Spacecraft Interoperability Hazards: Visiting Vehicles and Extravehicular Activity

Visiting vehicles and extravehicular activity

Spacecraft visiting with (i.e., docking or berthing) and extravehicular activities on and around the International Space Station are discussed together because the spacecraft charging hazard causes and effects are similar. In both cases, the hazard cause will be the flow of current that can be expected whenever two metallic objects at different floating potentials make galvanic contact in low Earth orbit. Possible hazard effects include both broadcast and conducted electromagnetic interference, surface damage due to arcing, and, in the case of extravehicular activities, electric shock to the extravehicular activity crew.

Visiting vehicle docking and separation hazards

The docking and separation of spacecraft at different floating potentials in low Earth orbit is specifically addressed in Assessment of International Space Station Plasma Contactor Utilization Plan (NASA Engineering and Safety Center, 2009; Keys, 2010; Koontz, 2010, export controlled and not publically available, request access by contacting authors). If both the docking and separating spacecraft meet or exceed the International Space Station’s electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic compatibility and grounding/bonding requirements, no hazards are possible and a verified grounding, bonding, and electromagnetic interference/electromagnetic compatibility immune design is the verified hazard control. No arcing damage is expected on docking surfaces at floating-potential differences up to 140 V. The Progress, Soyuz, Space Shuttle, Automated Transfer Vehicle, and H-II Transfer Vehicle are all capable of docking safely with the International Space Station independent of station or visiting vehicle floating potential, so no hazard reports are open on this subject.

The Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency’s H-II Transfer Vehicle incorporates a 117-V photovoltaic power system with exposed metallic interconnects between photovoltaic cells and is expected to maintain a floating potential that is near –100 V while the vehicle is in free flight in sunlight. Preflight analysis of the Space Station Remote Manipulator System capture of the H-II Transfer Vehicle-1 with subsequent berthing indicated no hazard, and both events proceeded smoothly. Floating-potential unit measurements made during the docked operations phase of the H-II Transfer Vehicle-1 verified the vehicle’s expected charging characteristics through comparison of floating-potential measurement unit measurements with Plasma Interaction Model predictions after the H-II Transfer Vehicle was inserted into the International Space Station Plasma Interaction Model (Kramer, Kerslake & Galofaro, 2010).

Some modifications to station operations and extravehicular activity safety procedures were mandated by H-II Transfer Vehicle-1 contributions to station charging and by the exposed 117-V metallic connectors and busses on the H-II Transfer Vehicle-1 photovoltaic array. The H-II Transfer Vehicle photovoltaic array cannot be shunted and is at or near full voltage whenever it is in sunlight, which can reduce the effectiveness of the station power control unit shunt fault detection, isolation, and recovery on plasma contactor unit failure. The International Space Station, in order to maintain compliance with extravehicular activity hazard control requirements, is reoriented to a –XVV flight attitude whenever an extravehicular activity must be conducted when the H-II Transfer Vehicle is docked to it. This –XVV flight attitude places most of the H-II Transfer Vehicle 117-V photovoltaic array in wake so the vehicle cannot contribute to station charging.

The use of resistors in “first-contact probes” – as a mean of limiting the magnitude of current flow when two spacecraft at different floating potentials come into contact – is completely ineffective for the kind of spacecraft charging processes encountered in low Earth orbit. The contact resistor is only effective if each spacecraft, when contact occurs, can be described as a simple charged capacitor that is no longer being actively charged by a current–voltage source. In that case, current flow between the two capacitors is limited by the resistor while the two capacitors come to the same floating potential. The dense, cold ionospheric plasma can readily and rapidly discharge such capacitors, and the effect is observed in International Space Station floating-potential measurement unit data in which the voltage floating potential tracks the motional electromotive force and photovoltaic array power production in sunlight.

If each spacecraft is being actively charged by the interaction of spacecraft electromotive force sources with the ionospheric plasma environment, current simply flows through the resistor while the voltage difference between the two spacecraft remains the same. The voltage drop appears across the resistor so that the two spacecraft, on docking or berthing contact, are still at different floating potentials and rapidly come to the same floating potential after contact.

Extravehicular activity hazards and hazard controls

It is useful, for purposes of electrical safety and spacecraft charging hazard analysis, to treat the U.S. extravehicular mobility unit (a space suit) and associated tools as an independent spacecraft and not as a garment. The accumulation of condensed moisture combined with perspiration in the extravehicular mobility unit can bathe the extravehicular activity crew member in an electrolyte that reduces transdermal electrical resistance and makes the suit occupant susceptible to electric shock from low-voltages that would normally be viewed as harmless in a dry-skin environment (Kramer et al., 2010). The extravehicular activity crew member and electrolyte-soaked interior of the extravehicular mobility unit can make electrical contact with hardware outside of the U.S. space suit through the many extravehicular mobility unit metallic structures and components in contact with both the interior and the exterior of the garment, hereafter referred to as feedthroughs (Kramer et al., 2010).

The extravehicular mobility unit configuration enables four specific kinds of electrical shock to extravehicular mobility unit-suited International Space Station crew members during extravehicular activities:

1. Direct contact with both high-positive voltage electrical equipment and the International Space Station structure ground via extravehicular mobility unit metallic feedthroughs that complete a conventional hard conductor shock circuit through the occupant of the extravehicular mobility unit that is likely to be lethal to the occupant.

2. Direct contact with high-positive voltage electrical equipment through only one extravehicular mobility unit metallic feedthrough while the space suit is in contact with ionospheric plasma. The extravehicular mobility unit and its occupant come to a high-positive voltage rapidly, and the shock circuit is completed by ionospheric plasma charging of the suit capacitance and flow of ionospheric current collected by exposed extravehicular mobility unit metallic feedthroughs. The shock event is likely to prove lethal to the suit occupant.

3. Direct contact with International Space Station structure ground when the station floating potential is more negative than –40 V. In this case, the extravehicular mobility unit and its occupant are charged to the station floating potential and collection of current from the ionosphere charges extravehicular mobility unit capacitance, including any aluminum with thin chromic acid anodic coatings. The local arc plasma that results from dielectric breakdown arcing of the thin anodic coatings on the extravehicular mobility unit can then close a circuit through the ionospheric plasma that discharges the entire station capacitance through the suit’s occupant. The outcome is likely to be lethal to the occupant.

4. Direct contact with International Space Station low-positive floating potential conducting structure at only one extravehicular mobility unit metallic feedthrough while in contact with the ionospheric plasma. The extravehicular mobility unit and its occupant come to a low-positive voltage rapidly, and the shock circuit is completed by ionospheric plasma current charging the suit’s capacitance and the direct flow of ionospheric current collected by exposed extravehicular mobility unit metallic feedthroughs via the suit’s occupant to the station ground. While the shock event may result in minor injury to the extravehicular mobility unit’s occupant, it is generally not expected to be directly lethal. The noxious stimuli from the shock event in combination with human factors associated with the stressful and intrinsic hazard of the environment during extravehicular activity poses a hazard that could be lethal.

The U.S. extravehicular mobility unit, by design, provides its occupant with no verified electrical hazard protections. Instead this electrical safety function was assigned, early in the design and development phase of the unit, to the spacecraft on which the extravehicular mobility unit operates. A safe extravehicular activity environment is maintained on the International Space Station as described below. The extravehicular activity shock hazards depicted in hazard report ISS-EVA-312 (report not publicly available, request access by contacting the authors) and associated nonconformance reports (i.e., risk acceptance waivers) are present for both negative and positive values of the station floating potential. The negative floating-potential hazard is controlled by both the two plasma contactor units and the fault detection, isolation, and recovery software package that shunts the 160-V photovoltaic arrays (reducing the photovoltaic string voltage to near zero) on failure of one power control unit. The negative floating-potential hazard is then controlled in a two-fault-tolerant manner as required for any possibly catastrophic hazard on the International Space Station.

The positive floating-potential hazard is present only at the extreme ends of the truss when the power control units are operating; i.e., the primary controls for the negative floating-potential hazard are the cause of the positive hazard. The positive voltage hazard can also be controlled by flying the International Space Station in attitudes (e.g., YVV or truss aligned with the velocity vector) that minimize or eliminate magnetic-induction voltages at extravehicular activity work sites and translation paths.

The YVV flight attitude is one example of an operational hazard control that manages station extravehicular activity shock hazards by managing the International Space Station’s charging causes. If acceptable levels of electrical power production can be achieved in the corresponding photovoltaic array configuration, selected photovoltaic array wings can be shunted or wake-pointed to eliminate their contributions to vehicle charging, thus meeting the station extravehicular activity safety floating-potential requirement. “Wake pointing” the active electron-collecting surface eliminates hazardous electron collection because plasma density is much lower in wake than it is in ram. Ionospheric plasma diffuses into the spacecraft wake in a process referred to as ambipolar diffusion, in which the rapidly moving electrons separate from the slower ions and the resulting electrostatic field limits movement of electrons into wake. The Plasma Interaction Model, floating-potential measurement unit data, and space weather date from several ground based and satellite assets are combined to design verifiable operational extravehicular activity hazard controls for each station extravehicular activity.

Both negative and positive floating-potential extravehicular activity hazards are mitigated to some degree by the extravehicular mobility unit itself, which does offer limited, although unplanned, protection from electrical hazards. The probability of making electric contact with the International Space Station is on the order of 1/10,000 after limited extravehicular mobility unit tool modifications that were designed to isolate large metallic components for the interior of the suit. The low probability of contact and reduced current collection from the ionospheric plasma reduces the likelihood and severity of electric shock and provides the basis for risk acceptance waiver NCR-ISS-232 (not publicly available, contact authors to request access), which accepts the risk presented by the positive voltage hazard on an extravehicular activity-by-extravehicular activity basis. The risk is of comparable likelihood to that posed by micro-meteoroid penetration of the extravehicular mobility unit during extravehicular activity.

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8.7 Spacecraft Contamination Hazard

Carlos E. Soares, Ronald R. Mikatarian and Steven L. Koontz

Spacecraft Contamination Causes

Spacecraft contamination is typically caused by a combination of materials outgassing, thruster operations, venting of gases and liquids, and the generation and release of particulates.

Outgassing from materials is a product of the release of volatile components contained in the materials with vacuum exposure. Nonmetallic materials are typically the most significant sources of outgassing contamination on spacecraft. For example, organic silicone-based materials such as room-temperature vulcanizing silicones outgas a variety of substances – including silicones compounds – that can produce significant contamination impacts on sensitive surfaces.

Thruster operations induce both contamination and erosion on exposed surfaces. Chemical thrusters typically produce a two-phase plume. While the majority of the effluent is in the gas phase, combusted and partially combusted by-products are also present in the liquid phase. Contamination (and erosion) from the liquid phase affects surfaces operating at any temperature. Contamination from the gas phase is limited to surfaces that are cold enough to condense the gaseous species.

Particulate releases also produce contamination. Particulate matter originates from ground contamination (introduced during assembly and storage), from degradation of coatings and materials, and with venting operations.

Thruster Plume Impingement Contamination and Erosion of Critical Surfaces

Thruster plumes produce on exposed surfaces contamination and mechanical erosion that can impact optical properties and performance of spacecraft systems, such as solar arrays, radiators, cameras, star trackers and sensors, and science payload operations. These plumes can also introduce hazards to extravehicular activities due to potential contact with toxic contamination deposits.

Bipropellant chemical thrusters, which are widely employed on spacecraft, use hypergolic components – typically monomethyl hydrazine or unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine – as the fuel and nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) as the oxidizer. Unburned and partially burned propellant is present in the exhaust plume in the form of liquid particles. The liquid phase serves as the dominant transport mechanism for contamination (i.e., nonvolatile residue) in the exhaust plume for typical receiver surface temperatures (Soares, Mikatarian & Barsamian, 2002). Furthermore, the gases in the exhaust plume accelerate these propellant particles to high velocities (1–3 km/s) due to gas drag forces. The effect of these high-velocity particles impacting sensitive surfaces, such as the solar arrays and active radiators, is akin to the impact of micrometeoroid and orbital debris particles. The flux of particles in thruster plumes is much larger than the flux of micrometeoroid and orbital debris particles of comparable diameter, however. Given the comparably high flux of thruster plume particles, the plume erosion/pitting effect is of great concern to the International Space Station Program as well as to other programs (Pankop, Alred & Boeder, 2006).

Three space flight experiments that studied plume-induced effects were the Shuttle Plume Impingement Experiment on STS-52, the Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment on STS-64, and the Plume Impingement Contamination flight experiment on STS-74 (a mission to the Mir space station). The Plume Impingement Contamination flight experiment studied plume contamination from both U.S. and Russian thrusters. Both the Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment and the Plume Impingement Contamination flight experiment demonstrated pitting from plume particles (Soares & Mikatarian, 2002; Larin, Lumpkin & Stuart, 2001).

A Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment aluminum witness coupon, which was plumed by the Space Shuttle Reaction Control System thrusters, is shown in Figure 8.7.1. Plume particle pits in the range of 1 to 10 μm are shown in this figure, although plume particle pits as large as 24 μm have been observed. A post-flight examination of a glass camera lens on the Plume Impingement Contamination flight experiment also revealed impact features on the surface. It should be noted that impact features on the Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment and the Plume Impingement Contamination flight experiment samples were not visible to the unaided eye. Surface pits were observed with a scanning electron microscope.

image

FIGURE 8.7.1 Plume particle impact features on the Shuttle Plume Impingement Flight Experiment witness aluminum coupon.

Monopropellant thrusters also produce contamination and erosion. Hydrazine, a typical monopropellant, contains a certain amount of nonvolatile residue that produces a permanent contaminant deposit on exposed surfaces. Condensation of gaseous effluents from monopropellants can also cause contamination, but this contamination is limited to surfaces operating at temperatures low enough to condense the gas-phase species. Erosion from monopropellant thrusters is caused by the release of catalyst bed particulates in the plume. Such particulates can erode optically sensitive surfaces and are a source of performance degradation.

Fluid Venting and Dumping

Venting of gases and liquids to vacuum is also a source of contamination to spacecraft systems. Vented gases, depending on effluent composition and receiver surface temperatures, can condense on surfaces. For long-duration space systems, as in the case of the International Space Station, trace contaminants of organic nature can significantly contaminate surfaces near vent ports, as observed on the station’s amine bed-based carbon dioxide scrubbing systems.

Venting or dumping of liquids can produce even more pronounced impacts. Venting of propellant to empty lines after refueling operations can produce significant levels of transient contamination on receiver surfaces. Propellant contamination can impact extravehicular activities as contaminated areas will require vacuum exposure to ensure deposits have sublimated. Liquid venting can also induce mechanical damage to surfaces with thin coatings.

The molecular column density (gas density along a payload line of sight) and any released particulates and contaminants may affect viewing payloads for vacuum venting of gases.

Vacuum venting can produce not only direct contact but also an orbital recontact hazard. This venting produces a large flux of ice particles that can recontact the spacecraft every half orbit. The risk of recontact can be mitigated through control of vehicle attitude to prevent orbital recontact with ice particles. Feathering of moving hardware, such as solar arrays and photovoltaic radiators, can be used to mitigate mechanical damage due to ice particle impacts.

Particulate Releases

Particulate matter can originate from ground contamination (particulate matter remaining on both spacecraft surfaces and inaccessible areas from assembly or storage, or particulate matter that is transported during launch) as well as from on-orbit sources (e.g., mechanisms and degradation of vacuum-exposed materials). On-orbit disturbances, such as thruster operations during re-boost and attitude control as well as extravehicular activity operations, can dislodge and disperse particulates.

Contamination Hazard Effects

Contamination can produce hazard effects on spacecraft as contaminant deposits can degrade the performance of spacecraft systems, restrict the spacecraft operational envelope and extravehicular activity operations, and damage mechanisms.

Degraded Performance of Navigation Instruments

Spacecraft navigation instruments such as star trackers are sensitive to optical performance and can be affected by contaminant deposits that are a source of optical errors. Contamination of star tracker windows can affect performance of the star tracker, which requires a high level of sensitivity. Dispersion of particulates that reflect light can also affect the operation of star trackers by introducing features that can confuse star identification algorithms.

Degraded Performance of Thermal Control Surfaces

The thermo-optical properties of spacecraft surfaces are impacted by the combined effects of contaminant deposition and exposure to the space environment. Ultraviolet radiation and atomic oxygen exposure promote changes in the optical properties of contaminant layers. This process is continuous, and the contaminants are deposited gradually in conjunction with ultraviolet radiation and atomic oxygen exposure. The contaminant layer darkens and consequently degrades the thermo-optical properties of the affected surfaces.

Spacecraft thermal control surfaces have requirements for end-of-life properties to support the design mission. Degradation of thermo-optical properties limits heat-rejection capabilities. The consequences of this can range from impaired function and operational constraints to loss of the affected system (e.g., when an electronic system exceeds its operating temperature range and is shut down or fails).

Degradation of the thermo-optical properties of vehicle systems must be carefully evaluated, as system failures leading to unplanned extravehicular activity removal and replacement of hardware introduce operational hazards.

Hardware lifetime is highly dependent on optical properties, which may degrade over time due to space environment effects. Induced effects that can degrade optical properties include molecular deposition due to outgassing and water vent/thruster plume contaminant deposition and erosion. Degradation of optical properties affects the thermal performance and can result in hardware becoming hotter or colder than its thermal design environment. Similarly, degradation of optical properties can also limit the attitudes in which the vehicle can fly or require that hardware be replaced sooner than planned.

Damage to Mechanisms

Contamination can also produce damage to mechanisms, such as rotary joints and rail systems. Damage to mechanisms can be caused by molecular contamination films as well as by deposition of particulates.

Contamination Hazard Controls

Contamination hazards can be controlled during the design phase of a spacecraft. Analysis tools are used to model contamination and support trade studies. The results of these studies are used during materials selection; design of venting paths; and design, placement, and orientation of vacuum vent and thrusters.

Design Rules and Guidelines

An important design guideline is to define and characterize the sources of contamination on the spacecraft. For materials, the required definition includes not only the identification of the materials but also the distribution of the materials on the spacecraft and the vacuum-exposed surface area as well as the operating temperature regime.

Materials selection

Outgassing from materials is a significant source of contamination on spacecraft, so materials selection plays a critical role in contamination control.

The identification, location, vacuum-exposed surface area, operating temperature range, and condensable outgassing rate data for materials must be compiled to support trade studies and characterize outgassing-induced contamination sources. Condensable materials outgassing rates are obtained through ASTME 1559 (Standard Test Method for Contamination Outgassing Characteristics of Spacecraft Materials) or equivalent testing.

Contamination transport analysis

Several models have been developed for contaminant transport analysis. Ray tracing and Monte Carlo algorithms are widely used in contaminant transport modeling of neutral species with negligible effects from intermolecular collisions (long mean free paths). Modern contamination analysis tools can support detailed geometric models (with tens of thousands of surface elements) and account for both moving surfaces (as in the case of Sun-tracking solar arrays and movable radiators) and the interaction of multiple spacecraft (as in the case of spacecraft rendezvous and proximity operations: docking and undocking).

Thruster plume impact analysis

Thruster plume-induced contamination and erosion analysis requires models for the liquid and gas phases of the plume and a droplet/particle impact model to assess surface impacts. The availability of flight data on plume-induced contamination and erosion is limited, however.

Design margin

As contaminant deposition and effects are cumulative in nature, establishing design margins requires careful consideration of how accrual of established margins will propagate on system lifetime analyses. This is an important consideration for long-duration systems in which contamination accumulates over long periods of time (as in the case of the International Space Station).

Operational Hazard Control

Risk can be mitigated through operational hazard controls once the hazards are indentified. Hazard Reports and Flight Rules are typically used by NASA to document hazard operational and control strategies.

In-flight bake-out

Vacuum exposure in conjunction with thermal cycling can provide for in-flight bake-out of materials. Such an approach was used on the International Space Station when the first element – the Russian-built Functional Cargo Block module – was deployed 1.5 years before the Active Thermal Control System radiators. The extended on-orbit residence time of the Functional Cargo Block reduced contaminant deposition on the Active Thermal Control System surfaces and prevented additional optical property degradation of the radiator surfaces.

Vehicle attitude control

Chemical thrusters are typically used for spacecraft attitude control. As previously discussed, these thrusters induce contamination and erosion on surfaces exposed to the plumes.

International Space Station Examples

During a typical year of International Space Station operations, induced environments are produced with thruster operations (i.e., station re-boost and attitude control as well as proximity operations of the Space Shuttle Orbiter and Russian, European, and Japanese visiting vehicles) and with the operation of vacuum vents, which vent a variety of gases and, in some cases, liquids to space.

Unique challenges were encountered during the design, assembly, and operation of the International Space Station. Mitigation strategies were developed to protect the station from induced environment effects, and to develop risk mitigation and safing constraints to protect the vehicle and its science utilization capabilities. These mitigation strategies include protecting the crew from exposure to thruster-induced contamination during extravehicular activities as well as protection of vehicle systems from thruster plume effects and operations, vacuum venting of liquids, and optical property degradation. Examples are provided in the following sections that illustrate both the issues and risk mitigation strategies and the safing constraints that were developed to resolve these issues. These strategies are applicable to the development of future long-duration space systems, not only during the design phase but also during assembly and operation of such systems.

Extravehicular Activity Toxic Propellant Residue Hazard

Thruster-induced contamination also produces hazards to extravehicular activity because fuel/oxidizer reaction products contain toxic by-products (fuel–oxidizer reaction products). The Boeing Space Environments Team supported the International Space Station Program by coordinating with our International Partner Russia and the Extravehicular Activity and Safety Teams to develop hazard mitigation through Flight Rules defining extravehicular activity crew keep-out zones (Schmidl et al., 2006). Later, the Boeing Space Environments Team coordinated fuel–oxidizer reaction products testing at the NASA White Sands Test Facility to obtain the additional data needed to provide extravehicular activity constraint relief.

The U.S. control moment gyros maintain the vehicle attitude of the International Space Station by compensating for disturbances. However, when the docking compartment (Russian segment airlock) of the station is depressurized for extravehicular activities, the Service Module attitude control thrusters must be fired because the control moment gyros have insufficient margin of momentum to compensate for the disturbance and must therefore be desaturated. The thruster firings result in fuel–oxidizer reaction products contamination of the adjacent Service Module surfaces.

The International Space Station propellant is unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine and the oxidizer is N2O4. Thruster firings produce fuel–oxidizer reaction products that can contaminate adjacent surfaces around the thrusters. There is concern – for extravehicular activities on the aft end of the Service Module of the Russian segment of station – that when extravehicular activity crew members translate around the fuel–oxidizer reaction products-contaminated area, these crew members could inadvertently brush against the fuel–oxidizer reaction products and transfer some of the products to their suits.

Fuel–oxidizer reaction products are composed of both volatile and nonvolatile components. How fast the volatile components leave varies. One component present in fuel–oxidizer reaction products represents the greatest toxicological concern to the crew: the carcinogen N-nitrosodimethylamine (NDMA). NDMA is a volatile that poses an inhalation concern if introduced into the International Space Station atmosphere. In addition, NDMA can be formed when other components in the dried fuel–oxidizer reaction products, such as dimethyl ammonium nitrite and nitrate, are reintroduced into a humid environment such as the station’s cabin. Hence, the concern is that if fuel–oxidizer reaction products (on a suit) are brought back into the humid environment of the station cabin, NDMA can be released into the atmosphere, thus exposing the crew to a carcinogen.

Because of the presence of fuel–oxidizer reaction products on Service Module surfaces adjacent to the roll thrusters and the potential for fuel–oxidizer reaction products contamination of the extravehicular activity crew, additional extravehicular activity constraints had to be implemented in these areas. These constraints were initially established through a nonconformance report that discussed the removal of the Russian Kromka 1-0 flight experiment and installation of the Kromka 1-1 experiment as well as in subsequent International Space Station Program Safety Review Panel discussions.

The extravehicular activity constraints were initially developed because the Kromka experiment is in close proximity to the Service Module thrusters, and extravehicular activity crew members would need to enter that area. These constraints include: establishing, before the extravehicular activity crew members could enter the area, a 1-m keep-out zone around the thrusters for 2.5 hours after the last Service Module thrusters fire; procedures for inspecting the extravehicular activity suits before ingress back into the airlock; and procedures for wiping the gloves and suits with towels that are jettisoned to retrograde. Once the crew members are inside the station, their extravehicular activity gloves are also bagged to mitigate any potential risk from fuel–oxidizer reaction products.

Because extravehicular activities are generally time constrained, the International Space Station Program approved a test program at the NASA White Sands Test Facility to obtain fuel–oxidizer reaction products test data that could be used to determine whether extravehicular activity constraints could be relaxed. The test program was conducted in 2003 and 2004.

Fuel–oxidizer reaction products contamination of the Service Module surfaces, release of NDMA in a humid environment from crew extravehicular activity suits (if the suits happen to be contaminated with fuel–oxidizer reaction products), and toxicological risk associated with NDMA release were calculated. It was determined that fuel–oxidizer reaction products and NDMA evaporate rapidly and their concentration drops off rapidly with distance from the thrusters. For the nadir (cold-side) case, the fuel–oxidizer reaction products remaining after 1 hour were found to be 36% of the initial mass. For the zenith (hot-side) case, the fuel–oxidizer reaction products remaining after 1 hour were found to be 22% of the initial mass.

The NASA Johnson Space Center Toxicology Group found that the highest calculated cancer risk from projected NDMA concentrations is less than 8.46E–5 (–40°C, 0.08 m distance from the thrusters). This group, with the concurrence of the National Research Council Spacecraft Maximum Allowable Concentrations Subcommittee, accepts a cancer risk of 1/10,000 (i.e., 1.0E–4) in deriving spacecraft maximum allowable concentrations on carcinogenic compounds, such as benzene.

Based on the results of the NASA White Sands Test Facility laboratory tests performed in 2003 and 2004, subsequent analyses, and the NASA Johnson Space Center Toxicology Group assessment of cancer risk, it was determined that the constraints could be reduced and the time to remain outside the 1-m keep-out zone could be reduced to 1 hour. Procedures for inspecting the extravehicular activity suits and clean-up procedures were retained. The constraints are documented in the International Space Station Program Flight Rules. The reduction in keep-out zone time results in a significant time savings for extravehicular activity planning.

Thruster Plume Impingement Erosion of Critical Surfaces

Optically sensitive surfaces typically employ special coatings that are applied to enhance optical performance and/or to provide environmental protection. For sensitive International Space Station surfaces, mechanical damage from thruster plume particle impacts has significant implications. Optically sensitive surfaces on the station can be damaged (or eroded) when impacted by high-velocity droplets/particles from unburned and partially burned liquid propellant present in bipropellant thruster plumes.

Sensitive surfaces that may see a great number of thruster firings during International Space Station operations include the station photovoltaic solar arrays and the cameras located on the Space Station Remote Manipulator System and mounted along the station truss structure.

Plume contamination and erosion models were developed to support the definition of acceptable solar array and camera positions/orientations during specific thruster operations. These constraints protect the performance of the International Space Station electrical power system and cameras, which are vital both to vehicle and to science operations.

Another thruster-induced contamination of concern is the hazard to crew members performing extravehicular activities from exposure to fuel–oxidizer reaction products that deposit on adjacent surfaces. The fuel–oxidizer reaction products contain toxic by-products that may be transferred to the extravehicular activity suit through inadvertent contact. When a crew member re-enters the moist International Space Station cabin environment, fuel–oxidizer re-action products may release carcinogens into the atmosphere that pose a toxicological risk to the crew. This hazard will be discussed in a later section.

International Space Station solar arrays

Protection of the U.S. solar arrays from International Space Station thruster plume contamination and erosion impacts has significant implications for solar array operations during thruster firing events. Figure 8.7.2 identifies the station solar arrays for the 15A assembly stage configuration and demonstrates station thruster plume impingement on a solar array. The U.S. solar arrays have 2 degrees of rotational freedom: the first about the International Space Station truss (α) and the second about the solar array wing centerline (β). The solar array rotates in both axes during quiescent operations to track the Sun.

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FIGURE 8.7.2 International Space Station solar array configuration for the 15A assembly stage (top) and example view of a station attitude control thruster to a solar array (bottom).

The Boeing Space Environments Team in Houston, TX, developed an approach to modeling thruster plume-induced erosion of International Space Station solar array surface materials. This approach combines number density and velocity distribution of unburned fuel droplets (particles) in a thruster plume with a damage matrix for solar array surface materials based on impact simulations for various particle sizes, impingement angles, and velocities. Available thruster firing data are used to simulate thruster firings and calculate thruster-induced erosion to the station solar arrays (Pankop, Alred & Boeder, 2006).

The Boeing team has also conducted analyses simulating bipropellant thruster particles impacting International Space Station solar arrays across various solar array α/β angle pairs. The results of these analyses show that the particle impingement angle greatly affects surface damage, with normal impacts being the most severe. Particles with highly oblique impact angles (~75° off-normal) will essentially skid off surfaces without producing any damage, however. The analysis results also show that solar arrays positioned around 30° from a plume centerline (or farther) are typically nearly free of plume particle impact damage. This is because the majority of plume particles are located near the plume centerline (Pankop, Alred & Boeder, 2006).

The Boeing Space Environments Team was tasked to determine solar array α/β angle pairs for which thruster plume erosion would be minimal. It is not feasible to completely eliminate plume erosion impacts, as this would result in extreme restrictions on solar array operations. Therefore, solar array positions that induce no greater than 1% surface area damage per year are considered acceptable as they allow significant operational flexibility.

This criterion is largely a function of the position of the solar array from the centerline of the thruster plume, because the majority of plume particles are located near the plume centerline. If the solar array α joint can be sufficiently rotated away from the plume centerline, the β joint can rotate freely to optimize the view to the sun. Otherwise, both the solar array α- and β-rotations must be fixed, or “feathered,” such that the plume impingement angle to a solar array surface is greater than 75° from the normal (Pankop, Alred & Boeder, 2006).

Current thruster-induced erosion events of concern for the International Space Station solar arrays include thruster firings for station attitude control and visiting vehicle thruster firings during approach and separation proximity operations. Feathering angles to mitigate plume erosion have been defined for each type of thruster firing event. A sample table of allowable solar array α/β angle pairs for station attitude control thruster firings is shown in Figure 8.7.3. This sample table gives allowable positions (shown in grey) for the P4-2A solar array.

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FIGURE 8.7.3 Example of solar array feathering constraints for International Space Station attitude control.

Proximity operations add complexity to plume erosion mitigation. Solar arrays may need to be positioned to minimize plume erosion from the incoming (or departing) vehicle’s thruster firings. The International Space Station’s thrusters also fire to maintain station attitude during proximity operations. Consequently, solar arrays must be positioned to mitigate plume erosion from both the visiting vehicle and the concurrent station thruster firings for attitude control. Space Shuttle Orbiter proximity operations provide a good example of this scenario, as shown in Figure 8.7.4. When compared to Figure 8.7.3 (the α/β pairs that mitigate plume erosion from International Space Station attitude control thruster firings alone), it is evident that the added element of Space Shuttle Orbiter thruster firings dramatically affects the allowable solar array positions.

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FIGURE 8.7.4 Example of solar array feathering constraints for Space Shuttle Orbiter proximity operations with concurrent International Space Station attitude control.

Operational constraints for plume erosion mitigation are coordinated in conjunction with other solar array operational constraints (e.g., power, thermal, and plume-induced structural loads). An integrated operational solution is then implemented to ensure system-wide performance during thruster firing events.

International Space Station cameras

International Space Station mobile camera assets, which are essential to the vehicle’s construction and maintenance, are also protected from thruster-induced erosion and contamination through modeling and development of keep-out zones for camera operations.

Simulations of visiting vehicle approach to and separation from the International Space Station are used when developing contamination/erosion planes (contour plots) that are employed to define keep-out zones for station robotic camera assets. These keep-out zones are used to protect the Space Station Remote Manipulator System as well as truss-mounted robotic cameras from incursions into regions with potentially high particle flux.

The definition of contamination/erosion planes is of particular importance for the planning and execution of camera operations, since camera assets are mobile and several translation paths, positions, and viewing directions are examined when defining operational constraints.

A sample erosion plane plot for a Russian vehicle approach to the International Space Station Mini-Research Module-1 nadir docking port is shown in Figure 8.7.5. The results are in units of percent surface area pitted. White regions, which include a “shadow” of the station, have off-scale low erosion.

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FIGURE 8.7.5 Erosion plane plot for Russian vehicle approach of the International Space Station Mini-Research Module-1 nadir docking port.

Keep-out zones in the form of conical volumes originating at thruster nozzles are also sometimes generated for application to the three-dimensional International Space Station computer models used when planning camera movements. The shapes of the cones are influenced by thruster properties and expected firing times for the event(s) of concern.

In 2009, removable plastic covers were installed in front of the Space Station Remote Manipulator System camera lenses specifically to provide erosion protection when visiting vehicle proximity operations require the cameras to view the approaching or separating vehicle.

These measures have been proven to be successful, as robotic camera assets continue to operate without optical performance degradation from erosion effects while they are being used to monitor the approach of automated vehicles to the International Space Station.

Fluid Venting and Dumping

In addition to water, propellants (unsymmetrical dimethyl hydrazine and N2O4) can be purged from the Service Module, Docking Compartment 1, Functional Cargo Block, and Mini-Research Module-2 on the International Space Station. Similar feathering constraints are imposed during propellant purges.

Experiments were performed aboard the International Space Station to record, with cameras located on the Space Station Remote Manipulator System, the U.S. Laboratory’s condensate venting and Russian propellant purging events. Images of the vent plume were acquired close to both the port and the starboard vent nozzles (Figure 8.7.6); images for the propellant purge were acquired for both the fuel and the oxidizer purge ports on the aft end of the Service Module.

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FIGURE 8.7.6 U.S. Laboratory water venting.

Data from the video images were analyzed to obtain the characteristics of the vent, including the duration of the vent event, the approximate cone angle encompassing the core of the vent plume, the number of particles outside the core plume, and the velocities of the ice particles. Data from these experiments were used to develop an updated model of the U.S. Laboratory condensate vent plume and to better characterize the Russian fuel and oxidizer purge plumes.

U.S. Laboratory water dump damage mitigation and operational constraints

The port-side U.S. Laboratory condensate water nozzle has been converted to a hydrogen vent for the Oxygen Generator System. Figure 8.7.7 shows the field of view from the starboard-side U.S. Laboratory condensate water nozzle for International Space Station assembly complete. The solar arrays, with engineering margin, are just inside the impact zone. This would not be an acceptable position for assembly complete, however. The U.S. Laboratory hardware can be seen in the left section of the view.

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FIGURE 8.7.7 Field of view from starboard-side U.S. Laboratory condensate water dump nozzle. The solar array is just inside the impact zone with engineering margin.

An example of the allowable feathering angles for solar array wings is shown in Figure 8.7.8. The table in this figure, which was developed based on defined constraints, gives allowable solar array α/β feathering angle pair combinations that will mitigate damage from U.S. Laboratory water starboard-side nozzle dumps. The grey region represents the allowable solar array wing positions. In this table, the port-side solar array rotary joint α-rotations are defined down the left side of the table.

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FIGURE 8.7.8 Example of U.S. Laboratory starboard-side condensate water dump allowable solar array feathering angles for the S6-1B solar array wing for β gimbal assembly β-rotations from 0° to 100°. The grey zone is the allowable solar array wing positions.

The β gimbal assembly β-rotations from 0° to 100° are defined along the top of the table. Similar tables have been developed for Space Shuttle Orbiter water dumps.

Space Shuttle Orbiter water dump damage mitigation and operational constraints

Figure 8.7.9 shows the field of view from the Space Shuttle Orbiter dump nozzle for a solar array rotated out of the high-impact zone and with the solar array feathered so that impacts are on the back side of the array at a shallow angle. The solar array is feathered to ensure there are no impacts on the active side of the array, and so impacts on the back of the array are at a shallow angle. The Japanese Aerospace Exploration Agency payload sites can be seen just below the center of the plume. Urine dumping was discontinued with the deployment of the Japanese modules.

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FIGURE 8.7.9 Field of view from the Space Shuttle Orbiter water dump nozzle. The solar array is feathered and rotated out of the impact zone with engineering margin.

Allowable feathering angle α/β pair combinations, which are similar to those discussed earlier for U.S. Laboratory condensate water dumps, have been developed for Space Shuttle Orbiter water dumps.

This approach is used to develop the constraints needed to mitigate damage to International Space Station hardware from U.S. Laboratory and Space Shuttle Orbiter water dumps. The results of these studies show that during water dump operations, the station solar arrays can be parked at select angles that will protect the solar array and radiator surfaces from impact damage from liquid/ice particles.

Particulate Releases and Foreign Objects and Debris

Release and dispersion of particulates and foreign objects and debris can pose a threat to sensors (e.g., star trackers) as well as to exposed mechanisms. Events of this nature occurred on the International Space Station when the solar array rotary joints were examined and cleaned due to an accumulation of metallic particulates from the degradation of solar array rotary joint mechanisms (loss of coating on rollers). The solar array rotary joint maintenance events took place when the Space Shuttle was mated to the station, which increased the number of surfaces of concern.

Particulate dispersion and deposition were modeled to support the identification of potential impacts and hazards to both vehicle and crew. The mitigation strategy included closing the Space Shuttle star trackers to prevent particle deposition.

References

1. Larin M, Lumpkin F, Stuart P. Modeling unburned propellant droplet distribution and velocities in plumes of small bipropellant thrusters. AIAA Paper 2001–2816. The 39th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting and Exhibit Reno, NV: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics; 2001.

2. Pankop C, Alred J, Boeder P. Mitigation of thruster plume erosion of International Space Station solar array coatings. Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets. 2006;43(3):545–550.

3. Schmidl WD, et al. Mitigating potential water dump particle impact damage to the International Space Station. Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets. 2006;43(3):551–556.

4. Schmidl WD, et al. N-nitrosodimethylamine release from fuel oxidizer reaction product contaminated extravehicular activity suits. Journal of Spacecraft and Rockets. 2006;43(3):557–564.

5. Soares CE, Mikatarian RR. Thruster plume induced contamination measurements from the PIC and SPIFEX flight experiments. International Symposium on Optical Science and Technology. Vol. 4774-20 Bellingham, WA: Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers (International Society for Optical Engineering); 2002.

6. Soares C, Mikatarian R, Barsamian H. International Space Station bipropellant plume contamination model AIAA Paper 2002-3016 The 40th AIAA Aerospace Sciences Meeting and Exhibit. Portsmouth, VA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics; 2002.

8.8 End-of-Life Debris Mitigation Measures

Nicholas Johnson

Until 2007 the majority of debris in Earth orbit that is hazardous to operational spacecraft originated from the explosive breakups of non-functional spacecraft and rocket bodies. The frequency of such events since 1961 has not only been significant (as high as seven in 1999), but also large quantities of debris were often ejected into long-lived orbits, where they posed increasing risks to vital space operations. By contrast the accidental breakup of operational spacecraft and rocket bodies has been relatively rare.

Beginning in the 1970s NASA, with the assistance of the U.S. Department of Defense and industry, sought to determine the reasons for such behavior with an aim of implementing effective countermeasures via corrective vehicle designs and operational practices. This highly successful effort led to the development of orbital debris mitigation guidelines, first at the national and later at the international level. Many of these guidelines are directed at preventing the generation of long-lived orbital debris after mission termination.

Principal Causes of Post-Mission Fragmentations

The analyses of nearly 150 accidental on-orbit explosions have identified the three primary sources for self-induced satellite breakups: propellant systems, pressurant systems, and electrical systems. This is not surprising, since these systems can contain substantial levels of stored energy, even after the vehicle has been decommissioned.

Propellant Systems

By far, inactive propellant systems have been the leading root cause of post-mission on-orbit explosions. More than 80 breakup events have been associated with the propellant systems of inactive launch vehicle orbital stages or auxiliary propulsion units, i.e., ullage motors. Remarkably, the majority of these breakups occurred following completely successful spacecraft delivery missions, after which the vehicles were simply abandoned in orbit. Some of the nearly 50 satellite breakups for which no root cause has been officially identified might well also have been propellant-induced.

The phenomenology behind these explosions appears to have been varied, including over-pressurization, inadvertent mixing of hypergolic propellants, and possible degradation of the propellant itself. In addition, launch vehicles from nearly all the major spacefaring nations and organizations have succumbed to one or more of these deleterious mechanisms.

The first known breakup in Earth orbit was a U.S. Ablestar stage which inserted the Transit 4A navigation satellite into an orbit of 880 km by 1000 km, along with two smaller, secondary payloads, Injun 1 and Solrad 3, in June 1961. A little over an hour after orbital insertion, the approximately 600-kg stage exploded into nearly 300 fragments large enough to be detected and cataloged by the U.S. Space Surveillance Network. Just prior to the explosion, the official Earth orbital population consisted of just 54 objects.

A detailed investigation first narrowed the possible causes of the breakup to four candidates: (1) the command destruct system; (2) the propulsion system tankage, valve leakage, or rupture; (3) an electrical or electronic malfunction; and (4) external heating or particle impact. The final assessment pointed to a failure in the oxidizer tank with 41 kg of unsymmetrical dimethylhydrazine (UDMH); the integrated propellant tank also contained 60 kg of inhibited red fuming nitric acid (IRFNA) on the other side of a common bulkhead. Both propellants were under a pressure of about 320 psia. The accident report noted that this was the first Ablestar mission for which the fuel tank had not been vented and recommended that venting be resumed on future missions.

Two years later another launch vehicle stage exploded soon after orbital insertion. In this instance the stage, the first U.S. Centaur to reach Earth orbit, contained a significant amount of residual liquid hydrogen, which vaporized, increasing the tank pressure. Over-pressurization of the tank was prevented by an aft vent tube, but the release induced a rapid vehicle tumble (up to 48 revolutions per minute), which in turn led to the release of insulation blankets and perhaps other debris.

For nearly 20 years during the 1970s–1990s, the Delta second stage was the most prolific producer of debris of all U.S. rocket bodies. A total of nine stages fragmented anywhere from just hours to 16 years after performing successful missions. Eight of these stages, that all employed hypergolic propellants, experienced severe fragmentations, creating an average of 200 cataloged debris per event. The number of smaller, but still hazardous, debris from each event was assessed as far higher. The only stage that had conducted a depletion burn still had an estimated 40 kg of propellants (mainly oxidizer) remaining and created more than 170 cataloged debris.

Most of the launch vehicles of Soviet origin have also experienced significant breakups after orbital insertion, including the Cosmos 3M, Molniya, Proton, Tsyklon, Vostok, and Zenit launch vehicles. These stages have widely differing sizes and designs and use either hypergolic propellants or a mixture of liquid oxygen with a form of kerosene.

The most prevalent breakups (at least 39 to date) involve ullage motors separated from Proton Block-DM fourth stages. These small (55 kg), hypergolic propulsion units are used to re-settle the Block-DM propellants before re-ignition after long coast periods. The assessed cause of the breakups, which can produce more than 100 tracked debris, is the residual propellants.

Two relatively recent events (2007 and 2010), involving Proton Briz-M upper stages, highlight a different problem. Both stages were to place a communications satellite into a geosynchronous transfer orbit, but the stage propulsion systems failed, leaving large amounts of unburned propellants. After 1 year in the first case and after 2½ years in the second case, the stages exploded, producing large amounts of debris. The Briz-M upper stage employs hypergolic propellants in two separate units, each with fuel and oxidizer. In fact, one of the units is ejected when depleted after completing the initial burns of a typical multi-burn deployment profile. Two of the most likely causes of the explosions are thought to be (1) over-pressurization of one of the units or (2) failure of the wall separating the fuel and oxidizer in one of the units.

Since the 1970s, only one Cosmos 3M second stage is known to have suffered a significant breakup, a month after launch in 1991, which produced nearly 100 cataloged debris. The cause of the fragmentation was assessed as due to more than 170 kg of residual propellants. Although other major breakups have not been identified, this type of upper stage is well-known for orbital perturbations seen months after launch, presumably due to the venting of residual propellants, probably the oxidizer.

Europe’s Ariane launch vehicles, from Ariane 1 through Ariane 4, have also been susceptible to modest or severe fragmentations. The most significant was the breakup of the Ariane 1 final stage that delivered the SPOT 1 spacecraft to a sun-synchronous orbit in early 1986. Nine months later the stage broke-up violently, creating nearly 500 debris large enough to be cataloged. Several other Ariane stages left in geosynchronous transfer orbits also have fragmented after successful missions.

China’s Long March launch vehicle and India’s Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV) have not escaped problems with post-mission breakups. Two Long March 4 final stages (1990 and 2000) and one PSLV final stage (2001) broke-up within 5 months of successful launches. These three breakups alone accounted for nearly 800 cataloged debris.

Pressurant Systems

Pressurant systems normally employ inert gases to keep propellants under proper operating pressures. Although they do not present a self-ignition hazard, their high pressures can lead to other serious problems. A case in point was the intense breakup of a U.S. Pegasus upper stage (Hydrazine Auxiliary Propulsion System or HAPS for short) in 1996. This small (97 kg) stage was responsible for more than 700 cataloged debris when it exploded after 2 years in orbit.

A thorough investigation determined that the likely root cause of the breakup was a failed regulator valve. The valve separated a high-pressure helium supply from the hydrazine propellant. Failure of the valve is presumed to have permitted the helium under very high pressure to rapidly enter the hydrazine tank which was rated at a much lower maximum operating pressure. Consequently, the hydrazine composite over-wrapped tank ruptured explosively. Even leak-before-burst tank designs are susceptible to such a scenario.

Electrical Systems

In addition to propellants and pressurants, another substantial source of energy on space vehicles is found in the batteries of the electrical storage system. Spacecraft with battery charging systems are more vulnerable to explosive malfunctions than launch vehicles with their simpler non-rechargable batteries.

At least eight spacecraft fragmentations have been linked to exploding batteries. The battery types have ranged from silver–zinc and mercury–zinc to nickel–cadmium and nickel–hydrogen batteries. Over-charging and subsequent over-pressurization can occur whether the spacecraft is operational or non-operational, as long as the batteries remain connected to the charging circuit.

Mitigation Measure Guidelines

In 1995 NASA published the first set of detailed orbital debris mitigation guidelines as NASA Safety Standard 1740.14. One of the principal goals of this standard was to curtail the creation of orbital debris during both the active operations of spacecraft and launch vehicle orbital stages and their post-mission states. To avoid accidental explosions after the completion of mission operations, Guideline 4-2 of the standard stated that “All on-board sources of stored energy will be depleted when they are no longer required for mission operations or post-mission disposal. Depletion will occur as soon as such an operation does not pose an unacceptable risk to the payload.”

The depletion of all stored energy on space vehicles is known as passivation and includes all propellants, pressurants, batteries, momentum wheels, and other devices with stored mechanical or chemical energy. Experience has shown that complete passivation of spacecraft and rocket bodies at end-of-mission prevents future self-induced debris generation events.

To increase the likelihood that such passivation measures are possible at the end of mission, which might be many years after launch, a separate guideline (Guideline 5-2) addressed the vulnerability of critical subsystems to the space environment. Specifically, the guideline stated that “In developing the design of a spacecraft or upper stage, a program should estimate and limit the probability of collisions with small debris of size sufficient to cause loss of control to prevent post-mission disposal.”

Hence, communications and electrical systems must remain capable of performing their passivation tasks. If a disposal maneuver is necessary (see next), then the propulsion system must also be protected.

For the long-term preservation of the near-Earth space environment and its availability to support vital applications, exploration, and science missions, collision risks between resident space objects must be curtailed. It is now generally accepted that portions of the region of low Earth orbit (LEO, i.e., below 2000 km) are already environmentally unstable. In other words, the congestion (or spatial density) of objects in certain altitude regimes will lead to the production of collision-induced debris at a rate faster than the debris can naturally decay to lower altitudes, thus leading to a steady increase in the Earth’s satellite population.

Recognizing this effect, the NASA standard set a limit for the residual orbital lifetime of spacecraft and rocket bodies in LEO to a maximum of 25 years following the end of mission (Guideline 6-1). For a spacecraft, end-of-mission normally is defined as when the payload is turned-off or ceases to operate due to a malfunction. Launch vehicle stages in LEO typically reach end-of-mission on the day of launch. If a spacecraft or rocket body is in a sufficiently low orbit that natural orbital decay will lead to re-entry into the Earth’s atmosphere within 25 years, then no specific additional action beyond passivation is necessary. However, if the vehicle is in a higher altitude orbit, then a maneuver into a lower orbit or some other option must be invoked.

Although the geosynchronous orbital regime (GEO) does not exhibit spatial densities that currently result in significant accidental collision risks, the exceptionally long-lived nature of any debris produced in such a collision has led to a general international consensus that GEO satellites should be maneuvered into higher altitude storage orbits at end of mission (1995 NASA standard Guideline 6-2). Since the 1970s the definition of an appropriate disposal orbit for GEO satellites has evolved, and today a commonly held view is that the orbit should be sufficiently high in order to remain at least 200 km above the nominal GEO altitude of 35,786 km for a period of at least 100 years.

The aforementioned measures to mitigate the creation of new orbital debris have been broadly accepted by several other national space agencies and the international aerospace community as a whole. Japan’s first Space Debris Mitigation Standard (NASDA-STD-18A) in 1996 reflected many of the previously established NASA guidelines. The French space agency CNES followed with a similar set of guidelines (MPM-50-00-12) in 1999. The Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China also produced orbital debris mitigation guidelines in 2000 and 2005, respectively.

The first multi-national set of orbital debris mitigation guidelines was adopted in 2002 by the 11 members of the Inter-Agency Space Debris Coordination Committee (IADC) which was comprised of national space agencies of 10 countries (China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, Russia, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and the United States), as well as the European Space Agency. The IADC guidelines contained the by then widely–accepted recommendations for post-mission vehicle passivation and disposals in orbits which would result in limited-duration stays in the LEO or GEO regions.

The IADC guidelines were presented to the Scientific and Technical Subcommittee of the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space (COPUOS) in early 2003. After several years of deliberations, the subcommittee produced in 2007 a very similar set of mitigation guidelines, which were endorsed later that year by both the full COPUOS and the UN General Assembly.

Mitigation Measure Practices

Some national standards call for the preparation of a preliminary end-of-mission plan early in a space project’s development. Issues such as passivation and disposal are best addressed no later than the project’s Phase A in order to promote cost-effective compliance with all the necessary requirements. A draft end-of-mission plan should be completed before launch and updated during the mission, particularly if critical subsystems degrade or suffer serious malfunctions.

Passivation of liquid or gaseous propulsion systems is normally accomplished by either depletion burns or venting. For example, U.S. Delta launch vehicles execute depletion burns to expend residual propellants, whereas U.S. Atlas launch vehicles choose to vent residual propellants.

Depletion burns have the potential added advantage of being able to assist in reaching acceptable disposal orbits without additional cost. For example, a Delta 2 second stage executed a depletion burn in 1996 to enable a re-entry from a 900 km circular orbit in only 9 months. In 2006 a Delta 4 second stage performed a controlled re-entry from an altitude of 850 km. Similarly, after a highly successful mission of 14 years NASA’s UARS spacecraft conducted a depletion burn in late 2005, accelerating its fall back to Earth by more than 20 years. In 2010 the commercial Orbview-3 spacecraft executed a controlled re-entry with its residual propellants.

Whether propellants are vented or burned, the amount of propellants remaining on the vehicle should be as close to zero as possible. Satellites with less than 10 kg of propellants have fragmented, leaving hazardous orbital debris in their wake. It is recognized that very small amounts of propellants might unavoidably adhere to tank and propellant line walls after passivation. Such small amounts are unlikely to pose future breakup risks.

As noted above in the two examples of the Proton Briz-M stages which shutdown prematurely after experiencing engine malfunctions, unanticipated residual propellants can pose risks of future breakups. Consequently, orbital stages should be designed to automatically vent propellants in such malfunction scenarios.

The pressure in propellant and pressurant tanks should also be as close to zero as possible. Limits such as 25% of maximum expected operating pressure (MEOP) are undesirable due, in part, to the unknown failure modes of tanks, even those of leak-before-burst designs, decades into the future, e.g., in GEO disposal orbits. Moreover, hypervelocity impact laboratory tests have clearly demonstrated that small particle (natural or man-made) impacts on tanks with as little as 1 atmosphere of pressure (i.e., 14.7 psi) can produce significantly greater damage and resultant numbers of debris than tanks which are in a vacuum state. Hence, it is desirable that all tanks be vented to space, even if depletion burns have been conducted.

Designing spacecraft and launch vehicle stage tanks to be vented to space is not difficult and need not reduce the reliability of the vehicle. In fact, many modern spacecraft have implemented this capability. Concerns about accidental venting can easily be addressed with multiple valves in the final vent line. For spacecraft the software commands needed to activate the valves do not need to be loaded into the spacecraft until shortly before the decommissioning process begins.

With current technology designs, passivating some pressurized components would present challenges and little benefits. For example, many batteries and heat pipes are pressurized with no option for relieving that pressure at end of mission. Heat pipes by nature are very ruggedly built and less susceptible to small particle impacts. To date no satellite breakup appears to have been caused by a heat pipe, and thus NASA exempts this component from passivation measures.

If batteries are removed from charging circuits as recommended (or required), the chances for explosion are reduced. Leaving batteries connected to charging circuits but with an electrical load (e.g., a heater) is not desirable since that load could fail months or years later, possibly allowing the battery to overcharge and over-pressurize. Realigning the solar arrays to point away from the Sun is also not a viable permanent solution since spacecraft are subject to numerous perturbations, including small particle impacts, which can upset the attitude of the vehicle.

As with tank venting designs, the disconnection of batteries from charging circuits can be done in safe and reliable ways. In contrast to installing propellant and pressurant valves in series, electrical relays can be installed in parallel to ensure that a single malfunction does not prematurely disable the charging system. Again, software commands to activate the relays can be loaded only when they are needed. NASA is employing this technique with increasing frequency.

For many spacecraft and rocket bodies completing their missions in orbits above 600 km, meeting the goal of limiting residual orbital lifetime to no more than 25 years in LEO might require an additional action. For spacecraft in orbits up to 800 km, only a modest change in velocity (delta-V) is necessary to lower perigee such that the vehicle will re-enter within the desired time. The exact magnitude of delta-Vs required will be dependent upon when in the solar cycle the end of mission occurs. Moving from a circular orbit to an elliptical one is always more efficient from an energy standpoint than maneuvering into a lower circular orbit with the same residual orbital lifetime.

Higher altitude spacecraft would necessarily require greater propellant expenditures. One solution might be the use of low thrust, higher efficiency engines, such as ion engines. On the other hand, such operations would require maneuvers over a much long timeframe, perhaps months or even longer, raising additional concerns about spacecraft reliability and ground support costs.

For spacecraft in orbits above 600 km with no maneuvering ability, alternative means must be investigated to comply with the 25-year rule. The deployment of drag-augmentation devices, e.g., an inflatable balloon, might be an option. However, the increased cross-sectional area needed to accelerate drag effects is off-set by a greater collisional cross-section, increasing the possibility of colliding with other resident space objects. Hence, the drag-augmentation device must be designed to minimize the consequences of such a collision.

Another alternative is the use of an electrodynamic tether. Such tethers can be packed into very small volumes during the spacecraft mission. At the conclusion of the mission, the tether can be extended, producing an effective thrust to lower the orbit. One of the advantages of electrodynamic tethers is their ability to quickly lower the orbit of a satellite with an acceptable tether length. Short operational periods and special tether designs can also significantly limit the chances that the tether might be severed by a collision with small particles.

When mission requirements call for spacecraft to operate at moderate to high altitudes within the LEO region, disposal of their launch vehicle orbital stages must also be addressed. One solution is to trade-off the lift capacity of the launch vehicle with the design of the spacecraft, opting for a slightly more massive and more capable spacecraft to be deployed initially at a lower altitude, followed by orbit raising maneuvers by the spacecraft itself. Hence, the orbital stages can more easily fall back to Earth within 25 years. This deployment plan is particularly attractive for missions using solid-propellant upper stages which cannot reignite and maneuver after shutdown.

The deployment of the Iridium and Globalstar U.S. LEO commercial communications networks in the 1990s provides an outstanding example of how mission requirements can be met while still limiting residual orbital lifetimes of the launch vehicle stages. During 1997–1999, 88 Iridium spacecraft were launched using three different launch vehicles (Proton, Delta, and Long March) from three different countries. Although the operational altitude of the Iridium spacecraft was to be 780 km, all spacecraft were released from their launch vehicles at altitudes between 500 and 650 km. After payload release the Proton orbital stages executed controlled re-entries, whereas the Delta and Long March stages maneuvered into lower, short-lived orbits. Of all 26 orbital stages only one was left in a long-lived orbit following a malfunction; all the others remained in orbit less than 1 year.

The Globalstar constellation posed an even greater challenge for both spacecraft and rocket bodies due to its chosen operational altitude of 1415 km. Again, the deployment scheme called for release of the Globalstar spacecraft at intermediate altitudes by both Delta and Soyuz launch vehicles, followed by spacecraft maneuvers to reach the operational orbits. Delta stages then lowered their orbits using depletion burns, and Soyuz IKAR stages were deorbited over the Pacific Ocean. Only two of 19 stages utilized in deploying 52 spacecraft remain in Earth orbit; the others all re-entered within 4 years of launch (most much sooner).

Having been successfully inserted into orbits at an altitude of 1415 km, the Globalstar spacecraft were faced with a new challenge of proper disposal at end of mission. Lowering the perigees of their orbits to ensure remaining lifetimes of less than 25 years would have required significant propellant expenditures. However, moving to higher orbits above 2000 km would require less energy, and that was the solution chosen. For example, in 2010 four Globalstar satellites, all launched in 1999, began months-long treks to disposal orbits near 2000 km or above.

Rocket bodies and mission-related debris abandoned in geosynchronous transfer orbits (GTOs) should also be disposed of in a manner which preserves the future near-Earth space environment. Two principal options exist: the use of GTO perigees at very low altitudes or at altitudes above 2000 km. Both are used in practice. Normally, perigees of 300 km or lower will naturally decay within 25 years, but the effect of solar-lunar gravitational perturbations must be evaluated, since in some cases these perturbations can cause perigees and orbit lifetimes to both increase. Slightly higher perigees can be employed for upper stages which can then lower their orbits when performing depletion burns.

The other extreme is to select perigees above 2000 km to avoid the 25-year orbital lifetime limitation. The multi-national Sea Launch organization has chosen this technique for several of its commercial missions. Such trajectories need not result in burdens on the payloads being launched and typically are energy neutral or slightly advantageous to the payload.

When NASA began using the large Delta 4 and Atlas 5 launch vehicles, another incentive was found to use high perigee transfer orbits. The upper stages of these launch vehicles pose undesirable risks of human casualty on the Earth following re-entry (see next chapter “Re-Entry Operations Safety”). Consequently, by using high GTO perigees, the re-entry of the stages can be delayed for centuries. NASA has used high perigees for multiple GEO missions, including the GOES 13, 14, and 15 missions flown on Delta 4 launch vehicles and the Solar Dynamics Observatory flown on an Atlas 5 launch vehicle.

The proper disposal near GEO of spacecraft and rocket bodies is also vital to preserving that unique orbital regime. The majority of operators of GEO satellites have accepted the recommendations of the global aerospace community to remove spacecraft from the GEO regime at the end of mission. Failure to do so will result in derelict spacecraft drifting along the geosynchronous arc, posing collision risks to the highly valuable operational spacecraft population, which now numbers almost 400. Due to gravitational perturbations, many of the wandering spacecraft will oscillate around one or both of two gravity wells near 75 E and 105 W longitude. Operational spacecraft near these locations are subject to increased collision risks.

During 2010, 15 of the 18 spacecraft reaching end of mission were maneuvered into higher disposal orbits, although a few of the disposal orbits did not fully meet international recommendations. It should be recognized that many of the GEO spacecraft now concluding their missions were launched prior to the adoption of more recent disposal recommendations, e.g., of the United Nations. Some of these spacecraft were designed when the recommended disposal orbits were as low as 150 km above GEO.

Today, few launch vehicle orbital stages enter nearly circular orbits near GEO. The Proton Block-DM and Briz (aka Breeze) stages and the Atlas 5 Centaur stage are occasional exceptions. For such missions two options exist. The first option is to insert the stage into an orbit which is compliant with GEO spacecraft disposal recommendations and then maneuver the payload down into an operational geosynchronous orbit. An alternative is for the stage to place the payload into an orbit very close to GEO and then for the stage to maneuver to a higher disposal orbit.

Overall, compliance with end-of-mission recommendations designed to preserve the future near-Earth environment appears to be improving with each passing year as spacecraft and launch vehicle manufacturers and operators become better acquainted with the recommendations. Certainly, such measures are in the long-term best interests of not only the aerospace community, but also the much larger population, which relies on uninterrupted space services.

8.9 Space Debris Removal

Eugene Levin

Debris mitigation practices, such as passivation and post-mission disposal, have noticeably improved in the last decade. However the density of debris has increased to the point where catastrophic collisions involving large debris objects can become the dominant source of debris pollution in low Earth orbits (LEO). These collisions will produce hundreds of thousands of debris fragments in the centimeter range that are hard to track, but could be lethal for operational spacecraft. The next catastrophic collision is likely to be on the scale of the Fengyun-1C and Cosmos–Iridium events combined. Large intact debris objects should be removed from populated regions of LEO to prevent its pollution with small collision fragments. Selective removal can be done with rocket-propelled orbital tugs. However, it will not prevent future catastrophic collisions. Electrodynamic propulsion can be used to remove all intact debris objects from LEO. That would practically prevent generation of collision debris in LEO and make it much safer for operational satellites.

Threats to the Safety of Assets in LEO

There are three major groups of man-made debris objects threatening the safety of assets in LEO: intact satellites and rocket bodies, mission-related components and large debris fragments, and hundreds of thousands of small fragments (“shrapnel”) generated in explosions and collisions (Table 8.9.1).

Table 8.9.1

Lethal debris objects in LEO

Image

Tracked debris can be avoided by active maneuvering, but the conjunctions are becoming more frequent and the task of avoidance is getting more and more complicated as the catalog grows. Figure 8.9.1 illustrates how many tracked debris objects cross the orbital plane of a satellite at a 50° inclination. This pattern is repeated every orbit with somewhat different phasing, and the number of conjunctions accumulates rapidly with time. The snapshot in Figure 8.9.1 was taken after the Cosmos–Iridium collision, and the two streams of fragments are clearly distinguishable around 780 km.

image

FIGURE 8.9.1 Intersections of tracked debris orbits with an orbital plane at 50° inclination.

The need for avoidance maneuvering has increased dramatically after the Fengyun-1C and Cosmos–Iridium events. Most of the fragments produced in these collisions are still in orbit, and every day they create hundreds of conjunctions with satellites. Table 8.9.2 shows that the fragments of Cosmos and Iridium were the primary cause of collision avoidance for the NASA Earth-observing satellites in 2010 (USA SDE, 2011). Also, the International Space Station had to maneuver on April 2, 2011, to avoid a fragment of Cosmos 2251 (ISS ADD, 2011).

Table 8.9.2

Collision avoidance by NASA satellites in 2010

Spacecraft Date Object avoided
Terra 22 Jan 2010 Iridium 33 debris
Cloudsat 17 Aug 2010 Unidentified
Landsat 5 24 Aug 2010 Cosmos 2251 debris
Cloudsat 11 Oct 2010 Zenit rocket body debris
Cloudsat 13 Oct 2010 Cosmos 2251 debris
Aura 22 Nov 2010 Cosmos 2251 debris
Landsat 7 21 Dec 2010 USA 26 debris

Small fragments in the centimeter range (“shrapnel”) are currently untracked and, therefore, impossible to avoid, but they can disable or seriously damage operational satellites. In a recent hypervelocity impact test performed by ESA (Hypervelocity impacts, ESA), a 1.2 cm aluminum ball traveling at 6.8 km/s made a large crater in an aluminum plate 18 cm thick (Figure 8.9.2). Satellites cannot be currently shielded against such impacts.

image

FIGURE 8.9.2 Hypervelocity impact of a 1.2 cm ball on a 18 cm plate in ESA test.

For each tracked debris object, there are estimated 30–50 untracked fragments in the centimeter range presenting real danger to operational satellites. Due to the large numbers, this “shrapnel” is the primary threat to operational satellites. New observation techniques will allow tracking of smaller fragments in the future, and the chart of the cataloged LEO population is set to explode upward, while the map of the cross-traffic shown in Figure 8.9.1 will become much denser.

Catastrophic Collisions

Collisions between intact objects (inactive or operational) in low Earth orbits will be catastrophic in most cases, resulting in complete disintegration of the objects. As debris mitigation practices improve, they can become the dominant source of debris pollution in LEO, producing hundreds of thousands of fragments in the centimeter range that are hard to track, but could be lethal for operational spacecraft. Note that because of high kinetic energy, even a relatively small object, such as a 3U CubeSat, can smash a large object, such as a rocket stage, into pieces at orbital velocities (Figure 8.9.3).

image

FIGURE 8.9.3 Collision between a 3U CubeSat and a rocket stage can be catastrophic.

Since the beginning of the space age, the annual probability of a catastrophic collision in LEO has been growing approximately quadratically with time, as shown in Figure 8.9.4. This is because it is roughly proportional to the second power of the number of intact objects in the catalog, and the catalog has been growing nearly linearly with time. In 50 years of space flight, this probability has been accumulating to the point where a catastrophic collision has become very likely, and it finally happened. This probability will continue to grow, unless the catalog is substantially reduced by active debris removal.

image

FIGURE 8.9.4 Probability of a catastrophic collision per year.

The consequences of future collisions can be measured by the yield of fragments. The average statistically expected yield in terms of mass can be calculated as

image (1)

where image are the masses of the objects, image are the probabilities of a collision between objects k and n, image is the overall probability of a catastrophic collision,

image (2)

and image is the probability of a catastrophic collision involving object k,

image (3)

The values image are rather small, and only linear terms are retained in the cumulative probability calculation. The collision probabilities image can be calculated using a method developed by Kessler, (1981) or other methods. Objects that successfully maneuver to avoid all tracked objects do not contribute to the totals in eq. (1). The whole LEO debris cloud is dynamic, and the probabilities image vary with time, as the orbits and population change. For example, after the Cosmos–Iridium collision, the corresponding terms image dropped out of the probability matrix.

In the current LEO debris field, the average statistically expected yield of fragments (eq. (1)) is about 2.7 tons, which is more than the yield of the Fengyun-1C and Cosmos–Iridium collisions combined. Figure 8.9.5 shows the distribution of the expected fragment yields by 1-ton ranges in the current LEO debris field. The last bar covers the range from 10 to 17 tons. We see that the Cosmos–Iridium collision was on the small side. Over 60% of the catastrophic collisions will yield more than 2 tons of fragments. Collisions involving Zenit upper stages can yield up to 17 tons of fragments, but they are much less likely.

image

FIGURE 8.9.5 Distribution of the yield of fragments in a catastrophic collision.

Judging by the number of small fragments produced in the Fengyun-1C and Cosmos–Iridium events, we can expect on the order of half a million “shrapnel” pieces in the centimeter range to be released in an average catastrophic collision. Figure 8.9.6 illustrates the aftermath of an average catastrophic collision.

image

FIGURE 8.9.6 An average catastrophic collision in LEO will be comparable in scale to the Fengyun-1C and Cosmos–Iridium events combined.

Smaller fragments have a tendency to spread wider than larger fragments, and they have a potential to indiscriminately threaten the safety of all operational satellites in LEO, not only the immediate vicinity of the collision altitude. The air drag will cause a gradual decay of the debris population, but fragments produced in high-altitude collisions and fragments ejected into trajectories with high apogees can persist for many decades after the collisions.

Debris Ranking for Removal

It is now recognized that a single catastrophic collision between intact objects in LEO can negate many years of debris mitigation efforts. The amount of “shrapnel” produced in the Fengyun-1C and Cosmos–Iridium events was comparable to the accumulation of explosion fragments over 50 years of spaceflight. These fragments are currently untracked and impossible to avoid, but they can disable or seriously damage operational satellites.

In order to prevent LEO pollution with fragments produced in catastrophic collisions, large debris objects, the primary source of future “shrapnel,” should be removed from densely populated regions in LEO (Klinkrad, 2006; 2010; Liou 2011; Krag and Virgili, 2011; Levin et al., 2012). The collision-generated debris potential associated with groups of large objects can be estimated by the statistically expected cumulative yield of fragments generated in catastrophic collisions (Levin et al., 2012)

image (4)

where image is the mass of object k, image is the probability of a collision between objects k and n, and image is the probability of a catastrophic collision involving object k.

An important feature of the probabilities image involved in calculation (4) is their sensitivity to “inclination pairing” observed when image is approaching image. Figure 8.9.7 illustrates this notion by plotting typical multipliers image resulting from “inclination pairing,” as described in (Carroll, 2009). For objects at image, the multiplier peaks at image (a), while for objects at image, it peaks at image (b). This happens because the orbits at image and image precess in the opposite directions, and when they become nearly coplanar, the objects move head-on, greatly increasing the probability of collision, as illustrated in Figure 8.9.8.

image

FIGURE 8.9.7 Inclination pairing coefficient for image (a) and image (b).

image

FIGURE 8.9.8 The Sun-sync and 81–83° inclination orbits precess in the opposite directions, align periodically, and create head-on traffic.

Using formula (4), we can evaluate collision-generated debris potential of selected groups of debris objects and analyze its cumulative distributions by location and ownership. Figure 8.9.9(a) shows the cumulative distribution of the collision-generated debris potential by image inclination bins compared to the distribution of the number of operational satellites in LEO (b). A comprehensive database of operational satellites is available online (IDOS).

image

FIGURE 8.9.9 Distribution of the collision-generated debris potential (a) and the number of operational satellites (b) by inclination.

Three clusters stand out, the 71–74°, 81–83°, and the Sun-sync clusters. The Sun-sync cluster, populated with most operational spacecraft, is “inclination paired,” as explained above, with the 81–83° cluster, populated mostly by old upper stages, and the two clusters represent elevated collision threats to each other. Removing just the old upper stages from the 71–74°, 81–83°, and the Sun-sync clusters would make a huge difference. The overall collision-generated debris potential (eq. (4)) would drop by a factor of four.

Figure 8.9.10 shows the impact of removing large debris (Levin et al., 2012). We see that only removal of hundreds of tons of large debris can make a noticeable difference in the collision-generated debris potential in LEO. When many objects are removed, the statistically expected frequency of catastrophic collisions will drop drastically as well. According to formula (4), the largest fragment yields come from the objects with high values of image, where image is the mass of the object k, and image is the probability of a catastrophic collision involving this object. Such objects should be considered for early removal.

image

FIGURE 8.9.10 Reduction of the collision-generated debris potential with removal of large debris objects.

There is a range of opinions on how many objects should be removed annually. Conservative suggestions call for removal of five to ten large objects per year (Liou, 2011) and rely on a very high post-mission disposal compliance. Such campaigns would be long-term in nature, and many of the 2200 dead satellites and rocket stages currently in low Earth orbits will persist for very long periods of time. During that time, catastrophic collisions and production of “shrapnel” will continue. An alternative could be a short-term wholesale debris removal campaign (Levin et al., 2012), in which a couple of hundred objects are removed per year, and LEO could be mostly free of large debris objects in a decade or so. In this scenario, there will be no more catastrophic collisions, and no more “shrapnel” will be produced.

Debris Removal with Drag Devices

Drag devices (such as inflatables, solar sails, and electrodynamic drag tethers) may be suitable for some newly launched objects, but they are not well suited for removal of large numbers of legacy debris objects. First of all, they have to be somehow delivered and attached to derelict objects, which may require a lot of propellant and many delivery vehicles. Second, spiraling down in large numbers, they will introduce excessive mutual collision risks if used en masse because of their large collision areas. For example, if passive electrodynamic drag tethers are attached to a few dozen large debris objects, a collision during their slow deorbit process will become very likely (Levin et al., 2012).

Debris Removal with Orbital Tugs

Various mission scenarios of debris removal with rocket-propelled orbital tugs are being considered. The tugs can either move debris objects directly, or they can deliver and attach solid propellant deorbiting kits (Bonnal & Bultel, 2009; Castronuovo, 2011).

To understand requirements and general relations, let us consider a simplified problem of moving K debris objects image from circular orbits at altitudes image to circular orbits at a lower altitude image. The migration will be attempted by N tugs with a dry mass image and fuel capacity image. Let us disregard the penalties for the inclination and node changes and assume that all tugs are placed in orbits with the same inclination as their targets, and that the differential nodal regression is used to match the nodes. Let us also assume that the tugs have low thrust engines with a specific impulse image. Each tug will start at an altitude image and spiral up to its next target image at an altitude image, capture the target, and then spiral back down to the altitude image, where the debris will be released for natural decay. We will approximate the delta-V for the transfer between the two orbits as

image

where ω is a fixed orbital angular rate. The amount of fuel consumed on this round trip will be approximated as

image

where image and image are the average masses of the tug on the way up and down, and g is gravity. Statistically, with many trips, the tugs will be carrying half of the fuel on average, and we will use an average value of image instead of image for the purpose of summation. Then, the total amount of fuel consumed in the process of migration will be

image (5)

where

image

image is the total mass of the debris objects, and image and image are their simple and weighted altitude averages,

image

Substituting image into eq. (5), we find the total mass of fuel, and then, the total mass of the tugs with fuel

image (6)

The total mass of the tugs is the lowest when the number of tugs is equal to

image (7)

where

image

Here, image is the average mass of the debris objects. The total amount of fuel and the total mass of the tugs with fuel are equal to

image (8)

while the amount of fuel per tug is equal to

image (9)

and the average number of debris objects removed per tug is equal to

image (10)

For bi-propellant, it is possible to deorbit debris by lowering the perigee to some altitude image that guarantees quick re-entry. In this case, the required delta-V is approximated as

image

and formulas (7)(10) apply with

image

With a given ψ, the number of tugs is proportional to the number of debris objects, while the masses of fuel and the tugs are proportional to the total mass of the debris, and all values are inversely proportional to the specific impulse. The number of tugs grows with ψ, but their total mass drops. Because ψ is inversely proportional to the dry mass image, making image as small as possible reduces the total mass. However, it also reduces the amount of fuel per tug, according to eq. (9), which may become insufficient for moving large objects.

Figure 8.9.11 shows the total mass and the number of tugs optimally required to remove all LEO debris over 2 kg as a function of the specific impulse of the propulsion system. The tug dry mass is set to image kg. The dots on the left represent the bi-propellant solutions with image km, while the lines represent the high-specific impulse (Isp) solutions with image km. We see that low-Isp systems would require excessive mass and number of tugs, while cost-effective solutions would require Isp’s much higher than currently available. Some economy promised by bi-propellant fuel depots is not that impressive for this particular task and is offset by higher complexity of the design and operation.

image

FIGURE 8.9.11 Total mass (a) and number of tugs (b) for wholesale debris removal.

Electrodynamic Propulsion for Debris Removal

Electrodynamic propulsion is propellantless and can meet the high delta-V requirements for removal of large numbers of debris objects from LEO. The electrodynamic thrust is the Ampere force acting on a conductor in the geomagnetic field (Figure 8.9.12). Electrons are collected from the ambient plasma on one end and emitted back into the plasma from the other end. The current loop is closed through the ionosphere. Electron collection can be achieved by biasing bare metal surfaces, while the most efficient electron emission devices in the ampere range are hollow cathodes. They spend a small amount of xenon. Taking into account this expenditure, the equivalent Isp of the electrodynamic system described later in this section is on the order of 200,000 s. This places it far on the right on the performance charts in Figure 8.9.11 and makes it a suitable candidate for wholesale debris removal in terms of performance.

image

FIGURE 8.9.12 Electrodynamic propulsion.

The electrodynamic propulsion technology is not new – it has been in development for over 25 years. The first demonstration in orbit took place in 1993 during the Plasma Motor Generator (PMG) experiment by NASA Johnson Space Center. It used insulated copper wire and hollow cathodes on both ends for electron emission and collection. PMG was the second in the series of four successful flights with J. Carroll’s tethers and deployers (Tether Application Inc.) that included also SEDS-1 in 1993, SEDS-2 in 1994, and TiPS in 1996 (Cosmo & Lorenzini, December 1997).

In 1996, TSS-1R demonstrated effective bare surface electron collection, ionospheric circuit closing with emission nearly 20 km away from the collection area, and revealed the arcing problem at high voltages.

In 1998–2002, NASA Marshall Space Flight Center designed and built the Propulsive Small Expendable Deployer System (ProSEDS) to demonstrate electrodynamic deorbit of a 1-ton Delta II upper stage. J. Carroll designed the tether and the deployer. The system involved 500 m of insulated wire, 4.5 km of bare aluminum wire, and a 10-km non-conducting “pilot” tether, with a 20-kg counterweight at the end. The flight was delayed and then canceled due to changing perspectives on risks to ISS after the Columbia accident. It would have been the first debris removal mission with an electrodynamic tether.

In 1999–2000, J. Carroll designed and built the Mir Electrodynamic Tether System (METS) (Tether Applications Inc.; Levin, 2007). The tether consisted of a 6-km insulated wire, 1-km bare aluminum tape for electron collection, and a 0.5-km pilot tether. A spare 200-kg Manned Maneuvering Unit was to be attached in orbit as a counterweight. The system would draw 2 kW of power from Mir and produce 0.2 N of average thrust along track to keep Mir in orbit without fuel re-supply, allowing the newly formed MirCorp to open Mir to commercial space tourists. Unfortunately, the decision was made to deorbit Mir before there was a chance to test METS.

In 2001, it was suggested that rotation will improve stability and widen the range of angles with the geomagnetic field (Levin, 2007), and J. Carroll designed the first rotating electrodynamic tether system. It featured multiple distributed power nodes to reduce voltages and prevent arcing (a lesson learned from TSS-1R) and bare aluminum tapes for the full tether length to improve performance at low plasma densities, provide more flexibility of control, and greatly increase tether survivability.

Electron collection with a bare aluminum tape was tested by JAXA in August 2010, when a tape 133 m long and 25 mm wide was deployed from a suborbital rocket (Fujii & et al, August 8-11, 2011). JAXA is considering active debris removal with electrodynamic tethers (Kawamoto et al., December 8-10, 2009).

In recent years, the Naval Research Laboratory took the initiative of advancing the electrodynamic propulsion technology and is currently building a 3U CubeSat for the Tether Electrodynamics Propulsion CubeSat Experiment (TEPCE) (Coffey et al., January 12-14, 2010; NRL Programs, TEPCE). The 1.5U end-bodies will be energetically separated by a stacer spring, deploying a 1-km conductive tether. The system will demonstrate electron emission and collection, electrodynamic propulsion, tether libration control, orbit determination and navigation. In addition, it will collect plasma measurements over a wide range of ionospheric conditions.

As the technology matures, it can be integrated into a debris removal system. A candidate design layout of an electrodynamic “garbage truck” is shown in Figure 8.9.13. It includes two end-bodies with controllers and electron emitters, and multiple power nodes with solar arrays, all connected sequentially with reinforced bare aluminum tapes. The tapes are 1 km long, 30 mm wide, and 0.04 mm thick, and serve both as conductors and electron collectors. A 10-section vehicle weighs only 100 kg, including 41 kg of tape, 3 kg in each power node, and 16 kg at each end. Two vehicles can fit into one ESPA slot (Levin et al., 2012).

image

FIGURE 8.9.13 Design layout of an electrodynamic vehicle for debris removal.

The vehicle is designed to be highly redundant and survivable. Propellantless thrust and on-board global positioning system (GPS) allow avoidance of all tracked objects by wide margins. The tapes are immune to punctures by small particles in the millimeter range and smaller. The probability of a tape cut by untracked debris in the centimeter range is much lower than a typical probability of failure of the spacecraft avionics. Even if the tape is cut, both parts remain controllable and can deorbit themselves in days, avoiding all other objects.

The entire structure rotates slowly at 6–8 revolutions per orbit. This gives stability and wider range of angles between the conductor and the geomagnetic field, especially in high inclination orbits. All orbital elements, as well as the tether orientation and vibration, can be controlled by varying and reversing the currents in different sections of the conductor (Levin, 2007). Each inboard node produces ~800 W of power, and the vehicle can make large orbit changes in a fairly short time. In deboost mode, additional energy can be extracted from the orbital motion through the emf, substantially increasing the thrust capability. Being propellantless, the vehicle is not limited by the Tsiolkovsky rocket equation and can produce enormous delta-Vs of hundreds of km/s over its operational lifetime.

Figure 8.9.14 compares altitude rates of the rotating system (a) and a conventional vertically oriented system (b) dragging down a 1-ton debris object. The difference is drastic, especially at high inclinations, where most of the large debris is concentrated. There are two reasons. First, for a vertical electrodynamic system to remain stabilized and controllable the thrust must be an order of magnitude less than the tension produced by the gravity gradient while the rotating system can apply all the thrust it is able to produce electrically. Second, a vertical system cannot produce much of a thrust along-track in near-polar orbits because of the orientation of the geomagnetic lines, while the rotating system can spin normal to the orbital plane and get very good “traction” with the geomagnetic field.

image

FIGURE 8.9.14 Deorbit rate of the rotating (a) and vertical (b) electrodynamic tether systems with 1-ton object.

Theoretically, a dozen such vehicles launched on one ESPA ring (two per slot) could remove all intact debris objects from LEO (approximately 2200 objects totaling 2000 tons) in about 7 years, and it would take only four vehicles and 7 years to remove all upper stages from the 71–74°, 81–83°, and Sun-sync clusters, reducing the collision-generated debris potential in LEO by a factor of four. This is very promising, but the electrodynamic propulsion technology needs time to mature and go through flight testing before it can be used operationally.

Debris Capture

Even though it may seem straightforward, debris capture is challenging and riddled with engineering problems (Kaplan & et al, September 2010). In the most frequently considered capture scheme, the remover spacecraft rendezvous with a debris object, moves into its close proximity, extends a robotic arm (or arms), and grabs onto a protruding feature, such as the rim of the thruster nozzle. The underlying technologies have been in development and operation for quite some time. Robotic arms have flown on many Shuttle missions since 1981, and the International Space Station has used a robotic arm since 2001. Autonomous robotic systems are being developed for satellite servicing (Henshaw, 2009). Key remote servicing functions have been demonstrated during the Orbital Express mission in 2007. It is believed that future systems of this class should be adequate for debris capture (Teti, November 11-12, 2011). Also, a new generation of miniature capture systems that can be mounted even on CubeSats is emerging (Cleaning up Earth’s orbit).

Most old debris objects are expected to be either gravitationally stabilized or rotate slowly, due to eddy-current damping in their aluminum structure (Williams & Meadows, 1978; Bonnal, June 10, 2011; Praly et al., July 4-8, 2011). Some debris, however, will tumble fast enough to complicate grappling. The remover spacecraft would have to approach and literally “land” on the tumbling object, avoiding appendages, and attach itself quickly, or the object will swing the “lander” away. This is risky, particularly for electric tugs with large solar arrays. One of the suggestions is to use a brush contactor to detumble the object before capture (Nishida & Kawamoto, February 2011).

A radically different idea is to avoid grappling altogether and steer the debris object from a distance using an ion beam. The concept is called the Ion Beam Shepherd (IBS) (Bombardelli & Pelaez, June 2011). It is illustrated in Figure 8.9.15. A spacecraft with electric propulsion will rendezvous and fly in formation with a debris object and direct a low-divergence, high-specific-impulse ion beam towards the object to exert a decelerating force image. The reaction force image will push the spacecraft away from the target, but the main engine will compensate for it by thrusting in the opposite direction (image). The onboard control system will maintain the distance to the debris, and the invisibly linked pair will spiral down to a disposal orbit, where the debris will be left for natural decay, while the remover will proceed to the next target.

image

FIGURE 8.9.15 Ion Beam Shepherd deorbiting a space debris object.

Ion engines are the leading candidates for this kind of missions (Bombardelli & Pelaez, June 2011). They have a high specific impulse of ~3000 s, high efficiency (~65–80%), and a low-divergence plasma plume of less than image. With a power supply of 2–3 kW, they provide thrust ~0.1 N. It takes approximately as much fuel to maintain the ion beam as to thrust. Therefore, the effective specific impulse will be ~1500 s when paired with a large debris object.

The electrodynamic system shown in Figure 8.9.13 has an advantage of being propellantless, but it requires different capture techniques (Carroll, December 2, 2002). For debris removal, the payload managers at each end carry many large, lightweight nets (~50 g each). To catch a debris object, the tip velocity is matched with the target, a spin-stabilized net is extended from the payload manager by the centrifugal force at the end, the target is approached at a few meters per second under manual control from the ground, and the net is enclosed around the target. The multi-newton tension in the net induced by the rotation of the entire system rapidly synchronizes the object’s rotation with the tether rotation without any special control, even if the object is tumbling up to 1–2 rpm, and continues to hold the object firmly in the net during deorbit. Figure 8.9.16 illustrates schematically how the restoring torque is applied to the debris object. The tether tension image is induced by the rotation of the entire system, while the tension image in the net straps reacts to the rotation of the debris object.

image

FIGURE 8.9.16 Automatic detumbling during net capture with a rotating electrodynamic system.

Nets have an advantage of being indifferent to the shapes and sizes of the objects, but they are still in a prototype stage. An alternative technique would be for the electrodynamic system to carry a small autonomous robotic unit that is released in close proximity to the debris, approaches and grabs onto a suitable debris feature, extended a mating interface, and is recaptured from the payload manager (Carroll, December 2, 2002). Such symbiosis between robotic capture and electrodynamic propulsion would be mutually beneficial.

Disposal of Debris

The naturally occurring clean-up process in LEO is due to the air drag. It slowly drives debris to re-entry in the atmosphere. Most debris removal schemes are simply assisting this natural decay process by moving debris objects to lower altitudes with much shorter orbital life. Altitudes below the ISS may be preferred for the reasons of ISS safety.

As discussed earlier, debris removal campaigns are much more efficient when they utilize propulsion with high specific impulse. Electric and electrodynamic propulsion systems are the leading candidates at this time; however, they cannot provide controlled re-entry for large debris objects because of low thrust levels. Uncontrolled re-entry may be acceptable for objects that are expected to burn up in the atmosphere, but it raises concerns for objects whose parts may survive re-entry (Bonnal, June 10, 2011). Controlled re-entry can be achieved with chemical propulsion, but if it is used to move large debris all the way from their original orbits to re-entry, the removal campaign becomes much less efficient.

One way to solve this problem would be to use electric or electrodynamic propulsion to move the debris below ISS and release it there with a small re-entry package. This package could contain either a chemical thruster with a minimal amount of fuel or a small device for aerodynamic steering during re-entry.

An alternative way would be to avoid re-entries altogether and move large debris objects from crowded regions in LEO to intermediate altitudes for storage and possible future utilization. The objects, however, should not be left in random orbits, because this will create another congestion. Instead, they could be gathered and assembled in several maneuverable collections (Carroll et al., October 30–31, 2010). Each collection can be propelled electrodynamically without fuel expenditure for the purposes of collision avoidance and orbit maintenance. When technology is developed, the collections may be reprocessed into construction materials (Carroll et al., October 30–31, 2010). Note that there are 1000 tons of old upper stages in LEO, and much of their mass is aluminum alloy. It took a lot of money to put them in orbit, and they still have some residual value. This value should not be overlooked.

The task or debris relocation to intermediate altitudes is much less demanding than reentering the objects. Let us consider orbital tugs propelled by ion engines with a specific impulse of 3000 s. Using formulas (7) and (8), we estimate that it would take 21 tugs with a total launch mass of 11 tons to move all old upper stages currently orbiting above 600 km in the 71–74°, 81–83°, and the Sun-sync clusters to collections around 600 km. Alternatively, electrodynamic vehicles can do this job with a total launch mass ~400 kg. This campaign will greatly improve the situation in LEO, reducing the probability of a catastrophic collision (eq. (2)) by a factor of nearly three and reducing the collision-generated debris potential (eq. (4)) by more than 70%.

Placing three collections in each cluster and spacing them at image nodal distances, a full nodal sweep utilizing differential nodal regression could be complete in less than 7 years. This way the tugs will spend the least amount of fuel on orbital plane changes, as assumed in formulas (7) and (8). On average, around 100 tons of old upper stages will be accumulated per collection. An electrodynamic propulsion system of the kind needed for such collections has already been developed and built once to maintain the orbit of the Mir station (Tether Applications Inc.; Levin, 2007) (it was not flown because of the decision to deorbit Mir). Mir had a comparable mass of 136 tons at the time and experienced a much higher air drag than the collections would.

Debris Removal with Lasers

There is one debris removal technology in development that does not require launches at all. It involves lasers operating from the ground (Phipps & et al, May 2012). If a low-intensity laser is pointed at an orbiting object, the light pressure from the laser beam can slightly change the velocity of the object. However, this effect is too weak for debris removal. A focused beam from a high-intensity laser can cause ablation of the surface of the object, when some of the surface material is melted, vaporized, and ejected from the surface in high-velocity jets. The reaction force from the jets acting on the object can be four to five orders of magnitude higher that the light pressure itself and can be used in debris removal. Pulsed ablation is more efficient than continuous heating of the target, but it requires multi-kilo-Joule pulses and mirrors larger than 10 m in diameter to focus a beam of desired intensity on the target. Recent advances in lasers and telescopes could make such systems feasible.

Objects under 1 kg could be re-entered in a single pass from low orbits by about a thousand 5-nanosecond pulses. But larger targets would require multiple passes, during which they will be pulsed thousands of times, gradually lowering to re-entry. Targeted re-entry for objects that may not burn in the atmosphere is believed to be possible (Phipps & et al, May 2012).

The lasers would have to be combined with telescopes for target acquisition and accurate pointing. Due to the finite speed of light, the lasers will be shooting at positions up to 50 m ahead of the last observed positions of the targets at ranges up to 1000 km. Accurate prediction and execution will be crucial, and a large array of safety measures would have to be put in place to support these operations.

Debris Removal Service

When technical and legal hurdles are overcome, debris removal can be offered as a routine commercial service to launch and spacecraft operators to keep LEO clear of dead satellites and spent stages. In order to make economic sense to them, debris removal should cost much less than a typical launch cost per kilogram. Early estimates indicate that selective removal with rocket-propelled tugs may end up being expensive (Bonnal & Bultel, December 8–10, 2009). It may be undertaken by governments, but may not appeal to commercial operators. Electrodynamic propulsion has potential to drive the cost down toward perhaps $400 per kg at the current prices (Levin et al, 2012). This is where wholesale removal of large debris makes sense not only in terms of preventing LEO pollution, but also economically by offering service at wholesale prices. Ground-based lasers could also drive debris removal costs toward and below $1000 per kg (Phipps & et al, May 2012).

Conclusions

Catastrophic collisions between large objects in LEO will produce hundreds of thousands of debris fragments in the centimeter range (“shrapnel”). The fragments of these sizes are currently untracked and impossible to avoid, but they can disable or seriously damage operational satellites. Statistically, the fragment yield of an average catastrophic collision will be comparable to the yield of the Fengyun-1C and Cosmos–Iridium events combined. To prevent further pollution of LEO with collision fragments, a substantial number of large debris objects, the primary source of future “shrapnel,” should be removed from densely populated regions in LEO.

The task of debris removal is challenging. Selective removal can be performed by rocket-propelled orbital tugs equipped with robotic capture units. Wholesale removal, however, is too demanding for the rockets because of the sheer amount of fuel and vehicles required. Electrodynamic propulsion can assist in this task. It is propellantless and capable of delivering very large delta-Vs over the operational lifetime of the electrodynamic vehicles. Such vehicles can be combined with robotic capture units and deorbit packages for targeted re-entry of large debris. Wholesale removal of small and possibly large debris could also be achieved using ground-based lasers. These technologies still have to mature before they can be used operationally.

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