Chapter 6
Public relations and corporate communication

Emma Wood

Chapter Aims

This chapter aims to aid an understanding of what corporate communication is, from both functionalist and critical perspectives, and analyse how it operates in current contexts.

Current Practice

Current practice is affected by a number of contextual developments. Our digitalised society, ‘a public arena of ongoing constructions of meanings by (self-invented) stakeholders’ (van Ruler 2015: 187) has affected communicators’ ability to control corporate messages. Pressure for ethical practice has been exacerbated by the failures in the financial sector and demands for greater organisational transparency mean that a whole range of stakeholders (including hostile and critical media) scrutinise corporate communications for inconsistencies (Christensen and Cheney 2015). In addition, recent research from New Zealand indicates that that a key future trend is that businesses will pressure governments to legislate for level playing fields in relation to sustainable practice (Roper et al. 2015). However, there is also public outcry at the threat of less transparent decision making resulting from proposed transnational free trade agreements about reducing the regulatory barriers to trade for big business (such as TTIP and Trans Pacific Partnership).

Corporate communication has been defined in a number of different ways – in relation to public relations perhaps the most significant is as the process of establishing trust, social capital and legitimacy.1 Another popular conceptualisation is the functionalist view that corporate communication is about ‘harmonising’ all communication within an organisation to ensure consistency with corporate missions and objectives – a view that is contested by critical scholars:

Whilst it may seem appealing to align all messages inside and outside an organization, a deeper examination of this position reveals logical, practical and even ethical problems. With our organizational approach, we want to demonstrate that plurality and diversity of opinions and expressions are necessary for organizations operating in complex environments and having multiple constituencies.

(Christensen et al. 2008b: ix)

Consequently, it is argued here that corporate communication should be seen less as harmonising all communications and more as establishing meaningful values communicated in a way that encourages the organisation (and organisational members) to behave in a way that is consistent (but not homogeneous) with them in order to build social capital and establish legitimacy, thereby encouraging stakeholder support (expressed through local communities being open to corporate plans, employees feeling highly motivated, top performers seeking employment with an organisation, investors wanting to invest and legislators not jumping to introduce punitive legislation, as well as potential consumers being more open to promotional messages aimed at getting them to purchase goods or use services).

Corporate communication is such a multifaceted practice that the use of a case study has been selected here as one of the best ways of illustrating the different dimensions and issues to be considered in attempting to manage these effectively. For anyone wanting to justify the strategic importance of effectively managed corporate communication in commercial terms, the case study used demonstrates the impact that poorly managed communication can have on the bottom line. But it goes further than this and shows the importance of ethical, transparent decision making, of building social capital or trust and relationships with a whole range of stakeholders – and how effective communication with stakeholders other than shareholders/funders is important and can significantly affect an organisation’s image, reputation and consequently its ability to conduct its business. The analysis goes further than providing a functional ‘how to’ guide and points to some of the conceptual frameworks that can be used to guide decision making and practice in this area. It illustrates what can happen if dialogic relationships with key stakeholders are ignored. This case had a real impact on senior thinking about corporate public relations and in the current climate where the impact of failings in the financial sector is being keenly felt, is still very relevant.

C@se Study

The Bank of Scotland – A Case Study

The Bank of Scotland (BoS) was founded in 1695, by an Act of the Scottish Parliament, making it Scotland’s first and oldest bank. Its image resonates with Scots’ national identity as being ‘canny’ with money and highly effective financiers. With such a long history, and cultural significance, arguably, then, its leaders may well have felt their power was unassailable and the bank’s position secure. However, in 2008 the bank all but collapsed and had to be taken over by Lloyds TSB. In 2014, the UK’s Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards described its fall not so much as a ‘cautionary tale’, but a ‘manual of bad banking’, and in terms of corporate communication important insights can be gained from a critical analysis of its recent history.

The Lloyds TSB Banking Group has over 30 million customers and is the UK’s leading provider of current accounts, savings, personal loans, credit cards and mortgages. The Bank of Scotland issues a range of credit and charge cards (including cards to supporters of affinity groups ranging from charities to universities) and is known for its pioneering electronic and telephone home and office banking service.

In the early part of this century, its community mission statement clearly signified a stakeholder approach to its business:

Throughout Bank of Scotland’s 306-year history, we have been keenly aware of our responsibilities as good corporate citizens. We know that our own business will be stronger if the communities where our existing and future customers live and work are stable and healthy.

(www.bankofscotland.co.uk: September 2003)

Its ‘statement of business principles’ specified that:

In three centuries of doing business, we have learned how to win trust in all of our relationships – and how vital it is to retain that trust. The highest standards of business conduct and fair dealing in all our operations is our aim.

(www.bankofscotland.co.uk: September 2003)

These values now appear to be empty rhetoric bearing in mind the Parliamentary Committee’s swingeing criticism of the bank, and its leaders’ behaviour. The case below demonstrates the gap between the rhetoric and practice and the impact it has had.

The bank and the TV evangelist

In March 1999, the bank announced its intention to team up with Pat Robertson to set up a direct bank in the US. The new bank would operate only through telephones and computers.

Robertson is well known in the US as a religious broadcaster, entrepreneur and right-wing politician who ran unsuccessfully for the US presidency in 1988. His Christian Broadcasting Network provides programming by cable, broadcast and satellite to approximately 180 countries with a mission of converting 500 million people to Christianity. As direct banking was less developed in the US than in the UK, the combination of BoS expertise and Robertson’s access to a vast network of potential customers seemed to guarantee a highly profitable business venture.

Soon after the announcement, the press published details about Robertson and his extreme right-wing views. Robertson’s attacks on homosexuals, feminists, Muslims, Hindus and other religious groups were reported, particularly in the Scottish media. Pressure groups were quick to publicly denounce Robertson, and the bank for being associated with him. Utilising the internet and other media, these groups coordinated attacks on the deal. They set up websites with links to the media and the bank to help the public to learn more about the issue and to register their condemnation. Direct action included calls for bank accounts to be closed and protesters handcuffing themselves to the bank’s headquarters.

The bank remained adamant that it would not succumb to public or media pressure. Its PR strategy seemed to alternate between refusing to comment and blaming the media for distorting or exaggerating Robertson’s views. Robertson’s approach was similar; in addition he attempted to place legal restrictions on press reporting of his opinions. Far from diminishing interest in or coverage of the issue, this resulted in the media becoming more entrenched. Rather than being frightened off by threats of legal action, the media substantiated their attacks with evidence of Robertson’s comments, using direct quotes from his TV shows, books and an open letter that claimed: ‘The feminist agenda is not about equal rights for women. It is about a socialist anti-family political movement that encourages women to leave their husbands, kill their children, practice witchcraft, destroy capitalism and become lesbians’ (The Scotsman, 24 April 1999).

The bank was reported to believe that these views should not affect their potentially lucrative joint venture. Peter Burt, BoS Chief Executive, defended the deal by drawing a distinction between the intrinsic moral and ethical values of a commercial decision and the ethics of the individuals involved: ‘An individual’s personal religious views do not form the basis on which the Bank makes its business and commercial judgement. And nor should it’ (The Scotsman, 22 April 1999). However, key opinion formers disagreed and major institutions began to publicly register their disapproval of the bank’s association with Robertson.

The logical extension of this disapproval would be for these key institutions to disassociate themselves from the bank. Media coverage became dominated by reports of city councils, universities, trade unions, charities and churches threatening to close their accounts. Several highprofile MSPs were happy to be named in condemning the deal and called for the Scottish Parliament’s account to be removed from the bank if the deal went ahead (The Scotsman, 2 June 1999).

The bank’s defence of Robertson ceased in mid May when he was reported as condemning Scotland as a ‘dark land’ overrun by homosexuals (The Scotsman, 2 June 1999). In early June the bank announced that it was abandoning its joint venture. A joint statement said:

Dr Pat Robertson and Peter Burt, following a meeting in Boston yesterday, agreed that the changed external circumstances made the proposed joint venture … unfeasible. In reaching this agreement Dr Robertson expressed regret that the media comments about him had made it impossible to proceed.

(The Scotsman, 7 June 1999)

The announcement was seen as terse by some and interpreted as still blaming media distortion for the failed venture rather than the bank fully condemning Robertson’s views. The Scotsman deemed it an ‘apology that leaves a lot to be desired’ (7 June 1999), The Guardian, ‘a grudging, gritted-teeth apology’ (19 June 1999). Tim Hopkins of gay rights campaigners Equality Network represented a number of views with his comments:

People are still very angry with the Bank and it will have its work cut out getting back their confidence. We would like to see the Bank reaching out to minority groups to rebuild its reputation for equal opportunities, which before the Pat Robertson business was very good.

(The Scotsman, 7 June 1999)

It was only after a more full and personal apology was given to shareholders at the annual general meeting that public opinion was reported as mellowing towards the bank. At the AGM, the bank’s deputy-governor, Sir John Shaw, said:

The board of the Bank regrets any concern to customers, proprietors [shareholders] and staff caused by the events of the past few weeks. The Bank failed to predict the strength of public reaction after announcing the deal with Dr Robertson. The last straw came when he described Scotland as an overly ‘dark land’. We have a long-standing commitment to ethical values, tolerance, equal opportunities, and nondiscrimination in all our dealings. Determination to uphold these principles as we develop our business world-wide will continue to characterise the Bank of Scotland.

(The Scotsman, 11 June 1999)

Analysis

This case study demonstrates several important aspects of corporate public relations practice. Before moving to consider the strategic elements, it is important to reflect on what this tells us about some of the philosophical ideas that could influence practice, particularly in relation to establishing legitimacy and building trust and social capital.

Stakeholder Approach

In 2008, HBOS made a pre-tax loss of £10.8bn and in 2009 had to be taken over by The Lloyds Banking group to save it from collapse (The Scotsman, 3 December 2009). This was during the dramatic change in the global economy when an era of financial liquidity or ‘easy money’ was replaced by the ‘credit crunch’ leading to an erosion of trust in financial institutions and, indeed, for some a questioning of the very foundations of capitalism. A number of commentators blame the financial crisis on banks’ philosophy and priorities in pursuing profits. The Robertson case illustrates this type of adherence to profit making that sees the shareholder as the most important public and contradicts a stakeholder approach to business, an approach deemed by many to underpin the most effective approach to corporate public relations (although it was eventually forced to adopt a stakeholder approach and ditch the Robertson deal).

The extreme focus on shareholders at the expense of other stakeholders has been construed as short termist and ultimately damaging. At a 2009 forum The Global Financial Crisis: What Happened and Lessons for the Future, Will Hutton blamed the banking crisis on the ‘intellectual and moral failure’ not just of financial institutions, but also of legislators, regulators, business leaders and academics basing their ideas on a ‘narrow ideological theory and consumer culture’ with a business mantra deemed ‘a short termist philosophy and amoral way of doing capitalism’. Hutton reaffirmed his beliefs expressed in The State We’re In (see below) that stakeholder capitalism is the ideology necessary for a sustainable future, and Margaret Curren MSP speculated on the need to return to the ‘third way’.

In his best-selling book, Will Hutton argues for a democratic political economy that relates to the whole of British society. He criticises business for being short-termist and relentless in pursuit of some of the highest financial returns in the world: ‘Companies are the fiefdoms of their Boards and sometimes of just their Chairmen; and companies are run as pure trading operations rather than productive organisations which invest, innovate and develop human capital’ (Hutton 1996: 25).

In contrast to this view of companies being dominated only by the idea of improving returns for shareholders, the concept of stakeholding advocates a democratic approach to business that values relationships with a range of stakeholders.

The term ‘stakeholder’ refers to groups or individuals who have an interest or stake in an entity such as an organisation, community or country. In corporate terms, a company’s stakeholders typically include:

certain individuals and groups that have legitimacy in the eyes of management. That is, they have a legitimate, direct interest in, or claim on, the operations of the firm. The most obvious of these groups are stockholders, employees and customers. But, from the point of view of a highly pluralistic society, stakeholders not only include these groups, but … the community, competitors, suppliers, special interest groups, the media and society.

(Caroll and Buchholtz 2009: 85)

Each of these groups can affect or is affected by the ‘actions, decisions, policies, practices or goals of the organisation’ (Freeman 1984: 25).

From an organisational perspective, stakeholderism is linked to notions such as ‘death of deference’, whereby people no longer automatically defer to professionals or large organisations but can feel more powerful in granting a ‘licence to operate’ – consequently, to be successful, organisations must maintain public confidence in the legitimacy of their operations and business conduct.

Figure 6.1

Figure 6.1 Various forces in the external environment combine to influence a company’s licence to operate

Source: RSA inquiry (1995). Used by permission of the RSA

There is no firm consensus on the meaning of stakeholder theory.2 It has been described variously as being based on Keynesian economics (Hutton 1996), communitarianism (rights matched by responsibilities) (Burkitt and Ashton 1996) and the Kantian notion of duty (as opposed to utilitarianism) (Etzioni 1988 in Burkitt and Ashton 1996; see also Chapter 9).

In political terms, stakeholder theory is premised on the interrelation of state, society and the economy as opposed to a ‘free market’ approach (where the market is not primarily concerned with notions of social responsibility and regulates itself through supply and demand rather than through state intervention). In the UK, the free market approach was advocated by Margaret Thatcher and the New Right, whereas stakeholder theory has been associated with New Labour’s philosophy of social inclusion, a philosophy labelled ‘the third way’ by a number of political thinkers including, perhaps most notably, sociologist and advisor to Tony Blair, Antony Giddens, who sees the third way as:

a label for upgrading left of centre thinking in the face of the profound changes affecting social and economic life today … The ‘first way’ was traditional social democracy – in the context of [the UK] Old Labour based on an unswerving faith in the state …The second way’ was Thatcherism, or free market fundamentalism … founded on the belief in the primacy of markets the need to reduce the scope of the state and minimize taxes, and upon a relative indifference to social justice.

(Giddens 2007: 15)

As the Labour party battles in the UK to determine its future philosophy, this framework provides a useful barometer.

Both stakeholder capital, and the third way are closely connected to the concept of social capital (Franklin 2003).

Social capital

A number of key thinkers have noted an erosion of social capital in contemporary cultures – notably, Putnam (1996, 2000) in the United States. In the UK, Hutton notes: ‘In the early 90s … mainstream culture moved away from public purpose and fairness; the new priorities were individual self-fulfilment, personal experience and loyalty to self’ (Hutton 2008: 2). And the ideas inherent in the theory of social capital – building trust and connections between individuals and social networks – clearly resonate with David Cameron’s rhetoric in relation to ‘Broken Britain’ and his ambitions for a ‘Big Society’. The debate surrounding the Conservative party’s utilisation of the concept reflects a wider debate whereby some thinkers such as Bordieu (1983) see social capital as belonging only to elites, and a way in which they access and sustain power and resources, whereas commentators such as Coleman (1988, 1990, 1994) see it as a way in which all socio-economic groups can build capacity in their communities.

Most definitions of social capital focus either on its individual/private aspect (Bourdieu) or the public/collective aspect (Coleman, Putnam and Fukuyama). The OECD’s (2013) framework for measuring social capital is therefore divided into four aspects: personal relationships, social network support, civic engagement, and trust and cooperative norms. Clearly, the latter category is of particular interest to corporate communicators, and most relevant to the case study. The BoS’s support of Robertson can be seen to erode ‘trust, social norms and shared values that underpin societal functioning and enable mutually beneficial cooperation’ (OECD 2013: 20).

The public and media outcry provoked by BoS’s joint venture with Robertson certainly demonstrates a transgression of several of the tenets of stakeholderism too. Consequently, far from deferring to the bank’s decision to go ahead with the deal, a range of stakeholders publicly debated the bank’s licence to operate, and lack of public confidence in the moral legitimacy of the venture eventually resulted in its demise. Communities insisted on their rights being respected, and the bank conceded – preferring to find a new and less controversial partner than Robertson, despite the millions of pounds that could have been quickly realised through the proposed deal. The bank opted for a more sustainable approach to development.

Stakeholder management

Hutton’s argument for an end to short-termism in the financial community could be seen to resonate with a number of public relations scholars and practitioners’ calls for public relations practitioners to take a long-term view in managing organisational relationships with a range of stakeholders and publics (Ledingham and Bruning 2000; Grunig and Huang 2000; Grunig et al. 2002; Ledingham 2003, 2006a, 2006b; Jo et al. 2004; Welch 2006; Jahansoozi 2006; Kia and Shin 2006; Hung 2007; Scott 2007; Szondi 2010; Ki and Hon 2012; Kang 2013).

They argue that practitioners do not wait until publics are actively campaigning before communicating with them. Effective public relations strategists are involved in organisational decision making (see Chapter 4). Before decisions are made they would draw a stakeholder map identifying their stakeholders and anticipating the ways in which they may be affected by organisational decisions and how they would react to them. A number of stakeholder mapping models are particularly problematic in their corporate centric approach to determining who should be communicated with and who should be ignored. Many matrix approaches only take account of criteria such as power and interest and not of who actually has a legitimate voice. Consequently, this author prefers Mitchell, Agle and Wood’s (1997) approach using the criteria of legitimacy and urgency in addition to power.

If the BoS used this type of strategic approach it is difficult to understand why it did not either actively manage its stakeholder relationships or ‘moderate their consequences’ on its stakeholders by deciding not to venture into a relationship with Robertson in the first place. It is important to note that the process outlined above advocates organisations adjusting their goals to accommodate stakeholder views. This is the key to public relations people implementing a stakeholder approach, and a lack of this type of symmetrical activity could be seen as the basis for accusations of the bastardisation of term. Some approaches have stripped away the philosophical context to focus on a purely functionalist approach as illustrated in one of the perspectives considered by Carroll and Buchholtz (2009: 92): ‘Let us approach stakeholder management with the idea that managers can become successful stewards of their stakeholders’ resources by gaining knowledge about stakeholders and using this knowledge to predict and take care of their actions.’ Critical scholars debate the basis for this type of managerial approach, which can be identified as an ‘almost exclusive analysis of stakeholders from the perspective of the organisation’ (Friedman and Miles 2002: 1), an approach that they argue ‘hampers’ stakeholder theory:

Generally stakeholder theory has been approached from the point of view of business ethics, corporate governance and/or corporate social performance. This puts the organisation at the centre of the analysis and discourages consideration of stakeholders in their own right as well as discouraging balanced viewing of the organisation/stakeholder relation.

(Friedman and Miles 2002: 2)

Figure 6.2

Figure 6.2 The strategic management of public relations

Source: Grunig and Repper (1992: 124). Used by permission

Stakeholder engagement

In recognition of the difficulties (both practical and ethical) of managing stakeholders (or even relationships), the concept of stakeholder management is being increasingly replaced by the notion of stakeholder engagement premised on a dialogical approach (Heath 2007; de Bussey 2010; Pieczka 2014). Effective stakeholder engagement is key to the success of corporate communication conceptualised in this way, but the ability to achieve real engagement is highly contested. A significant body of knowledge points to dialogue theory and dialogic and deliberative approaches (see Kapein and van Tulder 2003; Anderson et al. 2004; Deetz and Simpson 2004; Pieczka and Wood 2013) as being the best way to achieve engagement, and views are emerging which point to the importance of this approach to public relations (Kent and Taylor 2002; Heath et al. 2006; Bruning et al. 2008; Heath 2010; Pieczka 2011, 2014).

Following this approach, the more traditional adversarial behaviour witnessed in the case study could be argued to ultimately undermine social capital. Alternatively, a stakeholder engagement approach, based on dialogic principles of facilitating dissensus, could have resulted in more sustainable outcomes (Wood and Escobar 2011).

This discussion demonstrates that stakeholder theory can be used by public relations practitioners to inform a pragmatic, strategic approach to practice, but its implications are more far-reaching. Stakeholding is ‘intimately connected to societal values and power relations and interactive with them. Culture, polity and society are conceptualised as inextricably connected with the economy, each being highly interactive with each other’ (Burkitt and Ashton 1996: 5). The BoS case seems to illustrate that public relations practitioners ignore the values of stakeholding at their peril.

Corporate Social Responsibility

Stakeholderism is inextricably linked to broader concepts of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and the role of public relations in relation to democracy. CSR is covered in depth in Chapter 9 but the application of some of these ideas is important to highlight here. Amnesty International’s Peter Frankental believes certain paradoxes evident in organisations’ application of CSR suggest that far from embracing a real duty to society, CSR has become a ‘PR invention’. He argues that CSR can only have:

real substance if it embraces all the stakeholders of a company, if it is reinforced by company law relating to governance, if it is rewarded by financial markets, if its definition relates to the goals of social and ecological sustainability, if its implementation is benchmarked and audited, if it is open to public scrutiny, if the compliance mechanisms are in place and if it is embedded across the organisation horizontally and vertically.

(Frankental 2001: 18)

In other words, these ideas must not only influence the language chosen by PR practitioners to communicate with publics, as a way of spinning an organisation’s activities, but must permeate thinking at all levels of strategic decision making and implementation. And the buck does not stop with organisations – government and other regulators must guarantee a regulatory framework that forces organisations to comply with these ideas. Frankental endorses the call for auditing according to a triple bottom line that is ‘financial, environmental and social’ (Frankental 2001: 19). Annual social reports must be more than gloss or spin. In a properly regulated world ‘the terms of reference will be more comprehensive, standard methodologies will be developed and issues of definition, measurement, monitoring and verification will be … addressed. (Frankental 2001: 20)

Clearly though, it is significant to note the criteria of measurement of corporate social responsibility.

BOS’s key performance indicators for ‘contribution to society’ very much focus on Frankental’s ‘financial’ and ‘environmental’ impact but only seem to encompass the ‘social’ if this is interpreted as wealth creation and providing tax revenue to the government to spend on social infrastructures. They were:

  • taxation paid
  • dividends paid
  • total payroll
  • energy use
  • water use
  • waste
  • business travel
  • protection of the environment
  • prosecutions/reported cases of bribery/corruption
  • regulatory fines or reprimands

(www.hbosplc.com/community/includes/HBOS_CR_Report_14Aug_2005.pdf)

The case can be seen as evidence to substantiate an argument that CSR or CSR(S) Corporate Social Responsibility and Sustainability, is not about corporate development of policies or activities designed to build a socially responsible image or to help achieve predetermined strategically important objectives; but is about the process of understanding an organisation’s impact on a broad range of stakeholders, relates to social capital and is located in a broader social context (Beckmann et al. 2006: 26).

Reputation

Better-regarded companies build their reputations by developing practices that integrate economic and social considerations into their competitive strategies. They not only do things right – they do the right things. In doing so, they act like good citizens. They initiate policies that reflect their core values; that consider the joint welfare of investors, customers and employees; that invoke concern for the development of local communities; and that ensure the quality and environmental soundness of their technologies, products and services.

(Fombrun 1996: 8)

The aims outlined in the BoS’s corporate statement reflect an understanding of this approach to reputation-building. However, its actions or behaviour (teaming up with Robertson and defending the deal by attempting to distinguish between the ethics of commercial decisions and the personal views of business partners) is not congruent with the core values its statement expresses. Its problems could be judged to have stemmed from its failure to ‘integrate economic and social considerations’.

A consideration of the bank’s withdrawal from the deal also provides a useful insight into this perspective of reputation building. The bank stood to make tens of millions of pounds’ profit as a result of the Robertson deal, which would have resulted in the opening of millions of new accounts by American customers. At the time it withdrew from the venture, only 500 accounts had been closed by British customers (compared with more than 21,500 opened during the same period) (The Guardian, 16 June 1999). Clearly the potential gains would vastly outweigh the losses. An analysis of the bank’s early statements and subsequent apology seems to indicate that it did not abandon the deal because of ethical considerations. The motivation for the decision can be interpreted as stemming from concern that direct action from key stakeholders might escalate, irreparably damaging its British business (and profits). Clearly, the bank recognised its long-term reputation as being more valuable than the short-term profits it could have made as a result of going ahead with the venture.

The case not only illustrates how a reputation is earned (and damaged) but also its value and the relationship between a good reputation and profits. As Fombrun (1996: 81) explains:

Corporate reputations have bottom line effects. A good reputation enhances profitability because it attracts customers to the company’s products, investors to its securities, and employees to its jobs. In turn, esteem inflates the price at which a public company’s securities trade. The economic value of a corporate reputation can therefore be gauged by the excess market value of its securities.

Impact on Share Price

Advocates of a stakeholder approach to business do not disregard the shareholder as a vitally important stakeholder, based on the argument that by adopting a stakeholder approach an organization will be well managed and therefore able to deliver greater value to its shareholders. In contrast, ‘organisations that continue to act as if shareholders are the only important group will colour the financial community’s view of the quality of management and endanger the interests of the very group they seek to satisfy’ (RSA 1995: 1). The effect of the Robertson venture on the BoS share price seems to bear this out. When the deal was first announced the share price rallied, but when public outcry emerged, it fluctuated – falling significantly following the publicity surrounding Robertson’s ‘dark land’ comments.

Opinion Formers

An analysis of the people and organisations that influenced the bank’s decision is useful in identifying the range of opinion formers public relations practitioners should communicate with. Council leaders, MSPs, church leaders, individual shareholders, the unions, pressure groups and civil rights leaders’ views were all reported in the press.

Communication Technology and Globalisation

The internet played an important role in the case. Not only did it enable pressure groups to mobilise public pressure, it also facilitated fast and effective access to information about the American preacher. For example, while Robertson complained about being misquoted, The Scotsman printed instructions for readers to download real-time video footage of the programme in which Robertson denounced Scotland as a ‘dark land’ (2 June 1999).

These developments are also significant in the process of globalisation (and antiglobalisation movements) and multiculturalism. Indeed, Starck and Kruckenberg (quoted in Heath 2001a: 52) identify ‘communication/transportation technology, multiculturalism and globalisation’ as the ‘three phenomena that promise incalculable continuing effects on human kind’ resulting in ‘immense societal changes’. They identify communication as the ‘indispensable component’ in negotiating this ‘increasingly globalised, diversified and multicultural world’ (quoted in Heath 2001a: 57). See Chapter 19 for further discussion of these concepts and Holmstrom (2010).

Environmental Scanning

At the AGM, Sir John Shaw was reported as saying:

The Bank was well aware that Mr Robertson was a controversial figure in the United States. We did not expect that the controversy he was associated with there would have transferred to here where he has no political constituency or business.

Critics could argue that in a global economy, geographical boundaries do not operate in the way Sir John had anticipated.

Effective public relations input at board level should have forewarned the bank that Robertson would be a controversial figure, particularly in the current business environment where discussions of ethical practice and social responsibility are prevalent on business and political agendas. The case serves as an effective argument that public relations expertise should be included in the strategic planning process and should be able to influence dominant coalition decision making (see Chapter 4).

Ethics

Final thoughts could be given to the locus of ethical decision making in this case. Conventional wisdom may refer to a ‘business case’ approach where ethical decision making is driven by what is commercially sensible for the long-term interests of the organisation. However, in relation to corporate communication it is also interesting to think about the communication practitioner’s own role in this. Holtzhausen and Voto’s (2002: 64) view is that:

The practitioner as organizational activist will serve as a conscience in the organization by resisting dominant power structures, particularly when these structures are not inclusive, will preference employees’ and external publics’ discourse over that of management, will make the most humane decision in a particular situation, and will promote new ways of thinking and problem solving through dissensus and conflict. These actions will contribute to a culture of emancipation and liberation in an organisation.

And, more recently, the theory of virtue ethics provides an interesting lens offering ‘a useful approach that focuses on the importance of individuals’ moral character in driving virtuous business conduct as well as fostering an ethical corporate and social climate’ (Wang et al. 2015).

Questions for Discussion

  • 1 How does corporate communication differ from consumer public relations?
  • 2 What constitutes a good reputation?
  • 3 To what extent can BoS build or erode social capital?
  • 4 What is the role of communication in establishing legitimacy?
  • 5 Why is a stakeholder perspective important? Can it be used cynically?
  • 6 How can PR practice damage or benefit the democratic process?
  • 7 Draw a stakeholder map for BoS.
  • 8 Should an organisation centric view of stakeholders be avoided?
  • 9 What criteria should be used to measure a company’s contribution to society?
  • 10 Does ‘A good reputation enhance profitability because it attracts customers to the company’s products’? (Fombrun 1996: 81)

Notes

1 The concepts of trust, legitimacy and social capital as explicated in the works of Luhmann (1969/1993 in Ihlen et al. 2009: 333) Weber (1922/1968) Habermas (1984, 1987) Bourdieu (1983) and Putnam (1996, 2000) are very usefully debated in relation to public relations practice in Ihlen (2009). Hazleton and Kennan (2000) and Kennan and Hazleton (2006) also offer interesting insights into the significance of social capital for public relations practice.

2 See Clarke (1997) and de Bussy (2008) for a useful analysis of different approaches to the concept of stakeholding and stakeholder theory.

Further Reading

Christensen, L. T., Morsing, M. and Cheney, G. (2008) Corporate Communications: Convention, challenge, complexity, London: Sage.

Ihlen, O., van Ruter, B. and Fredrikson, M. (eds) (2009) Public Relations and Social Theory: Key figures and concepts, New York: Routledge.

Wood, E. (2013) ‘Corporate communication’ in R. Tench and L. Yeomans (eds) Exploring Public Relations, Harlow: Pearson Education, pp. 46–67.

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