Spaceport Design for Safety
Isabelle Rongier
Chapter Outline
Bernard Brandt, Jean-Pierre Trinchero
Bernard Brandt, Nathalie Costedoat, Jean-Pierre Trinchero
2.3 Master Plan of a Spaceport
Bernard Brandt, Nathalie Costedoat, Jean-Pierre Trinchero
Jean-Pierre Trinchero, Bernard Brandt, Nathalie Costedoat
Jean-Pierre Trinchero, Bernard Brandt, Nathalie Costedoat
2.6 Safety Design for a Spaceport
Bernard Brandt, Nathalie Costedoat, Jean-Pierre Trinchero
2.7 Major Impacts of Safety Requirements on Spaceport Design
Bernard Brandt, Jean-Pierre Trinchero, Nathalie Costedoat, Udaya Kumar
2.8 Specificity of Launch Pad Escape System Design for Human Spaceflight
Sandrine Richard, Estelle Champesting, Jean-Pierre Trinchero
2.1 Introduction
Bernard Brandt and Jean-Pierre Trinchero
Access to space involves strategic decisions. The choice of a launch site contributes to the independence of this activity for the country or countries concerned. It requires heavy investments. The location commits and structures the activity over the long term. Safety considerations are therefore of paramount importance.
Two steps must be examined sequentially:
As far as safety is concerned, the regulation of the space activities is considered from two distinct but coherent aspects: ground risk control and flight risk control.
Space activities are generally orientated towards scientific, geopolitical or strategic societal interests. Safety objectives therefore naturally imply an epistemic approach. It is fundamental that they be defined right from the start of the program and before any structuring choices are made.
2.2 Choice of Launch Site
Bernard Brandt, Nathalie Costedoat and Jean-Pierre Trinchero
Launch activities are, by nature, carried out in a geographical area on a global scale. All risks must be assessed right from the initial studies, particularly the risks outside the perimeter of the launch site (in-flight launcher accident, nominal fallback of stages, etc.). Restrictions concerning public, air and maritime traffic, economic and human activities in the chosen sector (fishing, agriculture, tourism, etc.) must be taken into account, especially with regard to the environment.
The following approach was applied when choosing a location for the French Guiana Space Centre.
List of the Sites Studied
The following 14 sites were studied:
The Seychelles Archipelago, the Island of Trinidad, the Island of Nuku-Hiva Hiva (Marquesas Islands, French Polynesia), the Tuamotu Archipelago (Island of Rairoa, French Polynesia), the Island of La Désirade (French West Indies), the Island of Marie-Galante (French West Indies), Cayenne (French Guiana), Djibouti (French Somaliland), Darwin (Australia), Trincomale (Sri Lanka), Fort Dauphin (Republic of Madagascar), Mogadishu (Republic of Somalia), Port-Etienne (Islamic Republic of Mauritania) and Belem (Brazil).
Selection Criteria
• Possibility of polar and equatorial launches.
• Size of the site for launch safety.
• Deepwater port with sufficient handling facilities.
• An aerodrome capable of handling a long-haul aircraft (3000 m runway).
• As short as possible a distance between the launch site and Europe.
• Political stability (especially if the site does not belong to the state which launches).
Five sites were short-listed and French Guiana came out well ahead in the final choice. This site has:
• A very wide opening to the Atlantic Ocean favoring all space missions, launches both to the East (for geostationary orbit) and to the North (for polar orbit) with a minimum risk for the surrounding population and property.
• Proximity to the Equator (latitude 5.3° North) which gives a maximum slingshot effect.
• A low population density (45,000 inhabitants in 1964 over a territory of 91,000 km2, i.e. 1/6 of France), highly concentrated in the coast.
• The possibility of installing tracking means (radars and telemetry antennas) on the surrounding hills.
• Is well ventilated and the climate very bearable despite its equatorial position.
• Area sheltered from cyclones and earthquakes.
• Existing infrastructures relatively easy to adapt to the future space center’s requirements (roads, aerodrome, ports, telecommunications, etc.).
The basic criteria safety concern the size of the territory, the low population density and the almost total absence of population in the zones flown over in the initial phase of the launch (including the seas near the launch zone) (Figure 2.1).
New criteria are now emerging, especially concerning the protection of the environment.
(a) Natural risks
Where possible, the choice of location will favor an area where natural risks occur as rarely as possible. Otherwise, major technical sizing and/or availability constraints must be anticipated. This has a significant effect on the cost and lead times of the space program as well as on general safety standards. These risks must be mapped as accurately as possible, from the start:
• Geological phenomena: earthquakes, landslides/ground movements.
• Hydrological phenomena: floods, tidal waves if close to the sea (particularly bathymetry and currentology, Tsunami).
• Violent atmospheric phenomena: cyclone, tornado, keraunic level.
It must be noted that currently there is a greater awareness of and consideration for the scale of natural catastrophes. For example, after the earthquake in June 2006 in French Guiana, the studies on the earthquake resistance of the facilities were repeated, confirming the original files. This new loading threshold with respect to earthquakes is now an integral part of the dimensioning studies for the facilities.
(b) Protection of the environment
A growing preoccupation, this aspect is covered in Section “Environment Protection”.
2.3 Master Plan of a Spaceport
Bernard Brandt, Nathalie Costedoat and Jean-Pierre Trinchero
Once the choice of geographical location has been made, the principles for the deployment of the facilities in this location must be defined. This is the purpose of the master plan.
The master plan is designed to:
It defines the principles for the location of the facilities which contribute to:
• the safety of persons and property, protection of public health and the environment;
• the absence of danger from one facility (with respect to each other) in the event of a major accident by applying rules concerning the installation of the facilities, roadways and critical networks;
It defines the general layout rules for the facilities, the use of roadways and critical networks, the area covered by the facilities and the development possibilities, respecting the regulations relating to pyrotechnic facilities and Facilities Classified for Protection of The Environment (ICPE).
It is established based on general considerations and majoring hypotheses (Figure 2.2).
2.4 Ground Risk Control
Jean-Pierre Trinchero, Bernard Brandt and Nathalie Costedoat
General Requirements
Ground range safety is subject to four main regulations. These regulations are not specific to space activities:
• Labor acts related to workers’ occupational health and safety.
• Pyrotechnic safety regulations, related to workers’ occupational health and safety in pyrotechnics facilities. These regulations are mainly derived from pyrotechnic and the military industrial activity, generally compatible with the United Nations’ standards.
• Environmental protection acts are edited to control the pollution and accident hazards of facilities involving dangerous substances and focus on the protection of the environment and the public.
• Regulations set up to prevent major accidents for high-level industrial risk facilities (known as SEVESO II in Western Europe. It gets its name from an industrial disaster which occurred in northern Italy).
This set of regulations is completed and detailed through the Range Space Safety Regulations focusing on system safety (design, qualification, and operational rules including flight hardware). These requirements are supported by national and international space standards (as a basis for best practices).
When considering security at design level, access control and surveillance equipment are taken into account. These means can be used during operations, in particular when a restricted number of persons are imposed for safety reasons during potentially hazardous operations. The Kourou launch site is considered to be at the highest level in this domain (malicious acts). It is a “Defence Priority Facility” (IDP).
The safety requirements are taken into account right from the design phase. The Operating Regulations of the French Guiana Space Centre facilities (referenced in article 27 of the Order of 31/03/2011 relating to the technical regulations, in application of Decree no. 2009-643 of 9 June 2009) stipulates in particular that in each design phase (summary preliminary study, detailed preliminary study, acceptance after completion and qualification) the design definition file and the associated safety substantiations are the subject of a formal agreement by the French Guiana Space Centre Safety Department. This “safety submission” method is applicable to all new facilities or developments to existing facilities.
Apart from the regulations applicable to the territory concerned, mainly relating to the protection of the public and the environment, and worker protection (concept of major industrial accidents and pyrotechnic safety), there are also rules specific to the launch site and to the specific features of space vehicle integration, preparation and test activities.
Specific Requirements for Space Activities
An Integrated Approach to Ground Safety in the Development of Space Programs
Space activities take place intermittently and by their nature they require large budgets. Therefore, the quality assurance measures play a major role and their specifications are among the most stringent. For efficiency reasons, it is thus necessary to closely associate the ground safety questions to them by relying in particular on the risk control in the operating safety sense of the term (RAMS concept).
It is also very important to be able to rely on standards which often represent the profession’s capitalization of skills and which guarantee a global coherence in the dimensioning activities.
General Objectives
Because they supplement the regulations mentioned in the introduction, they are necessarily coherent and compatible with these regulations.
They are generally defined for major accidents and the processes at the space vehicle interface by a single or double fault tolerance according to the severity of the considered risk.
For the flight systems, they are completed by dimensioning qualification requirements for the most critical systems. We can mention:
For the GROUND support facilities, we generally define architectural principles for the “sensitive” networks such as the fire network, the safety low current network (including the radio frequency [RF] network) and the road networks internal to the launch site.
The supervision means must be adapted to real-time monitoring of the potentially hazardous operations: such as video and radio means, and the transfer of technical data, and safety alarms.
The electromagnetic environment must be precisely characterized in all the possible configurations and the electromagnetic compatibility between the sensitive systems and the emission sources must be demonstrated at system level.
2.5 Flight Risk Control
Jean-Pierre Trinchero, Bernard Brandt and Nathalie Costedoat
Danger Zones
The flight risk control within a launch site perimeter during a launch operation starts with the definition of the zones to be protected with respect to the public, persons working on the launch site, property and protection of the environment and public health.
It can only be designed on the launch site and in its close geographical zones by coherence with the ground safety rules, in particular the thresholds for the protection of persons (thermal, chemical, mechanical, etc.). It must also be carried out with a permanent desire for total transparency and by informing the different publics concerned.
If several launchers are operated from a same launch site, it is fundamental to have general objectives to guarantee an identical risk control level whatever the launcher considered, in spite of technologies and characteristics which sometimes differ.
General Approach
After defining the zones to be protected, the general protection objectives and methods to achieve them must be set out. Generally, during the initial moments of flight, the maximum energy is applied and a very large number of technical events take place concentrated in a very short flight sequence – ignition, separation and functional component configuration change phases (arming, pressurization, etc.).
It is mainly for these reasons that the conventional failure mode analyses, although unavoidable, cannot be guaranteed to be exhaustive in the event of a failure. The accidentological analysis confirms this and also demonstrates that the major part of the launch failures result from the concomitance of several independent events.
It is therefore essential to build the flight safety on the conventional foundations of risk control, completed by a “worst case” logic leading to the implementation of a reliable Flight Termination System independent of the on-board functional systems. It is operated from the ground for the initial flight phases (qualitative launcher fault tolerance criteria generally to be completed by “Failed Operational” criteria on the neutralization function guaranteeing double fault tolerance at system level).
“Flight Termination System”
It depends on the type of technology used for the launch vehicle’s propulsion:
• The thrust on a solid propellant motor can technically only be interrupted by pyrotechnic means.
• The interruption of the thrust on a liquid propellant motor generally depends on the type of propellants used: In the case of hypergolic propellants, neutralization at altitude dissipates the major part of the energy before fallback to the ground. This solution is thus generally almost unavoidable. In the case of nonhypergolic propellants, cutting the thrust can also be envisaged by stopping the engines on condition that the vehicle’s behavior is well under control. The worst cases such as a total fallback and a “High Velocity Impact” scenario must be considered. The High Velocity Impact scenario limits the trajectory and therefore the performance and/or availability of the launch site.
Intervention Criteria
They depend on the previously mentioned neutralization method, but also on the launch vehicle’s flight characteristics. The failures associated deviated trajectories and the launcher’s maximum physical capabilities must be studied by referring to the worst case logic. Special care must be taken with the representativeness of the simulation models, their confidence level and their uncertainties.
Reliability Objectives of the Ground Support Facilities Contributing to the Flight Safety Mission
The ground support facilities contributing to this mission are generally, in addition to the neutralization means, the localization means and the telemetry means to diagnose the flight status in real time. These means must be treated with the same importance level as those necessary for the mission’s success. They must be coherent with the state of the art of the best available and attainable technologies.
The architecture of these means must be designed and developed considering these objectives as priorities.
The elements described above are limited to the specific features of a launch site, which is the subject of this publication. They are sufficiently general to be transposable to different launch sites and launch systems. They are key parameters for design phase, and should never be in conflict with other program’s objectives. They are an indispensable component to the success of the program (space safety and mission success).
2.6 Safety Design for a Spaceport
Bernard Brandt, Nathalie Costedoat and Jean-Pierre Trinchero
Limiting the Exposure of Personnel in the Hazard Zones
The presence of persons in the hazard zones depends on the risk level evaluated for each potential source of accident. A personnel refuge strategy is defined according to the activity in progress (fuelling, test firing, launch, etc.).
The personnel allowed into the hazard zone of potentially hazardous operations are limited to the strict necessity to carry out this operation. The maximum number of operators and their positions are given in the procedure for the potentially hazardous operation. Individual operators (e.g. photographers) are considered to be part of the operational team.
Every precaution must be taken to ensure that the public is not exposed to risks and harm. In particular, for the launch and test bench operations, the hazard zones beyond the limits of the corresponding site must be combed.
All explosive products can generate effect zones. Various effects produced by a hazardous pyrotechnic phenomenon can take place in these zones. They are liable to cause lesions to a human organism and create physical damage.
These effects are basically of four types:
• aerodynamic with the overpressure effects (pressure rise – blast effects);
• thermal with the heat flows;
Aerodynamic effects (blast):
• pressure waves of several bars which propagate through the air, their intensity decreases with the distance from the explosion;
• effects on the structures which can destroy the constructions (walls, buildings, etc.), generating secondary fragments and/or breaking windows;
• Effects on persons such as perforated eardrums, compression of the lungs.
The thermal effects (heat flows) are generated by a fireball plus a heat wave.
Kinematic effects: flying fragments:
• primary fragments from the reactive product;
• secondary fragments torn from the surrounding environment.
Chemical effects (toxic) are generated by the emission of combustion gases, for example when a solid propellant stage is on the test bench (Figure 2.3).
FIGURE 2.3 Example of toxic fallout calculation results with combustion taking place at a distance (right) and combustion taking place nearby (left).
These effect zones are classified according to the decreasing potential consequences that they represent for persons and property.
Definition of Hazardous Effect Zones
The regulations relating to pyrotechnic safety define thermal effect, blast and flying fragment zones according to five severity levels written Zi (i is a whole number between 1 and 5 inclusive) according to the probable severity of the effects they represent for persons and property. They are centered on the objects that caused the accident when these are small fixed volumes. In all other cases, the limit distances of these zones are calculated from the external surfaces of the objects. The regulations for facilities classified for protection of the environment subject to authorization define the toxic effect zones where the thresholds (Significant Lethal Effects Thresholds (SELS), Lethal Effects Thresholds (SEL) and Irreversible Effects Thresholds (SEI)) can be reached.
The threshold values of the thermal effect zones and overpressure effect zones are specified in the Order of 20 April 2007 and in the Order of 29 September 2005. For exposure times less than 120 seconds, the thermal effect zones are evaluated with respect to the thermal dose received by the target. The thermal dose is the product of the thermal flux density received, raised to the power 4/3 and of the exposure time.
The Order of 20 April 2007 does not propose thresholds for the flying fragment effect zone. We thus consider that the thresholds linked with the conditional fatality probability defined as the probability of a person being hit by a flying fragment with energy E greater than 8 J.
The threshold values of the toxic effect zones are specified in the Order of 29 September 2005.
The application of the pyrotechnic regulations is extended to the propellants by determining a TNT equivalent which is then used to calculate the radii of the overpressure effect zones and the flying fragment zones for explosions. To do this, a specific software application has been developed which takes into account the propellant masses and characteristics and also the environment conditions (temperature, pressure, etc.).
If we refer to the specialist literature, the effects on persons are:
• 1000 mbar: death by direct effect (pulmonary hemorrhage)
• 700 mbar: 99% fatalities (source: Netherlands official expert company TNO, 1989)
• 200 mbar: 1% fatalities (source: Netherlands official expert company TNO, 1989)
• 340 mbar: eardrum damage (source: French official expert company INERIS)
• 300 mbar: 1% fatalities (source: Netherlands official expert company TNO, 1989)
• For a thermal flux expressed in (kW/m2)4/3 greater than:
• 2600: superficial 3rd degree burns (source: The physiological and pathological effects of thermal radiation, Hymes, 1983)
Table 2.1
Definition of effect zones and associated effects
DR1 «Règles générales d’hygiène et de sécurité dans les établissements pyrotechniques – Règles d’isolement des installations pyrotechniques», 1979 DR 1 «Règles générales d’hygiène et de sécurité dans les établissements pyrotechniques – Règles d’isolement des installations pyrotechniques», décret n°79–846 du 28 septembre 79, arrêté du 26 septembre 80 et circulaire du 8 mai 81 (RD 1 «General health and safety regulations in pyrotechnic establishments – Rules for the isolation of pyrotechnic facilities», Decree no. 79-846 of 28 September 1979, Order of 26 September 1980 and Circular of 8 May 1981).
DR 2 Arrêté du 29 septembre 2005 relatif à l’évaluation et à la prise en compte de la probabilité d’occurrence, de la cinétique, de l’intensité des effets et de la gravité des conséquences des accidents potentiels dans les études de dangers des installations classées soumises à autorisation (RD 2 Order of 29 September 2005 relating to the evaluation and incorporation of the probability of occurrence, kinematics, intensity of effects and severity of the consequences of potential accidents in hazard studies for classified installations subject to authorization).
DR 3 Arrête du 20 avril 2007 fixant les règles relatives à l’évaluation des risques et à la prévention des accidents dans les établissements pyrotechniques (RD 3 Order of 20 April 2007 setting out the rules for risk evaluation and accident prevention in pyrotechnic establishments).
DR 4 Règlement d’Exploitation des installations du Centre Spatial Guyanais (référencé à l’article 27 de l’arrêté du 31/03/2011 relatif à la réglementation technique en application du décret n°2009-643 du 9 juin 2009) (RD 4 Operating Regulations for the French Guiana Space Centre facilities (referenced in article 27 of the Order of 31/03/2011 relating to the technical regulations in application of Decree no. 2009-643 of 9 June 2009)).
• 1200: 2nd degree burns (source: The physiological and pathological effects of thermal radiation, Hymes, 1983)
• 1000: 1% fatalities (source: Explosion hazards and evaluation, Baket, Cox, Kulesz, Strehlow, 1983)
• 700: superficial 2nd degree burns (source: The physiological and pathological effects of thermal radiation, Hymes, 1983)
• 200: 1st degree burns (source: The physiological and pathological effects of thermal radiation, Hymes, 1983)
• 85: pain threshold (source: The physiological and pathological effects of thermal radiation, Hymes, 1983).
2.7 Major Impacts of Safety Requirements on Spaceport Design
Bernard Brandt, Jean-Pierre Trinchero, Nathalie Costedoat and Udaya Kumar
The objective of a good design or safety design, apart from respecting the legislation, is to minimize the operating costs and constraints. The design must allow the best compromise to be found between the absence of risk and risk control.
Building Locations
The locations of the buildings are restricted to limit accidental effects and also by a certain operating flexibility. Therefore to avoid the domino effects of an accident in a building from affecting another building, these facilities must be at a distance from each other, which generates costs and additional potentially hazardous operations (transport).
The facilities exposed to thermal effects, overpressure and flying fragments from another facility are located in such a way that the roadways open to the public are outside all zones exposed to the irreversible effects from these facilities.
Two independent facilities and their access routes are located outside the zones exposed to significant lethal effects and to reciprocal domino effects.
The envelope of the significant lethal effect zones and the domino effect zones of a same launch site facility is confined within the perimeter of the site.
A potentially hazardous facility is placed outside the zones exposed to the domino effects of an accident due to the transport of dangerous goods not approved for transportation on public roads.
The choice of the location of a launch zone is subject to a prior flight safety approval which, based on the possible trajectories, the launcher’s technical performance and characteristics, the neutralization method, and the hazardous products on board the launch vehicle, is designed to guarantee the protection of persons, property, the environment and public health.
The storage facilities for solid propellant motors are located in the zone protected from the thermal and mechanical (heavy fragments) hazards.
The location and design of the launch observation sites receiving the public are chosen to prevent exposing the public to the irreversible effects of a ground or in-flight accident (Figure 2.4).
Roadways – General Design Rules
Among the ground infrastructures, the internal roadways are a major dimensioning element which depends on the major options selected when deciding on the locations of the facilities. They are part of a space center’s “master plan,” particularly if this site is to operate several launch systems.
The operational deployment of a new launch system is a major parameter in the initial architectural choices. It is therefore fundamental that the roadway requirements should be taken into account right from the preliminary phases of the project. During the transfer phases, the space objects are no longer protected by the buildings and are generally not in transport containers, which makes them more vulnerable to external aggressions and mainly to natural risks. These transport activities are potentially hazardous.
Consequently, the resulting safety requirements are indispensable and indissociable from a general risk evaluation approach.
The dynamic transfer operations of “hazardous” materials or objects contain large amounts of high energy material exposing these elements to specific vulnerability conditions. They are highly specific to the space activities; that is why they are generally not governed by the dangerous goods transport regulations applied to more conventional industrial activities. It is of primary importance that their number and duration be minimized. This principle must take priority for the entities responsible for design.
The Right Balance of Safety Distances Between Facilities and Limiting Transfer Operations
The safety distances between facilities are one of the fundamental measures to limit the effects of a potential accident, and more specifically with respect to domino effects. Rules based on the safety regulations in industry and in the field of pyrotechnic safety govern such measures according to the feared effects and the mechanical energy thresholds (pressure, kinetic energy), thermal thresholds and chemical thresholds (toxicity). These rules are developed in the Section “Safety Design”. They may appear to contradict the efforts to limit the transfer operations. Therefore, the right balance must be sought between these two types of considerations. This is particularly the case for the launch zone with respect to the flight accident scenarios for which the safety distances are generally greater.
Technical Adequacy of Roadways
The technical characteristics of the roadways result from the choice of operational deployment defined during the preliminary study phase: transport per part, transport configuration (in vertical or horizontal position), by road or rail, type of roadway (emergency exit, circulation of emergency means, inter-site logistic or operational transport, etc.). Depending on these initial structuring choices, the technical compatibility of the internal roadways must be demonstrated and the following general principles integrated: no tight or right-angle bends, possibility to reverse, flatness, horizontality, structural strength, adaptation to the climatic conditions.
Lightning Protection Systems
Several incidents of lightning strike to pads with a vehicle on the pad have been reported. This has forced the interruption of testing and postponement of the launch operation. On the adverse side, there is evidence that lightning strike to launch pads, which were not protected by any specific lightning protection schemes, have triggered sounding rockets and other similar vehicles. In general, the consequences of a lightning strike can prove to be catastrophic to both launch pad and the vehicle. Extreme care therefore must be exercised to prevent such an exigency. For various reasons most of the launch sites are located at the sea coast and this land–sea junction is known to have relatively higher lightning activity. Further, launch pads having heights in the range of 60–100 m and form the tallest object in the surrounding flat terrain and hence are more prone to a cloud-to-ground lightning strike. Therefore, they need to be protected against deleterious effects of lightning. Refer to Appendix D for a brief introduction to the lightning phenomena and the associated parameters.
Limitation of Present Day Knowledge in Quantifying the Threat to Launch Pad
Both natural and triggered lightning are threats to launch pad and this is particularly true when a vehicle is on the pad. Summarizing the points enumerated in the previous section, the possible major threats can be identified as: damage to the digitally controlled flight systems and other instrumentation, disruption of power and digital lines and even the uncontrolled ignition and triggering of pyrotechnic devices. However, quantification of the threat at present seems to be a formidable task due to the following reasons: (a) The higher frequency contents of lightning current, responsible for rising portion of the current, excites transverse magnetic mode of electromagnetic wave propagation along the pad/vehicle, which later settles down to quasi-transverse electromagnetic mode. Therefore pad/vehicle cannot be represented and analyzed by interlinked lumped circuit elements like inductances and resistances. (b) Launch pad and vehicle are very complex structures to be modeled electrically for wave regime. Further, the calculation of induced currents in the umbilical and other internal cables/wires requires very sophisticated numerical methodology, which is capable of accurately handling problem intricacies of dimensions orders of magnitude smaller. (c) The possibility of lightning strike is rather rare and the characteristics of current being random, a reliable in-situ measurement on the pad seems to be nearly impossible. Due to these, the present protective measures are very conservative.
Lightning Protection System
Due to the possible catastrophic consequences, the lightning protection system to launch pads is considered to be imperative. In line with the general protection philosophy, the protection system is split into external and internal protection measures. They will be dealt below.
The basic responsibilities of external protection schemes can be specified as:
(i) Intercept and divert all dangerous downward flashes away from the launch pad.
(ii) Control the consequential electric potential (voltage) rise in the system, as well as that in the soil to be within safe limits.
(iii) Limit the resulting electromagnetic fields in the launch pad area to a minimum.
For the launch sites on the sea coast as well as that on sea, height of the pads are not high enough to have significant upward lightning activity and hence protection is intended only for downward strikes. Both economy and unhindered launch operation demand that a small fraction of strokes with prospective current lower than certain critical value be permitted to sneak through or bypass the protection system. This philosophy is commonly employed in lightning protection engineering. However, with regard to the launch pad it is rather difficult to decide on stroke current levels that can be tolerated. In fact, the stroke interception capability of any protection scheme is not independent of stroke polarity. As compared to negative strokes, positive strokes with higher current level can bypass the protection system. The upward discharge from grounded objects is negative in positive strokes and hence higher electric gradient is required for their propagation. Consequently, the resulting attractive radii or the interception efficacy would be lower. However, in most of the places the negative cloud downward lightning dominates over positive and hence the designs are based mainly on negative downward lightning.
Fortunately, for both the polarities, the interception efficacy of the external protection system increases with magnitude of prospective stroke current. This ensures that the magnitude of current in the inevitable bypass strokes would be towards lower magnitude regime. In addition, the lower is the probability of occurrence of strokes with lower current magnitudes, the safer is the situation.
Brief Description of the Present Protection Schemes to Launch Pads
Different protection schemes currently employed for launch pads at different places are sketched in Figure 2.5. It may be worthwhile noting here that in some cases, the importance of lightning protection was realized only after building the launch pad.
FIGURE 2.5 1. Lightning rod, 2. Catenary/Ground wire, 3. Insulating mast, 4. Fixed Service Structure, 5. Launch pedestal , 6. Shield wires, 7. Umbilical Tower, 8. Launch Vehicle, 9. Towers.
The lightning protection scheme at John F. Kennedy Space Center consists of a 24.4 m (80 feet) long fibreglass mast supported on the Fixed Service Structure. A 1.22 m (4 feet) long lightning rod sits at its top and two 2.5 cm (1 inch) diameter stainless steel cables run in the opposite direction from the bottom of the rod to remote earthing points which are 304.8 m (1000 feet) away. This approach is designated as scheme (a) in Figure 2.5.
Isolated lightning protection systems seem to have been employed in most of other launch pads. In the first scheme under this category, one or more tall towers without any aerial interconnections are employed around the launch pad. This is shown as scheme (b) in Figure 2.5. Available limited data suggests that this scheme has been employed for protection of launch pads in Russia, Japan and China. For example, in the Russian Energia launch pad complex, all the three launch pads are surrounded by two 225 m tall lightning protection towers and two shorter lighting towers. All four towers are about 150 m away from the pad.
In the other two schemes (c) and (d), higher efforts are made to intercept the descending leader approaching from any of the direction. Such an exercise becomes essential when protection against even the low current strokes of either polarity is intended. The most common version of this scheme, shown as scheme (c) in Figure 2.5, involves tall towers carrying an insulating mast at their top. These insulating masts in turn support the lightning rods which are interconnected at their base by shield wires. The catenaries forming the down conductors run from the base of the lightning rods to remote earthing points. The basic goal of this scheme is to carry away the lightning stroke current from the launch pad area, thereby ensuring augmented safety. Further observations on this scheme are given in next section.
The following two cases serve as examples for the above scheme (c). Four protection towers are employed for the Ariane 5 launch pad of Europe’s spaceport at French Guiana. The effective height of lightning rods is about 90 m and the effective length of insulating mast is about 10 m.
The launch complexes SLC 40/41 of Cape Canaveral Air Force Station in Florida, USA, also have a four tower system with insulating mast of length about 22.86 m sitting at the tower top. The interconnected air termination system is of about 106.7 m in height and the shield wires form a double square over the launch pad. On the other hand, the Delta IV launch facilities at Cape Canaveral Air Force station consist of two 116 m tall towers on either side of the launch pad. The ground wires run from the bottom of the lightning rod, which is supported on an insulating mast to remote ground.
In the scheme (d) of Figure 2.5, lightning rods are directly mounted on towers with the towers themselves serving as down conductors. The initial protection schemes for both the Indian satellite launch pads had employed this scheme. The towers were 120 m tall, supporting a 10 m long lightning rod at their top. Six shield wires interconnected the towers in pairs at 120 m, 115 m and 110 m. Even though experience for more than 5 years on first pad was quite satisfactory, an administrative decision was taken to transform this system into an insulated mast scheme.
The detailed theoretical analysis for the interception efficacy and lightning surge response of LPS seems to be carried out only after the construction. A more elaborative analysis for evaluating the stroke interception efficacy of the LPS to two of the Indian satellite launch pads has been carried out. The finite difference time domain method has been used for the analysis of the lightning surge response of the protection system for Ariane, of course with some simplifications. A detailed analysis for the surge response of the insulated mast design with conventional design has been carried out by Kumar through experiments on electromagnetically scaled models. Important issues like the voltage stress across the insulating mast and the level of induction to supporting towers in insulating mast design have also been investigated. A distributed ladder network model has been attempted for the evaluation of the performance of earth termination system of LPS to Indian satellite launch pads.
Based on rather limited information available at present, all the schemes seem to be working satisfactorily. This could be predominantly due to launch commit criteria, which will be dealt in a later section.
Fire Protection
A space center’s fire protection initially depends on the prevention rules which are implemented right from its design phase and which must be strictly monitored throughout its lifetime.
The buildings have fire stability and reaction characteristics which guarantee the resistance of the structures long enough to evacuate the workers. The features and coverings of the buildings also guarantee that the fire cannot spread. The isolation of the buildings from each other and their internal compartmentalization prevent the domino effect.
The permanent surveillance of the potentially hazardous premises either triggers automatic extinguishing systems or alerts the intervention teams. The presence of a firefighting water grid network, isolated from the drinking water system and with a backup network, guarantees a sufficient supply for the hydrants.
The flammable product storage areas are protected by sprinkler systems. The premises with special hazards and which are inaccessible are protected by automatic gas extinguishing systems.
The buildings receiving a large number of persons and the buildings that are potentially hazardous are equipped with a manually triggered evacuation alarm system. The lighting must allow all the workers to reach the adequate number of rationally located exits.
Rapid escape chutes are installed to evacuate tall buildings, especially pyrotechnic buildings.
Smoke evacuation in the potentially hazardous buildings and large area buildings also allows workers to be evacuated and emergency services to intervene. Fixed emergency means are available to fight all breakouts of fire (extinguishers and fire hose cabinets).
Trained firemen with appropriate means are rationally posted to intervene rapidly at any time on all fires at the space center.
A road network provides access for fire engines to all zones and surrounds the buildings.
Handling and Lifting
The pyrotechnic stage transfers must take place in the safest possible conditions (no ignition system, anti-lift-off device fitted, etc.). Special care must be taken with the lifting and handling means.
Therefore, priority must be given to remaining at the same level (iso-level) (railways, air cushions) for the pyrotechnic objects (segments or stages). If necessary, the bridges are then dimensioned in a similar manner to the nuclear industry (closed chain bridge). Figures 2.6 and 2.7 give an example of how to handle a solid propulsion stage and its thruster.
FIGURE 2.7 Project no. 2: the thruster always remains at the same level and is only placed on its launch pad by translation. Project no. 2 has been chosen because it avoids additional handling of the thruster. There is therefore no need for a raised platform/lift but more rock must be excavated for the flame exhaust.
Command Control Process – Fluid
Barriers
The circuits or systems at risk can be unintentionally activated either by an equipment failure or by a human error. To correct this, “barriers” are introduced. The minimum number of barriers used depends on the severity of the feared event. For the circuits at risk, the component located in this circuit, which controls the flow of fluid or current, can be considered to be a barrier. The barriers that oppose a same feared event must be independent and, if possible, of different types. They can be mechanical, electrical, software, etc. For the circuits with catastrophic consequences, the Safety Department requires:
2.8 Specificity of Launch Pad Escape System Design for Human Spaceflight
Kelli Maloney
A launch pad escape system for human spaceflight is one of those things that everyone hopes they will never need, but it is critical for every manned space program. Since people were first put into space in the early 1960s, the need for such an Emergency Escape System (EES) has become apparent. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) has made use of various types of these EESs over the past 50 years.
Early programs, like Mercury and Gemini, did not have an official launch pad escape system. Rather, they relied on a Launch Escape System (LES) of a separate solid rocket motor attached to the manned capsule that could pull the astronauts to safety in the event of an emergency. This could only occur after hatch closure at the launch pad or during the first stage of flight. A version of a LES, now called a Launch Abort System (LAS), is still used today for all manned capsule type launch vehicles. However, this system is very limited in that it can only be used after hatch closure and it is for flight crew only. In addition, the forces necessary for the LES/LAS to get the capsule away from a rocket during the first stage of flight are quite high and can cause injury to the crew. These shortcomings led to the development of a ground-based EES for the flight crew and ground support personnel as well. This way, a much less dangerous mode of egress is available for any flight or ground personnel up to a few seconds before launch.
The early EESs were fairly simple, gravity-powered systems to use when things go bad, and things can go bad very quickly and catastrophically when dealing with a flight vehicle fueled with millions of pounds of hazardous propellant. With this in mind, early EES designers saw such a passive/unpowered system as a must for last minute escapes. This and other design requirements had to be derived for an EES, and this section will take a look at the safety design aspects for a launch pad escape system.
Historic Apollo and Shuttle Program EESs
The first EES for the Saturn V rocket was to use the existing launch tower elevators to the base of the mobile launcher platform. Personnel would then transfer to a slide tube that ended in an underground rubber room. They would then walk over to a sealed blast room beneath the pad and wait out the emergency, or wait for rescue personnel to arrive. A few years later another EES was built for the Saturn V rocket. This second system was a single cab on a slidewire that egressed the astronauts from the capsule level of the launch tower to the ground outside the pad’s perimeter fence (Figure 2.8). Up to nine personnel could load into this cab and ride down a steel cable to a landing site 2400 feet away. They would then exit and enter a bunker and wait for rescue personnel to arrive.
The Space Shuttle system was no different from Apollo in its need for a safe means of escape from the launch pad. The Shuttle expanded upon the slidewire system from Apollo since they did not have an LAS on the vehicle. This meant the EES was the only method of emergency egress at the pad. They installed five slidewires to the launch tower (and later expanded it to seven) with baskets that could hold up to four people each. These slidewires ended at the same Apollo bunkers outside the blast danger area (BDA) where personnel could wait out the disaster or transfer to an armored vehicle (M-113) and drive to a triage site where they could be met by rescue personnel.
Key Design Safety Factors for New EES
Over the years, there were safety-related design attributes that have evolved ever since the manned space program has begun. Here is a list of safety requirements that must be considered and determined feasible or not depending on the type of rocket, launch tower, ground personnel, hazards present, flight crew size, and program customer needs:
• Quick egress time, i.e. the desired complete evacuation of all crew members to a safe haven in just a few minutes from the time the emergency egress is called.
• Must be able to handle incapacitated personnel.
• System must be passive, which means either unpowered or have available back-up systems independent of launch pad systems.
• Must accommodate flight crew plus any ground support personnel and rescue personnel present during the time of flight crew insertion into the vehicle.
• The system must accommodate pressurized and non-pressurized space suits, rescue suits/gear, and any special ground support personnel suits.
• G-forces (or gravity induced forces) on egressing personnel need to be limited in order not to result in further injuries.
• The EES needs to be single fault tolerant at a minimum, so that there could be one failure and the system still needs to operate within requirements.
• Removes personnel away from the disaster or outside the BDA. The BDA is a circular “stay-out” area around a rocket, that if it were to explode anything in this area would be affected.
The original EES designed for the Saturn V rocket met most of these, but was lacking in a few requirements. Specifically it did not handle incapacitated personnel well since there was a transfer from the elevators to a slide tube, and it did not remove personnel away from the disaster. The second Saturn V EES and Shuttle’s EES slidewire system solved both of these problems.
Design of Future EESs
NASA’s Constellation Program designed the most advanced EES that manned space flight has ever seen. It consisted of a multi-car high-speed rail system and used gravity to get personnel to a safe haven (Figure 2.9). It was very accommodating to incapacitated crew members and limited g-forces on the people riding the cars with a passive electromagnetic braking system. There was even an option to extend the rails to an area outside the BDA directly into a triage site. For this system NASA relied on many different areas of expertise: Safety, Medical, Operations Personnel, and the Astronaut Office. This helped to meet all of the customer’s design requirements.
Other Considerations and Lessons Learned for an Effective EES
Other important safety factors needed for a good EES design deal with how the crew is extracted from the launch vehicle by rescue personnel:
• Limit or eliminate any steps or changes in elevation for walking personnel until they enter the EES.
• Provide rescue aides like platforms that are quickly put in place to help extract crew from the vehicle. Have these available in close proximity to the crew hatch. Another item along these lines is to provide hand-holds to help in getting incapacitated crew out of the vehicle as well.
• Provide ample room for two-way traffic on access arms or platforms in the egress path so as not to create a traffic jam of egressing personnel leaving and rescue personnel arriving. In addition, incapacitated crew rescue usually requires the use of a rolling rescue-chair (Figure 2.10). These need to be stored near the crew level of a launch tower and there needs to be room to accommodate them in an egress path.
• Keep the egress path shielded against possible fire and debris in order to block the heat from a burning vehicle.
• Recommend use of a water deluge system for the entire egress path on a launch tower to help with any fires or chemical leaks near the egress path. However, point any deluge nozzles away from the egressing crew’s face and field of vision. In addition, provide a non-slip surface for egress that the water may make slippery, like grating or anti-skid flooring.
• Provide emergency battery powered lights along the egress path to help guide personnel, especially during night launches. Along with this should be very visible directional floor markings to show the egress path.
• There needs to be communication (point-to-point) at the vehicle exit and in the safe haven with the Launch Control Center.
• Mission management also needs to know where the crew is at all times, so cameras placed along the egress path are usually required as well.
Keeping in mind these key safety requirements and lessons learned from past and current EES designs ensures an effective EES for future programs to come.
2.9 Environment Protection
Sandrine Richard, Estelle Champesting and Jean-Pierre Trinchero
Among the many parameters that lead to a launch site, the environment protection of this site is an important element. Before making the choice it is essential to evaluate all the environmental components and, in particular, to make an initial assessment of the environment (inventory of the fauna and flora, qualitative and quantitative identification of any protected species which may be present, etc.).
This inventory is the fundamental element for evaluating the impact of the space activity. It must be exhaustive, indisputable and transparent. It can be useful to rely on the support of independent partners such as accredited scientific organizations, environment protection associations, etc.
From this initial state, certain vulnerability points may appear. It is essential to take these into account for the location of the infrastructures, but also in the continuous or specific control and monitoring actions.
Regulatory Context
On a launch site, the regulatory context and the scope of activities of the state services are generally defined specifically and in coherence with the existing regulations relating to major conventional industrial risks applicable on the territory concerned. They are entrusted to a legally competent body representing the state in question. This body validates the necessary regulatory studies and verifies that they are correctly applied on site. These actions are followed by communication actions to the civil society’s different players in the context of the indispensable and unavoidable transparency with respect to the public.
At the Guiana Space Centre, CNES is responsible for the Safety and Security of persons, property and indissociably the environment as the representative of the French State (the launch state at the site).
To this end, CNES carries out or verifies the regulatory studies prior to the operation of the facilities, monitors the impact of space activities on the environment and implements the action plans at the Guiana Space Centre (one plan for each launch).
The launch activities are not continuous; however they have an impact on the local environment, which is monitored by an action plan.
The ground activities that have an effect on the environment concern, in particular, filling the payloads, water and energy consumption, as well as the production of hazardous waste. The facilities classified for protection of the environment (ICPE) are managed under a Prefectoral Operating Order, which requires the implementation of means to eliminate, limit or monitor the environmental impact. For example, the storage of hazardous products on containments; hazardous waste sorting, collection and treatment; the use of washing columns to treat the gas effluents from the payload filling.
Geographical and Ecological Context
In an integrated environmental approach, it is essential to carry out an initial environmental inventory of the site concerned before all space programs are developed.
This inventory is designed to identify the initial constraints (protected zones and/or species) and to evaluate the environmental changes over time.
For example, the Guiana Space Center has a surface area of 690 km2. Several Natural Zones of Interest for Ecology, Flora and Fauna (ZNIEFF) have been inventoried on the CSG’s territory. They show a very rich fauna: 464 species of birds; a colony of waders, which represent 75% of the totality of the red Ibises present in French Guiana; 48 species of mammals. The floral diversity is also very rich. All Guiana’s ecosystems are present on the CSG’s territory: primary forest, flooded savannahs, floodable savannahs, swamps, mangrove (Figure 2.11).
Action Plans and Results
The principal aim is to monitor the emissions and the effects of the launches on the environment. All these controls are used to monitor the environmental impact of the space activities. They include, in particular:
• Monitoring air quality; the quality of the industrial, surface and ground water; the quality of the sediments; the impact of the combustion cloud on the trees.
• Surveillance of the aquatic fauna of the surrounding watercourses and of the avifauna.
To put in place some of these measures, partnerships are generally developed with independent accredited organizations and with the nature conservation associations concerned.
Methodology
Methodology consists in:
• Identifying the main combustion products; with respect to the current solid propulsion, the main combustion products tested for are hydrochloric gas (HCl) and alumina particles (Al2O3); the focus is therefore on characterizing their interaction with the site’s ecosystem.
• Modeling and dispersion calculations: a qualified simulation model is used to evaluate the dispersion of the gas effluents from the launcher’s solid propellant motors. This simulation concerning the fallout inside the launch site perimeter and its nearby environment is used for an altitude of between 0 and 4 km, altitudes where the transport layer of the main combustion cloud to be characterized is to be found.
Simulation input data
• Characteristics of the launcher, propellant and combustion products.
• Geographical position of the launch zone (latitude, longitude) and geographical position of the measurement points on the ground (identification code, latitude, longitude).
• Meteorological data collected using radiosounding: wind direction strength, temperature, relative humidity for the atmospheric layers between 0 and 4000 m (in 100 m layers).
The output data are the combustion product concentrations in the environment close to and distant from the point of emission.
Analysis of Results for Ariane 5: Example
This is globally an environmental risk assessment focused on the launch, but transversal to the launch site activities, which also evaluates these risks in the event of a controlled neutralization of the launcher for flight safety reasons following a failure.
Air quality
At CSG and in the surrounding urban areas (Figure 2.11), the air analyses are carried out by automatic means at eight fixed sites (continuous measurement of the ground fallout of the combustion products for the two solid propellant stages) and at five sites which vary according to the meteorological conditions of the moment: 24 continuous air analysers are installed at the fixed sites.
In parallel to this, 45 open water containers are installed nearby and at a distance to monitor the ground fallout from the combustion cloud.
After analysis of the various samples the results are the following:
Ozone layer
Rockets equipped with solid propellant motors release great quantities of numerous gaseous and particulate reactive chemical compounds into the atmosphere. In the troposphere (layer between an altitude of 0 and 12 km) and the stratosphere (layer between an altitude of 15 and 45 km), it is the two solid propellant motors and the thruster’s cryogenic stage which burn. The solid booster stages contain the solid propellant and separate from the launcher at an altitude of approximately 70 km.
Studies are carried out to evaluate the impact of the release of chlorinated compounds from the thrusters on the stratospheric ozone at various altitudes. The active chlorine fraction (Cl, Cl2) compared to the inactive fraction (HCl) is one of the main parameters for quantifying the amplitude of the ozone depletion.
Physico-chemical quality of water
This involves monitoring the quality of the surface water. An automatic sampler is installed and several indicators are measured (pH, conductivity, chlorides, aluminium and sodium).
For the surface water, no variations in the various parameters are observed with respect to the initial state. The results are uniform and indicate, in particular, a dissolved aluminium concentration well below 5 mg/L (legal threshold defined in the Prefectoral Order). For the ground water, two sampling campaigns are performed each year and several physico-chemical parameters are also analysed (especially the pH, the hydrazinated products, etc.).
Vegetation
The throughfall analysis (anion and cation contents, pH, conductivity) indicates the vegetation’s ability to attenuate the pollution.
In the nearby zones, the impact is visible in the axis of the ducts. The concentration of the various physico-chemical parameters in the throughfall varies according to two criteria: the geographical positioning of the open containers and of the combustion cloud (with respect to the launch pad), and the rainfall of the moment. In the medium and far distance, there is no visible impact and the concentrations are of the same order of magnitude as the natural concentrations.
Noise and vibration
An appraisal, survey and consulting company in the geological risk sector carries out studies on the vibrational movements induced during a launch.
A series of measurements was carried out during the mission considered to be the most dimensioning. The vibration levels measured show that the maximum vibration levels felt at the CSG and in the surrounding urban areas are comparable to those observed during the day, during normal activities such as a vehicle passing 10 m away from the measurement sensor. In addition, the levels measured are more than 50 times less than the light damage threshold and more than 30 times less than the legal thresholds.
Aquatic fauna
The aquatic fauna has been studied since the start of the program; the monitoring is consolidated and specified over time. The monitoring is performed both on the watercourses within the launch site and the surrounding watercourses. The aim is to carry out verifications on the abundance, diversity, characterization of the habitat, dominant species, characteristics of the species (length and weight), sex and sexual maturity, diet, possible lesions and the aluminium contents in the flesh. No lesions or external malformations were observed in the fish.
The aluminium content in the muscles are very low and comparable with all the watercourses. The average content is slightly higher during the rainy season (compared to the dry season) and no bioaccumulation was observed (no relationship between fish weight and the aluminium content in their muscles, unlike mercury). Seasonal variations were observed in the populations which are more diversified during the dry season.
Avifauna, the wader colony and the dynamics of the CSG coastal ecosystems
The waders and coastal ecosystems are monitored to:
• estimate the density and locations of the nests of the various species by sample transect;
• estimate the reproductive success of the various species;
• make an exhaustive inventory of the nesting of the rare species.
No effect either on the behavior or on the quality of bird populations was detected. These populations are very rich.
Also, a new indicator has been defined after more than 10 years of data collection on the study of the residual alumina content in bird feathers (outer and inner feathers). It is designed to provide more precise results on the impact of the chlorine fallout liable to be generated by the launcher’s combustion and to interact with the alumina particles from the launches on the avifauna. The study is based on measuring eggshell thickness. It is inspired by research into the effect of acid rain in Europe, North America, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. This is because eggs seem to be sensitive to the action of alumina particles from the environment. In the case of acid rain, the alumina present in the ground is released more easily and then competes with the calcium essential to the eggshell production process and the growth of young chicks in the nest.
Communication of Results
Each action plan results in a report which is widely diffused to the nearby municipalities, to the relevant state departments, to the different scientific organizations and to the regulatory consultative structures. These reports contain information on the diversity of the animals and landscapes on the launch site territory and contribute to improving the knowledge of the fauna and flora in Guiana.
Ground Activities
The activities carried out on the ground are governed by the regulations specific to the territory concerned and generally applicable for major industrial risk control. These activities produce both liquid and gaseous waste. The liquid effluents mainly contain hydrazinated products, nitrogen oxides and perchlorates. The gaseous effluents basically contain hydrazinated compounds and nitrogen oxides, as well as compounds such as sulphur oxides or carbon dioxide when using the generators. The activities also produce solid waste such as batteries, electronic equipment, scrap metal, etc.
Treatment systems are implemented to manage this waste. The liquid effluents are treated by chemical means. Washing columns are used for the gaseous effluents from the satellite filling operations. They reduce the pollution by more than 99%. The liquid and solid wastes are collected and eliminated in approved centers.
Conclusion
Today, environment protection must be clearly a priority for a launch site in the same way as safety, performance, reliability and competitiveness. It is achieved, among other things, by a recognized environment management system which, in particular, involves an environmental analysis of the activities, an associated action plan and a strong and transparent communication with the stakeholders.
The rich and diverse ecosystem makes an ideal environment which must be monitored to understand it better and also to evaluate the changes with respect to the launch activities. It is a major opportunity for partnership with scientific research organizations, and this improved knowledge of the environment is also used to assess the vulnerabilities and the appropriate and ongoing protection measures over the long term. Research activities give a more precise understanding of the impacts through specific launcher impact studies, especially on the ozone layer, but also on the newly-formed products in the combustion cloud. Environment protection also means reducing the carbon footprint of our activities. The objectives are a 20% reduction in energy consumption by 2015. The use of renewable energy and building insulation are ways to reach this objective.
2.10 General Conclusion
Bernard Brandt and Jean-Pierre Trinchero
Generally, the rules concerning risk evaluation and accident prevention in pyrotechnic establishments and the regulations relating to Facilities Classified for Protection of the Environment guide the design of space vehicle launch facilities.
These rules define, in particular, the distance between buildings to be respected according to the feared effects. Figure 2.12 gives an example of the final setting chosen for Ariane 5 assembly buildings.
FIGURE 2.12 Final assembly building and Ariane 5 launcher integration building 650 m apart and linked by a railway for launcher transfers.
The quality of a safety design basically depends on the locations of the buildings and associated roadways which define the operating flexibility (independence of activities, access and escape routes, growth potential).
Further Reading
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5. Golde RH. Lightning Currents and Related Parameters. In: Golde RH, ed. Lightning. London: Academic Press; 1977.
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