Chapter 2

Threats and Hazards at Educational Institutions*

Philip Purpura, CPP    Director of the Security and Justice Institute, Florence Darlington Technical College

Abstract

This chapter describes the threats and hazards currently facing school administrators. It separately covers school districts (K-12) and higher education (colleges and universities), and includes information about legislation and protection measures.

Keywords

Bomb threats

Crimes of violence

Cybercrime

Drugs

Property crimes

Soft targets and hard targets

Vandalism

Zero-tolerance policy

Educational Institutions

Two major types of educational systems are emphasized here: school districts and higher education. A key difference between school districts and college and university campuses is that, in the former, students normally go home at night and buildings often are empty. On campuses, students often live on the premises in dormitories. Exceptions are community and technical colleges whose students typically commute. School districts and campuses both schedule evening and weekend activities such as classes, sports events, and meetings. A major factor for those who plan and implement protection programs for these institutions is that the security and safety measures must cater to the needs and characteristics of the particular institution.

School districts and higher education are known as the education facilities subsector (EFS) of the government facilities sector under the National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). The U.S. Department of Education’s (ED) Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools (OSDFS) served as the sector-specific agency for the EFS. OSDFS promoted policy and recommendations on safety, health, security, emergency management, and resilience for the EFS. In 2011, the OSDFS became the Office of Safe and Healthy Students.1 Under the Tenth Amendment (“…powers…reserved to the States…”), the general authority to administer the EFS is empowered to the states. The EFS is highly decentralized and protection is primarily a local responsibility.2

Threats and Hazards at Educational Institutions

Educational institutions are subject to a host of threats and hazards similar to other segments of society. Examples are crimes of violence, bomb threats, illegal drugs, property crimes, cybercrimes, and vandalism. Additional concerns are fire, accident, disaster, gangs, terrorism, infectious disease outbreaks, food recalls, suicide, date rape, bullying, hazing, crowd control for sports and other events, traffic, parking, student activism, graffiti, the discharge of toxic substances (e.g., the release of pepper spray in a crowded hall), and the release of an animal in a school as a prank. Incidents may involve cross-sector protective efforts that assist in mitigation. For example, health-care and public health sector, transportation sector (e.g., school buses), commercial facilities sector (e.g., stadiums and arenas), and IT communications sector.

Protection for Educational Institutions

The following list describes measures for security and safety of school districts and institutions of higher education:

 Establish a security and safety committee and meet at least monthly.

 Ensure that all stakeholders and first responders are involved in security and safety planning and programs.

 Conduct risk analyses and prepare comprehensive, all-hazards protection.

 Offer counseling services and programs to assist students in crisis.

 Conduct substance abuse education and prevention programs.

 Typical security measures are access controls, emergency telephones, mass notification systems, intrusion and fire alarms, patrols, CPTED, lighting, and digital surveillance systems (closed-circuit TV, CCTV).

 Use vandal-resistant construction materials.

 If graffiti is an issue, photograph it before removing it and show the photos to police.

 Carefully consider the use of unarmed students to supplement police and security forces; provide good training.

 Research online resources on protection, training programs, and grants (see the Web site addresses at the end of this book).

School Districts

More than 55 million students are enrolled in U.S. elementary through high schools.3 From July 1, 2009 to June 30, 2010, there were 33 “school-associated violent deaths,” defined as a homicide, suicide, or legal intervention (by police), in which death occurred at an elementary or secondary school in the USA. In 2010, for students aged between 12 and 18, 828,400 nonfatal victimizations occurred at school; this includes 358,600 victims of violence and 469,800 victims of theft. During this same year, for students aged between 12 and 18, 652,500 nonfatal victimizations occurred away from school; this includes 281,200 victims of violence and 371,300 victims of theft. It is difficult to draw conclusions about crime victimization and safety “at school” versus “away from school” because of reporting practices of victims and officials. Besides the physical and psychological effect of victimizations at schools, it can lead to increased dropout rates, decline in learning, early retirements, and increased fear.4

Legislation for School Districts

The Safe and Drug-Free Schools and Communities Act supports programs that prevent violence in and around schools, mitigates the illegal drug problem, facilitates parent and community involvement in school challenges, and appropriates funds to local schools and higher education facilities victimized by violence or a traumatic incident. As a requirement for grant funding, the Act necessitates a crisis management plan. In 2011, Congress eliminated programs implemented under this Act. At the same time, the Office of Safe and Healthy Students continues to promote drug and violence prevention programs.5

In an attempt to reduce school violence, Congress enacted the Gun-Free Schools Act, which requires that each state receiving federal funds under the Elementary and Secondary Education Act must have a state law requiring local educational agencies to expel from school for a period of not less than 1 year a student who is determined to have brought a weapon to school. Each state’s law also must allow the chief administering officer of the local educational agency to modify the expulsion requirement on a case-by-case basis.6 This law resulted in many schools adopting a zero-tolerance policy for weapons being brought to school. In other words, any infraction results in full punishment. This same policy extends to alcohol and drugs. Meadows7 writes that the intent of such a policy is both preventive and punitive. He notes the following: “Although zero-tolerance policies have a place in school security, there is the threat of over enforcement, which may undermine school-community relations and label students unfairly.”

The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) protects the privacy of students by limiting the types of information school officials can release. School records and personal information are protected. FERPA does not protect information disclosed during an emergency or obtained through observation or personal knowledge (e.g., a teacher hearing a threat from a student).

Protection for School Districts

A comprehensive school district loss prevention program must involve the community: students, teachers and administrators, parents, public safety agencies, civic groups, and businesses. The program can be divided into four components: special programs, personnel, physical security, and emergency management.8

Special programs include character education to help students distinguish right from wrong, conflict resolution, diversity, prevention of bullying, anonymous tip lines, and programs that involve parents. Since gangs are a problem in many schools and communities, and they are often linked to violence and drugs, school administrators should be proactive to reduce this problem by, for example, meeting police gang specialists on a regular basis to exchange information and antigang strategies. One popular program is the Gang Resistance Education and Training (GREAT) program that provides students with tools to resist the lure and trap of gangs. Modeled after the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) program, the GREAT program seeks to prevent violence and introduces students to conflict resolution skills, cultural sensitivity, and negative aspects of gang life. This program has spread to all 50 states and several other countries.9

All employees at schools should be trained on early warning signs of inappropriate behavior or violence. These signs include feelings of isolation, rejection, and being persecuted, plus behaviors indicating anger or violence, such as threats. Intervention and counseling are vital in response to such signs.

A combined counseling and education approach might reduce student hostility and funnel student time into constructive activities. Traditional suspension from school often sends troublesome students to the streets, where more trouble is likely. On the other hand, if students remain at school in an appropriate program, improved results are probable.

Personnel consist of teachers, teacher aids, administrators, counselors, security officers, and school resource officers (SRO). SROs are police officers on duty at schools; they provide visibility, create rapport with students, and respond to incidents. Parents and volunteers play an important role in supplementing employees. All those who perform job duties at schools should undergo background screening, receive constant training, and clearly understand the policies and procedures for day-to-day events, such as student discipline problems and how to care for people during emergencies.

Physical security examples are handheld and walk-through metal detectors and duress alarms. Students must be safe without feeling as if they are in a prison. Students can swipe an ID card when they climb onto a bus and when they arrive and leave school; RFID tracks their movements. At the same time, CCTV cameras watch students on buses and on school premises. Visitors can be asked for their driver’s license to check against a database of sex offenders. The strategies that are implemented should be subject to research and evaluation to produce the best possible solutions and utilization of resources.

Emergency management consists of plans to respond to violence, weapons, hostage situations, bombs/explosions, abused students, aggressive parents who are on the premises, and incidents involving parental rights. Many school districts distribute their crisis plans to public safety agencies that have a ready reference containing maps and building plans, utility shutoffs, staff and parent contact information, a yearbook to identify people, and a set of keys.

The National Center for Education Statistics10 surveyed public schools and reports a host of safety and security measures at schools, including the following:

 Controlled access and locked doors. Nearly all public schools require visitors to sign in and obtain a visitors badge

 Restrictions on student access to certain Web sites on school computers

 Prohibiting certain electronic devices (e.g., cell phones)

 Anonymous threat reporting

 Drug testing of athletes and other students in extracurricular activities. Random dog sniffs to check for drugs

 Other measures include picture ID, searches, student uniforms, and mass notification systems

Research by Sobel11 found that surveillance and searches at a high school were viewed in a positive light by male and female employees. Although students viewed surveillance positively, a majority of students viewed searches of lockers, backpacks, and self negatively.

The Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, 2nd edition,12 offers numerous suggestions, including the topics above and the following: establish a climate for reporting threats and violence, create an antibullying program, use a student court for noncriminal offenses, and educate students about drugs, alcohol, suicide prevention, gangs, and other important topics.

Are Educational Institutions “Soft” Targets?

Terrorists search for “soft” targets containing limited security to increase the likelihood of a successful attack. Examples of “softtargets are educational institutions, houses of worship, shopping malls, and theaters. “Hardtargets include military bases and fortified government buildings.

Emergency management became an important priority at many schools following the 1999 Columbine High School massacre. During this incident in Jefferson County, Colorado, two teenage students, armed with a variety of weapons and bombs, killed 12 students and a teacher, wounded 24, and then committed suicide. Prior to the attack, one of the killers showed warning signs of violence through a Web site, which contained violent threats, information on how to make bombs, and a log of mischief. The massacre fueled debate over gun violence, gun control, and the influence of the media on violence. In addition, the event reinforced attention to warning signs to prevent violence.

Another, more deadly massacre, tied to terrorism, was the Beslan Elementary School massacre in 2004. This attack was part of the Chechen war for independence against Russia. Russia has fought an insurgency in the breakaway republic of Chechnya since the 1990s, a time when the former Soviet Union collapsed. The 3-day hostage standoff at the elementary school in Beslan, where Chechen rebels rigged bombs around 1200 hostages, ended in gunfire, explosions, and 338 deaths, mostly children. Each side blamed the other for the battle at the school that caused more controversy over Chechen terrorism and Russian responses.

The carnage began when 32 attackers—armed with AK-47s, a machine gun, grenade launchers, explosives, and two dogs (to protect against chemical attack)—drove to the crowded school and herded children, teachers, and parents into the school gym, which was quickly wired with explosives. Male hostages were forced to build barricades at doors and windows, and when the work was complete, they were executed and their bodies were thrown out of the building. Two female suicide bombers were among the attackers, which illustrated the resolve of the attackers and the possible outcome. The attackers demanded the release of Chechen rebels, the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya, and Chechen independence. The Russian government’s options were very limited, and giving in to terrorist demands fueled new hostage events. By the second day, the terrorists continued to refuse water, food, and medicine for the hostages. In their desperation, the hostages began to drink their own urine. On the third day, the terrorists permitted a crew to collect the bodies of 20 male hostages that had been thrown out of the building. At this point, a bomb exploded within the gym, supposedly by accident, a fire began, the roof collapsed, and as hostages escaped, the terrorists shot them. The terrorists were killed, and two that escaped were caught by a mob and lynched. As the disaster unfolded, “finger-pointing” began to explain what went wrong. Explanations were that Special Forces were not ordered to rescue the hostages and assault the building, no one wanted to take responsibility to order the rescue and assault, and armed volunteers interfered with the hostage situation and were not kept back. The disaster shocked the world, and the Russian government promised reform of the police and military.13

On April 16, 2007, the Virginia Tech massacre became the worst school mass murder incident in U.S. history when a mentally disturbed student murdered 32 people and then committed suicide. Among the questions that followed the shootings were: Why did it take over 2 hours to release a notification that a killer was on the loose after two students were found shot earlier in another building? Was the police response quick enough to end the threat of an “active shooter”? Many factors must be considered when attempting to answer these questions. For instance, rushing into a building without a team and a plan is risky. Harwood14 writes of strategies that require refinement: behavioral threat assessment teams to identify risky students, mass notification systems, and “active shooter” response. The federal government, including the U.S. Secret Service and the FBI, studied campus violence and concluded that although most (73%) violent acts on campus targeted a specific individual because of a triggering event (e.g., romantic breakup or academic failure), “understanding what leads an offender to exclusively target random individuals remains a complex and difficult challenge.” The study also noted the importance of college and university threat assessment teams to evaluate “persons of concern.”15


13 Abdullaev, N. (2004). “Beslan, Russia.. Terror! In The Schoolhouse!” Homeland Defense Journal, 2 (September), pp. 28–35.

14 Harwood, M. (2007). Preventing the next campus shooting. Security Management, 51, 55–65.

15 Drysdale, D., et al. (2010). Campus Attacks: Targeted Violence Affecting Institutions of Higher Education. Washington, DC: U.S. Secret Service, FBI, DHS, and U.S. Department of Education.

Colleges and Universities

Legislation for Colleges and Universities

In response to increasing crime on college campuses and the need for more accurate statistics, Congress passed the Student-Right-to-Know and Campus Security Act of 1990. This Act is also known as the “Clery Act,” named after Jeanne Clery, a college student who was raped and murdered in her dorm room. For institutions receiving federal student aid, this legislation requires crime awareness and prevention policies and an annual report of campus crime sent to the FBI Uniform Crime Reports program, while making these statistics available to students and the general public. Such data, available on the Web, enable comparisons among colleges and universities. Amendments to this Act include the requirement that a campus community must be notified immediately of an emergency or threat to safety, disclosure of emergency plans, reporting on hate crimes, and reporting of relationship of campus police with state and local police. For campuses with housing, the amendments require procedures for missing students and methods of fire protection reporting.16

Congress enacted the Campus Sexual Assault Victims’ Bill of Rights in 1992, requiring schools receiving federal student aid to afford sexual assault victims basic rights and to develop policies to deal with sexual assault on campus.

There is conjecture that some schools omit reporting acts of violence to protect recruiting efforts and their reputations.17 FBI crime data have been criticized over the years because they represent crimes reported to police, and many crimes are never reported or recorded, as shown by victimization studies.18

Protection for Colleges and Universities

Campus Security Guidelines were prepared by the Major Cities Chiefs Association and Bureau of Justice Assistance.19 These guidelines focus on policies, coordination among local and campus police, interoperable communications, risk assessment, prevention, preparedness, emergency management, and external relations.

Numerous campuses have implemented the strategy of many public police agencies, namely, community policing. It aims to control crime through a partnership of police and citizens, and it strives to become a dominant philosophy throughout a police department. Community policing includes a proactive approach to problem solving, rather than responding repeatedly to the same problem. High priorities for protection on campuses are programs that focus on crime prevention, self-protection, and neighborhood watch.

In 2004, a National Summit on Campus Public Safety was held in Baltimore, Maryland. It was supported by the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services20; the International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (IACLEA, see below); the International Association of Chiefs of Police; the U.S. Department of Homeland Security; and the FBI. Some of the main points from this summit are as follows:

 There is a need for a national center for campus safety to support information sharing, standards, model practices, and research.

 Many campuses house sensitive materials and information and serve as contractors for the Department of Defense, Department of Justice, National Security Agency, other government bodies, and corporations.

 Securing chemical, biological, and radiological materials in an accessible environment, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, creates security challenges.

 Many campuses have a substantial number of international students who entered the country through student visas. In addition, many U.S. educational institutions maintain campuses overseas.

 Special events (e.g., sports, graduation, lectures) draw thousands of people to campuses and create vulnerabilities.

 U.S. educational institutions should be more closely linked to local and regional emergency management plans.

Research by Fisher and Sloan21 produced the following points that should be considered when evaluating programs designed to reduce campus crime.

 A comprehensive approach includes security, faculty members, staff members, students, and public law enforcement personnel.

 Campus administrators should conduct surveys of the campus community to understand the nature and extent of crime and fear, perceptions of the effectiveness of security, and participation in crime prevention programs and whether participants adopted any of the preventive measures. Until evaluations become an integral part of responding to campus crime, administrators will continue to make poor decisions on security strategies.

 Research has confirmed that crime on campuses is influenced by poor lighting, excessive foliage, blocked views, and difficulty of escape by victims. (These issues relate to CPTED.)

 Location measures (e.g., proximity to urban areas with high unemployment) are predictors of high campus crime rates.

One particular group that has advanced the professionalism of campus safety and security is the IACLEA. This group began in 1958 with 11 schools, and today, it represents 1200 colleges and universities in 20 countries. The group maintains a Web site of resources; holds an annual conference; offers training, professional development, and standards and accreditation; and publishes the Campus Law Enforcement.22

Safety and Fire Protection at Educational Institutions

The NFPA 101 Life Safety Code offers guidance to protect educational facilities from fire. Examples of fire hazards endangering life in places of public assembly are (1) overcrowding; (2) blocking, impairing, or locking exits; (3) storing combustibles in dangerous locations; and (4) using combustible decorations. Furthermore, hazards of educational buildings vary with construction characteristics and with the age group of students. Younger students, for example, require protection different from that for older students. The NFPA Life Safety Code specifies that kindergarten and first grade rooms should be on the floor of exit discharge so that stairs do not endanger these students. Because junior and senior high schools contain laboratories, shops, and home economics rooms, these facilities should have fire-resistant construction. School kitchens require similar protection. A fire alarm system is required for all educational buildings. Most schools conduct fire drills for pupils. The Life Safety Code and many good building codes provide numerous standards for increasing fire safety.

For colleges and universities, the Life Safety Code is applied depending on building characteristics and use. If buildings are windowless, the Life Safety Code requirements for special structures are applicable. This includes, for instance, venting systems for smoke. Because many campus buildings are multistory, specific safeguards are necessary. Fire drills and training are important for residence halls and academic buildings. If a campus contains “high-risk” chemicals, it may be subject to regulations of the Chemical Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS).23


* This chapter is excerpted from Purpura P. Protecting Commercial and Institutional Critical Infrastructure. Security and Loss Prevention. Boston, MA: Butterworth-Heinemann; 2013. Updated by the author, 2014.

1 U.S. Department of Education (2011). “Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools.” www.ed.gov, retrieved April 15, 2012.

2 U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Education (2010). Education Facilities Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the Government Facilities Sector-Specific Plan. www.dhs.gov, retrieved April 14, 2012, p. 55.

3 U.S. Census (2011). “Back to School: 2011-2012.” www.census.gov, retrieved April 14, 2012.

4 National Center for Education Statistics (2012). Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2011. http://nces.ed.gov, retrieved April 15, 2012.

5 U.S. Department of Education (2011). “Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools.” www.ed.gov, retrieved April 15, 2012. U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Education (2010). Education Facilities Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the Government Facilities Sector-Specific Plan. www.dhs.gov, retrieved April 14, 2012, p. 55.

6 Anderson, J. (2012). “Gun-Free Schools Act”. Education Law (February 14). http://lawhighereducation.com, retrieved April 15, 2012.

7 Meadows, R. (2007). Understanding Violence and Victimization, 4th ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson Prentice Hall, p. 170.

8 Decker, S. (2000). “Increasing School Safety through Juvenile Accountability Programs.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

9 Institute for Intergovernmental Research (2012). “Welcome to the G.R.E.A.T. Web Site.” www.great-online.org, retrieved April 16, 2012.

10 National Center for Education Statistics (2012). Indicators of School Crime and Safety: 2011. http://nces.ed.gov, retrieved April 15, 2012.

11 Sobel, R. (2012). “Perception of Violence on a High School Campus.” Journal of Applied Security Research, 7 (January-March). pp. 11–21.

12 International Association of Chiefs of Police and Bureau of Justice Assistance (n.d.). Guide for Preventing and Responding to School Violence, 2nd ed. www.theiacp.org, retrieved April 16, 2012.

16 U.S. Department of Education (2011). The Handbook for Campus Safety and Security Reporting. www2.ed.gov/admins/lead/safety/handbook-2.pdf, retrieved March 10, 2011.

17 Jaeger, S. (2001). “Crime Concerns on Campus.” Security Technology & Design, 12 (March). p. 6.

18 Purpura, P. (1997). Criminal Justice: An Introduction. Boston: Butterworth-Heinemann.

19 Major Cities Chiefs Association and Bureau of Justice Assistance (2009). Campus Security Guidelines: Recommended Operational Policies for Local and Campus Law Enforcement Agencies. www.majorcitieschiefs.com/pdf/MCC_CampusSecurity.pdf, retrieved April 19, 2012.

20 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services (2005). “National Summit on Campus Public Safety.” Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice.

21 Fisher, B., and Sloan, J. (1993). “University Response to the Campus Security Act of 1990: Evaluating Programs Designed to Reduce Campus Crime.” Journal of Security Administration, 16, 67–77.

22 International Association of Campus Law Enforcement Administrators (2011). “About IACLEA.” www.iaclea.org/, retrieved April 17, 2012.

23 U.S. Departments of Homeland Security and Education (2010). Education Facilities Sector-Specific Plan: An Annex to the Government Facilities Sector-Specific Plan. www.dhs.gov, retrieved April 14, 2012, p. 24.

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