16

INDIA–RUSSIA–CHINA: THE MULTILATERAL PROCESS IN CENTRAL ASIA

Anita Sengupta

The debate on multilateralism, defined in the broadest sense as international cooperation among more than two states in the international arena, has reemerged in the light of a unilateralist impulse emanating from the Bush administration in recent years.¹ While a debate on the reform of the United Nations as the principal global multilateral forum had been an ongoing process prior to recent US actions, a multilateral approach towards regional issues measures reflected the belief that existing and potential conflicts could be effectively managed through regularized dialogue and consultation, without the necessity of recourse to coercion. It was pointed out that multilateralism is distinctive not merely because it coordinates national policies in groups of three or more states—which is something that other organizational forms also do—but additionally because it does so on the basis of certain principles of ordering relations among states.²

Questions about the viability of multilateralism were revived in the background of US actions in Iraq that bypassed the United Nations.³ However, the United Nations was not the only multilateral forum under review; the prominence of bilateral arrangements with the US also brought into question the viability of regional multilateral forums, particularly in the immediate neighbourhood of Afghanistan. This was considered to be particularly significant as a reversal of the post-Cold War scenario, with the United Nations ‘returning’ to the vision and intentions of its founders in becoming an effective instrument for maintaining international peace and security. The end of the Cold War had therefore been seen as presenting an opportunity to move towards a system of collective security that would create conditions for greater international stability and reduce the risk of war. With the end of the Cold War, it was also assumed that a more independent stance in terms of regional security forums was in sight since there remained no overarching global dynamic over regional initiatives. Writings on Asian security practice, for instance, noted:

Local and regional dynamics are becoming more salient, and states appear to have greater latitude in shaping their immediate environments. Unlike the economic do-main, where the Asian economies and their regional activities are becoming integrated into the global economy, the security domain seems to be witnessing the development of a much more independent regional system.⁴

In the post-September 11 scenario, it was argued that this independent stance, at least as far as regional security arrangements was concerned, would change in the region in the immediate neighbourhood of Afghanistan. Here, once again, the ‘war against terrorism’ would demonstrate the significance of either bilateral or global security alignments, particularly where the Central Asian region was concerned. This change would herald what was identified as the ‘post post-Cold War’scenario where global security would be the guiding norm. This was noted as being particularly significant and projected as a reversal of the post-Cold War scenario. In fact, analysts argued that, in the future, all campaigns would be ‘a coalition of the willing’ that is completely dominated by the US, and with contribution on a bilateral basis.⁵ Yet, the ‘war against terrorism’ itself has proven the importance of multilateral cooperation. Although the decisive battles in Iraq and Afghanistan were largely the product of unilateral US military power, much of the success that has been achieved was through broad multilateral cooperation on a number of lower profile fronts such as intelligence sharing, border security, economic sanctions and law enforcement.

The debate that followed US actions, however, was less about strategic choice but more a matter of disagreement about the very meaning and purpose of multilateralism.⁶ The debate has since moved in numerous directions.⁷ While most of it has been a critique of a process that is still largely defined by states according to convenience, a significant part of the debate also focusses on it as an ideal to be aspired for in a global system that is now being identified as unipolar.⁸ As against this unipolar and unilateralist tendency, multilateral options are being advocated by a significant part of the global community.⁹ In recent times, Russia and China have advocated global multilateralism and have emphasized the necessity of strengthening the role of the United Nations.¹⁰ They have also sought multilateral solutions to conflicts in their immediate neighbourhood. They share similar views with regard to opposing unilateralist actions by a US-led NATO extending beyond Europe into Central and South Asia. The extent to which such common concerns can lead to the development of multilateral co-operation in particular regions remains to be seen, particularly in the light of the fact that multilateralism is often variously defined by them and commitment to multilateral options has varied, particularly in cases which concern national interest. For instance, analysts have noted that while China’s thinking on multilateralism and regional security cooperation has evolved over the last decade, it is yet to demonstrate that it accepts the principles of multilateralism unequivocally. It is pointed out that China follows conditional multilateralism, which is characterized by a low degree of institutionalization of the multilateral forum.¹¹

However, there are certain areas where there is broad agreement on the need for multilateral action. For instance, there have been attempts to explore multilateral options in terms of security and confidence-building in the Central Asian region by Russia and China. The Central Asian states are part of the Common-wealth of Independent States (CIS) and as such most of them are signatories to the Collective Security Treaty (CST), now renamed the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).¹² In addition, they are also part of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), which includes Russia and China. Russia, China and a number of other Asian states are part of the Conference on Confidence Building and Interaction in Asia (CICA), a Central Asian initiative at confidence building in the region.

A significant part of strategic writing emanating from western scholarship brought into question the role of these regional multilateral organizations in the post 9/11 scenario.¹³ In fact, it was suggested that regional multilateral forums would no longer be significant and most security agreements would once again be bilateral. It was also argued that to the limited extent that multilateral options would be considered as viable, transregional institutions would tend to be favoured at the expense of regional collectivities.¹⁴ In the Central Asian case the assumption was that the NATO-sponsored Partnership for Peace (PfP) would emerge as the most significant security organization in the region as the transition from regional to global security became the guiding norm. This assumption was, however, not a recent one. As early as 1997, Zbigniew Brzezinski had talked about a‘new cooperative trans-Eurasian security system’, and the NATO had expanded its presence in the region since the mid-1990s. The most common comment about regional security arrangements in the post 9/11 scenario was that, given the US presence in the region, multilateral processes initiated by Russia and China would take a back seat. All of these positions were subject to critical assessment in the course of the events that followed the Andijan incident and the subsequent Uzbek demand for the evacuation of US forces from their bases in Karshi-Khanabad.¹⁵ In July 2005, an assertive SCO called for a timetable for the eventual departure of US forces from all Central Asian bases.¹⁶

In the period following September 11, certain strategic realignments that had already taken shape over the last few years came into sharper focus. The Central Asian states were already members of the PfP initiative and the NATO presence in the region well-established when the US asked for strategic cooperation. The watershed that Russo-US relations apparently underwent, with the Russian acquiescence to the presence of US troops in Central Asia, has also been reexamined. In the course of this it has been noted that most of the Central Asian states did not actually request Russian permission before offering their basing rights to the United States. It is therefore not surprising that within a year, statements from Moscow began to sharply criticize the US presence in the region, and alternative Russian bases emerged—often within miles of the US base—under a revitalized Collective Security Agreement of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). While Russia began focusing on the Collective Security Agreements of the CIS as a means to forging collective security, the emergence of a revitalized SCO became equally evident. These cleavages came sharply into focus and culminated in the course of the US intervention in Iraq when Russia moved away from its position of collaboration with the US and supported the Franco-German line. The intervention against Iraq also inaugurated a revolutionary notion of pre-emptive strikes that was a challenge to existing international norms, and would subsequently be put forward by Russia as a proposed move in the post-Beslan situation.In fact, the US intervention in Iraq possibly marks a more significant watershed in terms of strategic alignments and also the juncture at which the reemergence of multiple poles became evident once again.

An understanding of these global developments and their impact on the Central Asian region remains incomplete without a close reading of the Central Asian security paradigm; of how the region itself perceives of its ‘national’ and ‘regional’ security. Underlying these national priorities are a set of assumptions about the security of the state and how shifting alliances with other states can best preserve this. This rather realistic understanding of the situation is, of course, not without its problems. Not the least of which is that states often do not act as unitary and rational actors. In actual situations state decisions are often determined by the interplay of domestic and international factors and influenced by partisan interests.

This essay is an attempt at examining the extent to which India, Russia and China constitute significant parts of multilateral processes in the Central Asian region. Here, a number of issues assume significance. The first and foremost is the question of the viability of multilateralism in the region and the extent to which the states themselves are willing to be part of multilateral process. A second issue is the attitude of Russia and China towards multilateralism in general and about the status of their role in multilateral processes in the Central Asian region. A third is a debate on the role that India, as part of Russia–China–India axis, can play in the multilateral process in Central Asia. This paper begins with an examination of what is generally identified as the eclipse of the multilateral process in the Central Asian region. It then goes on to examine the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, its viability as an alternative multilateral process, and the Indian position as a possible part of this strategic partnership. The last section looks into the convergence of Indian and Central Asian positions on multilateralism.

Multilateralism in Central Asia

It is generally accepted that the purpose of any regional organization is two-fold: the acceleration of economic development and the reinforcement of regional stability and security. The role of multilateral regional initiatives as primary providers of security in Central Asia has not been rated very high. It has been observed that such initiatives have been unable to convey concrete defense guarantees, create joint military units, negotiate arms reductions or enforce the end of overt conflicts. However, a correct assessment of these initiatives would have to begin with noting their existential significance as groups of states that recognize some elements of community, and can define their national identity as complementary rather than antagonistic to their neighbours. Regular meetings and the creation of personal ties encourage esprit de corps and may help to defuse crisis. In fact, non-traditional security issues like the environment, pollution, water management, drug smuggling, organized crime, migration and refugees have provided more scope for regional discourse. In addition, there have been attempts at economic cooperation with an understanding that economic development is conducive to the security of the region.¹⁷

It is undeniable that, compared to the more successful of regional multilateral efforts, a great deal remains to be achieved.¹⁸ However, prior to any critical evaluation of these efforts, it is crucial to keep in mind that in a number of indirect ways both development and stability have been contributed to by these regional processes. Representative of this are the numerous agreements that have been made regarding environmental degradation. This is a case that in the Central Asian region could lead to regional instability and also affect economic development. This is particularly so since the ecological crisis in the Central Asian region overlays and aggravates a structural, economic and social crisis. Central Asia is a developing region, characterized by a high share in agricultural production, low industrialization, mass unemployment and a high population growth. With the standard of living considerably below the Soviet average, it was very dependent on the subsidies from the centre. The disintegration of the Soviet Union meant the beginning of a new process of nation-building in the region and a redefinition of political and cultural identities. It also saw the emergence of a new international water basin, the Aral, with predictable consequences for political, ethnic and economic relations between the states. The entire political geography changed and natural resources that used to be shared and were controlled by the centre became the national wealth of the newly independent states. Rivers became national borders and the division into up-and down-stream riparian zones became politically relevant. While it is accepted that environmental issues are unlikely to be the primary cause of conflict, it is also argued that they play a complex role in shaping relations among states. And here the success of regional initiatives in the Central Asian region cannot be denied. Speaking to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Dr Kadir Gulomov, Uzbekistan’s minister of defense, noted that security has many aspects. Efforts to promote regional cooperation through the use of water and energy resources are an important way to reduce tensions in the area.¹⁹

There is, in fact, recognition of the need for discourse on diverse issues, and this has been reflected in a number of multilateral initiatives. A very significant multilateral effort initiated by Nursultan Nazarbayev, President of Kazakhstan, is the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building in Asia (CICA). The CICA vision for security in Asia elaborates on multilateral approaches towards promoting peace and security, and visualizes itself as the forum for dialogue, consultation, and adoption of decisions and measures on the basis of consensus on security issues in Asia. CICA originated with the idea that there was necessity for a pan-Asiatic system of security that would keep in mind cultural origins, national peculiarities and the complicated history of relationship among them while addressing problems of security and confidence building. The purpose behind the initiative was the creation of a system of security in Asia where safety would be guaranteed by the whole complex of measures. CICA has been involved in dialogue over three groups of issues—military-political affairs, socio-economic development and humanitarian concerns. CICA identifies certain elements as challenges to security and seeks to find ways to eliminate them. In this context it resolves to support efforts for the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, ensure the establishment of nuclear free zones, curb excessive accumulation of conventional armaments, condemn terrorism, deny assistance to separatist movements in other states, reject the use of religion as a pretext for terrorists and separatists, and emphasize the significance of curbing the movement of illicit drugs and corruption. In light of these objectives, the CICA promised to take necessary steps for the elaboration and implementation of measures aimed at enhancing cooperation and creating an atmosphere of peace, confidence and friendship. All states were encouraged to resolve their disputes peacefully through negotiations in accordance with the principles enshrined in the UN Charter and International law.²⁰

The most significant aspect of CICA is its membership, which includes not just the Central Asian states and the two Eurasian powers, Russia and China, but also major South and South East Asian powers. In addition, it includes the US as an observer. This is especially significant since the reality of US presence and interest in the region cannot be wished away. Members include Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, China, Egypt, India, Iran, Israel, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Pakistan, the Palestinian National Administration, Russia, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey and Uzbekistan. Thailand was accepted as the 17th member in 2004 and Republic of Korea as the 18th member in 2006. Observers of CICA are Vietnam, Indonesia, Malaysia, USA, Ukraine, Japan and international organizations like the United Nations, Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe and the League of Arab States.

The multilateral basis of the CICA is evident in the first principle enshrined in the Declaration at the Second Summit of the CICA in Almaty in 2006. It notes:

We are convinced that multilateral cooperation based on the principles enshrined in the Charter as well as the Principles Guiding Relations among States and in the Almaty Act is more necessary today than ever for maintaining international peace and security. To this end we will intensify our efforts to develop a forum for political dialogue through elaborating common approaches to security on the basis of consensus.

While the scope of multilateral dialogue on diverse issues was being explored within the region, the dominant focus of literature on the region was a debate on the significance of bilateral arrangements or the international coalition in dealing with issues of regional security. In reality and contrary to the general perception of a movement towards bilateral arrangements with the US, there has been an in-creasing movement by the Central Asian states to accommodate both the US and Russia within their security arrangement. This meant that while bilateral arrange-ments with the US remained in place there was no attempt to move away from multilateral arrangements within the CIS or the SCO either, at least as far as some of the states were concerned. The former Kyrgyz President Askar Akaev, while explaining the existence of both American and Russian bases in his country, had an interesting explanation. He pointed out that the two parties perform different functions. While the American forces are focussed on Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan the Russian forces have peacekeeping objectives and are part of the CSTO commitments in combating terrorism and other regional security threats. Such agreements with multiple states and participation in multiple organizations are the common norm in the region today.

Strategic writings from Kazakhstan, for instance, clearly indicate that this is the preferred multivector policy that the state pursues.²¹ Concluding the study on the post-September 11 scenario in Central Asia, it was pointed out that

The multivector approach of foreign policy of RK has once again confirmed its expediency in complex conditions of international anti-terrorist campaign. It is necessary to pay attention to the following aspect of the foreign policy of RK in this period: inspite of the fact that Kazakhstan promoted active cooperation on the bilateral level, the importance of the regional factor and multilateral level of cooperation has greatly increased in our policy for the last year.²²

There are interesting examples of the Central Asian states participating in different interstate organizations and in plans involving states outside the region simultaneously. For example, with the exception of Turkmenistan, the Central Asian states are participants of both the SCO and various NATO programmes. Kyrgyzstan joined the World Trade Organization in 1998, although this contradicted with the principles and interests of the customs union of various post-Soviet states and of the Eurasian Economic Community, headed by Russia, which was set up on the basis of the customs union and in October 2000 and of which Kyrgyzstan is also a member. Kazakstan has been involved both with the Tengiz-Novorossiisk and the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline projects, the main lobbyists for which are respectively, the Russian Federation and the USA. Of course this policy has had its share of critics within the region. Talgat Ismagambetov, notes that while this allows the Central Asian states to maneuver between the interests of the three world powers and where possible to extract for themselves certain short term advantages it does so without solving any problems related to the entire area of their national security.²³

It is not surprising therefore, that, alternatives to such policy have emerged. It has been argued for instance that Central Asia should be considered as an independent ‘security system’.²⁴ As such, participation of the Central Asian states in a single anti-terrorist coalition should be supplemented by their independent cooperation in this sphere. It has been argued that a ‘market‘ for security and anti-terrorist activities has taken shape in Central Asia, where a number of international organizations, including UN agencies, the EU, OSCE, CSTO, NATO and SCO, offer their ‘professional assistance’ in the field of regional security. In addition, there are a number of bilateral security agreements like the Uzbek-US and the Uzbek-Russia strategic partnerships, the CSTO joint military exercises and the Kazakhstan–China strategic cooperation, established in July 2005. As such, it has been argued that Central Asian states find themselves deeply entangled in this ‘market’.²⁵ In order to avoid entanglement, arguments have been put forward for the states in the region to manage their security on their own in order to escape the effects of ‘geo-politics and reliance on extra-regional powers’.²⁶ In any case, it has been emphasized that the Central Asian states need to reject the ‘zero-sum game’ and adopt a ‘win-win’ strategy. Criticizing ‘inadequate old-fashioned zero-sum game geopolitics’, it has been argued that instead of regarding the states of the geopolitical triangle—US, Russia, China—as permanent rivals and, worse still, regarding themselves as victims of geopolitical rivalry, the states should take measures towards inviting all sides of the triangle to constructive cooperation in Central Asia. As for the powers involved, geopolitical pluralism, rather than geopolitical antagonism, will be based on the economic incentive of energy security.

Such statements call for a re-evaluation of the significance of multilateral regional forums, particularly in the light of statements that predicted their demise in dealing with problems of regional security. They also call for a more detailed analysis of evolving multilateral processes in the region like the Shanghai process.

‘Constructive Strategic Partnership’ as a Multilateral Form

In 1996, Russia announced the establishment of a strategic cooperation partnership with China. The rationale for evolving such a mechanism of cooperation was based on a number of factors. First, both sides recognized the dividends of a strategic partnership, and Beijing has been consistent in nurturing it with good results. The Moscow–Beijing bipartisan consensus was in favour of evolving a multilateral strategy to combat threats to regional security. This was the outcome of a strong and increasingly stable bilateral entente between the two states.²⁷ Second, as part of a growing convergence of interests, Moscow and Beijing have pledged not to interfere in each other’s domestic affairs. China has defended Russia’s use of military force in the Caucasus, and Moscow now defends Beijing’s policy towardsTaiwan, Tibet and Xinjiang. To craft issues of national interest around regional security appears to be the Sino-Russian agenda. Third, and most important, the two share resentment against a unipolar system dominated by the United States. Anxiety about the expansion of US military and economic intervention in Central Asia and the inevitable clash of interests has helped in forging a Sino-Russian entente in the Central Asian region through the creation of the Shanghai mechanism.

The process of the formation of the SCO was deeply connected with the creation of the ‘strategic partnership’ between Russia and China, and the signing of the Shanghai Agreement in 1996. In the Russian foreign policy context the idea of a ‘partnership’ had first been used vis a vis NATO as the ‘partnership for peace’ in 1994. This phrase, proposed by the Clinton administration, was meant to denote a ‘peaceful buffer’ between Russia and the NATO.²⁸ As Russian foreign policy shifted in the mid-1990s, President Yeltsin first talked about a ‘constructive partnership’ and then a ‘strategic partnership’ with Zhang Zemin in 1996. The two parties declared their partnership as non-union and non-bloc.²⁹ The SCO, whose core is based on Russo-Chinese partnership, turned into a multilateral partnership coping with a new threat in the SCO border areas. In 1996, Russian diplomacy had appealed for this ‘strategic partnership’ as a model, which in the 21st century could overcome the historic antagonism between countries with a long, shared border. It also suggested the enlargement of the partnership between China and India, who also share a long border.³⁰ China, however, was more cautious about the use of the term ‘partnership’ and expansion of Shanghai organization.

One issue on which there is common agreement is the need to develop a multilateral response to the threat of terrorism. The regional initiatives that are involved here are the SCO, CSTO and NATO. These share a number of overlapping multilateral antiterrorist activities in the Central Asian region. To reduce redundancies and exploit potential synergies the development of dialogue among them is essential.³¹ It has been suggested that dialogue between the SCO, CSTO and NATO is most crucial since the United States, China and Russia are the most significant non-regional powers involved in the region. Here an ambitious idea would be to establish an overarching coordination mechanism for the region’s major anti-terrorist institutions. In mid-December 2005, CSTO General Director Toktasyn Buzubayev said that the CSTO favoured creating a Eurasian Advisory Council that could include representatives from the CSTO, the SCO, NATO, the EU and the Eurasian Economic Community (which includes Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia and Tajikistan). It has been suggested that at a minimum such a body would allow representatives from the various institutions to meet periodically to exchange ideas and explore possible collaborative projects.³² Alternatively, a mechanism could be devised whereby individual SCO hosts could invite NATO observers to its sessions.

The SCO has also been very active in developing contacts and cooperative relations with other regional organizations and states. At the SCO Tashkent summit the group adopted ‘The Regulations on the Observer Status of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization’. Since then the SCO has established working relation ships with some other regional organizations. In April 2004, the SCO Secretariat and the CIS Executive Committee signed a Memorandum of Understanding expressing their willingness to cooperate in the areas of trade, anti-terrorism and social contacts. A similar memorandum was signed between the SCO Secretariat and the ASEAN Secretariat. These two organizations intend to cooperate in a wide range of areas including economics, finances, tourism, environmental protection, use of natural resources, social development, energy, fight against transnational crime and others.³³

Additionally, NATO governments could seek to become a partner of specific SCO organs such as RATS (Regional Anti-Terrorism Structure). Similarly, in the field of narcotics trafficking there have been proposals for cooperation between the CSTO and the NATO. Strengthening security along the Tajik-Afghan border is another area where there such collaboration is possible. The Tajik-Afghan border provides an optimal locale for multi-institutional collaboration, since the zone of interest of all three overlap here. The CSTO has established a special contact group with Afghanistan and the SCO has invited Afghan delegations to several of its meetings. The NATO enjoys overflight rights over Tajikistan in support of its operations in Afghanistan and provides technical assistance to Tajik border guards. The members of the three institutions have been especially concerned with the transit of Afghan heroin through Tajikistan to Russian and European markets.

Central Asian analysts have generally commented favourably on the achievements of the SCO.³⁴ However, there is also the recognition that the process is far from complete:

The potential abilities of the organization have not been fully exhausted. Upto this day, the main goal of the organization was the problem of security in the region. However, the leaders of the six states have pointed out the necessity of intensifying the development of the programme of economic cooperation. This sphere of activity has a very promising future. A combined market of the SCO states will be the largest in the world.³⁵

Here, while Beijing has been pressing for the SCO to move towards establishing a free-trade area, Russia has not been an enthusiastic partner due to its fear of a Chinese advantage in the establishment of any such free trade zone. Of the two fundamental areas of SCO activity, security and development, Moscow has been emphasizing the former. Questions have also been raised about whether the SCO will be able to deal with the challenges of geopolitics and democracy that the region faces today. Here, it will be faced with a dilemma; should the Organization maintain the status quo or should the Organization move instead towards a new democratic regional order?³⁶ The extent to which the organization is able to satisfy the shared strategic objectives of Russia and China also remains to be seen.

Strategic opinion in China, on the other hand, identify the constructive strategic partnership between China, Russia and the Central Asian republics as a stabilizing multilateral institution that will help define stability and cooperation in the region.³⁷ The effectiveness of the SCO in dealing with a number of issues, particularly border problems, has also been noted as significant in recent Central Asian strategic writings,³⁸ which also point out that the continuing significance of the mechanism would depend on the relationship between Russia and China as the two main axis of the organization. There is also a clear recognition that this today is dependent on a number of factors the most significant of which is the development of Russo-American relations.

The United States has developed important stakes in the region and its periphery that will demand their continued presence. The region is now a significant part of the strategic concerns that lies at the core of US interests.³⁹ Among them are the search for energy resources that can help in reducing the American dependence on West Asia, the campaign to fight terrorism and extremism globally, the importance of creating international markets for goods and services and the need to prevent the dominance of its potential rivals, China and Russia, in a region that is of strategic important to the US. Yet, it is equally significant that the US perception of the region has moved beyond the perception of the region as an arena for a new Great Game. Strobe Talbot, Former American Deputy Secretary of State, reflected this sentiment when he pointed out that “…we want all responsible players in the Caucasus and Central Asia to be winners”.⁴⁰ The US focus is, therefore, to construct cooperative instruments in the region. In order to do so it will seek to secure Russian support and Chinese acquiescence. There is clear recognition by the US administration that this is a pragmatic necessity. A confrontationist US policy will require material and manpower commitment that the US will find very difficult to commit in the region. There is also recognition within Russia and China that the US presence is a reality that cannot be ignored.

India–Russia–China and the Central Asian Multilateral System

It is this realization that has led to the search for new partnerships. One such proposed alliance was a strategic partnership among Russia, China and India. This proposed partnership was not just aimed against the eastward expansion of Western alliances but also as a means of counterbalancing the influence of neighbouring countries in the region. Whether this relationship will emerge as significant still remains to be seen.

While the idea of a strategic triangle has been present in a general way in much of Russian policy thinking for a number of years it has received little attention from the Chinese side.⁴¹ In fact, remarking on this triangular alliance, Zhou Yuyun, a Chinese scholar from the China Centre for Contemporary Affairs notes that the many unresolved issues in Sino-Indian relationship would act as an impediment to this. In fact he goes on to point out that the prospects of Sino-Russian and RussoIndian relationship are much better than a Sino-Indian one.⁴² In addition he points out, that India, Russia and China all attach importance to their relationship with the United States. A trilateral relationship based only on feelings of anti-American unilateralism would therefore not be in accordance with the national interest of any of the states. He also goes on to point out that while Russia attaches significance to this triangular relationship, both India and China seem to be more cautious. What is of significance is to ‘promote world multilateralism, prevent unilateralism, improve bilateral relations among the three and strengthen international co-operation of anti terrorism’.⁴³

In India, a ‘track two diplomacy’ has focused on arranging meetings between representatives of the three states. A general literature has also begun to evolve on the subject, though it has been noted that this deals with general issues, setting out to measure the potential for cooperation and avoiding focus on any one area of possible triangular relationship. Studies have noted that:

Neither trilateral trading links, nor the significance of overlap of the military production establishment, or even charting out feasible paths of cooperation has been explored to any extent. Nor has there been a careful study of crucial times when positions coincide/diverge as in the case of the run up to the Iraq crisis of 2003. Either leading actors treat the notion as far-fetched, merely a gambit to be played upon to contain the expansion of US authority. Or it is acknowledged that there are still relationships in the making.⁴⁴

However, others have noted that changed global politics and particularly the recent upgrade of Pakistan’s status to a non-NATO ally by the US should facilitate closer linkages between China and India and further strategic cooperation within the triangular framework.⁴⁵ Another area of confluence of interests relates to ballistic missile defence where any US attempt to deploy theatre missile defence in Pakistan would affect both Indian and Chinese interests. However, it is also pointed out that the extent to which this happens would depend on how far China redefines it military relationship with Pakistan. Also the Sino-Indian boundary issue will continue to bedevil the triangular cooperation.⁴⁶ The emergence of a formal strategic India–Russia–China triangle does not appear to be on the agenda in the immediate future, given the numerous other issues that would first have to be resolved at the bilateral level. The inclusion of India within multilateral forums that deal with Central Asia and its immediate neighbourhood also remains to be seen. However, India and Central Asia do share common concerns and India, after all, is a part of CICA.

From the Indian point of view, the last decade of the twentieth century presented a major strategic challenge as far the Central Asian region was concerned. With the collapse of the former USSR and subsequent Russian retreat from the region, the regional balance was altered, and India’s favoured position in a region identified by its strategic thinkers as ‘India’s extended strategic neighbourhood’was reduced.⁴⁷ The emergence of a number of regional players and the potential for local conflicts also significantly changed the strategic environment for India. Further, most of the Central Asian borders are fluid, having been demarcated out of political considerations rather than any ethnic contiguity. The possibilities of demographic changes and the proliferation of non-state actors was also a distinct possibility. The fact that Afghanistan and parts of the Central Asian region were emerging as significant opium producers also made India vulnerable to the opium trade. The consequent proliferation of small arms is also a destabilizing factor. Asfar as India is concerned, Afghanistan, terrorism, illicit drug trade and extremism have been identified as significant bases for collaboration.⁴⁸

The Indian and Central Asian positions coincide on a number of such issues of common concern. The people of the region have an ancient tradition of close and friendly relations that resulted in the development of cultural and economic cooperation, which strengthened further by common heritage and commitment to ideals of tolerance, democracy, secularism and the desire for peace. Another issue of common concern is terrorism, and here too the positions is similar. Hence, the Central Asian states strongly condemned the terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament on 13 December 2001. In this connection, Central Asian initiatives to collectively deal with security issues have been acknowledged by India.

India has also noted the progress being made by the SCO as a regional organization. Central Asian states, particularly Kazakhstan, expressed the belief that considering India’s geographical proximity in the neighbourhood and its active participation in regional and global matters of cooperation, India’s membership of the SCO would contribute significantly to the organization.⁴⁹ At the July 2005 summit in Astana, the then SCO Chairman and host Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev established a precedent by inviting senior officials from India, Iran and Pakistanto participate as ‘guests of the Chairmane’. Although these countries obtained formal observer status at the summit, Afghan representatives have at-tended several SCO meetings without receiving any such distinction. Commenting on the inclusion of the three states with observer status Pan Guang notes that this is a big step based on a number of factors.⁵⁰ First, it exhibits to the international community the promise, made at the launch of the initiative, of openness and cooperation on regional and global. Secondly, it demonstrates that the SCO is concerned not just with Central Asia but also with the Middle East and South Asia as regions with close inter-connections with Central Asia. Third, the recent expansion makes up a new platform for multilateral and bilateral cooperation between SCO members and SCO observers.

The President of Kazakhstan, noting the role being played by India in world affairs, supported India as an appropriate candidate as a permanent member of a restructured UN Security Council. Both countries are also agreed upon the expediency of expanding the Security Council of the UN to make it more representative and efficient. President Nursultan Nazarbaev’s support for the inclusion of India as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and the SCO is significant since both the countries are fighting cross-border terrorism and insurgency. However, some analysts have also warned that the inclusion of India would involve the SCO in the larger foreign-policy zone of competition involving other South Asian states.⁵¹ Given that the SCO projects itself as an attempt at creating a multilateral ‘peaceful buffer’ in the Eurasian world, expansion of the membership and cooperation with other states seems inevitable, but the apprehension against expansion is that the more the SCO expands as a macro-regional structure, the less likely it is to have an operational role in security policy or to correspond with the common concerns out of which a Central Asian security identity might emerge.⁵²

Despite these limitations, analysts have noted that the multilateralism that the SCO epitomizes remains significant.⁵³ Concluding his speech at the plenary Session of the Council of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the SCO, Kasymzhomart Tokayev, the State Secretary-Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kazakhstan, emphasized this by stating:

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization can and should by means of joint efforts (emerge as) an efficient instrument of ensuring stability and security in the region; an instrument of the creation of efficient mechanisms of trade, economic, cultural and humanitarian cooperation.⁵⁴

Conclusions

While an India–Russia–China axis is yet to emerge, there is realization that a common multilateral approach is the only viable option in terms of solutions in a number of areas. For instance, all three states have significant stakes in the working of multilateral institutions in the Central Asian region. How far each remains a significant part of the process is yet to be seen. What is important is thatthere now seems to be recognition about the need for a multiplicity of institutions dealing with multiple security issues that involve more than two states particularly in regions where the possibility of conflict is high.