Interplay of state and non-state actors

Despite new factors that add further layers of complexity to the two conflicts – elements of hybrid and proxy warfare,⁴ the strategic advantage provided by armed drones and other emerging technologies,⁵ and the utility of plausible deniability⁶ – at their core they remain inter-state confrontations for territorial control. In both cases, states are the primary actors. However, this does not mean that non-state actors have not played a role. This is particularly apparent in Ukraine, where both the Ukrainian and pro-Russian fronts have progressively blended state military capabilities, non-state militias and paramilitary forces.⁷ Recent trends demonstrated how Russia’s diminishing appetite for all-out annexation of the Donetsk and Luhansk ‘people’s republics’ has fragmented separatist entities into ‘a proxy leadership dependent on Moscow’; irredentist militias still fighting to obtain independence or annexation; and the local population, which feels increasingly marginalised by both Ukraine and Russia.⁸ Against this backdrop, Russia’s military movements in early 2021 may be interpreted as an attempt to restore hopes of independence, or as sabre-rattling aimed at disrupting the ongoing peace talks.⁹

The 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh conflict displayed slightly different characteristics: with the Armenian and Azerbaijani armed forces as the two main belligerents, non-state and quasi-state actors only had a secondary role. The Armenian military is supported by the Artsakh Defence Army (also known as the Nagorno-Karabakh Defence Army, NKDA), the 18,000–20,000-strong, conscript-based military organisation of the (internationally unrecognised) Republic of Artsakh/Nagorno-Karabakh Republic, which suffered significant losses from the Azerbaijani offensive in 2020.

New technologies and actors, old objectives

Azerbaijan reaped the benefits of the massive strategic advantage brought by Turkey’s military support, mainly in the form of armed drones, whose advanced technology could not be matched by Armenian air-defence capabilities.¹⁰ In addition, reports have emerged that suggest Turkey brought in Syrian mercenaries to carry out combat and support tasks in Nagorno-Karabakh.¹¹

The conflict hotspots in Europe and Eurasia display some important commonalities: while advanced technology and non-state actors are part of the politico-military equation, at their core these conflicts remain inter-state business, where territorial control is the ultimate goal and the possibility of conventional military escalation is ever present.

Political and institutional

Geopolitical

Traditional alliances and geopolitical drivers continued to play an important role in the conflicts. In September 2020, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky approved the country’s new National Security Strategy, centred around reinforcing Ukraine’s partnership with NATO, with membership as the ultimate goal – a major source of concern for Moscow.¹⁹ The growing tensions between Azerbaijan and Armenia (that eventually led to the 2020 war) pushed Baku and Ankara closer together, with the latter playing a central role in providing military support to Azeri operations in Nagorno-Karabakh, against the backdrop of a military partnership that goes back decades.²⁰

Prospects for peace

As the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh and Ukraine can be described as frozen,²¹ the distinction between a lack of armed clashes and peace needs to be at the forefront of any meaningful consideration of the prospects for their resolution. Ceasefires are a temporary expedience, and, as the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war demonstrated, years of relative quiet can be followed by a sudden military escalation. Russian armed forces’ deployment as peacekeepers in Nagorno-Karabakh since the November 2020 ceasefire and the agreement signed with Turkey for the creation of a joint observation centre are likely to prevent possible flare-ups in hostilities;²² in addition, from Aliyev’s perspective, the ceasefire is enough to seal Azerbaijan’s successful campaign in Nagorno-Karabakh and avoid opening further negotiations.²³ However, the dispute is far from resolved. In eastern Ukraine, aware that any major military offensive may prove counterproductive, both sides rely on the Minsk agreements’ terms that attempt to facilitate a political solution. However, as long as the Luhansk and Donetsk people’s republics exist as semiautonomous political entities, any progress is highly unlikely, as political authority will remain contested between Kyiv and secessionist entities.²⁴

International organisations – the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) above all – are well positioned to contribute to resolution efforts in both conflicts: The OSCE’s Special Monitoring Mission (SMM) to Ukraine has access to the Luhansk and Donetsk people’s republics, although its tasks mainly include monitoring and reporting ceasefire violations. However, its status and effectiveness are undermined by Russia’s involvement (with Russian OSCE observers monitoring Russian military units), which creates frictions and potential conflicts of interest.²⁵

In Nagorno-Karabakh, the OSCE is present through the Minsk Group, which is co-chaired by France, Russia and the United States. It aims to facilitate conflict resolution between Armenia and Azerbaijan. A pivotal entity since its creation in 1992, the Minsk Group now faces strong criticism not only from Armenian leaders, but also from Aliyev and Erdogan, who claim Azerbaijan and Turkey are being sidelined in the ongoing negotiations.²⁶ Promoting Turkey to the status of co-chair, the two leaders claim, would rebalance the group and give new impetus to the negotiations.²⁷ With Yerevan pulling in the opposite direction, it seems unlikely the Minsk Group will survive in its current form.

Escalation potential and spillover risks

The risk of escalation remains moderate in both conflicts. Reports of Russia delivering 650,000 Russian passports to eastern Ukrainians since 2019 have raised concerns in Kyiv and European capitals about a possible escalation of Russian military involvement in the region under the guise of a peacekeeping mission to protect Russian citizens that would de facto consign the Donbas to Russia.²⁸ There is also concern in Baltic countries and within NATO more broadly that Russian influence activities targeting Russian-speaking minorities in other regional states could create new crises.²⁹

Geopolitical changes

The presidency of Joe Biden in the US has the potential to make waves in both conflicts. Zelensky optimistically saluted his election as the catalyst that would ‘help settle the war in Donbas, and end the occupation’,³⁰ while Biden’s April 2021 decision to honour the 2019 US Congress resolution recognising the Armenian genocide – and formally declaring it as such – alienated Turkey.³¹ Aliyev declared Biden’s remarks ‘unacceptable’, continuing that the United States’ stance would ‘seriously damage cooperation in the region’.³² Both crises are also affected by the dramatic shift in US-Russia relations triggered by Donald Trump’s departure from the White House, as Biden is unlikely to allow Putin the same geopolitical leeway granted by his predecessor.³³

Notes

Political

Economic and social

Security

International

Change of negotiators

In January 2020, during Putin’s cabinet reshuffle, Vladislav Surkov was replaced as Russia’s chief political-military adviser and representative on the Ukraine conflict by Dmitry Kozak, who in 2003 had tried to broker a deal between Moldova and Transnistria. The Ukrainian government also changed its key appointments to the talks, with former president Leonid Kuchma replaced in the TCG by another former president, Leonid Kravchuk. Oleksii Reznikov also became Ukraine’s Minister for the Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories.

Continued fighting

The first half of 2020 saw intermittent fighting around several hotspots, notably three areas in the Donetsk region (around Donetsk airport; east of Mariupol; around Svitlodarsk) and one area in the Luhansk region (between Popasna, Zolote and Pervomaisk). Some signs suggested a slowing down in fighting, yet military activity persisted along the Line of Contact, including the continued deployment of heavier weapons – in violation of the Minsk Protocol – especially in non-government-controlled areas of the Donbas.

Ceasefire brokered

The coronavirus pandemic precluded some inperson talks, resulting in a virtual meeting of the Normandy Four in April 2020, before an in-person meeting in Berlin on 3 July. A virtual meeting of the TCG on 22 July yielded an agreement over the implementation of a comprehensive ceasefire, containing ‘measures to strengthen the ceasefire’ and a ‘coordination mechanism’ to report violations. In November, the TCG agreed to four new disengagement zones: in Luhansk’s villages of Petrivka, Slovyanoserbsk and Nyzhnoteple, and near Hryhorivka in Donetsk.

Fluctuating ceasefire violations

The ceasefire that came into effect on 27 July initially seemed effective, with ceasefire violations progressively and significantly decreasing: from 60,188 in the first quarter, to 56,879 in the second, 13,977 in the third and 3,723 in the fourth quarter. The daily average of ceasefire violations fell almost 20-fold after July 27 (623 to 33 respectively).¹ However, by the end of 2020 the ceasefire had come under strain as the OSCE reported over 200 ceasefire violations in the Donetsk region on three separate days (11, 19 and 29 December). In the first quarter of 2021, a total of 8,676 ceasefire violations were recorded by the OSCE, indicating a return to regular hostilities along the Line of Contact.²

Local council elections

Local council elections were held on 25 October 2020, except in the areas controlled by the Russian-backed separatists due to the prevailing political and security conditions. Other parts of Donetsk and Luhansk under Ukrainian-government control were also excluded from voting under the advice of civil–military administrators.

Russia's military build-up

In late March 2021, Russia moved a large amount of its military personnel, weapons systems and equipment into Crimea and into its western regions bordering Ukraine, notably Rostov and Voronezh. The total number of Russian military personnel massed close to Ukraine was estimated at 100,000, supposedly for a snap military exercise, as explained by Russian Defence Minister Sergey Shoygu.³ However, the Ukrainian government, the EU and NATO interpreted these actions as Russia either flexing its military muscle in a show of strength or preparing for a military incursion. Tension and uncertainty around Russia’s intentions remained high until late April, when Russia declared the end of its exercise and began to withdraw the additional forces.

Human rights and humanitarian

The war claimed 24 lives and injured 105 people in 2020. Half of these deaths and injuries were inflicted by mines and unexploded ordnance, with the rest inflicted by shelling or small arms and light weapons.⁴

There were 734,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Ukraine as of February 2021.⁵ Housing, employing and integrating these IDPs in their host communities remained an ongoing process. The coronavirus pandemic exacerbated the privations already suffered by many IDPs and by people who live near the war zone as quarantine restrictions and travel limitations were introduced and the five crossing points along the Line of Contact were closed.

In a prisoner swap ahead of Orthodox Easter, 20 Ukrainians were returned to Kyiv from detention by the Russian-backed separatists, who in turn received 14 people held by the Ukrainian authorities. Ukrainian prisoners in the DPR and LPR remained an agenda item for the Normandy Four, with discussions on potential access to these prisoners being given to the International Committee of the Red Cross. The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) reported that while its staff had unimpeded access to official places of detention in governmentcontrolled territory, such access was denied in the DPR and LPR territories.

Political stability

The war caused some disenfranchisement in the October 2020 local council elections. Ukraine’s Central Election Commission announced in August that voting would not be held in ten communities in the Donetsk region and eight in the Luhansk region, on the government-controlled side of the Line of Contact, based on the advice of the civil–military administration of these areas. Nationwide turnout for the election was 36.88%, with Zelensky’s party, Servant of the People, securing 15.05% of local deputies. Second place went to Fatherland with 10.63%, and third place to the Opposition Platform – For Life with 9.91% (the latter party being broadly sympathetic towards Russia).⁶ The low turnout, and the fragmentary outcome, reflected the enduring hold of local allegiances, as well as the relative success of decentralisation reforms since 2014.

President Zelensky, in his second year in office, faced challenges in implementing two of his major campaign pledges: ending the war and fighting corruption. In October, the Constitutional Court curbed the powers of the National Agency for Prevention of Corruption, which had been created after the Maidan Revolution. This prompted criticism from the US Embassy in Kyiv, which expressed concern on behalf of Ukraine’s international partners and donors. The Court reinstated the agency’s powers, but tensions persisted between Zelensky and the head of the court, Oleksandr Tupytskyy, who was suspended and later dismissed by Zelensky in 2021.

Economic and social

The conflict has had a catastrophic impact on Ukraine’s economy, resulting in rising inflation and poverty rates as well as years of macroeconomic contraction. The coronavirus pandemic added further pressure on Ukraine’s economy, which shrank by 4.2% in 2020.⁷ Consumer inflation was forecast by the National Bank of Ukraine to reach 7% as of year-end 2021.⁸

In November 2020, the World Bank approved a US$100 million project to support ‘Ukraine’s efforts to promote socio-economic recovery and development of Eastern Ukraine with these funds earmarked for the government-controlled areas in the Luhansk region’.⁹ The region’s heavy industry remained mainly located in separatist-controlled areas, and the conflict had prevented those in government-controlled areas who might have previously travelled across the region for work to access these jobs. Many residents of the Donbas fled once the war began, with some from the separatistcontrolled areas moving to Russia, while others were displaced internally within Ukraine. On both sides of the Line of Contact, some of the Donbas residents who remained in their homes have become dependent on economic opportunities from the mixture of legal and illicit trade across the front line. The economy of the separatist-controlled areas has suffered, with the properties in Luhansk city losing around half their value since the war began.

Relations with neighbouring and international partners and geopolitical implications

Ukraine–Russia relations remained in a dire condition due to Russia’s role in the war. Russia’s past use of military contractors in Ukraine resulted in a well-publicised incident in neighbouring Belarus, as authorities in Minsk arrested 33 contractors on 29 July 2020 reportedly from the Russian private military company the Wagner Group. President Zelensky demanded that Ukraine take custody of 28 of these contractors, including nine who had Ukrainian passports, while the Ukrainian Prosecutor General’s office cited the Wagner Group’s past role in the Donbas war. However, all but one of those arrested were sent back to Russia (the remaining individual held Belarusian citizenship). Although it is not possible to estimate the scale of past Russian military-contractor involvement in the Ukraine war, their utility to the Russian government is clear, given the close links between private military companies like Wagner and the Russian state, and the benefits of deniability that military contractors offer to Russia instead of deploying its regular soldiers abroad.¹⁰ Ukraine also remained concerned by signs of Russia extending its security presence in the region, as it sought to deepen its defence ties to Belarus, including through joint military drills and by exploring the possibility of basing Russian troops in Belarus.

Political scenarios

Although the 27 July ceasefire demonstrated that a significant de-escalation in the fighting could be achieved, the peace process remained blocked by persistent disagreements over the ultimate status and level of political autonomy of the DPR-and LPR-controlled areas. On this matter there is little sign of an immediate breakthrough in the respective positions of Russia and Ukraine. Moscow still accuses Kyiv of a reluctance to fully implement the Minsk accords; conversely, Kyiv remains politically constrained, given the domestic criticism that this would attract. The likely outlook is of a continuing peace process stymied on the core issues that could end the conflict.

An indication of Russia’s sentiments regarding the Donbas came on 28 January 2021, at the ‘Russia Donbas Forum’ held in DPR-controlled Donetsk city attended by Russian senator Kazbek Taysaev, DPR leader Denis Pushilin and LPR leader Leonid Pasechnik. Margarita Simonyan, chief executive of the RT news channel, made a direct emotional appeal, declaring: ‘Mother Russia, take Donbas home’.¹¹ However, Putin’s press secretary later distanced the Kremlin from the event, saying that integrating the Donbas into Russia was not a policy worth pursuing. Nevertheless, the event conveyed a public doubling-down of Russia’s material and ideological hold over the region and reflected a Russian line of thinking against returning the LPR and DPR to Ukrainian government control. Ukraine’s former president Kravchuk promised in February 2021 to raise the Russia Donbas Forum in the TCG negotiations.

Escalation potential and conflict-related risks

The possibility of escalation cannot be precluded, especially after the concern raised by Russia’s massing of its armed forces near its border with Ukraine in March–April 2021. The eventual withdrawal of these forces rather than their deployment into Ukraine suggests that Russia’s intention in this instance was to intimidate Ukraine rather than to seek additional military gains. One possibility is that Russia wants to step up measures to integrate the separatist-controlled Donbas areas, which have been in place for years – for example the DPR and LPR adopted Moscow’s time zone in 2014 – without escalating its existing military involvement.

Prospects for peace

The conflict defies straightforward characterisation as either an invasion, a proxy war, an insurgency or a civil war – featuring some constituent properties of each, even if the parties to the conflict may prefer to use only one of these terms. The mix of local, regional and international drivers, and Russia’s incentives around the war, present continuing obstacles to conflict resolution.

The OSCE has monitored the ceasefire since 2014 from its patrol hubs, vehicle patrols, uninhabited aerial vehicles and cameras. As a monitoring mission, its leverage over the conflict parties is low, and it can only offer an off-ramp from the war if the parties come to an agreement. The OSCE’s reporting provides an order-of-magnitude overview of the war. The 134,767 ceasefire violations it reported in 2020 were a steep decline from recent years.¹² It remains to be seen whether the overall number of ceasefire violations recorded in 2021 will continue this annual downward trajectory.

Source: OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine

Strategic implications and global influences

Several regional and international developments have been of consequence to the conflict. On 12 June 2020, NATO recognised Ukraine as an Enhanced Opportunities Partner, reflecting the past contribution made by Ukrainian troops in NATO missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan. This status granted Ukraine access to inter-operability exercises and equipment programmes, although it did not confer a commitment to future Ukrainian membership of NATO. In parallel, Ukraine set out several reforms to its military apparatus. In March 2020 Zelensky announced the separation of the armed forces leadership roles of chief of the general staff and commander of the armed forces, in line with NATO principles. Other changes to Ukraine’s military training, leadership structures and equipment procurement were also announced.¹³

The US diplomatic line with Russia became tougher since President Biden’s administration came to power in January 2021. An early step was the announcement of a US$125m military aid package comprising training, equipment and advisory assistance, including ‘defensive lethal weapons’ to improve the Ukrainian military’s ability to defend against ‘Russian aggression’.¹⁴

Tensions around the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline project in 2020–21 had some bearing on Ukraine’s regional position. The first Nord Stream pipeline already connects Russia’s gas supplies to Europe via the Baltic Sea, and Nord Stream 2 would greatly increase Russia’s capacity to bypass Ukraine when exporting its gas. Ukraine perceives the German-backed Nord Stream 2 as an anti-Kyiv project, intended by Russia to deprive it of future revenue from the transit of gas and to make it more vulnerable to Russia. With the Biden administration’s criticism of Nord Stream 2, Germany came under pressure to recalibrate its support for the project and mooted an idea by which it would agree to shut off Nord Stream 2 if Russia used it to put pressure on Ukraine.