chapter 1. The issue of adherence, which is also important, can then follow.

2.2.5. Governance and ethics

The wordings of this last pillar have evolved. In the [EXP 13] report, we had: “governance (including ethics)”. This first formulation posed different problems.

First of all, why should ethics be put in brackets? Does it mean that one should imagine governance covering the perimeter of research and innovation, including ethics? In this case it is good to know what a governance of ethics on its own is. We can also ask what a governance of ethics and of the other domains involved is, whether they are different research domains included or their respective disciplines, explictly convened or not. But should we understand ethical governance as submitting ethics to a mode of governance? This is conceivable since a considerable part of political philosophy prioritizes modes of cooperation over ethics, subjecting it in a way. This position is debatable [REB 12a]. One cannot disqualify the discussions on ethical issues as unmanageable, especially on behalf of a misunderstood pluralism.

Second, on the contrary one can attach importance to ethics in governance and support ethical governance like Robert Gianni [GIA 16] or, a deliberative governance, like Florence Quinche [QUI 05a, QUI 05b]¹³. In effect, ethics can be applied as social or political ethics for cooperation. However, this should not cause us to forget ethics toward the outside world (for example, that of objects and the environment), like ad rem ethics. Likewise, the problem of the levels of ethics addressed in Chapter 1 remains whole when one needs to qualify, justify and implement the ethics.

Third, ethics go beyond governance, in the perimeter as well as the depth of its questioning. From this point of view, one does not need to accept a reduction of the era of ethical governance. For the Ethics pillar, we can therefore bring back the elements, levels, theories and foundational factors of our second part of Chapter 1.

Governance too cannot be summarized by regulation. Today we have governance modes that involve different populations to whom one can give room for maneuvre which are equal, as we said with the PTA (see Chapter 5, also). Governance can be very reflexive as we see in Marc Maesschalck’s work in this same set of books or like his works published with the law philosopher Jacques Lenoble [LEN 03, LEN 10] already confirm.

Maybe due to these hesitations, ethics is now presented as a separate pillar in the H2020 programmes [EXP 15]. The order of the pillars and their names have been modified in this report : (1) governance, (2) public commitment, (3) gender equality, (4) scientific education, (5) open access/open science, (6) ethics, (7) sustainability and (8) social justice/inclusion. If the relationship between ethics and governance is not clear, one is not a subordinate of the other.

2.4.1. RRI conditions

The different RRI approaches depend on various emphases, that is, on various conditions of responsibility or responsibility with relatively varying significance. But, to some close terminological differences, they agree on five conditions¹⁶.

Transparency: As one of the EC pillars, the first RRI condition concerns information related to the process of research and innovation which has to freely circulate and inform the most open and broaden possible debate [VON 13]. As mentioned above, von Schomberg describes responsibility in research and innovation as a transparent process through which social actors become mutually responsible with respect to ethical acceptability of research and innovation [VON 13]. This condition therefore implies that the technological and scientific discoveries, their possible benefits and misdeeds to the society and the environment or better still the processes through which research and innovation are evaluated, should be accessible to various social actors, in a manner that contributes to a fruitful debate.

Anticipation: Secondly, to repeat an idea supported for more than 50 years within the framework of various versions of technological assessment (see, for example, [BEC 92, CAL 01, FUN 92, JAS 03, GIB 94, NOW 01]) the evaluation of emerging science and technology as well as the decisions concerning them should result to an anticipation process [GRU 11, HEL 03, OWE 12, OWE 13b, STI 13, LEE 13, GUT 14, NOR 14]. These processes depend on two important parts: first, risk assessment which includes the set of all traditional techniques that enable us to imagine the various possibilities and give them probabilities. But, the need to anticipate also requires – and here one can see the influence of sociology and critical philosophy of contemporary science, for example [FER 91, JAS 03] – a more open discursive exercise, whose objective is a collective elaboration of possible scenarios, including the production of norms. These collective thoughts based on various accounts or narrations encourage moral innovation and allows different levels of complexities on new technologies to be spread, that is mostly implicit, [NOR 10, GUS 14, ROB 13]. In effect, the exploratory philosophy allows potential openings/outlets, benefits or misdeeds of new technologies, to be linked to various world views that these technologies convey or arouse, which the speeches that defend them support or question. This type of activity is the first important stage toward the co-construction of a common normative horizon [GRU 10, SEL 07, NOR 14]. It contributes to creating normative systems which could support the development of emerging technologies, as soon as possible, to avoid the backlash of a technology once it is produced, because there was no adequate normative debate.

Inclusion: The third condition, linked to the preceding and the following condition, also repeats a theme which is important in the domain of PTA mentioned above and echoes the first pillar stated by the EC on RRI – the participation of social stakeholders – which was presented at the beginning of this chapter. Thus, all authors of RRI, in one way or another, insist on the need to include citizens or the various stakeholders in the evaluation of research and innovation as soon as possible [MIT 03, GRU 11, GRU 13, SUT 11, EXP 13, GUS 14, OWE 12, OWE 13b, STI 13, STA 13]. These authors differ however in the way they define the collective process – “participation”, “deliberation”, “dialogue” – through which the developments of research and innovation are supported and managed, in a manner that includes the various stakeholders, policy makers, investors, research and innovation actors, NGOs and the civil society. In section 2.4.2.2., we shall see the specific problems that this inclusion condition poses in RRI literature.

Responsiveness: The fourth condition, frequently referred to as responsiveness, is an individual or a systemic [FIS 06] ability to adapt to a changing environment [VON 12, VON 13, EXP 13, OWE 12, OWE 13a, STI 13, GRI 13]. This condition, that Groves also talks about [GRO 09] as a capacity for “improvisation”, echoes the ideas of safety by design or value sensitive design supported by Kelty [KEL 09] and Van Den Hooven [VAN 13], respectively, or that of “resilience”, raised within the context of sustainable development ([PIS 12], for example).

According to an individualistic approach, this condition supposes that the various science actors be put in touch through speeches and actions, and they should “respond” to their mutual expectations. In concrete terms, this means, for example, that enterprises should go beyond the profit consideration (and the interest of their shareholders) and be open to the demands of other actors such as NGOs [VON 13]. The latter, on their part, should accept dialogue and the fact/task of thinking the benefits of technologies according to the terms of those that worked them out. Individual listening qualities and the ability to respond are therefore important to this condition.

But this condition of responsiveness can also be applied to an entire system [OWE 13b]. It is thus in line with a reflection on governance and institutional design, which reflects on the way critical voices can be integrated into the process of reflection and decision (for example, [WYN 93, JAS 03, STI 08]) and more generally to the collective dialectic through which normative conflicts and conflicts of divergent interests can transcend [BEC 92, FOG 08, KJO 08]. This condition ensures the epistemic quality of research and innovation process. This requirement guarantees the epistemological quality of the research and innovation process; it ensures that the new parameters or the changes in these parameters (scientific discovery, evolution of a political or legal context, evolution of values) be taken into consideration in the management of research and innovation. In other words, it also means ensuring that a “bad” decision or a “bad” direction should not be continued for too long, under the effect of a dogmatic stance. In section 2.4.2.2, we shall see some questions that raise this hopeful condition.

Reflexivity: The last condition supported by RRI literature also relies on a set of abilities – one could say a set of virtues – individual and systemic qualities that enable individuals or organizations (or a network of organizations) to question the frameworks from which they develop their normative perspective. From an epistemological point of view, this condition relies, once again, on a series of critical works on the relationship between science and society (for example, [BEC 92, WYN 93, JAS 03, RIP 06, VOS 06, STI 08, VAN 14]). These authors think that the way the actors (policy makers, science stakeholders, institutions that organize participatory or deliberative approaches)¹⁷ define the framework from where the development of science and technology is worked out, influences the quality of the solutions given to what is considered a problem.

Within the RRI literature, there are certain differences in the way authors define reflexivity. Jack Stilgoe, Richard Owen and Phil Macnaghten [STI 13, p. 1571] for example maintain that at the level of institutional practices, reflexivity means “holding a mirror up to one’s activities, commitments and assumptions” with the consciousness that the “framing” of the problem is peculiar and not universal. According to us, the mirror metaphor is inappropriate because it seems to imply that a normative perspective can be “objectively” reflected by a tool (the mirror). In fact, reflexivity instead implies a decentering of the person through whom he or she is able to identify their proper perspective (which remains more or less unconscious) and eventually appreciate/assess it using other normative frameworks.

A more elaborated conception of reflexivity was proposed in the European project – GREAT (Governance for Responsible Innovation), financed within the seventh framework program (Science in Society)¹⁸. Inspired by the works of Marc Maesschalk and Jacques Lenoble [MAE 01, LEN 03], the project brought forward the idea of a second order reflexivity. First, it indicates an individual capacity, thanks to which social actors are able to: (1) discern the implicit framing of their judgments (for example, the one that enables them to identify what they will consider as “problems”) and (2) to review this framework through confrontation or dialogue with other actors whose frameworks are different. Learning dynamics is created in the dialogue which produces reflexive actors who are able to formulate comprehensible and reviewable normative perspectives. These dynamics can spread to the systems and lead to forms of reflexive governance. This condition does not only require aiming at the co-construction of a common normative horizon to individuals who bear conflicting normative systems, but instead attaining some sort of co-construction of the context, that is, of all the relevant parameters in the common elaboration of a problem¹⁹. These two levels of reflexivity are not the only ones to be envisaged²⁰. But we will remain here for the moment.

2.4.2. A RRI research program

We said that the RRI literature is recent. RRI critiques are equally recent and few for the moment. Among others, one can mention the works of Vincent Blok and Pieter Lemmens [BLO 14] or of Xavier Pavie and his colleagues [PAV 14] on the application of RRI in a particular context of industrial innovation, Michiel van Oudheusden’s article [VAN 14] on the role of strategic behaviors in the deliberation process or Robert Gianni’s work [GIA 16] on the links between responsibility and freedom which features in the same set of books as our work.

However, there is a question that has not received the attention it deserves. It is about the manner in which participation or deliberation is conceived in RRI theories. Generally, the “collective” processes [MIT 03] of “inclusion” of stakeholders or the processes of “dialogue, engagement or debate” [OWE 12, OWE 13b, STI 13] are put forward in a vague manner, as we saw, as a condition necessary for the emergence of responsibility in research and innovation. But the concrete processes through which inclusion, participation, dialogue and/or deliberation are put in place are never thought of or developed as such. On the other hand, we shall see that authors do not always clearly give a distinction between the various notions.

2.5.1. Tension between ERs and RRI

A first difference, of length, is that of the era between one and the other. The compass or the consideration angle of RRI is much more open to research both upstream and downstream. If we take back the European Code on integrity in research, which did not want to be included in what is called “social context” to hold to what is understand by “ethics”, RRI embraces this social context. Moreover, in order to be precise, we need to distinguish at least three contexts: one, that is research-related, second that takes into consideration persons, animals, plants, involved in research and a third, the one this report calls “ethical context”, which resembles social context, but includes scientific policy.

A second difference is that ER do not come back to scientific knowledge (opening, education). They come in after the scientific assessment. Of course, with some questions from the EQ related to the involvement of animals, one should be able to say why it is impossible to make an economy from it, in order to respond to research issues, and show which benefits other animals and human beings can get.

A third difference is that ER proposes delimited lists of questions and principles, that we saw in Chapter 1, which are longer than RRI pillars. The transition to RRI could be problematic if it was the case of a dissolution, a removal and finally a non-consideration of these problems and principles which are expected to help in responding to them. Then ethics could be put in brackets.

A fourth difference, and a more delicate one, is that some RRI pillars can become problematic points of attention for the EQ in ER. The pillars should then be taken care of. For example, the RRI participation pillar is found as an issue in section 2.2 concerned with the involvement of humans in research. Therefore in a bid to do well and involve stakeholders following the RRI impetus, we are faced with a supplementary demand to anticipate templates for the appopriate collection of informed consents. Nevertheless, and in order to push this argument further, one can ask if the participants in the two instances have the same status. The answer can be negative if we estimate that the human beings involved in ER are subjected to experience, while the stakeholders can participate in the development and modifications of experience.

The case of research – and therefore open data – is also tense with the requisites on data and their protection; especially, when they are sensitive.

A fifth difference relies on the fact that different perspectives are taken by ER, through the inclusion of experts and ethical instances, in the form of enlarged ethical committees, if one needs to imagine an extended participation, where RRI can promote the types of participation that are less specific. The crossing between a large participation of heterogeneous actors (RRI) and ethical specialists or acting as ER have existed in certain experiences, rare, like the one brought up by the bioethics general assemblies (see the remark in Chapter 1) in France.

If the word ethics is found in a recurrent way in ER and is only one of the RRI pillars, it does not have the same concerns. ER could lose their specific attention to persons, animals and plants that research has to guarantee. On the contrary, RRI discusses things more widely, from different points of views. In case where the two come closer, one should think of destabilisation or decentering of research-related tasks if one opened this spectrum to what the Code related to integrity in research called “ethical context”.

The disparity, indeed the oppositions, between research in moral philosophy, applied ethics on the one hand and in political sociology or even the sociology of science and technology show these two directions.

2.5.2. Are ERs so far from RRI?

Nevertheless, one can find some RRI demands as already included in the general, scientific and ethical assessment of projects in the process. In effect, in certain projects we see that several pillars have already been taken into account. For example, gender is considered by some proponents without them being asked to do so²⁸. In the same way as the benefit sharings of research for the work done in a third and a poorer country figure in one of the sub questions on the EQ. With regard to participation, one could depend on the numerous norms guiding human experiences and which reveal a concern for the ethical validity of inclusion.

2.5.3. RRI an opportunity for ER?

Without raising all the questions posed by the EQ with the pillars and the RRI conditions, we can say that governance could be an opportunity to instil more reflexivity in ER. More precisely, evaluators could consider the manner in which the project initiators associate the governance modes to consider ethical issues, in the entire implementation of the process which is relocated in research teams and how they are taken care of and their response to it. This last term by virtue of its etymology talks about responsibility, which we shall see in the following chapters that there are several ways of understanding it.

The decompartmentalization permitted by RRI will be another opportunity, but also a risk. Actors other than ethics experts could also have a say in it. But it will also be good to know which title and responsibilities each person will be invited to express himself, but above all to react. Let us note that the first RRI pillar, that of participation, talks of citizens and interest stakeholders. The two are not equal and do not have the same concerns. For example, a citizen can consider the common good or the future generations, while a stakeholder will want to save the research in which he has invested and from which he awaits economic benefits.

A form of complementary association between ER and RRI does not necessarily imply the relocation or the processing of the question through an axis (work package) or an ethics committee, which is partly dedicated, as is usually the case now.

In the introduction to this chapter, we took a moment to compare ER and RRI, for the issue of the consideration of a governance relevant in responding to ethical issues which occur in research. We can now conclude the long discussion that we have had on the deliberative dimension, and exploit the theory of deliberative democracy.

To be precise, deliberation should not only offer conditions for collaboration between participants, but it should go beyond that. This beyond is a deliberation to teach ethical evaluation itself which should make up ethical pluralism talked about in Chapter 1. The passage between ER and RRI is sensitive in the tension between RRI’s implicit proceduralism and ER’s substantialism. The articulation of a double form of deliberation (moral and political) should reduce this tension²⁹.

Once again, it is not time for the convergence of ER and RRI or the suppression of one by the other. Nevertheless, should RRI become a new requirement for every research project, and its omnipresence in the presentation of H2020 might suggest this, it will then be necessary to answer the questions that we raised in this chapter. According to the answers, one could shorten the list requirements, but the points of the EQ appear inescapable for legal reasons linked to the various forms of protection, or take better advantage of RRI in order to better respond to the questionnaire, in a reflexive and sustainable manner, throughout the projects. RRI cannot be a pretext or runs the risk of forgetting or dispersing these protection requirements. RRI even goes beyond this protection by opening the association to stakeholders, and, at the same time enlarging the spectrum by considering ethical problems. Nevertheless, this step raises questions, and the first one is to know who has this or that responsibility. If researchers are part of the stakeholders, they do not have to bear these new responsibilities alone. To be brief, a longer list of requests could have a collateral effect of attracting attention which is the core of their research, that already respects the normative requirements that we talked about at the beginning of Chapter 1. RRI therefore has numerous challenges to meet so as to become an operational concept that respects the ethical criteria put in place and apply them in a participatory approach.