The Event 

At 10.59 h on June 3, 1998, the Eschede train accident occurred near the village of Eschede in Germany [5, 6]. Eschede is near the town of Celle. In the accident, 101 people died and approximately 100 were injured. The train concerned was an Intercity‐Express (ICE) running from Munich in the south of Germany to Hamburg in the north. The train consisted of a front power car, cars 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 14, and a rear power car.

Six kilometers south of Eschede the steel tire on a right wheel of the first car of the train broke and peeled away from the wheel. The train had a speed of 200 km h⁻¹ at that time. The broken tire punctured the floor of the first car; however, an important part remained under the floor in the vicinity of the rotating wheels. The train then covered a distance of approximately 5.5 km. Subsequently, the train passed over the first of two track switches approximately 200 m before the location where a traffic bridge crossed the railway. The broken tire carried the guide rail of the first switch away, which also punctured the floor of the first car. This event caused the derailment of the damaged wheel of the first car. The left wheel, opposite to the damaged wheel, also derailed and hit the points lever of the second switch, changing its setting. This event caused the derailment of the first four cars. The front power car and the first two cars cleared the bridge. The third car derailed violently and hit the piers of the bridge, which thereupon collapsed. The third car cleared the bridge. The fourth car also cleared the bridge and rolled intact into the embankment immediately behind it. The front part of the fifth car cleared the bridge as well; however, the rear part was crushed by the falling bridge. The sixth car, the restaurant coach, was also crushed by the falling bridge. The remaining cars all derailed and collected against the rubble in a zigzag pattern. The rear power car came to a standstill at an angle of about 90° with the remaining cars.

Wheel Design 

The ICE‐train concerned was equipped with Dual Bloc wheels. These wheels consisted of a steel wheel body surrounded by a 20‐mm‐thick rubber damper followed by a metal tire (see Figure 4.3). The Dual Bloc wheels had replaced Monobloc wheels, which were single‐cast wheel sets. The reason for this replacement was that the latter wheels caused, at cruising speed, vibrations. These vibrations caused loss of comfort and it was feared that parts of the train would be damaged. The replacement, which was approved by the management of Deutsche Bahn in 1992, resolved the issue of vibration. A design resembling the design chosen by Deutsche Bahn had been a success in, for instance, trams at Hannover in Germany. However, üstra, the company that operates Hannover's trams, discovered fatigue cracks in Dual Bloc wheels in July 1997. It began changing wheels before fatigue cracks could develop. The new wheels were also Dual Bloc wheels. üstra reported its findings as a warning to all other users of wheels built with similar design, including Deutsche Bahn, in autumn 1997. According to üstra, Deutsche Bahn replied by stating that they had not noticed problems in their trains [7].

Additional Remarks 

It strikes that the seriousness of the accident was caused by several aspects. “The worst‐case situation” started with the collapse of the tire on a wheel of the first car. A breakage of a tire on a wheel of, for instance, the last car would probably have had less serious consequences. Furthermore, the train rode on a track not specifically built for the ICE‐train. The track was also used by other train types. Hence, the train had a speed of 200 km h⁻¹, which was the maximum speed for the ICE‐train on this specific track. The presence of switches contributed to the seriousness of the accident. The presence of a traffic bridge crossing the railway immediately behind the switches is a further aspect. The bridge had two piers that were hit by the third car which caused the collapse of the bridge. If this bridge would not have had two piers but would have been supported on the two embankments, the accident would probably have been less serious.

Concluding Remarks 

The wheels of a train are, safetywise, critical parts. It is not possible to mitigate the effects resulting from breakage of a wheel tire. The proper functioning of the wheels was safeguarded by regular inspections. This method failed as the weakness of the tire was not detected during an inspection at Munich the night before the accident happened. Deutsche Bahn replaced the Dual Bloc wheels on all ICE‐trains concerned by Monobloc wheels in the weeks following the accident.

The Events 

The first commercial flight of a Boeing 787 Dreamliner airplane was on October 26, 2011. A battery of a Boeing 787 Dreamliner became overheated and a fire started in a battery compartment of the empty airplane at Boston's Logan International Airport on January 7, 2013 [8]. The airplane was operated by Japan Airlines (JAL).

On January 9, 2013, United Airlines reported a problem with the wiring in one of its six 787s in the same area as the area of the battery fire on JAL's airliner on January 7, 2013.

An All Nippon Airways (ANA) 787 made an emergency landing at Takamatsu Airport on Shikoku Island in Japan on January 16, 2013 after the flight crew received a computer warning that that there was smoke inside one of the electrical compartments. According to ANA, there was an error message in the cockpit citing a battery malfunction.

JAL and ANA, two major Japanese airlines, announced that they were voluntarily grounding or suspending flights for their 787s on January 16, 2013. Prior to that date, 24 Dreamliners had been delivered to these two airlines. The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) in the United States ordered United Airlines, an American airline, to ground their six 787s as well. Fifty Dreamliners in all had been sold by Boeing on January 16, 2013. Other countries ordered their airlines to also ground their 787s. The grounding by the FAA was the first time FAA grounded an airplane type since 1979.

On April 19, 2013, the FAA gave United Airlines permission to use their 787s again. On that date, changes had been made to the battery systems. In April 2013, the Japanese authorities also decided to allow Japanese Dreamliners to return to service.

On January 14, 2014, JAL reported that a maintenance crew at Narita Airport at Tokyo in Japan discovered smoke coming from the main battery of one of its Boeing 787 jets, 2 h before the plane was due to fly to Bangkok. Maintenance workers found smoke and unidentified liquid coming from the main battery, and alarms in the cockpit indicated faults with the power pack and its charger.

Battery Design 

The Dreamliner contains two sets of eight batteries, each set weighing 30 kg. One set serves to start an auxiliary power unit, a small generator raising the electric power to start the jet engines. The other set serves as backup for systems on board the airplane. Boeing has made the airplane Boeing 787 Dreamliner as light as possible. Boeing claims that this leads to, compared to competing airplanes, a reduction of the fuel consumption of 20%. The selection of lithium ion batteries comes within the compass of this effort. However, lithium ion batteries are inflammable. This is caused by the presence of an organic solvent in the cells. When the temperature within the battery becomes too high, the organic solvent decomposes and the developed gases can take fire.

On discharging a battery, chemical energy is converted into electrical energy. On charging a battery, the reverse process takes place. Both processes are always accompanied by some heat development. If a battery is mistreated, the heat development can be substantial.

Within the category of lithium ion batteries, Boeing selected lithium ion batteries having a positive electrode made of lithium cobalt dioxide. This battery type has an energy density of 150 Wh kg⁻¹ battery weight, which is a relatively high figure. However, the risks associated with this specific battery type are greater than those with, for instance, lithium ion batteries having a positive electrode made of lithium iron phosphate (LFP batteries). The energy density of the latter type of batteries is approximately two thirds of the former type of battery. The electrode made of lithium iron phosphate is inherently safer than the electrode made of lithium cobalt dioxide due to its greater structural stability and because oxygen in its structure is relatively strongly bound. These two aspects make the LFP battery more resistant to misuse (in particular on charging it) than the battery selected by Boeing.

Each set of batteries contains eight batteries next to each other. On January 7, 2013, the fire at Logan airport at Boston was caused by the overheating of one of the central batteries of one of the two sets of batteries. Subsequently, the organic solvent in the battery concerned decomposed and the gases developed thereby took fire. The other batteries of the set of batteries concerned were then overheated as well. The set of eight batteries was completely destroyed (see Figure 4.4).

Overheating of this type of battery can occur if the battery is overcharged. Overheating of this type of battery can also occur if the battery is ran down too far. Process control has to take care that neither overcharging nor running down too far can occur. A further aspect is that installing the batteries next to each other means that a central battery cannot get rid of heat in case overheating of the battery contents occurs. Heat is transferred from one battery to the next.

Boeing outfarmed the manufacture of the batteries to the Japanese company GS Yuasa. Neither Boeing nor GS Yuasa has informed the public of the cause of the fire on January 7, 2013, possibly because the cause of the overheating is unknown.

Concluding Remarks 

Lithium ion batteries having lithium cobalt dioxide as positive electrode are used for many purposes. Their use can be considered safe if the processes within the battery are controlled properly. It is possible that the process control of the batteries in the Dreamliner was not adequate in January 2013. It is also possible that Boeing had the process control improved after the fire and incidents described previously. Boeing communicated that the following measures were implemented:

• The improvement of electrical wires and connectors in the battery compartments
• The installation of insulating layers between the batteries of a set of eight batteries
• The installation of an insulating layer around each battery
• The installation of a stainless steel hull to enclose each set of eight batteries and
• The installation of a pressure relief valve on the stainless steel hulls relieving to the atmosphere outside the airplane. Thus, in case of decomposition, the access of oxygen is prevented and a fire cannot develop.

I started to study chemical engineering at the University of Twente in The Netherlands in 1964. There were, at that time, three faculties, namely, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, and mechanical engineering. A student could complete the first year at the university without making a choice for a faculty. Thus, students acquired knowledge of all three fields. When I worked for Akzo Nobel, I noticed that it has, for engineers, advantages to also have knowledge of other fields than their own field. It is possible that having more knowledge of electrochemistry than they had would have paid off for the aeronautical, electrical, and mechanical engineers at Boeing. It could then have been realized that proper process control is of paramount importance for the safe operation of lithium ion batteries having a positive electrode made of lithium cobalt dioxide.

Events 

A ferry service existed on the North Sea Canal in The Netherlands between Amsterdam and Velzen‐Zuid in the period April 1998 to January 1, 2014 [9] (see Figure 4.5). The length of the reach was approximately 20 km and the average width of the North Sea Canal is 280 m. A number of harbors are connected to the canal between Amsterdam and Velzen‐Zuid. The boats used were so‐called hydrofoils. A hydrofoil's hull is lifted out of the water as speed is gained, whereby drag is decreased and speeds in the range 50–65 km h⁻¹ are made possible. The initial service speed of the hydrofoils was 65 km h⁻¹. Later on, the service speed was decreased to 60 km h⁻¹ and that speed was maintained till January 1, 2012. The maximum speed of all other boats on the greater part of the North Sea Canal is 18 km h⁻¹. Five accidents in which the boats were involved occurred in the period 2003 up till and including 2008. Hydrofoils hit a bank in three accidents, in one accident a hydrofoil hit a second boat, and a second boat hit a hydrofoil in one instance. The most serious accident, in which 21 people were injured, occurred on October 18, 2003. A bank was hit in this accident. A further accident, in which one person was seriously injured and several people were injured, occurred on October 8, 2007. A hydrofoil was hit by a different ship in this accident.

The Dutch Safety Board investigated these accidents and concluded that the transport by these fast boats was not adequately safeguarded. A general rule is that fast boats have to give way to slower boats. The Board stated in 2009 that giving way to other boats, when a hydrofoil has a speed of 60 km h⁻¹, is not fully possible. The skipper must, in too short a time, and at too large a distance from the object or ship to be avoided, start a corrective action to evade the object or ship. Speed reduction is not the solution as the stability and the maneuverability of a hydrofoil decrease when the speed is reduced to a value in the range 20–45 km h⁻¹. Evading an object or ship then becomes quite problematic.

The service speed of the hydrofoils was reduced to 50 km h⁻¹ on January 1, 2012, to prevent further accidents. The service was stopped on December 31, 2013. The speed reduction to 50 km h⁻¹ caused a decrease of the number of trips per day. This decrease led to a decrease in the number of passengers per day and that hurt the economy of the service.

Additional Facts 

Connexxion, the operator of hydrofoils, received an exemption from the maximum speed on the North Sea Canal. The maximum speed is 18 km h⁻¹ on the greater part of the canal.

Ships having a speed higher than 40 km h⁻¹ always have to give way to other ships on the North Sea Canal. The background of this rule is that it is not easy for ships having a relatively low speed to give way to ships having a speed higher than 40 km h⁻¹. The Dutch Safety Board concluded that it is not fully possible for hydrofoils having a speed of 60 km h⁻¹ to always give way to slower boats. The Board illustrates this with figures. A fast ferry having the service speed of 60 km h⁻¹ has advanced 139 m when a port correction of 20 m has been made. It takes the boat 8 s to advance 139 m at the service speed. A hydrofoil having the service speed of 60 km h⁻¹ has advanced a distance between 190 and 280 m when it stops. For cars having a speed of 60 km h⁻¹, this distance is 45 m on a wet road.

Concluding Remark 

Economy and trip time received attention before the introduction of hydrofoils on the North Sea Canal. The trip time was 27 min when the hydrofoil's speed was 60 km h⁻¹. The Dutch Safety Board concludes that safety should have received more attention before the introduction than it did.

Events 

The production of natural gas in the northern part of The Netherlands has caused earthquakes in that part [10]. The first relatively important earthquake that was thought to be related to the extraction of natural gas occurred at Assen in the province Drente in 1986. Both provinces Drente and Groningen are in the northern part of The Netherlands. It had a magnitude of 2.7 on Richter's Scale. The first relatively important earthquake in the province Groningen that was thought to be related to the production of natural gas occurred at Middelstum in 1991. It had a magnitude of 2.4 on Richter's Scale. The annual number of earthquakes above the Groningen reservoir increased between 1991 and 2012. However, the annual average magnitude of these earthquakes did not increase in that period [11]. On August 16, 2012, an earthquake having a magnitude of 3.6 on Richter's scale occurred at Huizinge in the province Groningen. That earthquake is the most serious one experienced until now. Neither people nor animals were harmed. Buildings did not collapse; however, a lot of damage was done to many buildings. The damage was greater compared to that of earlier earthquakes. People panicked during the Huizinge earthquake and fled into the streets.

The occurrence of the most serious earthquake until now at Huizinge in 2012 and the fact that the annual average magnitude of the earthquakes did not increase between 1991 and 2012 can be understood as follows. 584 earthquakes of a magnitude greater than 1 on Richter's Scale have occurred until now [11]. These earthquakes have various magnitudes, e.g. 1.5, 2.2, and 1.8. A probability distribution of magnitudes can be made. The Huizinge earthquake had a magnitude of 3.6. An earthquake having a magnitude of 3.6 could have happened in, e.g. 1995. By the same token, an earthquake having a magnitude of, e.g. 4.5 can happen in 2020. It is a matter of probability.

There were 187 damage reports in 2011, and NAM, the company exploiting the natural gas reservoir, paid € 560 359 to compensate for the damage. There were 13 384 damage reports in 2014. The amount of money paid to compensate for the damage is not yet known.

The Production of Natural Gas in the Northern Part of The Netherlands 

In 1959, a large reservoir of natural gas was discovered in the province Groningen in The Netherlands. It is, with an initial capacity of 2800 billion nm³, Number 9 on the list of most important natural gas reservoirs worldwide. The largest reservoir of natural gas on the earth is the South Pars reservoir in Iran and Qatar. It had an initial capacity of 10 000–15 000 billion nm³. The reservoir in Groningen is the only large natural gas reservoir worldwide under a relatively densely populated area. The area over the reservoir is approximately 900 km². Figure 4.6 gives an impression of the size of the gas reservoir. It is a map showing the expected subsidence in cm due to the gas production in Groningen in 2070. The exploitation of natural gas in Groningen started in 1963. The reservoir is present at a depth of approximately 3 km. The initial pressure of the gas in the reservoir was approximately 320 bar. The pressure in the spring of 2015 was approximately 100 bar [9]. Approximately three quarters of the initial amount of natural gas have been extracted. Almost 30 billion nm³ of natural gas were produced in 1990, whereas 53.2 billion nm³ of natural gas were extracted in 2013. The latter amount was the largest annual production from the reservoir since the production started.

Earthquakes 

Two categories of earthquakes can be distinguished. First, natural or tectonic earthquakes. A great majority of earthquakes occurring on the earth are natural earthquakes. The heaviest natural earthquake recorded until now was the one that measured a magnitude of 9.5 on Richter's Scale (Chili 1960). Natural earthquakes having a magnitude greater than 8 occur on the earth on average once a year. Induced earthquakes form the second category. They are caused by human activities deep in the earth. The earthquakes experienced in the northern part of The Netherlands are induced earthquakes.

The magnitude is one parameter to characterize the effect of an earthquake. The magnitude is expressed by a number on Richter's Scale ranging from 0 to 10. It is a logarithmic scale; thus, an earthquake that measures 4 on this scale has a magnitude 100 times greater than an earthquake of magnitude 2. Furthermore, the effect of earthquakes is characterized by two further parameters, i.e. the energy and intensity. The energy of an earthquake increases strongly with the number on Richter's Scale. An earthquake having a magnitude of 4 on Richter's Scale and starting at a depth of, e.g. 3 km has a greater intensity at the earth's surface than an earthquake having the same magnitude and starting at, e.g. a depth of 10 km. The Groningen reservoir, having a depth of approximately 3 km, is relatively close to the earth's surface.

Knowledge of Earthquakes in Groningen 

Not much knowledge has been acquired worldwide concerning earthquakes caused by the exploitation of natural gas reservoirs. One reason is that large natural gas reservoirs present in the earth's soil are under relatively uninhabited areas. When the production of natural gas in Groningen started in 1963, it was thought that the exploitation would lead to subsidence of the soil only and that earthquakes would not occur. However, earthquakes related to the production of natural gas did occur. Natural earthquakes do not occur in this part of The Netherlands. The first relatively significant earthquakes were experienced in 1986. A commission of the Dutch government issued a report in 1993 in which it was stated that the maximum magnitude of earthquakes in the northern part of The Netherlands due to the production of natural gas would be 3.3 on Richter's Scale. However, an earthquake at Roswinkel in the province Drente in 1997 had a magnitude of 3.4. NAM, the company exploiting the natural gas reservoir, received more than 200 damage reports related to that earthquake. The Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute issued a report in 1998 in which it was stated that the maximum magnitude of earthquakes in the northern part of The Netherlands would be 3.8 on Richter's Scale. The incentive to issue this report was the earthquake at Roswinkel in 1997. The Royal Dutch Meteorological Institute issued a further report in 2004 stating that the maximum magnitude of earthquakes in the northern part of The Netherlands would be 3.9 on Richter's Scale. An earthquake having a magnitude of 3.5 on Richter's Scale occurred at Westeremden/Middelstum in the province Groningen in 2006. An earthquake of magnitude 3.6 occurred at Huizinge in the province Groningen in 2012, which was mentioned earlier.

The recapitulated sequence of magnitudes of earthquakes that actually occurred and the sequence of statements concerning the maximum magnitudes to be expected prove that the knowledge of earthquakes due to the production of natural gas in the northern part of The Netherlands is inadequate. A program to acquire the necessary knowledge has been started in January 2013. The view is held at present that a maximum magnitude of earthquakes to be expected exists. However, it can be greater than 3.9 on Richter's Scale.

Summary of the Earthquakes in the Northern Part of The Netherlands 

The production started in 1963.

Magnitudes on Richter's Scale of major earthquakes between 1986 and 2012.

584 earthquakes of a magnitude greater than 1 on Richter’s Scale occurred between 1991 and 2015.

Predictions of maximum magnitudes on Richter's Scale of earthquakes between 1963 and 2015

Complaints received

Concluding Remarks 

NAM, the company exploiting the natural gas reservoir in the northern part of The Netherlands, and the Dutch government, considered, till the beginning of 2013, the risk of the production of natural gas in the northern part of The Netherlands the occurrence of small damages. It was considered that such small damages could be simply compensated. The Huizinge earthquake in 2012 showed that the damage caused by earthquakes could be greater and that the safety of the citizens of Groningen is at stake. The safety of the citizens of Groningen was not taken into account till the beginning of 2013.

Event 

A fire started at the site of a company called Chemie‐Pack at Moerdijk in The Netherlands at approximately 14.20 h on January 5, 2011 [12]. The fire spread rapidly due to the ignition of inflammable materials. The site was completely destroyed by the fire. The adjacent site of a company called Wärtsilä, a Swiss company manufacturing diesel engines for ships, was also completely destroyed by the fire.

Chemie‐Pack 

Chemie‐Pack was an independent company, employing approximately 50 people, that processed chemicals and stored them. The processing of chemicals was physical and encompassed blending and packaging. Many of the materials processed by Chemie‐Pack were inflammable.

Chemie‐Pack was a BRZO‐company in The Netherlands. BRZO stands for Decision Risks Heavy Accidents. A BRZO‐company refers to a company that processes or stores large amounts of dangerous materials. There are more than 400 BRZO‐companies in The Netherlands.

Cause of the Fire 

An air‐driven membrane pump was used in the open air to transfer a resin in the afternoon of January 5, 2011. A tray containing xylene was under the membrane pump. The xylene originated from cleaning activities that had been carried out prior to the transfer of the resin. The ambient temperature was 3–4 °C. The activities to transfer the resin started at approximately 13.00 h. Shortly after the start, problems were encountered with the pump. The pump did not transfer resin. The air from the air‐driven pump passed through a muffler, in which icing had occurred. That was the cause of the interruption of the transfer. The first step taken by the operator was to increase the pressure of the air driving the pump to 7 bar. This pressure was adjustable in the range 2–7 bar, a low pressure corresponded with a low output and vice versa. The second step was heating the muffler with a flame. The flame came from a provision to apply plastic wraps around packagings by shrinking. The second step was successful and the transfer resumed. However, shortly after 14.00 h, it was again noticed that the pump did not transfer the resin. It is unknown whether this was due to icing of the muffler or due to an obstruction in the resin discharge line. The operator then heated not only the muffler but also the pump's body with the flame. This caused the ignition of xylene in the tray under the membrane pump (see Figure 4.7). The flash point of xylene is approximately 20 °C. The membrane pump was not stopped! During attempts of Chemie‐Pack employees to extinguish the fire, a flash was noticed. A rupture in the discharge line close to the pump had occurred. Resin was pumped through an opening and was ignited by the burning xylene. The cause of the rupture was probably the combination of high air pressure and pump heating. These two aspects caused a high pressure in the discharge line because the line was plugged. The plugging was probably caused by the cooling of the resin in the discharge line, leading to a high viscosity of the resin. The membrane pump discharged the resin through the opening not only in the tray, but also outside the tray.

Fire‐fighting Activities 

The site of Chemie‐Pack did not have an own fire‐brigade. The first action was taken by Chemie‐Pack personnel trying to use a powder extinguisher. However, the powder extinguisher failed to function. Further attempts with available extinguishers failed as well, mainly because it was not possible to extinguish the burning resin. Next, an employee tried to extinguish the fire with a water jet. This attempt made things worse as burning xylene and resin were transferred to IBC‐containers containing inflammable materials in the vicinity of the membrane pump. Thereupon, the IBCs took fire.

The company had raised an alarm at 14.26 h. The first car of the fire‐brigade arrived at 14.35 h and further seven fire‐brigade cars arrived at 14.43 h. The commanding officer gave the order to contain and control the fire. Attempts to extinguish the fire were not made. The fire‐brigade declared the fire under control shortly after 00.00 h on January 6, 2011.

Additional Remarks 

Chemie‐Pack's permission to work mentioned that it was not allowed to use flames. The permission to work also mentioned that it was not allowed to store inflammable materials in the open space of the site. The membrane pump was installed in the open space of the site. Approximately 120 IBC‐containers with inflammable materials had been stored in the open space.

Icing of the muffler of the membrane pump had occurred earlier. Provisions such as additional drying of the compressed air or warming the compressed air to avoid icing problems had not been installed.

Laws, rules, instructions, agreements, permissions, institutions, and inspections exist in The Netherlands. Nevertheless, this fire occurred because the regulations were neither observed nor enforced. This section is a recapitulation of what happened in this plant.

Approximately 120 IBC‐containers were present in the open space of the site. They contained inflammable materials. IBC stands for intermediate bulk container. These containers were made out of high‐density polyethylene (HDPE) and in the form of a cube. They were placed inside a gauze‐like metal frame for protection. HDPE softens at 70 °C and melts at temperatures in the range 105–130 °C. Thus, plastic IBCs are very vulnerable in case of fire. Metal IBCs exist as well.

Concluding Remarks 

VNCI, the Association of the Dutch Chemical Industry, has made the suggestion to, in industrial areas, combine chemical plants. This would enable companies to support and assist each other [13].

A further advantage is that companies not dealing with chemicals will not be affected.

Event 

On May 29, 2012, a fire ignited in a new apartment building at Frankfurt am Main in Germany [14]. The apartment building had not yet been put into use. The building had six floors. The fire was fierce, and it took 80 men of the fire‐brigade to extinguish it. The cause of the sharpness of the fire was the presence of polystyrene sheets between the walls of the building for insulation purposes. These sheets accelerated the fire. Mineral insulation materials had been alternated with polystyrene sheets along the height of the building to prevent spreading of the fire. However, at this fire, the presence of these noninflammable insulation materials proved useless as the fire passed them readily. It was difficult for the fire‐brigade to extinguish the fire because the polystyrene sheets were located between two walls.

Polystyrene 

Polystyrene is, like all organic materials, inflammable. The polymer softens on heating, and, at approximately 100 °C, the glass transition point is reached. On further heating, the material liquefies. This fact adds to the fierceness and spreading of a fire as the burning liquid flows.

Concluding Remarks 

Polyurethane, polyisocyanurate, and mineral insulation materials are alternatives for polystyrene. The first two materials are inflammable as well; however, they do not liquefy on burning. Mineral insulation materials are noninflammable and, thus, a good choice possibly for many applications.

The Event 

A fire ignited in a house at Cuijk in The Netherlands on June 20, 2013. Three women, a mother and two daughters, died in the fire. The house was equipped with rolling shutters. The three women did not manage to open the rolling shutters. Neighbors could not reach them because of the rolling shutters.

Rolling Shutters 

The rolling shutters in the house concerned could be operated electrically. However, it is not known whether the rolling shutters could be activated by the women. It is possible that the fire had damaged the electrical system. Rolling shutters are adequate to hinder burglars; however, they present a serious risk in case of fire.

Concluding Remarks 

Rolling shutters can be operated mechanically, electrically, or both. However, opening the rolling shutters takes time and, in case of fire, time is precious.

It is possible to install a manually operated emergency exit in a rolling shutter. A rope is pulled and the emergency exit door swings open without delay. This safeguarding method is a passive protection. A company like Deelen at Wageningen in The Netherlands can install such a provision, the Innosafe rolling shutter.

To cope with the situation that the electrical system of the house fails in case of fire, it is possible to install a local battery. However, this protection method is an active protection.

It is possible to install a smoke detector. The smoke detector automatically opens rolling shutters if smoke is detected. However, this safeguarding method is also an active protection.

Rolling shutters present few problems to the fire‐brigade. They have chainsaws to open rolling shutters. It takes the fire‐brigade only a couple of seconds. However, the existence of the fire‐brigade is a procedural safety method. The fire‐brigade may come in too late.