PROLOGUE

For decades, Boeing and Airbus shared the majority of the passenger-carrying jet market. Boeing arrived first in 1967 with the 737 and developed an early lead during the two decades it took Airbus to enter with its A320. Subsequently, both companies updated their airframe regularly, but complete overhauls were rare. By 2010, Airbus hadn’t refreshed the A320’s design since its 1988 launch, while Boeing’s last refresh dated to 1997, when the 737’s third generation, the 737NG, had made its début.

Long time the underdog, Airbus had been playing catchup. But in December 2010 it announced that it had stealthily developed a more efficient version of the A320, the A320neo, for ‘new engine option’. This new design was attractive, burning 6% less fuel than Boeing’s most advanced model. Airbus’ order books quickly filled up, even winning over American Airlines, a Boeing-exclusive customer until then.

At that time, Boeing had been debating the future of its narrow-body jet programme for many months, oscillating between updating its workhorse 737 yet again and launching a new design. Now facing intense market pressure, Boeing’s executives made their decision in a matter of weeks, announcing that they would launch a fourth-generation 737, the Max, in record time.

The implications of this decision were dramatic. The original 737 was designed at a time when many airports lacked infrastructure. Planes that were lower to the ground were attractive, with fewer steps to climb when boarding and easily accessed cargo areas. In contrast, when Airbus designed its A320, many of these constraints had vanished, enabling it to build a plane positioned higher. This difference now played a critical role as the new fuel-efficient engines were bigger than previous generations; small enough to fit on an A320 but big enough that the 737 required some structural modifications to achieve the required ground clearance.

These modifications affected handling and, in some circumstances, could lead the plane to tip skyward, risking a mid-air stall. Boeing addressed this issue with a software solution, an automated system called ‘Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System’ (MCAS). When it sensed that a stall was impending, the MCAS pushed the nose of the plane downward. With this solution in place, Boeing quickly revved up its production, and the Max made its maiden commercial flight in January 2016. Designed and produced in record time, it gave Boeing the response it needed to the A320neo. For a while, it looked like Boeing had pulled off the impossible.

However, after two fatal crashes in 2018 and 2019, the Max was grounded by regulators worldwide. Investigations soon revealed that MCAS activated automatically, without pilot intervention. They also revealed that, in an effort to keep training costs low and avoid the need for pilots to re-certify when transitioning to the Max, Boeing had chosen not to inform pilots about the MCAS nor explain how to disengage it. The MCAS was soon implicated in the crashes, and fatal design flaws surfaced.

By not deciding between revamping their existing airframe and developing a new one, Boeing executives had made a decision, albeit an implicit one — do nothing — that gradually painted them in a corner. When the A320neo was announced, Boeing chose a route that required a development cycle that was fast, cheap and high quality. Tragically, it failed to meet all three requirements.