The public relations state?

From its inception, New Labour can be viewed as a political project built upon a reliance on communication and information management; indeed, Michie argued that ‘the success of New Labour, indeed its very creation, is the product of spin-doctoring, practised with relentlessness and virtuosity’ (in McNair 2000: 8). It is therefore no surprise that when it was elected in 1997 New Labour set about reforming the communication structures within government, enhancing what Moloney (2006c: 121) has called ‘the most resourced, comprehensive and continuous PR operation in the UK’. Under New Labour, the numbers of communications staff employed in Whitehall departments rose from 795 in 1998 to 1,376 in 2008 (HL Paper 7 2009, p. 34). Specifically in terms of media relations, the number of press officers in Whitehall departments rose from 216 in 1998 to 373 in 2008 (HL Paper 7 2009, p. 35). During its time in office, New Labour also extensively utilised Special Advisors, who are publicly funded political advisors to Ministers. Their number fluctuated under New Labour, rising from 38 in 1997, to a high point of 84 in 2003, before falling back to 73 in 2007 (HL Paper 7 2009, p. 25). In 2007, 24 of these special advisors were employed within Number 10 (HL Paper 7 2009, p. 54).

Many commentators on British politics have noted how professional communication management strategies and the careful management of information turns it into a very valuable resource. Negrine (1996: 10), observing political communication since the early 1970s, notes the ‘increasing use of carefully crafted communication strategies by governments to ensure that … the information they seek to impart to their citizens has an appropriate “spin” on it’. Obviously this growth in the use of PR specialists by the government may merely reflect a more general ‘promotional culture’ in Britain (Miller 1998). However some observers have expressed disquiet at the increasing use of information management techniques by the government. Deacon and Golding (1994: 7) have noted with concern the rise of the ‘public relations state’ and Schlesinger (1990: 82) notes that there are important questions about the nature of information management in a society where groups exist in conditions of unequal power, and these questions are particularly acute in regard to government because ‘the apparatuses of the state … enjoy privileged access to the media’. There are various ways in which governments manage information in order to privilege their own views on an issue. Leaks of important information, or even important documents (Negrine 1996), to the Press are one way in which the government or powerful interest groups within the state may attempt to influence the media agenda, but perhaps the key weapon in the British Government’s information management armoury is the Lobby system.

The Lobby and media management

The Lobby is the exclusive group of journalists that is briefed twice daily by the Prime Minister’s spokesperson (PMS) during sittings of Parliament, so called because journalists historically assembled in the Member’s Lobby of the House of Commons. In 2008 it had 176 members, mostly representing the main national news outlets (HL Paper 7 2009: 21), and has been described as ‘the Prime Minister’s most useful tool for the political management of the news’ (Cockerell et al. 1984: 33). All of the national newspapers and television and radio broadcasters are represented in the Lobby, with some media organisations such as the BBC sending numerous journalists. This system is a very important resource that British governments use – and some would argue abuse – for keeping control of information flows to the media and hence to the general public. It remains the best way for political journalists to get the up-to-date position of the government on a developing news story, as it carries the authority of the Prime Minister. On this, Cockerell et al. (1984: 33) note that ‘what the Press Secretary says at these briefings is what the Prime Minister wants the press, radio and television to report’. Echoing this, Franklin (2004: 44) also suggests that when a government Press Secretary gives a briefing there is a strong likelihood that it will appear as a news item, ‘replete with the political spin he places on it’.

The Lobby system, despite claims to the contrary by those who have utilised it (Ingham in McNair 1994: 135) is a unique system within Western democracies. This does not mean that other governments do not attempt to manage information – of course they do – but it is normal practice to appoint a party political spokesperson (such as a Minister of Information) who openly represents the government position and is attributable. This is not the case in Britain – the Prime Minister’s Press Secretary is actually a member of the Civil Service and thus officially neutral. Following the Mountfield Review in late 1997, New Labour enabled the Prime Minister’s spokesperson to be identified regarding statements in the Lobby briefing by their job title, but not by name. Prior to this, Lobby briefings were off-the-record and non-attributable; they remain exclusive however, with the ‘only access the public and non-lobby journalists have to the proceedings … [coming] … in the form of a brief summary posted on the Number Ten website’ (Ramsey 2010: 88). There have been numerous calls (from government reviews and academic commentators) for the Lobby to be televised in an effort to make it more transparent, but they were continually resisted by the New Labour government and have been by subsequent administrations. Some compromises have been made, however, with more on-camera briefing by ministers and monthly televised Downing Street press conferences taking place, following changes implemented by Alastair Campbell in late 2002 after the initial recommendations of the Phillis Review. Whether such changes have actually resulted in a dramatic change in the way information is communicated to the media by government representatives is highly debatable with some commentators suggesting that the systematic practice of favoured journalists being given more revealing off-the-record briefings has continued as usual (Assinder 2002).

The Lobby is a peculiarly British institution in the government–media relationship in the UK which in other ways generally demonstrates the usual elements of political communication in democratic societies where ‘media management comprises activities designed to maintain a positive-media relationship, acknowledging the needs which each has of the other, while exploiting the institutional characteristics of both sets of actors for maximum advantage’ (McNair 2003a: 136). However, at the same time the relationship between politicians and the media can obviously involve a struggle between two different sets of interests and agendas. Moloney (2006a) offers two conceptualisations of the government–media relationship, one in market terms as an ‘exchange relationship’ and the other in military terms as a ‘contest relationship’. He notes:

From the perspective of the contest model the journalist attempts to seek out and present the ‘facts’ while the politician will wish to ensure that a news story reflects the ‘message’ that they wish to convey. There is nothing particularly new in the attempt by the political elites to try and control media representations, as is revealed in various accounts of the development and growth of political PR from the early years of the twentieth century onwards (Pearson 1992; McNair 2003a; L’Etang 2004). However, as noted above, there have been significant developments in government PR over the past three decades in the UK. This expansion of PR activity has not unsurprisingly been accompanied by an increasing reliance upon media management strategies. Some commentators (Fairclough 2000; Franklin 2004) have pointed to the increasing use of the ‘soundbite’ and the ‘pseudo-event’ (Boorstin 1962), of ‘image management’ and ‘spin’, as key strategies used by politicians to control media representations of them and their policies.

Soundbites and spin

As the use of spin and information management by government has increased, the impact upon the media, and particularly broadcast journalism, has been perceptible. It is the broadcast journalists’ ‘job’ to pick out the key details or important points of any political event or speech. If that task is made easier, if the speech contains memorable phrases (soundbites) that summarise the main points, then there is a good chance that these portions of the speech will be selected and broadcast on the few minutes allotted to ‘story’ on the broadcast news bulletins. Tony Blair’s phrase ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ from a speech made when he was Shadow Home Secretary has entered the national consciousness. It is indeed a memorable phrase, but it is important to remember that being ‘tough’ and talking about being ‘tough’ was a carefully constructed aspect of the Blair style. Fairclough (2000: 8) noted that ‘Blair’s “toughness” had been self-consciously built into his communicative style as a matter of policy and strategy’. Occasionally, Blair let the façade of the soundbite culture slip, when after the signing of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland he famously uttered, ‘A day like today is not a day for soundbites, really. But I feel the hand of history upon our shoulders’ (BBC News 2007). The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government, elected in May 2010, has paid similar attention to the soundbite: David Cameron and his Ministers have constantly repeated that in respect of the financial crises and public spending cuts, ‘we are all in this together’. In its first year in office, Ministers in the Coalition have often repeated the mantra that they are ‘fixing the financial mess that Labour left us’. Similarly Cameron’s recently elected (May 2015) Conservative administration have continued with austerity policies and familiar soundbites. Opening his first Queen’s speech debate in the new Parliament, Cameron claimed he was offering a legislative programme ‘for working people from a one-nation government who will bring our country together’.

Defining political spin is very difficult, and some commentators note that the term is now used to describe so many activities that it is in danger of becoming meaningless. Andrews (2006) points to the fact that today practically all of a government’s promotional activities now seem to be referred to as ‘spin’. Gaber (2000a: 61) argues that ‘As long as politicians have been politicking, spinners have been spinning’. However, there are some useful definitions that can help make sense of a phenomenon that is ancient, and yet in its current mediated form, quite recent. Street (2001: 1) locates spin within media relations and states that it involves ‘getting the right image, making the right connections, and ensuring that both appear on the next day’s front page’. McNair (2004: 328) argues that spin is a ‘convenient and media friendly shorthand for a particular kind of political public relations, with the negative connotation of spinning a yarn’. Describing the role of spin in the New Labour project, Ludlam and Smith (2001: 24) argue that it can be understood as a ‘new strategic thinking – against which all programmatic or organisational initiatives were judged – and this dominated the struggle for electability’.

Gaber argues that in trying to understand spin, we can break it down into two categories: ‘above the line’ and ‘below the line’ tactics. The ‘above the line’ category includes those activities that would be considered routine, and that ‘would have caused an “old fashioned” press officer no great difficulty’ (Gaber 2000b: 508). These activities may be carried out by civil servants working in communication, without breaking any regulations or straying into any notion that it involves the ‘politicisation’ of the civil service. They relate to the everyday business of government communication, and as such are often banal, receiving little coverage in the press. These activities might include releasing press releases, holding press conferences, and using Ministerial speeches and answers to Parliamentary questions in the House of Commons to communicate information. Gaber (2000b: 509) also identifies ‘Reacting to government/party announcements … publicizing speeches, interviews and articles … reacting to interviews or speeches … reacting to breaking news events’ as activities that can all be grouped into this category. The ‘below the line’ category includes those activities employed by spin doctors that are not conventional and, at times, ethically questionable. Gaber (2000b: 508) suggests that these activities are ‘usually covert and as much about strategy and tactics as about the imparting of information’. Below the line activities include ‘staying on message (ensuring a consistent line is taken) … setting and driving the news agenda (ensuring that government receives coverage on its terms) … kite flying (testing out reaction to a policy before a formal announcement)’ and ‘firebreaking’ (Gaber 2000b: 510–512). In the case of ‘firebreaking’, this involves distracting journalists from a particular story, by planting another of greater significance. Gaber (2000a: 65) notes that an example of this happened in 1997, when the ‘News of the World revealed the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, was engaged in an extra-marital affair’. New Labour’s spin doctors quickly released two stories; one relating to an MI6 investigation of Chris Patten, and the other about a possible reprieve of the Royal Yacht Britannia which was due to be scrapped.

Political communication, public relations and the public sphere ideal

The case study discussed above, along with Gaber’s analysis of the tactics of spin, raises important questions about the role of PR within the context of political communication in liberal democracies. The increased focus on spin and information management and the manner in which government presents its policies have all had an impact on how the public perceive the political process. Fairbanks et al. (2007: 23) have noted the decline in public trust in government and suggest that this decline ‘is an outgrowth of poor communication between government and its publics, where publics feel that they are not well informed about government actions’. They note that:

It is clearly the case that governments and mainstream political parties have the right to present their policies persuasively to the electorate. However, governments are elected to serve the people and this arguably means they must approach information dissemination in a more open and transparent way than any other institution. They have a responsibility to be accessible and accountable to those who have elected them and in this sense some would argue they have a responsibility to help develop a fully functioning ‘public sphere’ (Habermas 1989).

Dahlgren (2001: 33) notes that in its original formulation ‘the public sphere as described by Habermas consists of the institutional space where political will formation takes place, via the unfettered flow of relevant information and ideas’. In Habermas’s analysis the public sphere emerged within the bourgeois classes of late eighteenth-century Western Europe, and was aided by the development of mass literacy. The Enlightenment ideals of rational thinking, argument and discussion were, albeit imperfectly, manifested in the clubs, coffee houses, newspapers and pamphlet writing that characterised this era. In his historical analysis Habermas traced the decay of the public sphere as the nineteenth century developed, with the logic of the marketplace coming to dominate the media, resulting in an increasing trivialisation of political debate. Habermas calls this process the ‘refeudalization’ of the public sphere (Habermas 1989). Whether or not we have anything today that could qualify as a functioning public sphere has been widely debated (Dahlgren 2001; Sparks 2001) but many commentators would argue that at the very least the concept retains a usefulness as a normative vision. Bennett and Entman (2001: 2) suggest that in the ideal public sphere ‘all citizens have equal access to communication that is both independent of government constraint, and through its deliberative, consensus-building capacity, constrains the agendas and decisions of government in turn’. They note that of course this ideal has never been achieved, and probably never will be. Nevertheless the concept ‘serves theorists well as an ideal type – that is, as a construct against which different real-world approximations can be evaluated’ (Bennett and Entman 2001: 3). In respect to the political public sphere Richards (2004: 173) notes that in Habermas’s formulation ‘the public in the liberal democracies should be a participatory public, the collective of citizens engaged, ideally, in informed and rational discussion, and in dialogue with their leaders’. If this is to occur, citizens must be able to depend on information from government communication that is accessible, transparent and participatory. Based on the evidence presented thus far, a great deal of government communication in the UK and in other democratic societies is still a long way from this ideal.

Defining public affairs and lobbying

Harris and Moss (2001: 110) have noted that ‘the term “public affairs” remains one that is surrounded by ambiguity and misunderstanding’. Arguably this is much more of an issue in the UK than it is, for example, in the US and this is primarily to do with how public relations and public affairs are conceived of in the two national contexts. The two activities clearly overlap in several key ways, although the nature of their relationship tends to be viewed somewhat differently in US literature compared to UK perspectives. A well-known US public relations textbook describes public affairs as merely one aspect of public relations work: ‘PR counselling firms use the public affairs label for their lobbying and governmental relations services designed to help clients understand and address regulatory and legislative processes’ (Broom 2009: 35). McGrath (2005) argues that it is this conception of public affairs, as a public relations strategic specialism, that is articulated by the majority of practitioners in the US. In the UK, however, the relationship between public affairs and public relations is viewed rather differently and in fact commentators from the UK frequently resist or downplay the idea that there is any necessary connection at all between the two activities. Moloney (2000: 113) notes:

While some may see merit in articulating a conceptual difference between the two activities, public affairs whether in the UK, the US, or elsewhere, almost always involves much more than just face-to-face ‘insider’ dealings with those who hold power in public policy arenas. Arguably a considerable amount of public affairs activity is indistinguishable from public relations activity and indeed one of the arguments of this chapter is that shared conceptual understandings and theoretical explanations of both public affairs and public relations can enrich our understanding and analysis of much practitioner work.

McGrath (2005) offers a succinct and useful discussion of definitional issues and points out that many accounts, particularly those written by practitioners, lack clarity at best and at worst are rather confusing and contradictory. McGrath cites Milbraith’s, straightforward and still relevant, 50-year-old definition to describe the essential features of lobbying. Milbraith notes ‘lobbying is the stimulation and transmission of a communication, by someone other than a citizen acting on his own behalf, directed to a governmental decision maker with the hope of influencing his decision’ (Milbraith 1963: 8). Clearly, as is evident from Milbrath’s description, defining lobbying is a simpler task than defining public affairs. Lobbying, almost irrespective of where it is practised, is essentially an advocacy activity directed at government/legislators and carried out by actors within or on behalf of a group or organisation. However, public affairs is not limited to advocacy efforts to influence government policy through direct contact with political actors. As Harris and Moss (2001: 110) point out:

It is this broader definition that we adopt because public affairs work almost always involves monitoring and intelligence gathering in the public policy sphere and engagement with the wider public sphere through media relations activities. It may be concerned with building relationships and coordinating activities with other actors engaged in pursuing the same interest or promoting the same cause. Depending on the organisation it may also involve coordinating grassroots activities by members of one’s own group and those sympathetic to its agenda.

Pressure groups and interest groups

Who engages in public affairs and lobbying activity? Essentially it is those actors who have an interest in the development of public policy but are not directly engaged in legislating or governing. These actors tend to be described as ‘interest groups’ in much of the US literature and ‘pressure groups’ in the literature focusing on the UK/EU context. If we examine typical definitions of what constitutes a pressure group it is clear that the ‘pressure’ that groups primarily wish to exert is in respect of attempts to influence political agendas and more specifically the development and implementation of public policy and legislation. Grant (2000: 14) writing on the UK/EU context states:

Coxall (2001) in his analysis of pressure group politics makes an important distinction between a ‘cause’ group that ‘is formed to promote a particular cause based on a set of shared attitudes, values or beliefs: examples are Greenpeace, the Child Poverty Action Group and Amnesty International’ and a ‘sectional’ group that ‘represents the self-interest of a particular economic or social group in society: examples being the Confederation of British Industry (CBI), the Trades Union Congress (TUC), and the British Medical Association (BMA)’ (Coxall 2001: 5). Thomas (2004: 4), in the key US work in the area, echoes closely the above definition when he notes that the interest group is ‘an association of individuals or organizations or a public or private institution that, on the basis of one or more shared concerns, attempts to influence public policy in its favour’.

Public affairs theory

Getz (2001: 308) notes that ‘the dominant theoretical approach to political influence is interest group theory. Interest group theory suggests that the democratic public policy process is an attempt to reach a compromise between the competing goals of a multitude of interest groups.’ Essentially, as Thomas (2004: 17) notes in a key work on interest group theory, this is an approach underpinned by a pluralist conception. Thomas agrees with Getz that, while it is the case that different theoretical approaches make a definitive body of knowledge hard to construct, most theoretical approaches utilise some form of ‘pluralism’. Pluralism can be defined as:

Pluralism does in many ways provide a useful theory for understanding the role of public affairs in liberal democratic societies but there are some important critiques of the pluralist perspective. Hill (2005: 28) notes:

The ‘pluralist perspective’ is challenged by a range of theories that identify ways in which power is ‘concentrated in the hands of small groups, often described as elites’ (Hill 2005: 50). Hill notes that in much of the literature these perspectives have traditionally been described as ‘structural’ critiques. The key argument of such critique is that ‘there is a range of institutions – the family, the church, the economy, the state – that are linked together in a structure that has a powerfully determining impact on what gets on the [political] agenda’ (2005: 47). However Hill (2005: 48–49) suggests that when one examines much of this critique:

Arguably, as we will discuss below, Hill dismisses ‘structural’ issues rather too hastily. Nevertheless his reference to ‘discourses’ is interesting and important because although there have been some notable attempts (e.g. Fisher 2003) to apply a discourse perspective to public policy formation this has largely remained an underdeveloped theoretical lens through which to view the practice of public affairs (Somerville 2011). This is unfortunate because the discourse perspective has arguably opened up important new insights into PR practice and, we would argue, it can do the same for public affairs.

Motion and Weaver (2005: 52) argue that ‘In public relations, discourse is deployed as a political resource to influence public opinion and achieve political, economic and sociocultural transformation’. A ‘discourse’ then is the vehicle by which public relations practitioners and, we would argue, public affairs practitioners attempt to ‘establish, maintain, or transform hegemonic power [because] … public relations discourse strategies are deployed to circulate ideas, establish advantageous relationships, and privilege certain truths and interests’ (Motion and Weaver 2005: 52–53). Viewed in this way public affairs practitioners can be ‘theorised as working to (strategically) privilege particular discourses over others, in an attempt to construct what they hope will be accepted as in the public interest and legitimated as policy’ (Weaver et al. 2006: 18).

While not engaging directly with discourse theory some recent academic accounts of public affairs do adopt similar approaches to theorising the activity. For example McGrath (2007: 269) focuses on the tactic of ‘framing’ which he suggests involves assessing how ‘lobbyists use language consciously to frame policy issues in such a way as to position their organization and its policy preferences to greatest effect’. McGrath notes Entman’s (1993) definition that the process of framing is in essence ‘to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendations for the item described’ (Entman 1993 in McGrath 2007: 271). The parallel here with the notion of promoting a hegemonic discourse is clear. Similarly, Heugens’ (2002) analysis of the use of storytelling in public affairs, which involves the construction of a narrative discourse, is an important contribution. Heugens assesses storytelling as an important corporate and activist tool for gaining the support of various external constituencies in the ongoing semiotic wars over biotechnology. By ‘storytelling’ Heugens means the construction of grand narratives (or discourses) about biotechnology by the key opponents in the battle over GM technologies. He notes that the corporate interests on one side produce a narrative about scientific progress, human advancement, curing starvation etc. Their opponents, the environmentalists, construct a narrative, or discourse, focused on potential health risks, exploitation of third world farmers, corporate greed etc. Heugens (2002: 68) notes:

Political structures, institutions and culture

Motion and Weaver (2005: 50) suggest ‘that discourses deployed for public relations purposes can only be fully understood in relation to the political, economic, and social contexts in which they operate’. The same is certainly true of public affairs and the context always needs to be taken into account to fully understand why some public affairs efforts are successful and others fail, or why some discourses achieve hegemony and others do not. Thomas (2004: 67) makes the point that the ‘types of groups and interests that exist, and the way they attempt to influence public policy are determined by historical, geographical, cultural, social, economic, political, governmental structural and other factors’ and he adds that in turn ‘interest group activities help shape and define the nature of a political system’.

The significance of political structures, institutions, and culture is perhaps thrown into sharpest relief when comparisons between political systems are made. McGrath’s (2005) work on lobbying practices in Washington, London and Brussels demonstrates this through a detailed analysis of the role political culture, institutional frameworks, regulatory environments and executive/legislative relationships all play in determining the differing access points to the policy-making process that need to be engaged to attempt to influence policy decisions in the three political systems. Thus the UK, with its strong party system, is different to the US with its weak political party control over legislators and in turn both are different from the EU where McGrath (2005: 185) notes the key ‘policy-making institutions are supranational, and composed of members or appointees from a range of political parties’. Thomas (2004: 1) also draws attention to US constitutional arrangements when he points out that ‘largely because of its separation of powers system, its weak political parties, and low level of ideological politics, the United States is an aberrant political system in regard to interest group activity’. It is also important to recognise that wider sociopolitical changes may have the effect of ‘making the factor of parties less significant’ (Thomas 2004: 76) and some commentators see such changes producing a shift of power in the policy arena towards interest groups even in the Westminster parliamentary system in the UK where political parties traditionally exerted tight control over the legislative process. Jordan (2004) notes: ‘Given the scale of interest group numbers and memberships, the “decline of parties” and their replacement by group participation, interest groups are now taken seriously in Britain’ (Jordan 2004 in Thomas 2004: 302). It is also important, Thomas suggests, to bear in mind that ‘cultural differences have also led some countries to regulate interest group activity extensively, as in the United States, while in others it is much less stringently regulated, as in Britain and Germany’ (2004: 72). As noted above, McGrath’s study (2005: 167–180) is an excellent place to start for a useful account of regulatory environments in the US, UK and EU.

The various factors discussed above: how one defines public affairs, how its relationship with PR is envisaged and understood, recent scholarly theoretical and conceptual understandings of public affairs, and how structural, institutional and cultural factors all impact on practice have been subject to much scholarly debate. However, it is to public affairs practice that we now turn in order to focus attention on some of the key strategies adopted by groups seeking to influence the public policy arena in contemporary democratic societies.

Environmental analysis and strategic decision making

Broom (2009: 34) makes the point that ‘lobbyists spend substantially more time collecting information from government than they do communicating to it, since sound lobbying strategies, tactics, and positions are highly dependent on a strong base of information’. In regard to the analytical methods and techniques used by public affairs practitioners, Fleisher (2002: 168) acknowledges that the ‘majority of techniques have been borrowed from related fields like administration, management, marketing, political science, public policy and public relations’. The use of typical business and management tools such as the SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, Threats) analysis in public affairs has been noted by Shaw (2005). Fleisher (2002) suggests, however, that much of what does occur is not based on a coherent or rigorous methodology, which he argues is a weakness that needs to be addressed more seriously by current practitioners. It is clear that the identification, monitoring and analysis of legislators, officials, political opponents and other relevant stakeholders is very important in public affairs work, but of course analysing the political and socio-economic environment is only useful if it enables the development of relevant decision making in respect to the most appropriate strategy and tactics to use in any operating environment.

Although writing in the context of corporate public affairs, Getz (2001: 307) raises important questions that are relevant for most organisations seeking to influence public policy. She points out:

Despite a whole raft of public affairs techniques being identified in the literature (e.g. Showlater and Fleisher 2005), there are several key strategies, sometimes used in combination, that dominate (Thomas 2004; McGrath 2005; Showlater and Fleisher 2005). These strategies are: direct face-to-face lobbying; indirect lobbying using grassroots pressure; and the formation of coalitions or alliances with like-minded groups to exert broad-based pressure.

It should also be noted that decision making in respect to which strategy to adopt may be influenced by socio-economic and ideological constraints. For example, a key choice facing some activist groups is whether to engage at all in direct lobbying to try to influence policy or whether to eschew this in favour of protest and pressure from the outside. For example, some of the more ideologically driven environmentalist and animal rights groups have major concerns about compromising their core values by engaging with governments (and other organisations) that perpetuate systems that they are fundamentally opposed to. It is important to bear in mind that some groups may decide to deliberately reject some of the avenues or strategies open to them and choose to remain outside some parts of the public policy arena. Grant (2000: 16) offers a useful definition of insider and outsider groups: ‘An insider group is regarded as legitimate by government and consulted on a regular basis. … An outsider group does not wish to become involved in a consultative relationship with public policy-makers or is unable to gain recognition.’ Typically, outsider groups will adopt non-direct lobbying strategies to exert political pressure, such as grassroots lobbying and direct action.

Direct lobbying

Most groups recognise the importance of putting their case directly to political parties and those holding political office. Fleisher’s (2003: 373) advice to public affairs managers is ‘Be prepared to learn as much as you can about the official before meeting them; do not be concerned if the lawmaker is unavailable and a staff assistant is in their place’. With respect to direct lobbying efforts, knowledge and expertise of how to engage in and implement traditional face-to-face lobbying still determines the success or failure of many public affairs efforts, particularly in the UK. McGrath’s (2007: 269) point about lobbyists using ‘language consciously to frame policy issues in such a way as to position their organization and its policy preferences to greatest effect’ is clearly of key importance in any direct lobbying activity.

The view that direct lobbying is essentially persuasive communication tailoring the message and framing it in an appropriate and appealing way is echoed by many commentators. Mack (1997, cited in McGrath 2007: 271) suggests that ‘Issues should be framed to show how the public benefits from your side of the argument. Don’t go public with a narrow, self-serving issue’. Arguably, political discourse in liberal democratic societies is ultimately underpinned by utilitarian ideals so it is clear that the ‘story’ or ‘narrative’ presented must demonstrate how the policy that an organisation supports is in some way contributing the common good. This is where an understanding of the role and power of discourse becomes significant for the public affairs specialists. Being able to demonstrate that a position on an issue is part of a generally accepted discourse that is widely viewed as part of the core values in liberal democratic societies, for example, human rights, women’s rights, freedom or equality, will always be advantageous. A clear, coherent narrative works best, as McGrath (2007: 271) notes, ‘public policy issues (the focus of lobbying efforts) tend to be complex, involving an array of both factors and alternatives; framing is an attempt by lobbyists to set the boundaries of debate on a given issue.’

To actually present the case, access to government actors or key political figures is a key issue. Several recent studies have revealed the growing importance of party conferences as a key forum for meeting and engaging in face to face lobbying efforts with key political actors (Thomas 2004; Harris and Harris 2005). Harris and Harris (2005: 224) suggest:

Grassroots campaigning

Organisations may be excluded or may choose to exclude themselves, from direct ‘insider’ contact or they might decide other strategies are also required. Indirect lobbying using grassroots pressures is likely to be a useful strategy choice. Fleisher (2003: 371) argues that; ‘Very few issues, particularly those captured in the public’s attention by the media, escape the onslaught of organised grassroots techniques coming from all sides of the matter’. Titley (2003) and McGrath (2005) note the increasing importance of ‘outsider’ tactics, especially grassroots campaigns, which are increasingly supplementing and in some cases even supplanting ‘insider’ contact in respect to British and European public affairs activity. It is clearly a tactic that is seen more and more as a useful and legitimate strategy by all interest groups. To some degree then the adoption of what were traditionally thought of as US practices in respect to grassroots lobbying are emerging in the UK/EU context, although it is probably fair to say that at the present time – for the reasons to do with political culture noted above – grassroots lobbying in the US is used much more effectively as a political weapon during key legislative debates. Morris (1999: 132), reflecting on the tactics of the National Rifle Association (NRA) in the USA, notes:

Web activism can be used to underpin and complement the strategies of grassroots mobilisation and campaigning and transform existing power imbalances that lobbying by powerful groups produces (Kakabadse et al. 2003). There is an accepted wisdom that the internet helps resource-poor groups compete with resource-rich groups in the policy arena. In fact there is evidence to suggest that the internet may actually be reinforcing the status quo. Rethemeyer’s (2007: 199) research indicates:

The power and influence of the grassroots has not gone unnoticed and in recent years the practice of manufacturing a grassroots campaign to try to influence policy makers has become much more common. Although the creation of ‘front’ groups is not a new practice, the expansion of the internet has led to a significant amount of debate on the creation of artificial ‘grassroots pressure’ to deceive or mislead policy makers about public opinion (Showlater and Fleisher 2005). Known as ‘astroturf lobbying’, the tactic is designed to give the appearance of widespread citizen support, when in reality it is often created to promote narrow interests.

Coalition building

Building a public affairs strategy around grassroots campaigning is sometimes accompanied by the strategy of coalition and alliance building with other interest groups. Fleisher (2003: 373) has noted: ‘Through well-conceived coalitions with other allied interests, various groups have been able to achieve important public policy successes.’ Showlater and Fleisher (2005: 119) suggest:

Generally, those coalitions that share a similar ideological position, economic interest, or belong to the same socio-economic sector, probably have the greatest chance of long-term success.

While alliances between ideologically compatible interest groups are more common, it is possible for organisations that at first sight do not seem an obvious fit to work together for mutual benefit. McGrath (2005) notes the example of the alliance of the Japanese multinational corporation SONY with the Royal National Institute for the Blind (RNIB) in the UK, to campaign against an increased levy on audio technology. McGrath cites the views of a senior London lobbyist who helped develop the coalition on behalf of the manufacturer. The lobbyist stated:

There are several interesting elements to this example. The actors in this coalition not only changed the ‘frame’ of the debate – a ‘levy’ was re-articulated as a ‘tax’ – but even more significantly the discourse of equality/discrimination was brought to the fore and exploited effectively by the partners in the coalition. Coalitions and alliances are frequently fraught with difficulties but groups can work together, even those with radically different worldviews if they can agree on what each can bring to the alliance and what the strengths of each partner is (Showlater and Fleisher 2005).

Evaluation

There have been various attempts to derive evaluation and measurement criteria for public affairs work but according to Fleisher (2005: 158), ‘Unfortunately, the state of performance assessment in public affairs does not actually look all that much better than it did over a decade ago’. One key trend in literature on public affairs evaluation that Fleisher identifies is the tendency toward quantitative measurement in recent years, although as he rightly points out there seems to be a confusion between merely providing numeric data and carrying out evaluation in much of this work. He notes:

He points out this is misleading: ‘Counting is not equivalent to and is only the starting point of measurement’ (Fleisher 2005: 153). Fleisher in a number of publications (2002; 2003; 2005) has examined the difficulties in measuring or demonstrating the value of public affairs activity from a functionalist and quantitative perspective. For example, writing specifically about grassroots campaigns he notes:

Fleisher, who has published more than anyone else on this topic over the past decade and a half, is largely correct to assert that the effective evaluation of specific strategies and tactics is a problematic area for the public affairs practitioner. Ultimately, the key assessment that matters in respect to public affairs efforts is, has there been an effect on the public policy process and has there been legislation that impacts positively on the organisation or the cause that it promotes? A straightforward way of evaluating any public affairs effort is to examine the legislation adopted in response to the public affairs efforts surrounding an issue. Public policy shifts may occur over a very long period of time and this should be taken into account when contemplating evaluation and measurement. ‘Success’ in the policy sphere may not mean the achievement, at least in the short term, of legislative change at all; instead it may be measured in the gradual transformation of what McGrath (2007) refers to as the ‘language frame’ or the narrative or discourse used to describe the issue. Changing the discourse will in many cases result in policy change, and legislative change will inevitably follow. Public affairs managers and practitioners in all sectors would do well to follow the advice of key commentators in the area (Mack 1997; McGrath 2007) and become much more sensitive to the language and narratives used to describe issues.