Persistence of internal conflict

South and Southeast Asia’s conflicts are primarily internal, with the exception of Kashmir. The war in Afghanistan is an internal conflict that has become internationalised by notable thirdparty intervention. The Taliban remains backed by Pakistan, while Kabul relies heavily on US aid and has a close relationship with India. China, Iran and Russia have periodically supported both sides and vie for influence using political, security, economic and ethnic levers. Terrorist groups operating in the border areas between Pakistan and Afghanistan also affect and are affected by the war in Afghanistan and Pakistan’s own internal conflict. For example, the virulently anti-Pakistan Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) has taken refuge in Afghanistan and is escalating attacks inside Pakistan after reabsorbing splinter groups throughout 2020.

India’s conflict with CPI-Maoist is largely localised; so too are the Philippines’ conflicts with the NPA and Moro Muslim rebels, and the Malay Muslim ethno-nationalist insurgency in Thailand. The conflict in Myanmar is primarily internal but has resulted in approximately 855,000 Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh.³ India’s conflict in the northeast is also affected by insecurity across the border, with Naga, Assamese and Manipuri armed groups utilising disrupted but still-intact sanctuaries in Myanmar.

The influence of transnational jihad

The rise of the Islamic State (also known as ISIS or ISIL) has impacted the conflicts in Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as the Philippines’ fight against the Islamist Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The ISIS affiliate in Afghanistan and Pakistan, Islamic State in Khorasan Province (ISIS–KP), primarily recruits former TTP members and claimed responsibility for some of the most brutal attacks against ethnic and religious minorities in the region in 2020. In the Philippines, ASG, Ansar Khalifah Philippines and Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters maintained their allegiance to ISIS. Notably, the ethnonationalist insurgency in southern Thailand has remained centred on regional identity and demands for an independent state, having resisted influence from transnational jihadist groups.

Peace processes make progress

In 2020, some gradual progress was made in peace processes in the Philippines, Thailand, and between India and Pakistan, but without any permanent settlements. Most positively, a joint statement by India’s and Pakistan’s Directors General of Military Operations agreed to a ceasefire along the LoC – the site of frequent artillery exchanges between the two countries. Dialogue stalled between the Communist Party of the Philippines and its armed wing (the NPA) on the one hand, and the strongman president of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte on the other. In December 2020, Duterte declared that peace talks had been halted due to NPA attacks and forbade the agreement of local ceasefires. Elsewhere in the Philippines, a three-year extension of the transition period for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM) was backed by the BARMM chief minister and Philippines government, allowing a relative peace to prevail between Manila and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front despite delays to the latter’s disarmament. In 2020, the Thailand National Security Council’s Peace Dialogue Panel met with the Patani Malay National Revolutionary Front (BRN) separatists in a formal setting for the first time. The BRN unilaterally ceased hostile activities to better enable the government’s response effort to the coronavirus pandemic.

Political and institutional

The most active conflicts in the region are rooted in the ethnic, religious, irredentist and centre–province tensions that emerged in newly formed post-colonial states. The 1909 Anglo-Siamese Treaty demarcated the border between what later became modern Thailand and Malaysia, splitting the historical Muslim sultanate of Patani and laying the groundwork for the Malay Muslim ethnonationalist autonomy movement that drives insurgency in southern Thailand. In 1947, the last Hindu ruler of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir opted to join the Indian Union rather than Pakistan, effectively splitting Kashmir between India and Pakistan and giving rise to the current conflict. Baloch insurgency and insecurity in Pakistan’s Pashtun tribal areas stem partly from questions over the Durand Line as the legitimate border between Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as a post-colonial order that split Pakistan into two wings – West Pakistan, which resembles today’s borders, and East Pakistan, which is majority Bengali – following partition. This post-colonial order, followed by the secession of East Pakistan to become Bangladesh, gradually led to ethnic resentment as the Punjab province came to dominate others. Myanmar’s independence from British rule in 1948 placed numerous ethnic minorities under the control of the Bamar majority, a circumstance which set in motion the current conflict.

Very often, this post-colonial legacy has combined with issues of identity, lack of political representation and the search for autonomy to drive many Asian conflicts, particularly in Kashmir, Pakistan (especially among Baloch separatists), India (the Communist Party of India–Maoist (CPI–Maoist)), Myanmar, the Philippines (ASG and Moro rebels) and Thailand. States have responded harshly to non-state actors’ efforts for greater autonomy with military measures and restrictions. These have often targeted civilian populations that have ethnic or religious affiliations to non-state actors, impacting citizens’ daily lives and thereby serving as an additional conflict driver. Myanmar’s multiple internal armed conflicts are largely driven by EAOs’ struggles for greater autonomy in remote borderlands, with efforts to demarcate territory by force ahead of peace negotiations leading to fighting between armed groups.

Central governments have tended to conflate demands for greater civil liberties and limited autonomy with violent separatist movements, as seen in Pakistan’s suppression of the Pashtun Tahaffuz Movement (PTM) in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, which demands greater civil rights for Pashtuns and uses anti-state rhetoric but is distinguishable from violent groups like the TTP. Jammu and Kashmir’s integration with the Indian Union in August 2019 was a key driver of the Muslim-majority population’s intensified political resistance against New Delhi. Government measures to prevent violent protests – including curfews, internet shutdowns and the deployment of additional Indian paramilitary and army personnel – fuelled resentment, whereas the contrasting government approach in areas with CPI-Maoist presence, focusing on service provision, alleviated conflict drivers. Long-lasting insurgencies, such as the Afghan Taliban and the Philippines’ NPA, have also been enabled by their strong ideological unity and cohesion, and at times their decentralisation.

Economic and social

Socio-economic inequalities are root causes of the insurgencies in India, Pakistan and the Philippines. Poverty and lack of economic opportunities in parts of the Philippines continue to provide recruits for both Moro Muslim rebel groups and the NPA. India’s CPI-Maoist has long tapped into sentiments of disenfranchisement in impoverished rural populations. Similarly, the conflict between Pakistan and Baloch insurgents is partially fuelled by economic inequality, seen most recently in the distribution of economic benefits derived from natural-resource extraction and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) traversing Balochistan. In Myanmar, Pakistan and the Philippines, insurgents have cited internal migration of majority ethnic and religious groups to minority areas, or the entry of multinational (especially Chinese) firms, as key motivators for continued fighting. Projects like CPEC and the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor (CMEC) simultaneously motivate resistance and incentivise groups to consolidate control over future development zones so they can engage in rent seeking.

Illicit trade and informal taxation are also powerful economic drivers of conflict. The cultivation and export of illicit narcotics play a central role in Afghanistan, while illicit trade in narcotics, gems, timber and people fuels the conflict in Myanmar’s periphery. Civilian populations often find themselves caught between heavy-handed insurgencies and coercive state security forces; they are sometimes punished by both for perceived cooperation with the other.

Geopolitical

The conflicts in Afghanistan, disputed Kashmir, Pakistan and the Philippines have strong international drivers that often perpetuate violence by altering power dynamics on the ground. For example, the long-standing presence of US and NATO troops, regional support for the Taliban and other forms of covert and overt intervention in Afghanistan’s civil war are key drivers of conflict. The Taliban’s primary objective is the withdrawal of foreign forces followed by the overthrow of the government, which it views as an extension of foreign influence. The Taliban is enabled by a diverse group of foreign donors and sponsors that has at times included Iran, private Gulf donors and – most importantly – Pakistan. The Taliban also relies on safe havens in Pakistan and coordinates its operations through leadership councils in Quetta. Similarly, Islamabad often attributes terrorist violence in Pakistan to the safe havens found by militants in Afghanistan.

The spread of transnational jihadism in South and Southeast Asia – with various groups in the region pledging allegiance to ISIS since 2014 – also shapes the conflicts by radicalising populations and spawning new non-state actors that may derail ongoing negotiations between the original conflict parties.

Prospects for peace

Prospects for sustainable peace are slim in the short term, with some limited exceptions. In India’s Northeast, a final peace deal could be agreed with Naga armed groups in 2021–22. The largely observed ceasefire along the LoC may reduce violence in Kashmir, though further progress is needed for a political resolution of the conflict. India and Pakistan’s announcement of a renewed ceasefire along the LoC – initiated through ‘back channel’ talks – raised the prospects of a potential thaw in relations. If the back-channel talks progress successfully, they could lead to more normalised diplomatic relations, confidence-building measures and the resumption of official bilateral peace talks. However, it is too early to assess the opportunity this may present for a durable reduction in tensions.

The conflicts in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Myanmar and Pakistan have the greatest implications for continued regional and international insecurity. The withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan in 2021 marks an inflection point for outside intervention in the country and region. Kabul remains almost entirely reliant on outside assistance; continued aid from donor countries will likely require the government and Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) to remain cohesive and intact. While the troop withdrawal will satisfy a key Taliban objective and justification for its activities, the development is unlikely to lessen the Taliban’s determination to seize additional territory by force, overrun military outposts and wear down the ANDSF. The Taliban is likely to continue limited peace talks to justify the operation of its diplomatic office in Qatar, while making demands for new prisoner releases and the removal of UN sanctions. However, it is unlikely to engage in substantive negotiations or the compromise necessary to reach a political settlement with the Afghan government without substantial pressure from the international community and its regional backers, including Pakistan.

The February 2021 coup made Myanmar’s peace process under the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement framework appear defunct. The Fourth Union Peace Conference of August 2020 was more symbolic than substantive; several notable signatories suspended their involvement. Though some EAOs may seek stability in their areas of operation by maintaining old ceasefires or upholding informal truces, these are now less likely to be honoured by either side.

Escalation potential and spillover risks

Attacks by Pakistan-based terrorist groups against Indian military targets in India-administered Kashmir in 2016 and 2019 led to brief conventional conflicts that included artillery exchanges, airstrikes and dogfights between fixed-wing aircraft. The unlikely but catastrophic potential for one of these episodes to spark a nuclear exchange is a perennial escalation risk.

In Afghanistan, violence levels are likely to spike after the US and NATO withdrawal as the Taliban seeks to gain territory, while ISIS–KP may attempt to remain relevant by staging large-scale terrorist attacks in urban centres. Afghanistan’s increased instability is likely to spill over into Pakistan, as the TTP and ISIS–KP become emboldened.

Myanmar could develop into a multi-front civil war in the borderlands and an armed resistance in urban areas. The Tatmadaw is likely to continue crackdowns in urban centres and attacks on civilian populations in rural areas inhabited by ethnic minorities. Large numbers of refugees are likely to enter Bangladesh but the conflict itself should remain contained, as should low-intensity conflicts including India’s CPI-Maoist insurgency and the separatist movements in southern Thailand and the Philippines.

Geopolitical changes

The role of external powers is likely to become more regionalised in the short term as the US and NATO withdraw from Afghanistan. Eurasian powers, including China, India and Russia, will likely be forced to play a larger role in supporting efforts to establish and maintain regional stability, including in Afghanistan and Myanmar. Chinese investment projects across the region, especially in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, will continue to encounter attacks from separatist groups and perhaps increasingly from terrorist groups. Despite their mediation efforts, regional and international powers are unlikely to play a major role in Kashmir. Although the coup in Myanmar was broadly condemned by the international community, Russia and China blocked the imposition of UN sanctions against the military government, meaning the country’s political and military conflicts have continued to play out in relative isolation.

The geographies of transnational militant groups are also changing: they are likely to increase their operations in South Asia following the withdrawal of US and NATO forces from Afghanistan, while reducing their presence in Southeast Asia, including in the Philippines, where the number of foreign terrorist fighters is ebbing.

Political

Democratic legitimacy and governance flaws:

Weak governance and widespread corruption continue to plague Afghanistan. The 2014 presidential election required US-led and UN-backed mediation to resolve the contested results. The 2019 election was also contested and required closed-door negotiation to reach a political settlement, which in turn delayed the beginning of intra-Afghan peace negotiations.

Between May 2009 and 31 December 2019, the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction found US$19bn in waste, fraud and abuse.¹⁴ 95% of respondents to the 2020 Asia Foundation survey stated that corruption was a major problem in Afghanistan.¹⁵ Faith in institutions is also lacking, with only 53.9% of Afghans believing that the Afghan National Police improves security in the country, although this represents a notable increase from 36.4% in 2019.¹⁶

Economic and social

Ideological and subnational divisions:

Ideological and ethnic divisions are a major driver of violence and have fuelled conflict in Afghanistan over the past 43 years. The country has at least 14 ethnic groups and is divided along urban–rural and sectarian lines. The ethnic dimension of the conflict stems from the fact that the Afghan government comprises stakeholders from multiple ethnic groups, including Pashtuns, while the Taliban is a Pashtun-dominated insurgency, although it does have members from other groups. While the ethnic component of the conflict should not be exaggerated, ethnic polarisation is indeed a major obstacle to consensus building that inhibits the agreement of a political settlement. Loyalty to ethnicity and patronage networks often rivals national identity and polarisation is further fuelled by the perception that foreign aid is both misallocated and distributed unequally across regions and social classes. Low economic development, which leads to aid dependency, also fuels corruption.

Liberal democracy, civic liberties and women’s rights were difficult to reconcile with the Islamist form of governance pursued by the Taliban in the 1990s and which it is seeking to restore. Opportunities for upward economic mobility are rare in Afghanistan, especially for women, as shown by the country’s rank (169th out of 189) in the UN Development Programme’s Gender Inequality Index.¹⁷

International

Third parties’ involvement:

The continued presence of coalition troops, regional support for the Taliban and other forms of covert and overt intervention in Afghan domestic affairs are key drivers of the conflict. The Taliban’s primary goal remains the withdrawal of all foreign troops followed by the overthrow of the Afghan government. The Taliban is enabled by a diverse group of foreign donors and sponsors which have included China, private Gulf donors, at times Iran, and most importantly Pakistan. The Taliban also relies on safe havens in Pakistan and coordinates its operations through leadership councils in Quetta. Pakistan’s primary interest in supporting the Taliban is to prevent Afghanistan from aligning with India. While Iran and the Taliban were historic enemies, the former’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps has periodically provided financial support and training to the latter to encourage their opposition to and harassment of US troops.

Without external funding, the Taliban’s fighting capacity would be significantly diminished. The ANDSF funding model also relies completely on foreign aid, almost entirely from the US, and its combat capabilities depend largely on direct and indirect US operational support. One analysis concluded that if US troops were to leave Afghanistan, ‘the Taliban would enjoy a slight military advantage that would increase in a compounding manner over time.’¹⁸

The US–Taliban agreement

On 29 February 2020, the Taliban and the US signed the Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan (‘US–Taliban agreement’).¹⁹ This agreement called for the release of up to 5,000 Taliban prisoners by the Afghan government, the eventual removal of US and UN sanctions on the Taliban, and the gradual reduction of US forces towards a full withdrawal by May 2021. In exchange, the Taliban agreed to participate in intra-Afghan negotiations with the Afghan government, work towards a ceasefire and a political settlement, and prevent any group (including al-Qaeda) from using Afghan soil to threaten the security of the US and its allies.

Challenging intra-Afghan negotiations

Intra-Afghan negotiations did not begin in March 2020, as originally outlined by the US–Taliban agreement, due to delays in prisoner releases and a dispute between President Ghani and his political rival Abdullah Abdullah over the 2019 election results. The Trump administration threatened to withhold US$1bn in aid to the Afghan government, which prompted some compromise between the two politicians.²⁰ Intra-Afghan negotiations finally began on 12 September 2020 but were marred by a Taliban offensive on the outer areas of the capital of Helmand province, Lashkar Gah. The two sides did not reach an agreement on rules and procedures for negotiating substantive questions until 2 December 2020. Shortly after this breakthrough, the Afghan government and the Taliban announced a 22-day recess from negotiations. Negotiations briefly resumed in January 2021 and then abruptly ended as Taliban leaders visited foreign countries, including Iran and Russia, to bolster regional support. Talks resumed once again in late February 2021.

Continued Taliban violence

The dynamics of the conflict in Afghanistan changed significantly once the Taliban and the Afghan government initiated intra-Afghan negotiations. Nevertheless, the Taliban continued to maintain high levels of violent activity, seeing it as its primary source of leverage over the US and the Afghan government. The Afghanistan National Security Council reported that the Taliban conducted 2,804 attacks between 1 March and 19 April 2020, which it claimed violated the US–Taliban agreement.²¹ Ghani views a ceasefire as a necessary precondition to peace talks, but this has been rejected by the Taliban. However, the US–Taliban agreement significantly lowered the levels of violence faced by coalition troops. Four US combat deaths occurred in January and early February of 2020 and as of 8 February 2021, the US had gone a full year without suffering a single combat death in Afghanistan.²² This reduction in US fatalities was the combined result of both the US–Taliban agreement and the decline in US operational tempo. Other NATO troops also benefited from the reduction in violence aimed at foreign troops but were already largely disengaged from active combat operations prior to the US–Taliban agreement. ISIS–KP faced considerable pressure from both the Taliban and US and Afghan government forces in 2020, resulting in a significant decrease in its territory. However, the organisation still remained capable of carrying out attacks against US and Afghan forces.

Human rights and humanitarian

While UNAMA reported a 15% decrease in civilian casualties in 2020 compared to 2019 and the total fell below 10,000 for the first time since 2013, the 3,035 Afghans killed and 5,785 injured over the year was still significant. There was an uptick in civilian casualties between October and December 2020 compared to the rest of the year, caused, in part, by the breakdown in intra-Afghan negotiations and by high rates of Taliban-led violence and unclaimed terrorist attacks. Civilian casualties during this threemonth period increased by 45% compared to the same period in 2019.²³ Targeted killings of Afghan journalists, academics and activists increased in 2020, as did the opacity of the conflict since many of these attacks went unclaimed. Conflict-induced displacements decreased in 2020, with 404,139 internally displaced persons (IDPs) recorded by the UN compared to 460,603 in 2019,²⁴ which is consistent with the slight reduction in overall violence inflicted on civilians. In contrast, 2021 is on track to be one of the deadliest years in the history of the war.

Political stability

The Afghan government’s hold remained relatively stable in the areas under its control, including Kabul and the majority of provincial capitals in 2020, despite patterns of violence targeting members of Afghan civil society and government figures. Such incidents included an assassination attempt on First Vice-President Amrullah Saleh in September 2020, and the targeted killing of Yousuf Rashid, who headed the Free and Fair Election Foundation of Afghanistan, in December 2020. As of February 2021, uncertainty over the potential withdrawal of US troops, rising levels of violence and the targeting of officials had fuelled public debate over the longterm viability of the Afghan government, though the immediate stability held firm.

Economic and social

Afghanistan entered the coronavirus pandemic with an already floundering economy. The IMF estimated that Afghanistan’s real GDP shrank by 5% in 2020, but it is predicted to recover by 4% in 2021.²⁵ As a result of the pandemic, tax revenue from the sales of goods declined and cross-border trade was disrupted, especially with Pakistan. Afghanistan remained dependent on foreign assistance and at a Geneva meeting in November 2020, a number of international donor countries pledged a combined US$12bn in aid to the country over a period of four years, but with strict governance conditions attached.²⁶

Relations with neighbouring and international partners and geopolitical implications

Intra-Afghan negotiations and the announcement that the US intends to withdraw all remaining troops from Afghanistan were by far the most impactful developments of the conflict in 2020 and early 2021. As October 2020 marked the 19-year anniversary of the US involvement in Afghanistan, the Trump administration prioritised efforts to withdraw US troops from the country, making its partnership with the Afghan government and the ANDSF increasingly tense. In March 2020, the Trump administration threatened to withhold US$1bn in aid to the Afghan government to break the stalemate between President Ghani and his political rival Abdullah Abdullah that was obstructing the intra-Afghan negotiations aimed at ending the war. Following Joe Biden’s election in November 2020, the Taliban leadership engaged in diplomatic outreach to gain regional support from its allies both for its continued use of violence during negotiations with the Afghan government and for its aim to initiate new military operations against NATO troops should they remain in Afghanistan beyond the May 2021 withdrawal deadline. In December 2020, a Taliban delegation visited Islamabad to meet with Prime Minister Imran Khan and later with Pakistan’s foreign minister, Shah Mahmood Qureshi, who expressed implicit support for the Taliban’s position that successful negotiations must precede a ceasefire. A Taliban delegation also travelled to Iran and Russia in early 2021, and Russian Special Envoy for Afghanistan Zamir Kabulov publicly supported the Taliban’s position that the US should adhere to the May withdrawal deadline.

Political scenarios

The US remains the most consequential foreign actor affecting Afghanistan’s short-term trajectory, given its position as the primary source of ANDSF military support and given the Taliban’s explicit objective for their troop withdrawal. In April 2021, the Biden administration announced its intention to withdraw the remainder of US troops from Afghanistan by no later than 11 September 2021.

This date will keep US and NATO troops in Afghanistan beyond the May 2021 withdrawal deadline included in the US–Taliban agreement. However, so long as the Taliban determines a level of active engagement by the US and NATO in troop withdrawal, the trend of low US combat deaths will likely continue. While violence between the Taliban and foreign troops is likely to remain low, clashes between the Taliban and the ANDSF, as well as incidents of targeted killings and terrorism, are likely to remain high and even increase, particularly during the warm spring and summer months. The Taliban will attempt to consolidate territorial gains. Without the presence of foreign troops also fighting the Taliban, the latter will have little incentive to participate meaningfully in negotiations with the Afghan government since it calculates that it has the military advantage. In the absence of a negotiated political settlement, the Taliban would likely gradually capture provincial capitals and may eventually gain control of Kabul. In this scenario, the US and other international actors would likely attempt to use airstrikes, international aid, sanctions relief and global recognition as leverage to induce the Taliban to return to the negotiating table with the Afghan government. The success of such a strategy would depend on how much value the Taliban assigns to establishing its own international legitimacy and the continued cohesion of the Afghan government.

The Taliban’s targeting of ANDSF, Afghan government officials, journalists, academics, civil society and especially women in public roles is likely to continue. The Taliban is also very likely to conduct assaults on provincial capitals. The success of ANDSF attempts to repel these Taliban attacks and to regain control over urban centres already held or subsequently captured by the Taliban will likely depend on the availability of continued foreign air support and cohesion within ANDSF units. If NATO troops were still present in Afghanistan at this point, calls for increased deployment could arise. However, Washington would likely continue back-channel diplomacy with the Taliban during this period in order to restart negotiations toward a political settlement.

Whether or not foreign troops remain in the country, a negotiated political settlement to end the conflict in Afghanistan seems unlikely. The US–Taliban agreement was not fully implemented because both the Taliban as a party to the agreement, and the Afghan government as a reluctant beneficiary, applied a maximalist interpretation in their own favour. For example, the Taliban interpreted the clause calling for the release of ‘up to five thousand (5,000) prisoners’ to mean no less than 5,000. While not a party to the agreement, the Afghan government also applied a broad interpretation of its obligations to the Taliban, which obstructed the subsequent intra-Afghan negotiations. Notably, the US–Taliban agreement did not explicitly condition the US troop withdrawal on the successful completion of a political settlement between the Taliban and the Afghan government.

Escalation potential and conflict-related risks

A collapse of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in the short term is improbable. However, levels of violence are likely to rise regardless of developments with the peace negotiations. The most likely near-term outcome, leaving aside the US troop withdrawal, is an escalation in clashes between the Taliban and the ANDSF outside major urban centres, combined with targeted killings and terrorism inside Afghanistan’s cities.

Prospects for peace

Prospects for peace in 2021 are limited. The Taliban’s vision of governance and for a new constitution for Afghanistan, based on its version of Islam, is incompatible with the liberal-democratic model of an Islamic republic embraced by the post-Bonn political order.²⁷ Those who have benefited from the established system will not want to alter it or to relinquish power to the Taliban, as already evidenced by Ghani’s resistance to the proposal of an interim government. Some actors within the Afghan government view the inclusion of the Taliban in the country’s political system as an existential threat. Meanwhile, the Taliban is unlikely to accept a power-sharing agreement with the sitting Afghan government especially given its military advantage over the ANDSF.

Strategic implications and global influences

Regional powers, Afghanistan’s immediate neighbours and factions within Afghanistan have all expressed support for a political settlement to end the conflict. However, there is little consensus over how to successfully negotiate such a settlement and what the acceptable terms of a peace deal and the model for a future government might be. The failure of the intra-Afghan negotiations to reach a compromise on substantive issues and the Taliban’s ongoing high levels of violence diminish the chances of reaching a durable negotiated settlement that could be successfully implemented. The lack of a willing and neutral third party to monitor and enforce a potential negotiated settlement also lowers any chance of long-term durability. An increasingly unstable Afghanistan that descends into civil war could attract regional actors to back local proxies, thus plunging the country deeper into conflict.

Political

Ethnic grievances:

Politically mobilised segments of Pakistan’s ethnic minorities accuse the government, the army and the police of targeting them with a campaign of violent repression and marginalisation, with dissidents sometimes facing arbitrary detention, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Some groups also accuse the government of depriving them of their fair share of economic resources.

The PTM emerged in its current form in January 2018 to protest the extrajudicial killing of a Pashtun youth by the Karachi police, and its rallies attracted tens of thousands of attendees in 2019. The PTM calls for investigations into forced disappearances, an end to profiling by security services and greater civil liberties for tribal Pashtuns and migrants – positions which have garnered some support outside the movement. Protests were scaled back in 2020 due to pressure from Pakistani authorities and the coronavirus pandemic.

Economic and social

Economic grievances:

Baloch groups allege that the government violates their civil, political and human rights, but also object to Islamabad’s distribution of economic benefits resulting from the extraction of natural resources in Balochistan. CPEC, part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is often referred to as the latter’s pilot project and includes the construction of power plants, mines, highways, railways and improvements to a warm deepwater port in Gwadar. Baloch groups question whether the Baloch people will profit from CPEC or if benefits will instead accrue to China and its partners in the Pakistani government. Baloch insurgents’ strategy of attacking Chinese targets threatens not only CPEC’s progress but also Pakistan’s most important bilateral relationship.

Religious divisions:

Pakistan’s population is 96.28% Muslim according to the country’s Bureau of Statistics, but it does not delineate by sect.⁴ Estimates suggest that the Sunni population comprises 85–90% and the Shia 10–15%.⁵ Pakistan’s Sunni Muslims are primarily divided among the Barelvi and Deobandi subsects with a growing Ahl-e-Hadith community. Mainstream Islamist parties and movements representing both Deobandis and Barelvis are united in their support for blasphemy laws, which criminalise acts or statements perceived to malign Islam, particularly the Prophet Muhammad. However, the issue of blasphemy – a chief cause advocated by Barelvi militants and hardliners – has become a driver of radicalisation and violence among Pakistan’s Barelvi Sunnis, which is the largest Sunni subsect in the country.

International

Instability along Pakistan’s borders with Afghanistan and Iran:

Insurgent and terrorist groups have utilised Pakistan’s porous borders to regroup and conduct operations. Baloch separatist groups have previously launched attacks against Iran’s security forces from Pakistan. Cross-border attacks have therefore strained relations between the two countries. The TTP was able to retreat into Afghanistan and the majority of TTP fighters are currently based there. Pakistan has benefitted indirectly from US drone strikes that have killed a number of mid-level and senior TTP commanders in Afghanistan. However, a US withdrawal may limit this capability. Islamabad identifies the safe haven for terrorist groups in Afghanistan as one of the primary drivers of terrorist violence against Pakistan and evidence of Kabul’s complicity. However, this is due more to Kabul’s lack of control over parts of the country’s southeastern provinces, than any sponsor-proxy relationship.

Slow progress towards formalising FATA and KP merger

Attempts to formalise the de jure merger of the administrative and security apparatuses of the former FATA into KP, which began in 2018, continued to move at a slow pace. In 2018, the federal government announced a ten-year development plan for the former FATA, but lawmakers reported that less than 10% of the US$540 million allocated for development in FATA was actually spent in 2019–20.⁶

The aggressive military and police response to the PTM also undermined progress towards addressing the political and economic marginalisation of the former FATA. The PTM is unpopular among large segments of Pakistan’s population; Pakistani politicians and the military use the ongoing conflict in the former FATA to discredit such movements and suggest the PTM is sponsored by external actors and an enabler of TTP terrorism.

Blasphemy as rallying cry for Islamist groups

In 2020, Islamist groups continued to use the issues of sect and blasphemy to mobilise members and exert power. Islamist political parties in Karachi organised large protests against Shia Muslims in September 2020. Amnesty International reported an uptick in blasphemy accusations, primarily lodged against members of the Shia, Ahmadi and Christian faiths.⁷ Religious parties continued to actively defend blasphemy laws, particularly the hardline Islamist party Tehreek-e-Labbaik Pakistan (TLP). In November 2020, the TLP organised a mass protest in Islamabad over anti-Muslim cartoons that appeared in the French press. The protest prompted Pakistan’s government to sign an agreement with the TLP to boycott French products and delegate to parliament the decision to expel the French ambassador, following a non-binding resolution by the National Assembly to recall Pakistan’s envoy to France in October.

Foreign pressure to step up counter-terrorism measures

In 2018, the intergovernmental organisation, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), placed Pakistan on its ‘grey list’ of states with structural deficiencies in anti-money laundering (AML) and countering the financing of terrorism and issued a 27-point improvement plan for Pakistan. In the reporting period, the government focused on law-enforcement operations to seize property, regulatory frameworks for AML and legislation but failed to confront certain terrorist groups. Some progress was made throughout 2020; Pakistan had complied with 14 of the 27 points by February 2020, 21 points by October 2020 and 24 points by February 2021.⁸

Violence in Balochistan and the former FATA

Insurgent activity and violence increased significantly in Balochistan province and particularly along its western border with Afghanistan compared to the general downward trend observed since 2015.⁹ With the insurgents aiming to deter or disrupt Chinese investment through attacks, Pakistan remains the most dangerous posting for overseas Chinese workers, straining economic cooperation. Frequent attacks on military outposts in Balochistan occurred throughout spring and summer 2020, leading to dozens of security-personnel casualties.

The TTP grew in strength in the former FATA – reabsorbing formerly splintered militant groups – and conducted attacks on military and civilian targets.¹⁰

Human rights and humanitarian

There were 319 terrorism-related deaths in Pakistan in 2020, an increase of 11% compared to 2019.¹¹ Citizens in Balochistan and KP (including the former FATA) continued to suffer from insurgent violence, terrorist attacks, military checkpoints, forced disappearances, arbitrary detentions, arrests on dubious charges and restriction of movement. These regions have continued to suffer from chronic underinvestment and high rates of poverty since Pakistan’s formation. General security in Pakistan’s major cities has increased over the last decade but dangers remain for members of certain minority groups. In particular, the Hazara, a minority ethnic group that is predominantly Shia, face high levels of violence in Balochistan at the hands of groups such as ISKP.

Political stability

Pakistan’s civilian government and military establishment remained relatively stable despite large protest movements and continued conflict in Balochistan and the former FATA. The military ranks remained cohesive with very low risk of fragmentation and minimal insider attacks or defections to insurgent and terrorist movements.

Economic and social

Pakistan’s economic woes remain primarily structural rather than conflict driven. The country suffered from high inflation, a decline in real incomes, low exports relative to other regional countries and a depreciating currency. This economic malaise was partly due to low investment as a result of the security situation – as terrorism and insecurity continued to deter foreign investment – but a bigger factor has been the economic mismanagement of successive governments. The coronavirus pandemic negatively impacted Pakistan’s economy but less so than other regional countries. The IMF estimated that India’s real GDP shrank by 7.7% in 2020, whereas Pakistan’s shrank by 0.4%.¹² Pakistan’s avoidance of a severe economic downturn can be explained partially by the US$23.13bn in remittances received from overseas Pakistanis during 2019–20. The country’s continued presence on the FATF grey list has not directly affected the economy apart from deterring foreign investment. However, a future blacklisting could prevent Pakistan from receiving assistance from the World Bank, IMF and Asian Development Bank.

Relations with neighbouring and international partners and geopolitical implications

Pakistan’s relations with the West improved slightly in 2020 following Islamabad’s role in pressuring the Taliban to attend intra-Afghan negotiations with the aim of resolving the conflict in Afghanistan, which is deeply intertwined with insecurity in the former FATA. Relations with India remained tense partly due to an uptick in violence perpetrated by Baloch separatist groups, which Pakistan views as receiving support from the Indian government. China-Pakistan relations remained strong in 2020 despite the growing threat posed by the insurgency in Balochistan to Chinese investment. China also supported Pakistan by voting against its inclusion on the FATF blacklist along with Malaysia and Turkey.

Political scenarios

Religious parties and protest movements such as the TLP are poised to continue to influence Pakistan’s laws and aspects of foreign policy. Religious parties perform poorly at the polls but have a successful track record of extracting concessions from the government through large-scale street protests. This dynamic continued in 2020 with the TLP-led protest against the French government. Ethnic protest movements like the PTM are unlikely to gain widespread traction among Pakistan’s population, influence a change in policies or threaten government institutions. However, the marginalisation of Pashtuns in the former FATA and migrants in urban centres increases the risk of future social unrest.

Escalation potential and conflict-related risks

Since 2014, the PAF’s selective strategy against insurgent groups, targeting those that directly threaten the Pakistani state, such as the TTP, but largely ignoring Pakistan-based groups that primarily target Afghanistan and India, has led to a significant reduction in violence in much of the country, particularly in urban centres. These overall gains are likely to continue in the short term, albeit with localised upticks in violence in Waziristan (part of the former FATA) and Balochistan, particularly in regions with high Chinese investment, such as Makran.

Terrorist violence in Pakistan is unlikely to return to the peak it reached in 2013. However, the underlying political and economic drivers of violence in Balochistan and the former FATA persist: both regions face chronic underinvestment, heavyhanded security responses and insecure borders, making continued violence at current levels, or a slight increase, likely. Except for Quetta, Pakistan’s provincial capitals were relatively secure in 2020 and will likely remain so. Both the TTP and ISKP may try to engage in urban terrorism if the opportunity presents itself but neither group is particularly strong outside of KP.

Strategic implications and global influences

Insurgent violence in Pakistan’s tribal areas will affect its political calculation vis-à-vis Afghanistan and the Afghan Taliban. Islamabad may prefer an unstable Afghanistan to one that adopts a foreign policy inclined towards India, but it likely calculated the Taliban are the ascendant political force anyway. Its continued support for the Afghan Taliban despite rising violence from similar militant groups inside Pakistan may stem from the inflated perception that groups like the TTP are local agents of foreign actors rather than a home-grown phenomenon.

The uptick in insurgent violence in Balochistan is unlikely to significantly alter bilateral ties between China and Pakistan, which are security based. However, if Pakistan loses control of the violence in Balochistan, Chinese investment in the region may decline significantly. The ability of Islamist political parties to influence Pakistan’s foreign policy through large protests will strain bilateral relations, but groups like the TLP are still likely to stop short of engaging in anti-state violence or attacking foreigners.

Political

Indian and Kashmiri self-determination:

The origins of the Kashmir conflict lie in the controversial 1947 accession, supported by the JKNC but vehemently opposed by many Kashmiris who favoured accession with Muslim-majority Pakistan. New Delhi sought to win over Kashmiris by agreeing to substantial autonomy (with a separate constitution and flag) under Article 370 of the Indian constitution, which exempted the state from the full applicability of Indian laws. Unrest soon followed when New Delhi arrested the popular J&K prime minister Sheikh Muhammad Abdullah in 1953 on charges of conspiring to declare independence. JKNC’s cadres formed the Plebiscite Front, mobilising Kashmiris around the demand for selfdetermination until New Delhi co-opted Abdullah under the 1975 accord. This was strongly opposed by pro-plebiscite groups, who went on to launch an armed struggle in the late 1980s.

India has consistently refused to recognise Kashmiri demands for self-determination outside the framework of the Indian constitution, creating a fundamental discord. Kashmiris perceive that their political identity and group security are threatened by India’s centralising policies, which have systematically eroded J&K’s autonomy. Forcible integration of the disputed region with India has prompted the Muslim-majority population in J&K to intensify its political resistance against New Delhi’s policies.

BJP ethno-nationalism:

The removal of Article 370 has long been an ideological concern of the BJP, which believes in the political creed of Hindutva (Hindu ethno-nationalism) and seeks to establish Akhand Bharat (a supposed undivided India that includes much of South Asia) by incorporating areas bordering India, including Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Pakistan). With firmer control over the state now, the Modi government has initiated a slew of policies that are viewed with increased suspicion by J&K’s political parties and local population. The March and October 2020 amendments to domicile and land laws in J&K paved the way for ‘non-permanent’ residents to acquire domiciles in the region and apply for public-sector jobs previously reserved for local residents of J&K under Article 370 and 35A of the Indian constitution. The Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Adaptation of Central Laws) Third Order, 2020, promulgated on 26 October, gave New Delhi sweeping powers to acquire land and evict the population in order to establish industrial centres and designate strategic areas for ‘direct operational and training requirements’ of the army. J&K’s Muslim population view these policies as a strategy to alter the region’s demography and in the long term dispossess them of their land and resources. Regional parties have declared their opposition to these policies while armed groups have vowed to target Indian settlers.

International

Regional geopolitics:

Pakistan asserts its claim on Kashmir based on the ‘two-nation’ doctrine, which had been the basis for the partition of British India into two (religiously defined) separate states (India and Pakistan). Over the years, Pakistan has deployed different military and diplomatic tactics to weaken India’s control over J&K, including funding the Kashmiri insurgent groups that intensified the armed conflict and increased acrimony between the two countries. Kashmir’s abundant water resources, which feed vast agricultural lands in Pakistan and generate more than 2,000 MW of electricity for India’s government-owned National Hydroelectric Power Corporation, makes it an important strategic concern for both New Delhi and Islamabad.⁸ Pakistan’s formal military alliance with China provides balance against India.

Release of J&K political leaders

The Modi government released three former J&K chief ministers between March and October 2020 amid reports that detained former legislators and politicians were being forced to sign a bond declaring that they would ‘not make any comment(s) or issue statement(s) or make public speech(s)’ or ‘hold or participate in public assembly(s) related to recent events in the state of Jammu and Kashmir’.⁹ After JKNC patron Farooq Abdullah announced an alliance with other regional parties on 15 October and declared that they would ‘struggle for restoration of what was snatched from Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh’, he was immediately summoned by the Enforcement Directorate (a federal financial-investigation agency) in relation to a case registered against him in 2018 involving alleged financial irregularities in the Jammu & Kashmir Cricket Association. New Delhi used the same pressure tactic with some other influential J&K political leaders.

Modi's experimentation in J&K

The absence of an elected executive in J&K allowed the Modi regime to experiment and implement its policies there through a bureaucratic structure controlled by New Delhi. The BJP seeks to use the delimitation commission – responsible for periodically redrawing Indian electoral constituencies – to add seven or more seats to the J&K Legislative Assembly by 2022 and increase the seat share of Jammu province to at least 44, thereby increasing the likelihood that the party will be able to form the region’s next government.

Reconfiguration of the local political landscape and District Development Council elections

Many independent councillors joined the Jammu and Kashmir Apni Party (JKAP), a new political party created by former PDP politician and J&K minister Altaf Bukhari on 8 March 2020, which included legislators that defected from the PDP, JKNC and the Indian National Congress (INC). In public statements the JKAP aligned itself with the BJP’s stance that the abrogation of Article 370 is a fait accompli and that political parties should instead strive for the restoration of J&K’s statehood without autonomy.

The first District Development Council (DDC) elections were held in J&K in November and December 2020. Nearly 68% of registered voters in the Jammu region and 35% of voters in the Kashmir region cast their ballot.¹⁰ Introduced by New Delhi, the DDC undermines the influence of the two major regional parties, the JKNC and PDP. By creating 280 DDC constituencies (each district comprising 14 constituencies), political power is dispersed among different political parties and councillors.¹¹

For example, the People’s Alliance for Gupkar Declaration (PAGD) – an alliance of six parties formed in October 2020 that calls for Article 370’s restoration – won 110 DDC seats. However, crossvoting (which the PAGD blamed on horse-trading and arm-twisting of the elected DDC members by the BJP-controlled administration) meant the alliance secured the chairmanship of only five DDCs.¹² The exit of the Jammu and Kashmir People’s Conference (JKPC) from the PAGD in January 2021 further weakened the alliance’s position in northern Kashmir, a JKPC stronghold.

Violence along the Line of Control (LoC)

Indian and Pakistani forces continuously exchanged artillery fire along the LoC in 2020 and early 2021, leading to a substantial increase in violations of the 2003 ceasefire agreement and many civilian casualties. Amid heightened clashes, the Indian and Pakistani governments summoned the chargés d’affaires of each other’s High Commissions in November and December 2020 respectively to register protest over the ceasefire violations.

China-India clashes in Ladakh region

On 15–16 June 2020, China-India border skirmishes that first erupted 5 May in Ladakh escalated when their militaries clashed in Galwan Valley, with casualties on both sides. The crisis forced India to relocate some military units from the western front at the LoC to the northern front at the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a poorly demarcated 3,488-km line that divides Chinese- and Indian-held territories in J&K.

The border stand-off generated much interest among J&K residents, including former chief minister Farooq Abdullah, in the widespread expectation that a potential China-India war would herald a breakthrough on the Kashmir issue or pressure India to restore Article 370. Many analysts attributed China’s military posturing at Ladakh to India’s August 2019 reorganisation of J&K which had carved out Ladakh as a separate ‘Union Territory’ directly administered by New Delhi. On 11 February 2021 China and India announced disengagement plans to de-escalate tensions along the LAC.

India-Pakistan de-escalation measures

In a major development, India’s and Pakistan’s directors general of military operations (DGMO) made a surprising joint statement on 25 February 2021 announcing that they had agreed ‘for strict observance of all agreements, understandings and cease firing’ along the LoC and ‘all other sectors’.¹³

Human rights and humanitarian

The Modi government’s hardline Kashmir policy during its second term had a significant impact on human rights in the region. The authorities launched a sustained crackdown against the separatist movement and criminalised the propagation of the separatist narrative. Measures included the Media Policy-2020 and 18-month-long internet restrictions (the government viewed social media as a security challenge because it was being used by separatist groups for political mobilisation). Freedom House dropped its designation of Kashmir from ‘Partly Free’ in 2019 to ‘Not Free’ in 2020 and 2021, citing deteriorating civil liberties and the dissolution of locally elected institutions.¹⁴

Throughout 2020, New Delhi frequently deployed the PSA’s stringent anti-terror law and the Unlawful Activities Prevention Act (UAPA) against Kashmiri dissidents and suspected separatist activists. Restrictions on Kashmiri civil society remained in place, while human-rights defenders and journalists were targeted by the NIA. In October 2020, the NIA raided the offices of the Association of Parents of Disappeared Persons (APDP), English daily newspaper Greater Kashmir, Srinagar-based non-governmental organisation Athrout and the Jammu Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society (JKCCS). These raids and the NIA’s confiscation of hard drives prevented the JKCCS from publishing its comprehensive yearly report on human rights in Kashmir.

Continuing with its hardline counter-insurgency strategy, in 2020 the Indian Army destroyed dozens of civilian homes where militants had taken cover during gunfights or were suspected to be hiding. As a result, several families were made homeless and pushed into poverty, particularly in south Kashmir. While several political prisoners were released in 2020, many remained in detention, though India’s official statements on the exact number of persons detained and released since the August 2019 clampdown showed discrepancies.¹⁵

Economic and social

The Modi regime encouraged Indian corporations and industrialists to establish their businesses in Kashmir with a view to using an economic approach to resolving the political issue of Kashmir.¹⁶ However, Indian industrialists’ entry has affected small local enterprises. In February 2020, most of the successful bids for extraction of mineral blocks in Kashmir went to non-local bidders. Concurrently, the J&K administration continued to ban stone quarrying in 2020, affecting the livelihoods of thousands of families associated with the industry across Kashmir.

Political scenarios

The BJP government’s hardline policies in J&K have constrained separatist organisations’ ability to mobilise support. The crackdowns on dissenting voices and entities, arbitrary arrests, prohibition on public assembly and the censorship of local media through the Media Policy-2020 precluded any effective mobilisation against New Delhi’s controversial policies in the reporting period. The expansion of surveillance architecture and an increased security presence on streets and roads also helped New Delhi to control the restive population. The three separatist leaders – Syed Ali Shah Geelani, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq and Mohammad Yasin Malik – remained in custody or under house arrest. New Delhi also exerts increased pressure on local newspapers to ensure they do not carry press statements of separatist organisations, which has further undermined the latter’s political reach. The BJP government will continue with its hardline policy to prevent a conflict relapse into the political unrest that marked the decade prior to 2019. Strikes organised by the local population in February 2020 indicate that political resistance is still alive in Kashmir, although mass anti-India street protests (seen in 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2016) are also less likely to occur given India’s repressive measures and crowd-control tactics. This context may create the conditions for increased militant violence.

Escalation potential and conflict-related risks

Beyond the aforementioned risk that India’s repressive measures to curtail street protests could create the conditions for increased militant activity, since the abrogation of Article 370, armed groups have diversified and adopted new tactics to gain greater international legitimacy, including increased sophistication of their online content. Insurgent groups are likely to continue targeting non-locals to instil fear among possible Indian settlers.

Prospects for peace

The February 2021 India-Pakistan ceasefire agreement heightened prospects for the resumption of bilateral dialogue, which has been suspended since 2013. However, the BJP government has tried to delink the Kashmir issue from its discussions with Pakistan about other issues; it would be unwilling to explicitly include it in the agenda of talks at the ministerial level.

There are incentives for both countries to sustain the ceasefire. Although diplomatic efforts to resolve the Kashmir dispute have suffered regular setbacks, military confrontation has not changed the status quo either. Resumed bilateral dialogue could help sustain the February ceasefire, which, at the least, will provide respite from the violence for the residents living along the LoC.

If the ceasefire has a positive impact on the political situation within the Kashmir Valley, then New Delhi could consolidate its changes implemented in Kashmir following the abrogation of Article 370. With the border situation stabilised, India could redeploy some of its troops in the hinterlands of the Kashmir Valley and intensify counter-insurgency operations.

Pakistan’s options to confront India are limited due to its sluggish economy and overreliance on foreign aid and loans. Improved relations with India could help Pakistan’s economy. Pakistan has reportedly shown its willingness to resume dialogue with India provided J&K’s statehood is restored and Kashmiri voices are included (likely via the APHC). An India–Pakistan dialogue on J&K could pave the way for a wider engagement on other bilateral issues. The BJP government has already publicly pledged to reinstate J&K’s statehood at an ‘appropriate time’.¹⁷

Strategic implications and global influences

Although US President Joe Biden has pledged to put human rights and democracy at the core of his foreign policy, at present there is no real external pressure on India with respect to Kashmir. Instead, Biden has underlined India’s importance to the US foreign-policy goal of strengthening security in the Indo-Pacific, to counter the increasing challenge posed by China in the region. India’s position as a strategic partner in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (featuring Australia and Japan in addition to the US) will temper Biden’s response to Modi’s domestic policy.

Beijing is likely to continue applying pressure along the LAC to discourage New Delhi from actively participating in Washington’s policy of containment against China and targeting Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Pakistan), through which the CPEC (part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative) passes.¹⁸ Meanwhile, the US exit from Afghanistan and a likely return of the Taliban to power will give Islamabad greater influence. This context will encourage anti-India armed groups in Kashmir and affect India’s access to mineral-rich Central Asia. New Delhi may therefore find that it is preferable to normalise its relationship with Pakistan to agree a deal on Afghanistan (concerning access to its mineral resources and security issues). In return, Pakistan would likely push for Kashmir-centric initiatives and confidence-building measures.

Political

Marginalisation of ethnic groups:

Myanmar’s internal armed conflicts have been driven largely by a struggle for greater autonomy among the numerous ethnic groups that inhabit the country. Common grievances have been influenced by a history of neglect and abuse by successive Bamar-dominated governments that have extracted wealth from ethnic areas since independence in 1948.

In principle, most of Myanmar’s EAOs agree that the formation of a federal union would provide a political solution to enduring conflict. However, climate change and natural disasters continue to drive migration from the central dry lands and Irrawaddy delta inhabited by the socio-politically dominant Bamar majority. Internal Bamar migration to the fertile highlands inhabited by Myanmar’s ethnic populations complicates a potential political solution based on ethnic federalism.

Economic and social

Illicit economies:

Revenue generated from the production and trafficking of illicit narcotics has played a central role in Myanmar’s conflict by funding the continuation and expansion of armed activity. Armed groups have profited from every aspect of such illicit trade, including the import of precursors, renting of land to producers and taxation of shipments. State security forces conducted a crackdown on manufacturers in northern Shan State in the first half of 2020, likely to deny income to armed groups.

State-backed development projects:

Development linked to the China–Myanmar Economic Corridor, which includes plans for a highspeed rail link with Mandalay, is expected to exacerbate conflicts as groups vie to consolidate control of territories slated for development, with a future eye towards rent seeking. For example, some observers see the RCSS’s expansion into northern Shan State – which has driven conflict with the TNLA and SSPP – as economically motivated. In addition to related environmental and social concerns, armed groups have also alleged that the Tatmadaw have used hydropower projects to justify further militarisation.

Security

Ceasefire and state expansionism:

In 2019 the Tatmadaw demanded that the TNLA limit its movement within the Palaung SAZ and that the AA vacate Rakhine, demands that were fundamentally at odds with the TNLA’s wider fight for ethnic interests and the AA’s aim to seek a permanent presence in Rakhine. Such efforts to demarcate territory by force ahead of ceasefire discussions propelled fighting in 2019 and 2020.

The Tatmadaw has also used ceasefires to extend its control into ethnic areas, which has driven conflict in Hpapun township, Kayin State, where its ongoing road building has spurred sporadic fighting with the KNLA since March 2018 and which worsened in 2020. The KNLA, Karen civil-society organisations and the local population oppose the project, interpreting construction as an effort to ‘Burmanise’ the area.

Peace negotiations

After 15 months of stalled talks, the government, the Tatmadaw and ten EAO NCA signatories resumed formal peace negotiations at the Joint Implementation Coordination Meeting (JICM) on 8 January 2020. All parties agreed to hold the 4th Union Peace Conference (UPC), the premier peace summit meant for key agreements on a federal solution, but the coronavirus pandemic soon halted this limited momentum. As the already cumbersome pre-negotiations moved online, the government’s attention was diverted by the Rohingya genocide case brought against it by the Gambia at the International Court of Justice. Though the 4th UPC eventually convened in August 2020, the agreement reached was mostly symbolic, with key points recycled from the NCA and a document drafted at a previous UPC.

The Rakhine conflict

Fighting in Rakhine and Chin states intensified in the first half of 2020 as the Tatmadaw moved to retake control of the strategic Paletwa township. By mid-2020, the Tatmadaw had largely dislodged the AA from its fixed positions throughout the eastern half of the theatre. With a full river and land blockade in place, the Tatmadaw spent the monsoon months of May to September conducting village raids against AA supporters and operatives. By November 2020 the Tatmadaw appeared poised for a new offensive, but the fighting abruptly stopped as both parties entered into negotiations to hold elections in formerly disenfranchised constituencies.

Instability in northern Shan State

In northern Shan State, a limited Tatmadaw offensive to target TNLA weapons caches and outposts ended in February 2020. After declaring a unilateral ceasefire on 9 May 2020, Tatmadaw pressure on the TNLA eased, creating a vacuum that helped re-ignite a dormant conflict between the RCSS and a coalition formed by the TNLA and SSPP that continued into 2021.

Worsening of Hpapun conflict

Towards the end of 2020, ongoing conflict over the Tatmadaw road project between the Tatmadaw and the KNLA’s Brigade 5 continued to worsen in the remote township of Hpapun, exacerbated further by the coronavirus pandemic. Although the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JMC) had stalled in 2019, civilian delegates had managed to mediate the conflict through informal channels, but this became impossible due to pandemic-related restrictions. A major confrontation was already brewing before the coup of 1 February 2021.

General elections and coup d'état

General elections on 8 November 2020 were won by a landslide by the incumbent NLD, prompting the military to claim as many as 8.6 million voter irregularities, a figure widely dismissed by observers.⁴ An acute political crisis emerged in the final days of January 2021 as last-ditch efforts to mediate an agreement between the NLD and Tatmadaw failed. On 1 February 2021 the military staged a coup d’état.

Post-coup resistance and repression

The Tatmadaw’s initial response to nationwide resistance to its 1 February 2021 coup featured mass arrests, internet shutdowns and the use of less-lethal crowd-control measures. However, as protests and civil disobedience persisted, it deployed elite military units into major urban areas and began a campaign of mass killing, beatings, torture and terror. As of 30 April 2021, the regime had killed at least 759 civilians in its crackdown.⁵

Human rights and humanitarian

Human-rights abuses remained widespread in 2020. In Rakhine, arbitrary detention, targeted killings, arson and torture were widely reported. The Tatmadaw’s use of heavy firepower also drove high displacement. By March 2021, more than 99,300 people remained displaced by the Rakhine conflict.⁶

In Shan State, armed groups targeted civilians with forced recruitment, extortion and kidnapping, and renewed inter-EAO fighting near populated areas drove high displacement. Up to 3,900 people fled clashes between the TNLA and RCSS in the period between 27 December 2020 and 15 January 2021 alone.⁷ In southeastern Myanmar, intensified fighting between the KNLA and the Tatmadaw displaced up to 4,000 people in December 2020.⁸ Human-rights groups in Kayin State documented numerous incidents of Tatmadaw violence against civilians, including the indiscriminate shelling of villages, as the Tatmadaw continued to use collective punishment as a form of ‘counter-insurgency’.

As of January 2021, up to 855,000 Rohingya refugees remained in temporary camps in Bangladesh, with virtually no progress made towards their voluntary and dignified return in 2020.⁹

Political stability

The elite power struggle between the Tatmadaw and NLD-led government was the most destabilising factor in Myanmar’s political landscape. In response to the NLD’s landslide victory in the November 2020 elections, the Tatmadaw manufactured a political crisis with unsubstantiated allegations of irregularities and demanded the government dissolve the Union Election Committee. A crisis was clearly emerging by early 2021, yet heavily deteriorated civil–military relations precluded efforts towards a mediated compromise. The NLD’s unwillingness to concede to the Tatmadaw’s demands was used as the pretext for the 1 February 2021 coup.

Armed conflict also strained socio-political relations. For example, the conflict between the RCSS and SSPP, two Shan EAOs, and which involved the TNLA, disrupted the Committee for Shan State Unity, a coalition of Shan political parties, civilsociety organisations and EAOs. It also exacerbated tensions between Ta’ang and Shan constituents, with alleged RCSS intimidation against the ethnic Ta’ang National Party (TNP) leading to the cancellation of elections for nearly 60,000 people.¹⁰

Economic and social

The coronavirus pandemic and related lockdown measures led to the closure of businesses, the disruption of trade and labour supply and a reduction in remittances. According to the IMF, real GDP growth dropped from 6.8% in 2019 to just 3.2% in 2020. Already reeling from the pandemic slowdown, the February 2021 coup prompted the emergence of the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), a popular revolt that brought the country’s key economic sectors to a three-month standstill. An updated IMF forecast showed an 8.9% contraction of Myanmar’s GDP in 2021.¹¹

Relations with neighbouring and international partners and geopolitical implications

In 2020, regional interests in Myanmar were complicated most by the continued instability in Rakhine, which delayed progress on India’s Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project that aims to link Kolkata with Sittwe and by threatening Chinese interests on Ramree Island, which houses the pipeline terminus connecting the Shwe gas field in the Bay of Bengal to Yunnan province. The conflict also prevented any progress towards facilitating the safe and voluntary return of the Rohingya, thereby continuing to strain Myanmar’s relations with Bangladesh, with a diplomatic row ensuing at the UN General Assembly in September 2020.

Political scenarios

The February 2021 coup thrust Myanmar into its worst political crisis since 1988. Though the military regime initially articulated a plan to hold new elections in 2022, it later threatened to to delay the elections and thereby extend its control. Any future elections organised by the regime will lack credibility, especially given the detention of many of the country’s leading political figures, including Aung San Suu Kyi.

In opposition to the new regime, in April 2021 ousted members of the civilian government formed the National Unity Government (NUG), a parallel body claiming legitimate control over Myanmar, and announced plans to raise a ‘people’s defence force’. At present, the NUG commands strong public support, but it lacks a tangible way to exercise its mandate and will likely struggle to raise an effective fighting force.

Irrespective of the NUG’s performance, the Tatmadaw will likely face prolonged opposition from the general public, not least from the CDM. The siege mentality adopted by the Tatmadaw to quell postcoup protests only hardened public attitudes against it. Neither side is likely to back down easily, making continued volatility in Myanmar highly probable.

Escalation potential and conflict-related risks

Myanmar’s long-running internal armed conflicts are at stark risk of further escalation and intensification. At worst, the volatility seen in 2020 and early 2021 could develop into a multi-front war in the borderlands alongside armed resistance in urban areas. Any scenario will likely involve continued attacks on the civilian population in both urban and ethnic areas.

Two ongoing armed conflicts accelerated immediately after the coup. A fresh KIA offensive in February 2021 marked the return of open conflict to Kachin State for the first time in 36 months. Having vowed to protect civilians in its area, the KNLA overran a Tatmadaw border post on 27 March 2020 and the Tatmadaw responded with regular airstrikes, displacing as many as 40,000 civilians by 23 April 2021.¹²

On 30 March 2021, the Brotherhood Alliance, which includes the AA, TNLA and MNDAA, threatened to ‘join hands’ with the nationwide resistance movement that emerged following the coup if the regime continued its attacks on civilians. Though military action by the alliance could strain the Tatmadaw by creating a de facto unified front among the most important EAOs, the AA has expressed reluctance to resume fighting after more than two years of punishing warfare.

Armed resistance among the Bamar majority was also growing, with reports that thousands had left Myanmar’s cities to seek military training from EAOs, while community-organised ‘self-defence’ brigades have already mobilised in urban areas.¹³ Extreme violence against civilians – of the type used to quell protests in the industrial city of Bago on 9 April, which killed 82 civilians – will likely prompt resistance in the form of bomb attacks and armed clashes in major cities like Mandalay and Yangon.¹⁴

Prospects for peace

Myanmar’s peace process under the NCA was predicated on the pursuit of a democratic federal union, which has been shattered by the Tatmadaw’s blatant diversion from that path. The coup also forced a seismic realignment of Myanmar society. Driven by intense hatred for the regime, the Bamar majority began to champion the cause of the EAOs, which may embolden some groups to intensify their military opposition. Although other armed groups may seek stability in their areas by maintaining old ceasefires or informal truces, any formal agreement with the current regime will be considered unsavoury politically, reducing its likelihood.

Strategic implications and global influences

The international community’s response to the attempted coup largely consisted of inaction and deference, except for Russia, which expressed an explicit desire to deepen ties with the Tatmadaw in a March 2021 visit. China appeared to have adopted a laissez-faire approach to the unrest, maintaining its traditional line of ‘non-interference’, though it would likely block any response by the UN Security Council. Though some members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) condemned the coup and crackdown, the bloc appeared reluctant to take substantive diplomatic action to confront the crisis. For the most part, Myanmar’s political and military conflicts will likely continue to play out in isolation.