In Hindsight has dexterously reflected on a series of disasters from a business continuity perspective. Some had positive outcomes while others did not. Five of the companies featured were unprepared and never recovered from the catastrophes they faced, while a sixth only survived because it was ‘unbelievably lucky’. Some of the incidents were very high profile and had global consequences. Others were localised affairs but, to the companies affected, they were still major catastrophes that threatened their very survival.
The causes of the disasters are varied. However, a theme of poor management practices and ill-preparedness often featured with the occasional finger of blame pointed at human error. In at least three instances profitability arguably took priority over health and safety, resulting in avoidable injuries and fatalities. In fact, around half of the case studies record loss of life – some people died while at work whereas others were simply the victims of being in the wrong place at the wrong time – even though only one chapter, ‘A Tales of Three Cities’, focuses on terrorism.
This book investigates several incidents that caused environmental damage, which in some cases resulted in hefty fines being levied. Health and safety litigation is not uncommon in these case studies; early examples of corporate manslaughter are also touched upon; and there are instances of substantial compensation being paid out to victims. The prosecution of the defendants indicted in connection with the ‘Love Parade’ tragedy was still ongoing when the book was printed while other incidents saw the culpable individuals tried, convicted and imprisoned for their parts in the respective disasters.
There are examples of exclusion zones where one company’s disaster has had a direct impact on other companies located in the immediate vicinity. This includes the worst ever peacetime explosion in the UK at the Buncefield oil depot, which had an effect not only on nearby businesses but also on the downstream supply chain. The conditions created by this incident resulted in the ‘best recovery’ award for 2006 being presented to Northgate Information Services, a victim of collateral damage.
Mother Nature features in four of the case studies, demonstrating just how helpless we humans are to prevent these natural disasters occurring. We have no control over hurricanes, pandemics, flooding, tsunamis, earthquakes or volcanic eruptions, nor do we know where or when these events will strike. At best, we can plan and prepare for natural disasters in order to limit the damage, quickly bring aid and relief to the victims and facilitate a swift and efficient recovery. Each of these four case studies looks at the dramatic and far reaching consequences of events beyond our control.
Consideration in the book was also given to a number of supply chain issues and, in particular, the vulnerability of the single route to market. In the case of the Republic of Malta, the country was dependent upon one supplier for its public transport system. From the start of its ten-year contract in July 2010, Arriva Malta began losing revenue at an alarming and unsustainable rate. Contract renegotiations with the Maltese Government were protracted as the Maltese Government demonstrated a strong reluctance to yield ground over the contract’s terms and conditions, with the result that Arriva considered the bankruptcy option as a means of extricating itself from the untenable position. This would have resulted in the seizure of its Malta-based assets including the buses. Some Maltese citizens went on record via the local press expressing their delight at the prospect of Arriva’s demise. What seems to have been overlooked by this element of the local community, however, was the inevitable horrendous chaos Arriva’s bankruptcy would cause to both an already strained local transport infrastructure and the local economy, as there simply was no viable ‘Plan B’.
The inherent dangers associated with the off-shore oil industry were examined by comparing the plight of Piper Alpha and the Alexander L. Kielland North Sea rigs. Although the causes of the disasters differed (human error and structural failure respectively), poor management and an apparent indifference towards the health and safety of the crews undoubtedly led to many avoidable deaths. In both instances, a lack of safety training compounded the situation. Around 80 men died of carbon monoxide poisoning in the Piper Alpha accommodation block while they waited for management to direct them. Moreover, it is also believed that most of the 123 fatalities on the Alexander L. Kielland could have survived had someone taken charge of the situation.
The final chapter, ‘The Devil is in the Detail’, looks at a collection of small, seemingly insignificant possible events which could result in serious repercussions for companies struck by one or more of them. The chapter includes several examples including a lack of BCM awareness, succession planning, information security, data loss, employee fraud and malicious damage. The major lesson to be learned here is that it can be unwise to focus solely on the big ticket items when it comes to your BCM arrangements.
The collective cost of dealing with the case studies covered in this book runs into hundreds of billions of US dollars. The cost of introducing effective business continuity programmes to mitigate the risks and introduce resilience and contingency is likely to have been substantially less. Moreover, had they embraced BCM, the five companies that succumbed to their respective disasters might still be in business today. With those five companies in mind, perhaps it is fitting to close with the words of the late former American Footballer, Vince Lombardi: ‘It’s not whether you get knocked down; it’s whether you get up’.