Political

Economic and social

International

Growing tensions between the federal government and the federal states

Relations between the Somali central government and the federal member states remained strained in 2020, with unresolved disputes over the holding of the parliamentary elections and the succession to President Farmaajo. Ahead of the parliamentary elections initially scheduled for December 2020, a proposal to move away from indirect voting stoked tensions between Farmaajo and the opposition, including the presidents of Puntland and Jubaland. In February, federal meddling in the Galmudug local elections triggered clashes with Ahlu Sunna Wal Jamaa (ASWJ), a Sufi group whose militants were integrated into Galmudug’s security forces after battling with al-Shabaab. Jubaland President Ahmed Madobe, backed by Kenya and a vocal critic of Farmaajo, threatened to annul parliamentary elections if the federal government did not withdraw its troops from Gedo region ahead of the vote.

Fears that Farmaajo would delay the vote and abuse his presidential prerogatives to remain in power after the end of his term drew criticism from the opposition. In July, the Somali parliament ousted prime minister Hassan Ali Khayre, who was at odds with the president over the latter’s intention to delay the ballot. Despite reaching a consensus to keep the indirect voting system in September, the parliamentary elections were postponed to February 2021, with the Somali election body citing concerns over security and the coronavirus pandemic. After Farmaajo’s term expired in February 2021 without a clear electoral time frame, opposition candidates ceased recognising the president and called for a peaceful transfer of power.

Al-Shabaab's insurgency

Al-Shabaab confirmed its ability to launch highprofile attacks against government targets. Suicide bombers killed the governors of Nugaal and Mudug provinces in March and May respectively, while an explosion in December 2020 targeted the newly appointed Prime Minister Mohamed Hussein Roble. Other attacks were directed at military targets, including the Army Chief of Staff General Odawaa Yusuf Rageh, who survived a vehicleborne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack in Mogadishu’s Hodan district.

Al-Shabaab regularly attacked SNA and AMISOM military bases, convoys and patrols in rural areas across central and southern Somalia. In the early months of 2020, an increase in mortar attacks on Mogadishu revealed the difficulty facing security forces in expelling al-Shabaab from the areas surrounding the capital and the nearby Afgoye district. Al-Shabaab has increasingly shifted its operations northwards since ASWJ’s demise; in Puntland, it launched hit-and-run attacks on military posts and assassinated several security personnel, politicians and civil servants. As much as 25% of Somali territory is estimated to be under the control of al-Shabaab, which collected an estimated US$13 million through extortion and taxes in 2020 alone.⁶ Al-Shabaab also confirmed its significant transnational reach. In January 2020, the group staged an attack on Manda airstrip in Camp Simba, a military base situated in Kenya’s Lamu County that houses US and Kenyan troops.

Developments in counter-insurgency operations

During 2020, AMISOM and US forces continued to provide critical assistance to the SNA in its fight against al-Shabaab. Despite the withdrawal of some US special forces from Somalia, an estimated 72 counter-terrorism operations – 54 of which have been confirmed by AFRICOM – were conducted on Somali soil, the second-highest number since the first reported strikes in 2007.⁷ AMISOM supported Somali troops in the battle of Janaale, which they recaptured from al-Shabaab in March 2020. In May, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) passed Resolution 2520, which confirmed the deployment of 19,626 personnel until February 2021, stating that ‘the situation in Somalia continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security’.⁸ Yet a drawdown of 1,000 troops in February 2020, and the additional withdrawal of 200 Ethiopian troops in November 2020, foreshadowed the planned transfer of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the SNA at the end of 2021. Additionally, Somalia’s diplomatic turbulences with Djibouti and Kenya injected further instability into AMISOM.

Human rights and humanitarian

Armed violence continued to exact a high civilian toll in 2020. Around 750 civilians were estimated to have died between January 2020 and February 2021 because of armed violence, with al-Shabaab responsible for nearly half of these deaths.⁹ The humanitarian crisis in Somalia remained alarming, with approximately 5.9m people in need of humanitarian assistance.¹⁰ Heavy fighting in Gedo and Jubaland caused the displacement of roughly 60,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) during the first half of 2020 and by the end of the year there were an estimated 293,000 new conflict IDPs across the whole country.¹¹ Additionally, the coronavirus pandemic, desert locusts and floods exacerbated the humanitarian situation. In particular, concerns arose that the spread of new infectious variants of the coronavirus could lead to a surge in COVID-19 cases, especially given the country’s fragile healthcare system. Flooding displaced over half a million Somalis and affected an estimated 1.3m people across 39 districts, contributing to the spread of waterborne diseases such as cholera and acute diarrhoea.¹²

Political stability

Disputes over the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections dominated Somalia’s political landscape. These tensions sparked an outbreak of inter-clan clashes across Somalia and antagonised some of the government’s allies – such as the ASWJ – in the fight against al-Shabaab. Notably, al-Shabaab took advantage of these fissures to enhance its propaganda and recruitment.¹³ The stand-off between President Farmaajo and the opposition over the electoral law ended in September 2020 following agreement to retain the current indirect voting system for the December 2020 parliamentary elections. However, the postponing of the ballot ignited new tensions between the government and the opposition.

Economic and social

The combined effect of the pandemic, flooding and a locust infestation caused an estimated 1.5% GDP contraction in 2020, down from a forecasted growth of 3.2%.¹⁴ The recession is largely the result of an estimated 40% drop in remittances, and a concurrent fall in the export of livestock.¹⁵ In March, the IMF and the World Bank announced Somalia would be eligible to receive debt relief under the enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries initiative, restoring the country’s access to regular financing. In June, the World Bank approved a US$55m emergency package to support Somalia’s ailing economy. The package provided critical supplemental financing to the 2020 budget, sustaining service delivery in the face of considerable revenue shortfall.

Years of conflict have had devastating social effects. Approximately 69% of the population lives in poverty, with an even higher incidence rate among IDPs.¹⁶ An estimated 30% of children aged six to 17 were enrolled in school as of 2020, with strong disparities between urban and rural areas and between boys and girls.¹⁷ Additionally, the combination of heavy flooding and below-average rainfall seasons negatively affected crop and livestock production, leaving over 2.5m people acutely food insecure.¹⁸

Relations with neighbouring and international partners and geopolitical implications

Somalia was also caught in the midst of broader regional turbulences in 2020. Rivalries among Gulf countries continued to play out in the country, with Qatar and the UAE vying for influence and Turkey remaining one of Farmaajo’s most trusted allies. The conflict in Ethiopia’s Tigray region also had wider implications for Somalia. The Ethiopian government redeployed an estimated 3,000 troops from Somalia to Tigray and disarmed an additional 200 Tigrayan soldiers serving in AMISOM.¹⁹ These withdrawals have sparked concerns that AMISOM-backed Somali troops will be more vulnerable to al-Shabaab.

In December, relations between Kenya and Somalia deteriorated after the Somali government accused its neighbour of meddling in its domestic affairs. Hours after Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta welcomed President Muse Bihi Abdi of Somaliland in Nairobi on 14 December, Somalia cut diplomatic ties with Kenya. The crisis represented the culmination of years of simmering tensions between the two countries, which have escalated over Kenya’s involvement in AMISOM, unresolved trade issues, maritime-border disputes and alleged breaches of Somalia’s sovereignty. Subsequently, the Somali government dismissed as ‘biased’ the results of a fact-finding mission mandated by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to investigate the maritime-border dispute with Kenya.²⁰

Political scenarios

The turbulent run-up to the elections strained relations between the Somali federal government and the member states. Farmaajo’s nationalist platform antagonised influential clan leaders, including the presidents of Puntland and Jubaland. In these regions, the deployment of the SNA occasionally ignited clashes with local security forces. Inadequate measures to ensure widespread public confidence in the electoral process and its eventual outcome could provoke a violent backlash from the federal states and the opposition. The ongoing dispute with Kenya over the demarcation of the maritime boundary – with a postponed adjudication date of March 2021 at the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – is also likely to have a significant impact on Somalia’s domestic politics, not just on regional relations. A ruling favouring Somalia could lead the federal government to begin oil explorations off the coast of semi-autonomous Puntland, potentially igniting new disputes with the regional government over how to distribute oil revenues.

Escalation potential and conflict-related risks

AMISOM is set to transfer security responsibilities to the Somali government by the end of 2021. Yet tensions involving AMISOM’s TCCs represent a significant conflict-related risk. The crisis in Tigray already triggered a redeployment of Ethiopian forces in 2020 – both those under AMISOM and independent troops – from Somalia to the domestic front. If the Tigray conflict escalates or stretches out further into 2021, the Ethiopian government may be forced to withdraw additional troops from Somalia.

The potential of rising regional tensions between Kenya and Somalia – should either one of them ignore an unfavourable ICJ ruling – may also negatively affect AMISOM. Changes in the current size and composition of AMISOM may induce other TCCs, including Burundi, Djibouti and Uganda, to reconsider their participation in the mission: a threat Burundi and Uganda already made in 2019 after a proposed drawdown of military personnel. Cracks within AMISOM are likely to benefit al-Shabaab, as previous Ethiopian and Kenyan troop withdrawals saw the group increase attacks and quickly retake territory. With the SNA still ill-equipped to assume security responsibilities, AMISOM may continue to take a leading security role beyond the end of 2021.

Prospects for peace

The 2021 parliamentary and presidential elections represent an important inflection point for the country. Broad acceptance of election results could improve the relations between the federal government and the member states. However, this is contingent on the Somali political and security elites making a general commitment to the electoral process, which proved the major obstacle throughout 2020. A contested ballot could trigger a political crisis with broader regional ramifications. Political developments in early 2021, including the opposition ceasing to recognise Farmaajo and the violent repression of an opposition march in February, suggest that tension is likely to increase in the absence of a clear and mutually agreed electoral time frame.

Additionally, the prospects of a negotiated settlement with al-Shabaab remain thin. Over the years, calls to review the current strategy to fight al-Shabaab acknowledged the low probability of success by military force alone. Yet the protracted military stalemate between the federal government and al-Shabaab, along with the uneasiness among powerful regional actors over the situation, makes it unlikely that official negotiations will begin any time soon.

Strategic implications and global influences

The strategic value of the coastline along the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa leaves Somalia vulnerable to foreign meddling. Both Gulf and neighbouring African countries have taken advantage of the ambiguous status of federal states to bypass the central government’s approval of infrastructure projects. The UAE has established close relations with the federal member states, antagonising the central government. Although Farmaajo banned Dubai’s DP World from operating in Somalia and despite the rejection of a late-2019 UAE plan to build a military base in Berbera, the company successfully won 30-year concessions to develop the port of Berbera in Somaliland and the port of Bosaso in Puntland. In Puntland, the UAE were reported to have sponsored regional militias hostile to Mogadishu.²¹ Farmaajo has found two close allies in Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed and Eritrean President Isaias Afwerki. However, a conflict between Mogadishu and the federal states could force Abiy and Isaias – both aligned with the UAE – to abandon Farmaajo, plunging Somalia into further fragmentation. The consequences of regional turbulences and shifting alliances in the Horn are therefore likely to reverberate widely across Somalia.

Political

Security

International

Shifting the balance of power

Slow and growing pressure throughout 2020 led to a shift in political power dynamics with the dissolution on 6 December of the power-sharing parliamentary agreement between the Common Front for Congo (FCC), aligned with former president Joseph Kabila, and Heading for Change (CACH), a coalition which includes the Union for Democracy and Social Progress (UDPS) party of the current president, Félix Tshisekedi. Protests by UDPS party supporters against the dismissal of the national parliament’s vice-president and the end of the FCC–CACH ruling coalition spread to many cities.

The end of the FCC–CACH coalition was the culmination of a series of strategic decisions by Tshisekedi to remove his predecessor’s influence, including instating Albert Yuma Mulimbi as the head of the state-owned copper and cobalt enterprise Gecamines, replacing seven senior magistrates allied to Kabila and suspending Delphin Kahimbi, the military-intelligence chief.¹⁵ Tshisekedi also made controversial appointments to the Constitutional Court, installing judges viewed as sympathetic to him and reducing the influence of those allied to Kabila.

Regional tensions and cooperation

The presence and operations of foreign militaries in the DRC continued to increase in 2020–21, destabilising local populations and resulting in numerous casualties. For example, South Sudanese military forces attacked civilians and looted properties in Ituri, subsequently clashing with the FARDC. Zambian military forces also crossed into Tanganyika province on 13 March and clashed with the FARDC. Other operations were more complex, such as those with Burundian and Rwandan military forces, which partnered with the FARDC to eradicate non-state armed groups operating in eastern DRC amid tense relations between Kigali, Gitega and Kinshasa.¹⁶

Expanded ADF operations

While the ADF continued to focus operations within North Kivu, by the end of 2020 it had also become the second-most active and deadly non-state armed group in Ituri, second only to CODECO. ADF activities in Ituri took place in the southern part of the province in Mambasa and Irumu. By May 2020, around 4,000 ADF fighters had set up multiple bases in the chiefdom of Walese Vonkutu, partnering with Mai-Mai Kyandenga and Mai-Mai Simba. This shift in operations resulted from increased FARDC pressure on the ADF in North Kivu and the capture of numerous ADF bases in Beni throughout 2020.

Violence in Ituri

Violence escalated in Ituri in the first half of 2020. Since 2017, CODECO has increasingly mobilised Lendu groups with an ethnic rhetoric against the Hema.¹⁷ Equally, Hema groups have armed themselves and retaliated against Lendu communities. The FARDC’s retreat in early February 2020 from several positions around Djugu also allowed Lendu armed groups to take control of dozens of villages in the region. Violent events against civilians in Ituri nearly doubled from the previous year, with events increasing by 84.3% and fatalities increasing by 42.7%.¹⁸ After various peace agreements with CODECO in August 2020, violence began to decrease but has far from ceased completely.

DDR failures

Several armed grouped entered DDR programmes in 2020, with varied success. In February 2020, for example, the Front for Patriotic Resistance (FRPI) agreed to a ceasefire and reintegration, but some of its fighters continued to commit acts of violence. Deserters of the DDR process often cited insufficient resources and ineffective implementation. More troubling was the trend towards the surrendering and splitting of larger groups, like CODECO, leaving local power vacuums that were filled by defecting factions and other armed groups.

Human rights and humanitarian

Human-rights violations in eastern DRC continued in 2020, with both state and non-state armed groups committing violent attacks against civilians. Violence by armed groups targeting women increased in 2020, with the majority of these attacks occurring in North Kivu. Use of excessive force against protesters by police and the military had fallen since Tshisekedi took office in 2019, but many demonstrations continued to be banned or dispersed, with journalists targeted in particular. Coronavirus containment measures were used by police to bar demonstrations. Human-rights advocates, lawyers and political-party members continued to face threats, violence and imprisonment for voicing critical views towards those in power.¹⁹

Violence in the DRC has led to 5.2 million internally displaced persons and just under 950,000 refugees and asylum seekers, primarily in Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda.²⁰ New refugees also arrived into the DRC from destabilised environments in Burundi, the Central African Republic (CAR) and South Sudan.²¹ The DRC now hosts over half a million refugees from neighbouring countries.²² Humanitarian responses struggled amid the coronavirus pandemic, funding shortages and violence against aid workers in Ituri, North Kivu and South Kivu. This increased the number of people in the DRC experiencing acute food shortages to 21.8m, exacerbating malnutrition rates among children and making the DRC home to the second-largest hunger crisis globally after Yemen.²³

Economic and social

The DRC faced severe health concerns surrounding an Ebola outbreak during 2020. Although the government officially declared the end of the Ebola outbreak on 18 November 2020, its actual endpoint is uncertain.²⁴ Limited testing in much of the country made the exact spread and impact of the pandemic since March 2020 difficult to ascertain. Outside of Kinshasa, the conflict-affected eastern provinces were the most severely affected.²⁵ By the end of February 2021, 25,913 cases had been confirmed and 707 deaths recorded, although actual figures may have been much higher.²⁶ Coronavirus lockdown measures impacted school children across the country, who lacked the technology to continue their studies virtually. Workers in sectors such as mining faced harsh conditions of confined work environments. Conflict-induced displacement and the pandemic also compounded poverty. Many civilians, especially displaced people with already limited resources, faced indiscriminate looting, destruction of property and deterioration of local public services.

The coronavirus pandemic and subsequent lockdown measures did not affect all economic sectors equally. Compared to the previous year, mineral and rare-earth exports, especially copper and cobalt, increased in production in 2020, due to continued demand and mining companies’ practice of confining workers to job sites.²⁷ Increased production helped alleviate drops in mineral prices.²⁸ Contactintensive jobs were more severely hit, particularly those in the informal market, such as small traders, taxi drivers and vendors. The IMF estimated that the economy of the DRC contracted by 0.06% in 2020.²⁹

Relations with neighbouring and international partners and geopolitical implications

Relationships with some international partners markedly improved in 2020, with Tshisekedi gaining the trust of the United States and the reinstatement of the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), which allows sub-Saharan African nations duty-free access to the US market. The DRC government also secured loans from the IMF and the World Bank to handle the coronavirus pandemic and mitigate its economic fallout.³⁰ Insecurity and violence in the borderlands continued to drive preexisting regional tensions that stemmed from both the DRC government and neighbouring countries. Groups such as the Alliance of Patriots for a Free and Sovereign Congo (APCLS), FDLR and RED Tabara continued to operate freely and threatened crossborder attacks into Rwanda and Burundi from their bases in the DRC. Foreign militaries from Angola, Burundi, Rwanda, Uganda and Zambia carried out ongoing operations in the DRC, sometimes clashing with the FARDC and keeping diplomatic relations tense throughout the year.

Political scenarios

The ability or inability of Tshisekedi to win political allies and navigate dissent from FCC supporters will shape short-term politics in the DRC. Shortly after the FCC–CACH coalition ended, a Constitutional Court ruling removed a floor-crossing ban in parliament, which allowed some opposition MPs to support Tshisekedi.³¹ The president could also decide to dissolve parliament and hold elections.³² Kabila and the FCC still have deep ties within the country through FCC-appointed governors and could leverage these for political gain. The unfolding of these political dynamics will influence the government’s ability to drive development projects forward, deal with the spread of COVID-19 and influence which conflicts to focus on. The leadership of Tshisekedi, together with economic opportunities gained through the AGOA and loans from international institutions, may prove to be the necessary measures for recovery.

Escalation potential and conflict-related risks

The break-up of the FCC–CACH coalition may divide the interests of and the support for opposing armed groups. The FARDC has previously partnered with groups like the NDC–R to govern areas in eastern DRC, but FCC support for opposing rebel groups could lead to further violence. The NDC–R split will likely lead to fighting between these groups as they try to control local institutions and resources. The growing conflict in Ituri displaced tens of thousands of people in 2020 and may escalate further in 2021. Instability and violence may lead to further displacement of DRC citizens to fragile neighbouring countries. These hostilities challenge efforts to contain the spread of COVID-19 and stimulate economic recovery. While the mining industry has been resilient to the global recession, conflict and contestation over the control of mining sites continue to suppress the benefits this industry could bring to the DRC.

Prospects for peace

A majority government for Tshisekedi removes political stalemates and allows for better security-policy implementation across the country, provided they are not disrupted by Kabila and other FCC-backed actors. Agreements with CODECO reduced its violent acts in Ituri by the end of 2020, but this opened up local power vacuums that could be filled by other groups and caused infighting among defectors. The break-up of the NDC–R also created local power shifts, where previously the FARDC had often partnered with the NDC–R and permitted the group a level of integration into state institutions. The break-up of the NDC–R could allow the FARDC to control more territory, especially with more effective policy implementation by Tshisekedi. Long-term solutions are likely only if there is further funding and changes to the DDR process, given the high desertion rates due to the lack of supplies, food and opportunities. The fracturing of armed groups also complicates the DDR processes. Instead of negotiating peace deals with a few major actors, there are now multiple groups with differing agendas. A peace deal with one group offers another group opportunities to control territory and populations. As in previous years, the solution to the DRC’s conflicts continues to lie primarily in sustaining ongoing peace agreements rather than constructing new ones.

Strategic implications and global influences

Fragile relations between Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda and the ongoing support provided by these states to competing armed groups in eastern DRC make an immediate solution to the violence in the area unlikely.

Rwandan President Kagame warned of potential further military action against external threats, and Burundi will likely retaliate against RED Tabara for its incursions into Burundi during the second half of 2020.³³

The porous borders used by actors in the Great Lakes region are a point of growing concern, given the highly destabilised situations of the CAR and South Sudan. This poses the additional threat of attacks on civilians by state and non-state armed groups from these countries. MONUSCO continued a drawdown of troops from the DRC, but its mandate was renewed for another year. The ongoing military operations between the FARDC and MONUSCO, along with Tshisekedi’s improved relations with international actors, may provide further leverage and financing to handle instability in eastern DRC while managing the country’s response to the coronavirus pandemic.

Political

Economic and social

International

Escalating attacks

Overall, the number of ASJ attacks has increased exponentially since 2017. By early 2021, insurgent violence had affected 11 out of 16 districts in Cabo Delgado. Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia and Muidumbe experienced the largest number of attacks since 2017. However, in relative terms, Quissanga and Nangade saw the largest increases in 2020, while the number of attacks in Palma – containing the Afungi pensinsula – increased marginally but remained consistent with previous years. In 2020 the conflict also spilled over the border with Tanzania, with attacks in the southern region of Mtwara. In January and February 2021, there were 39 reported attacks and 72 fatalities, broadly in line with the trend seen over the same period in 2020.¹³

ASJ violence has followed an annual pattern, with spikes occurring in May and just preceding the rainy season – usually between December and April – before a lull when rainfall and periodic flooding restricts overland mobility and depletes food and other essential resources.

ASJ’s early attacks in 2017 and 2018 mainly used bladed weapons, arson, kidnappings and rape, and primarily targeted civilian communities. However, attacks between 2018 and 2020 increasingly used assault rifles, RPGs, and during the assault on Palma also used mortars. They also made more use of military vehicles and equipment often seized in attacks on security forces, which have increased in parallel to growing counter-terrorism efforts.

Tactics and strategic thinking also appeared to have improved, with the militants able to conduct near-simultaneous attacks in multiple locations and engage in protracted clashes with the security forces over several days. As a result of their improved capabilities, the number of victims also increased exponentially: while the number of attacks in 2020 increased by 110%, the number of fatalities increased by 128%.¹⁴

Ineffective public and private security-force responses

A reshuffling of the military’s command structure in January 2021 signalled Nyusi’s growing focus on the insurgency threat. Nevertheless, multiple sources complained about the relative absence of the FADM, although deployment to the region reportedly increased following the March 2021 Palma attack. The security forces continued to lack adequate resources and training amid issues of low morale.

Counter-insurgency operations were increasingly supported by foreign PMCs: by Russia’s Wagner Group between September and November 2019 and reportedly from around April 2020 by South Africa’s Dyck Advisory Group (DAG), which both had contracts with the Ministry of Interior. Wagner left the country after a series of setbacks in late 2019, while DAG’s contract with the authorities concluded in April 2021 and was not renewed. DAG’s contract had included the use of combat helicopters, and its exit from the region will likely undermine the capabilities and efficacy of future state security responses. The South Africa-based Paramount Group became the latest PMC market entrant in Mozambique. In December 2020, the company began deploying materiel, including armoured personnel carriers and combat helicopters, as part of a contract with the Ministry of Defence.

Human rights and humanitarian

Violations of human rights have increased over the past three years as the insurgency has intensified, with abuses committed by ASJ militants and government forces alike. Evidence from 2020 shows that ASJ militants raped, kidnapped and harassed members of local communities, driving some from their homes.¹⁵ Security forces were regularly accused of forced disappearances, arbitrary arrests, theft and murder or extrajudicial killings of presumed militants or informants.¹⁶ In March 2021, allegations were also made against DAG.¹⁷

The humanitarian impact of the conflict worsened dramatically in the period from the start of 2020 to the end of April 2021, with more than 2,000 fatalities.¹⁸ The number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) climbed from 110,000 in 2019 to over 676,000 in 2020.¹⁹ The areas with the largest number of departing IDPs and with impeded access to humanitarian relief were Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe, Macomia, Meluco and Quissanga, while the district with the highest proportion of incoming IDPs was Palma-Metuge. The vast majority of IDPs (90%) stayed with hospitable families in neighbouring districts, though often in cramped and squalid conditions.²⁰

Poor accessibility to the worst-affected areas restricted humanitarian aid, as did a general lack of funding, slow processing of visas for humanitarian workers, government restrictions due to the coronavirus pandemic and the insurgency, and militant attacks on transport, including humanitarian cargo. Cholera cases also increased, surpassing 4,900 confirmed cases and 55 deaths by February 2021, although the actual number is thought to be higher. There was no functional healthcare facility in the districts of Macomia, Mocímboa da Praia, Muidumbe or Quissanga, while access to water and sanitation was generally poor, and nine out of 16 districts experienced crisis levels of food insecurity.²¹

Political stability

In 2020–early 2021, the sub-national conflict did not significantly threaten Frelimo’s one-party rule in the country. It continued to control Cabo Delgado, having garnered a majority of provincial-assembly seats in the 2019 general elections. Nevertheless, some reports suggested that Nyusi was losing support, including within Frelimo, in part due to the Cabo Delgado crisis. However, his role as defence minister during the 2016 ‘hidden debt’ scandal and his ostensible resistance to launching credible investigations and prosecuting implicated officials, as well as his inability to fully disarm the RMJ – a dissident faction of Renamo – following the 2019 peace agreement were other pre-existing causes of frustration.²²

Economic and social

The insurgency adversely affected development, local livelihoods and foreign direct investment. It complicated and disrupted logistics and hampered construction of LNG production facilities, which were scheduled to be finalised in 2024. The March 2021 assault on Palma, a key logistical hub housing many expatriate workers, marked a turning point, and prompted most companies to evacuate their staff. The US oil and gas multinational ExxonMobil, which had repeatedly delayed its final investment decision, did so again in March 2021, with the situation unlikely to change until security conditions improve. Total, which has the largest cohort of workers in the area, also delayed construction plans after the Palma attack. The company had planned to progressively resume operations from April, but this remained unlikely in the short term. The continued expansion of ASJ’s operational zone also threatened gemstone-mining operations in the southwestern district of Montepuez. The large influx of IDPs also raised concerns among some commercial operators over illegal mining activities.

Poor provision of basic services in the province pre-existed the insurgency but 2020’s marked escalation of violence further deteriorated the situation. ASJ’s repeated targeting of humanitarian convoys further hampered response efforts and drove up inflation in the price of basic goods, leaving local populations nearly entirely dependent on foreign aid. The economic impact of the coronavirus pandemic globally compounded the dire situation, with GDP shrinking by 0.5% in 2020.²³

Relations with neighbouring and international partners and geopolitical implications

The government appeared reluctant to invite foreign-military presence into the country, fearing it could endanger national sovereignty, and opted instead to use PMCs.

Military and logistical support was offered by multilateral institutions and bilateral partners, including the EU, the SADC, Portugal and the US, but deployment was slow and limited. However, the Palma attack prompted an apparent shifting of the government’s stance, with US and Portuguese training missions launched in mid-March and mid-April 2020. On 8 April, an SADC extraordinary summit in Maputo discussed possible responses to the Cabo Delgado crisis and expressed willingness to deploy a technical mission to assess the security situation, and potentially troops.

Political scenarios

Government stability is unlikely to be challenged in 2021, despite continued frustration with Nyusi and his government’s inability to contain the insurgency. Frelimo is likely to remain the dominant political force in the near future.

Nevertheless, government finances face growing pressure due to the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, with high levels of public debt. Although economic growth is forecast to increase to 2.1% in 2021, risks are on the downside amid a very slow vaccine roll-out.²⁴ The mid-term positive outlook for the global natural-gas market, with solid demand in China, India and the Middle East, makes natural gas a continued strategic asset and means combatting the insurgency in Cabo Delgado is a top priority.

The likely highly lucrative Afungi concession remains central to Total’s growth strategy, as apparently confirmed by its reported contingency plans to use the island of Mayotte – more than 550 km east of Palma – as a rear base for its Mozambican operations. Nevertheless, the cost of such solutions combined with parallel increased spending on physical security may further delay production. ExxonMobil’s investment looks less certain, while planned LNG production by the Italian energy giant Eni – the third-largest energy company in the province – may also be delayed by the Palma assault.

Escalation potential and conflict-related risks

It is likely that the Cabo Delgado conflict will continue to escalate within the same broad parameters in the coming year. The government implicitly confirmed this with its acceptance of bilateral and multilateral military and political support, its security agreement with Total, and by its establishment of a 25-km security perimeter around the Afungi peninsula and an FADM Afungi operational command.

Despite the government claiming a series of counter-terrorism successes from the end of December 2020, the tempo of ASJ attacks remained largely consistent with the previous year. Despite a months-long lull in attacks and claims by ISIS, the Palma attack clearly demonstrated the extent of the insurgent threat and its willingness to target key economic sectors. The government’s narrow focus on counter-terrorism efforts also fails to address some of the underlying causes of the conflict, making it more protracted.

Prospects for peace

The government demonstrated little willingness to negotiate with the insurgents or to address the conflict’s root causes of marginalisation, corruption, organised crime and radicalisation. Furthermore, many of the government’s actions since 2017 appear contingent on LNG operations commencing fully by 2024. The government therefore likely sees the insurgency as a real threat to future rents and will attempt to quash it over the coming year or at least to create a perception that it is regaining control, particularly in Palma. Meanwhile, ASJ’s unclear command structure and demands will undermine any serious attempt to reach a negotiated solution.

Strategic implications and global influences

With Africa accounting for the bulk of Islamic State operations in 2020–early 2021, the Islamist extremist network is likely to continue to promote the activities of its West and Central African wilayats, including ASJ.

Furthermore, the growing presence of Western interests in Cabo Delgado, including French and US companies, could make strikes to personnel and assets symbolically important to ASJ and elevate its notoriety among ISIS branches. This would send a strong signal to the West that ISIS still poses a relevant threat to their citizens, while also demonstrating ASJ’s growing capabilities and its ability to strike more fortified facilities, despite significant efforts to secure the area.

Awareness of the insurgency and the humanitarian situation has led to mounting international political pressure, making further military intervention highly likely. Such support may come both from regional PMCs, as well as from bilateral and multilateral partners; an assumption supported by the series of high-level meetings that followed the Palma attack. Nevertheless, capacity-building of local authorities is likely to be prioritised over military deployment.

Political scenarios

Buhari’s second term in office did not radically change the government’s security response to the conflict. Despite pledges to tackle the roots of insecurity, the federal government was unable to systematically engage with pastoralist and farmer communities to induce them to buy into the government’s proposed modernisation programme. The implementation of the ten-year National Livestock Transformation Plan, which, among other measures, plans to turn grazing reserves into ranches to promote sustainable development in agro-pastoral communities, will be key to curbing competition over land and water in rural areas. Yet it may face some challenges, as state governors have occasionally resisted the establishment of ranches.

Escalation potential and conflict-related risks

The activation of state-sponsored vigilante groups embedded violence in local communities and community relations and led to a proliferation of armed militias in large parts of Nigeria’s North West and Middle Belt regions. These developments, along with the coexistence of communal and bandit communities in local conflict spaces, heighten the potential for a violent escalation, especially in areas where revenge feuds and ethnic mobilisation overlap with competition over access to land and water. Additionally, concern is growing that Fulani pastoralists and bandits may coordinate with jihadist militant organisations. While bandits have largely been non-ideological, the increasing presence of Ansaru, ISWAP and others in the North West could potentially lead to tactical alliances between these groups.

Prospects for peace

Regional governments and traditional authorities have occasionally spearheaded local peace initiatives to defuse intercommunal tensions. These have included peace and disarmament agreements as well as local development programmes targeting vulnerable communities in the North West and Middle Belt. Yet problems in local-authority coordination and the increasing militarisation of community relations continue to hamper any coherent response to resolve the conflict. The persistent cycle of attacks and counter-attacks has created a legacy of animosity between farmers and pastoralists that will be difficult to defuse, especially in the context of a climate of widespread impunity and government inaction.

Strategic implications and global influences

The implications of the crisis have extended to the wider Lake Chad Basin. In the North West, Nigerian citizens displaced by the conflict have sought refuge in Niger’s Maradi region. Home to their own large pastoralist communities, Nigeria’s neighbouring countries – Cameroon, Chad and Niger – are also vulnerable to tensions between herders and farmers who clash over land and/or water. Furthermore, jihadist militant organisations from the wider region, including the Sahel, may increasingly look towards northern Nigeria as a fertile ground for engagement and tactical alliances with bandit groups.

Political scenarios

The first talks between the Yaoundé government and separatists took place in 2020, along with the inaugural regional elections for 90 councillors with authority on certain local issues. Of these, 20 positions are filled by representatives of traditional chieftains, an influential position increasingly targeted through attacks and abductions by separatist groups. However, after boycotts by several opposition groups and the ruling party’s victory in nine of the ten regional seats, this limited decentralisation is unlikely to satisfy separatist demands for independence or a return to federalism. The fracturing of separatist groups, with some entering peace negotiations while others continue fighting for independence, will continue to weaken their political leverage over the Biya government.

Escalation potential and conflict-related risks

The fractured opposition may result in further violence as competing separatist groups clash with one another, leaving civilians caught in the crossfire. Targeted violence by separatists against an increasingly disillusioned population (especially local leaders suspected of not supporting separatist causes) may also escalate further. The frequent use of indiscriminate violence in military-clearance operations will risk further weakening the legitimacy of the Biya government and encourage anglophones to join armed separatist groups.

Prospects for peace

Tabe’s willingness to hold peace talks may point towards some 2021 resolution with those groups that are loyal to him. This will, however, create local power vacuums which will likely be filled by other separatists who wish to continue fighting. Indeed, the fracturing of separatist groups and their diverse demands make the prospect of sweeping universal peace arrangements very unlikely. Those left out of negotiations will continue using insurgency tactics.

Strategic implications and global influences

Boko Haram’s operations in northern Cameroon reduce the likelihood of international pressure being applied on the Biya regime for any significant political changes. The country’s strategic position as a backstop for Boko Haram’s expansion gives the international community little appetite for regime change and potential resultant political instability in Cameroon. Major political changes may affect military operations and create opportunities for Boko Haram to broaden its reach.

Political scenarios

The signing of the Juba Peace Agreement by the Sudanese government and rebel groups from Darfur and the Two Areas in October 2020 creates an opportunity to address the root causes of conflict and deliver durable peace. Although the deal is expected to improve the security situation in conflict-affected areas, it faces several implementation challenges, not least the non-inclusion of certain relevant rebel groups, including the SLM/A–AW. Communities in the eastern part of the country also opposed the deal, claiming that it excluded dominant forces in the region.

The inclusion of former rebel members in the newly appointed cabinet can be seen as an essential step in implementing aspects of the Juba Agreement. However, much remains to be done to (re)build confidence among the government and signatory parties/former armed groups to ensure that the promised reforms are realised. This is especially true given some parties’ dissatisfaction with the limited progress in implementing elements of the agreement, such as the facilitation of security arrangements.

Sudan’s removal from the US list of countries supporting terrorism will provide support to the government’s own efforts to stimulate economic growth. Despite years of contraction, with upcoming international support and possible debt relief, the country’s economic outlook is expected to improve in 2021.

Escalation potential and conflict-related risks

The spike in intercommunal violence in Darfur and the Two Areas in late 2020 and early 2021 underlined the government’s failure to protect civilians by filling the gap left by the UNAMID’s withdrawal, prompting calls for improved security. Unlike UNAMID, the mandate of the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan (UNITAMS) is to provide political rather than security support to the transition process. This leaves the provision of security and civilian protection entirely in the hands of government security forces, who have themselves been repeatedly implicated in atrocities in Darfur and other areas.

The humanitarian situation in Darfur and the Two Areas remains severe due to the continued intercommunal clashes and resulting displacements. An additional 4.1m people will need humanitarian assistance in 2021, taking the total to an unprecedented 13.4m, with Darfur and the Two Areas among the most affected areas.¹⁵ Furthermore, with Sudan already hosting over one million refugees and asylum seekers, including over 60,000 from Ethiopia’s Tigray region, any further displacement caused by the conflict there would stretch the country’s already scarce resources.¹⁶ While the Juba Peace Agreement is expected to facilitate humanitarian access across Sudan, including Darfur and the Two Areas, the increased violence in late 2020 and early 2021 continued to disrupt humanitarian activities.

Prospects for peace

Reaping the dividends of the Juba Peace Agreement will require the government to address its implementation challenges by involving the remaining holdout armed groups – particularly SLM/A–AW – improving relations between the civilian and military components of the transitional government and mobilising the required resources. The government will also need to step up civilian-protection efforts and ensure improved security in conflict-affected areas as part of its commitment under the national plan in the wake of UNAMID’s departure.