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INDIA AND RUSSIA: TOWARDS NEW STRATEGIC RELATIONS

Abhijit Ghosh

Vladimir Putin’s four-day visit to India in the first week of October 2000 has led to dramatic changes in Indo-Russian relations, with the two countries signing a declaration of strategic partnership and a host of bilateral agreements underlining the common national and geo-political interests and rejuvenating the once-close political, economic and military cooperation between them. Relations between New Delhi and Moscow had never reached such heights in the post-Soviet years as they have since Putin’s first trip to India. This has essentially demonstrated the Russian bid to restore old ties and build a new strategic relationship by seeking to revive the arms-transfer cooperation. Putin’s second visit to India in December 2002 has further strengthened Indo-Russian strategic relations.

The crumbling of the Soviet Union in December 1991 impinged on and produced unprecedented changes in the Indian security environment.¹ Since the 1950s, India had been one of the most important Third World allies of Moscow and was practically the keystone of the latter’s South Asia policy. It was also a major recipient of Soviet arms in the 1960s and continued to do so until the Soviet Union ceased to exist in 1991.² The USSR was also a major market for India’s exports. The fall of Kremlin had, in essence, serious repercussions on Moscow–New Delhi strategic relations, signalling the virtual end of an alliance that had long provided India with a measure of security against the combined military strength of China, Pakistan and the USA Second, it portended the end of an era of India’s absolute reliance on the Soviet political, diplomatic and military support and also on the Soviet veto in the UN Security Council on issues like Kashmir. Third, the fragmentation of the USSR heralded that the arms transfer relationship between New Delhi and Moscow would become extinct. India had reasons to be worried, particularly as Soviet hardware constituted about 70 per cent of its weaponry. India was increasingly concerned about the supply of spare parts for its MiG aircraft which account for about three-quarters of the Indian Air Force. No wonder; the supply of military spare parts had been seriously disrupted, jeopardizing the defence preparedness of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force. India’s problem was compounded by the reluctance of the successor states to the Soviet Union to provide sophisticated weapons to India at ‘friendship prices’. Thus, the collapse of the USSR foreshadowed bleak prospects for India’s security in the post-Soviet world order where no country could possibly replace Soviet political, diplomatic and military assistance to New Delhi. Ross H. Munro aptly observed: ‘India’s search for great power status is in shambles. The keystone of Indian power and pretence in the 1980s, the Indo-Soviet link, is history … India has no “useful friends”.’³

Russia’s Post-Cold War View of India

The disintegration of the Soviet Union leading to the formal end of the Cold War made the West jubilant. Immediately after emerging as an independent sovereign state, Russia followed an overtly pro-Western and pro-US policy corresponding to its efforts to establish a free market economy and a liberal democratic system with the help of political and financial support from the West. During the Cold War era, India was perceived by the Soviets as a possible counterweight against the US and Chinese influence in Asia which essentially increased New Delhi’s strategic importance to Moscow. The end of the Cold War brought about radical changes in the world political scenario which practically led to the decline in India’s value as a principal Third World ally in the global strategy of Russia. India, which once occupied a prominent place in Soviet foreign policy, was now relegated to quite a low priority area in the foreign policy calculations of the new Russia. A Russian foreign ministry publication of January 1993 on the ‘Concept of Russian Federation’s Foreign Policy’ revealed that India ranked seventh in the list of 10 priorities of Russia’s foreign policy.⁴ The fact that the Asia-Pacific region was accorded higher priority underlined that the countries like China and Japan claimed greater attention of Moscow than India, and were of immediate and practical concern to the Russian government.

As a matter of fact, the former Soviet Union seemed to be losing interest in further upgrading its relations with India in the context of the latter’s stand on the abortive coup against Gorbachev in August 1991. India’s response to the coup, which collapsed within four days indicating a triumph for the reformers, was slanted in favour of party hardliners who had actually plotted the coup. Virtually justifying the coup and describing it as an instructive example for over-enthusiastic reformers, India’s Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao categorically warned ‘that any leader who chalks out plans for the future should take each step cautiously’.⁵ The Soviets were dismayed, not unexpectedly, at the apparent failure of India’s Prime Minister to side with the reformers and to make ‘even a symbolic gesture of solidarity with the man with whom he had signed the historic Delhi Declaration’.⁶ Thus, India’s failure to endear itself to Russia by its pusillanimous response to the coup might have partly influenced the new Russia’s attitude towards India.⁷

The essential characteristic of the new Russian leadership was its emphasis on the need for ‘de-ideologization’ of its foreign policy⁸ implying that the enemies of Russia in the past would now become its friends. Logically, this meant that as Russia did not have any enemies, it did not need the support of other states. Thus, Russia no longer had any need for a ‘special relationship’ with India which the former USSR had cultivated to neutralize the influence of the US and China.⁹ In essence, Russia desired to establish good relations with all countries, especially those which catered to its interests and needs. Indo-Russian relationship was, therefore, expected to be governed more by common interests and calculations of commercial gains and less by geo-strategic considerations. The bilateral relationship between Moscow and New Delhi would develop irrespective of relations that either nation established with a third country.

With regard to Russia’s post-Cold War policy towards India, two different schools of thought seemed to prevail within Russia in the early 1990s. The first school, comprising academics, members of the Duma and the defence industry, favoured the continuation of the traditional ‘special relationship’ with India, and believed that relative priority should be accorded to India over other South Asian Nations. This school believed that a strong powerful India could help Russia effectively combat the growing menace of Islamic fundamentalism sweeping across the Central Asian states between Russia and India.¹⁰ The second school of thought, whose chief proponent was the then Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, advocated that the era of the traditional close relationship with India should be terminated. This school also believed that the pro-India stand of Moscow since 1955 had adversely affected its relations with other regional powers like Pakistan, and that Russia should now concentrate more on building relations with Pakistan than India in order to fulfil its immediate foreign policy and security interests. It was this anti-India school of thought which dominated Moscow’s South Asia policy since the last days of the Soviet Union to the early post-Soviet years.

The end of the Cold War, the beginning of US-Russian cooperation on a wide range of international issues, including disarmament and the unprecedented developments in Russo-Chinese relations, reduced India’s importance as a strategic ally of Moscow in international politics. Instead, Pakistan now appeared to be a more useful partner of Moscow in view of its strategic location between Afghanistan and the newly independent Central Asian states.¹¹ As a matter of fact, Russia sought to adjust its policy to the post-Cold War international reality. In a reversal of its Cold War policy, the United States had stopped arms and economic aid to Pakistan under the Pressler Law in October 1990 in view of its nuclear weapons programme and ambition. Pakistan was desperately seeking new allies as well as sources of military hardware and, therefore, tried to build ties with Russia. This coincided with the emergence of certain new conflicts of India’s interests with Russia’s. Russia joined the West in pressuring India to renounce the nuclear option, and supported Pakistan’s proposal to turn South Asia into a nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ). To India’s utter dismay, Russia endorsed in November 1991 a joint Pakistani-Bangladesh NWFZ resolution in the disarmament committee of the UN General Assembly.¹² Thus, even before its collapse, the Soviet Union followed a pro-West and pro-Pakistan policy opposed to India’s quest for regional leadership and security.

Moscow’s support of the Pakistani-sponsored resolution might have been the outcome of its strong desire to bring an end to the Afghan War and secure the release of its prisoners of war who were languishing in the custody of the Pakistan-backed Mujahideen factions. In the wake of the withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan, both India and the Soviet Union coordinated their efforts to use the Najibullah government in Kabul as a bulwark against the Islamic-fundamentalist Mujahideen forces. While Moscow provided the Najibullah regime with massive economic and military assistance, New Delhi extended political and diplomatic support to it. Significantly, in December 1991, a delegation of the Af, ghan Mujahideen journeyed to Moscow, and one month later—in January 1992—Russia cut off all military supplies, ordnance and fuel for military transport to the Najib regime, which was then struggling to cope with the Mujahideen. Thus, India was dismayed and shocked at Russia’s reversal of policy with the withdrawal of support to the nationalist-secularist Najib government.

Having been denied the pre-eminent position which it had enjoyed during the Soviet era, India responded to the new opportunities for improving relations with the United States. Although old differences between the two countries remained, both India and the United States made conciliatory gestures to each other in order to find new areas of cooperation.¹³ India and the United States conducted a joint naval exercise in 1992 and signed a pact on military cooperation in 1995. Further, the Narasimha Rao government, in mid-1991, had quickened the pace of the economic reforms programme leading to a sharp rise in foreign investment in the country with the United States being the largest foreign investor.

India made a simultaneous attempt to mend fences with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in the post-Cold War years.¹⁴ The then Chinese Premier Li Peng visited India only a few days before the Soviet Union formally collapsed. Two years later, India’s Prime Minister, Narasimha Rao, paid a return visit to Beijing in an attempt to improve relations with China. India, was however appalled by the warming of Sino-Russian relations in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War years.¹⁵ Thus, the low priority accorded to India in the Russian foreign policy led New Delhi to explore possibilities of improving relations with the USA and China.

Complementarities of Views and Interests

Notwithstanding the differences in perception between the two countries, as stated above, and India’s rather low and insignificant place in the Russian foreign policy, neither India nor Russia could ignore altogether ‘the basic geo-political factors that lay at the root of the decades-long uninterrupted Indo-Soviet friendship’.¹⁶ As early as 1990, a Soviet scholar warned that downgrading of relations with tried and tested friend like India would be ‘stupid … fallacious … short-sighted’.¹⁷ There was, in fact a complementarity of interest between Moscow as a major arms seller and New Delhi as a major arms purchaser. Russia was, therefore, keen to retain its arms market in India. Thus, in March 1992, Moscow offered India Charlie-class nuclear-powered submarines, MiG-31 aircraft and Su-28 fighter bombers in order to neutralize Pakistan’s possession of the French Mirages and US F-16s.¹⁸

Russian Secretary of State, Gennady Burbulis’ three-day visit to India in early May 1992 assumed significance as both the countries were trying to find common areas of interest. The Burbulis-led delegation affirmed that Moscow would continue defence supplies, but demanded that one-tenth of the payment was to be made in advance.¹⁹ The two countries signed a five-year trade and economic cooperation agreement on 4 May 1992, granting the most-favoured nation (MFN) status to each other. Burbulis seemed clearly satisfied with the two countries’ efforts to improve their relations with a new spirit of cooperation. While Russia had agreed to renew the export of oil, newsprint, and military equipment, India had offered a Rs 250 crore technical credit for exporting tea, coffee, tobacco and spices.²⁰ Two months later, Russia’s Ambassador to India, Anatoly Drukov’s interview to Asian Defence Journal, expressed Russia’s willingness to shift units for producing frontline aircraft, tanks, armoured cars and other military equipment for use in India and also for export to third countries. Drukov emphatically said: ‘The idea has been under discussion, but I think we have now to move from an exchange of views to the concrete deal, the contract’²¹

That a perceptible change in Russia’s policy towards India had started to take place was further confirmed by the visit of Ruslan Khasbulatov, Speaker of the Russian Parliament, as the head of a 15-member strong parliamentary delegation to India in August. Describing India’s relations with the former Soviet Union as ‘harmonious’, ‘deep’, ‘cordial’ and ‘very good’, Khasbulatov observed, in an interview to the Russian TV on 13 August after his return from India, that any attempt to alter its traditional relationship with India would be ‘completely unacceptable’ not only from Russia’s standpoint but also from that of other former union republics.²² The visits of Burbulis and Khasbulatov essentially laid the groundwork for a new pattern of Indo-Russian relationship.

The two countries now became keen to settle some of the major problems left over from the era of the former Soviet Union—the supply of defence equipment and spare parts to India, the rupee–rouble exchange rate, bilateral trade, and the repayment of India’s debt to Russia. Indian Defence Minister Shared Pawar’s seven-day visit to Russia in September 1992 was successful in rebuilding military ties between the two countries. During his sojourn in Moscow, Pawar met the major Russian leaders and expressed interest in acquiring sophisticated arms for the three wings of the Indian armed forces, including multi-role MiG-29 fighters.²³ On 7 September, the Russian Defence Minister Pavel Grachev, had significant discussions with Sharad Pawar, proposing a comprehensive military cooperation agreement to be signed by the two countries in future, and ‘discussed the volumes of military hardware and spares to be sold to India’.²⁴ On the next day, during the course of his meeting with Pawar, Burbulis emphasized the ‘need for developing the existing ties’ and assuring Pawar that India still remained ‘a priority’ for Russia. ²⁵ Pawar later observed that all problems regarding the supply of military spares to India had been settled, and that Russia would ‘fully honour’ all the previous ‘commitments of the former Soviet Union’.²⁶ Indo-Russian military cooperation gathered momentum and dominated the talks between the two countries in the remaining four months of 1992. The Chief of the Indian Air Force, Air Chief Marshal N.C. Suri’s visit to Russia in October-November and his meeting with the CIS Commander-in-Chief Marshal Yevgeny Shaposhnikov further consolidated the military cooperation talks between the two countries.²⁷

In mid-November, the Chief of the Indian Navy, Admiral L.N. Ramdas, visited Russia in order to continue bilateral defence talks. And in December, Indian defence ministry officials spoke about Russia’s offer to sell India an aircraft carrier for $458 million under attractive terms—half under barter terms and the rest on easy cash payment.²⁸ Pawar’s visit to Moscow in December 1992 helped India finalize an agreement for the purchase of 20 MiG-29M and 6 MiG-29 UM Fulcrum multi-role fighters, including related spares and support package totalling $466 million.²⁹ A major shift in the orientation of Russia’s policy towards India became visible when Russia’s foreign ministry prepared a draft concept paper in October 1992, which stated that while Russia’s policy should not be ‘deliberately pro-Indian’, it ought not to be also ‘artificially restrained in the name of striking an abstract balance and maintaining an equal distance’ between India and Pakistan.³⁰ The obvious implication of the paper was that Russia now desired to follow a pragmatic and flexible policy towards India on the issues of converging interest.

Yeltsin’s Visit Improves Relations

Against this background of Russia’s changing perception towards India, President Boris Yeltsin visited India in January 1993. It was a turning point in the post-Cold War Indo-Russian relations, showing a significant shift in Russia’s foreign policy orientation from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific region, with a renewed interest in India.³¹ Yeltsin’s sincerity in improving relations with India was clear when he declared, on the eve of his journey to New Delhi, that Russia would not press India to sign the NPT.³² Second, Yeltsin proclaimed that his country ‘unswervingly supports’ India’s position on Kashmir and its rejection of a plebiscite on the future of Kashmir.³³ He also made it clear, in his address to the Indian Parliament on 29 January, that ‘we do not intend to give Pakistan any military or technical aid’.³⁴ However, Yeltsin was cautious in denouncing Pakistan, as he said during a press conference shortly before returning to Moscow, that, ‘We do not want to see any rupture in our relations with Pakistan’. He added that on certain basic issues ‘we cannot go against common sense which dictates our position’.³⁵ Thirdly, on the issue of Moscow’s support to New Delhi’s claim for permanent membership of the Security Council, the Kremlin leader said that the question called for a detailed scrutiny, ‘but if the issue is brought up for discussion, I will give a yes vote for India’.³⁶

The most important diplomatic achievement of Yeltsin’s visit was the signing of a new friendship treaty on 28 January, whose groundwork was prepared by the Russian First Deputy Prime Minister, Vladimir Shumeiko, during his three-day visit to India from 19 January.³⁷ The treaty provided for a precise framework within which the future course of Russia-India relations would develop ‘as the former’s economy turns around and polity economy turns around and polity gets stabilised’.³⁸ No such treaty was signed when the Russian President visited Beijing shortly before coming to India.³⁹ The problem of the supplies of Russian military equipment and spares to India was sought to be resolved with the defence ministers of the two countries, Grachev and Pawar, concluding a new agreement on military cooperation on 28 January.⁴⁰ The agreement guaranteed the resumption of the supply of defence equipment and related items, spares, product support and comprehensive service needed for maintenance, overhaul and modernization. It further envisaged cooperation in defence, science and technology through technology transfer, training, visit, exchange of personnel, sharing of experiences between the two armed forces and joint projects in research and development. Further, Moscow offered to help New Delhi construct a large plant in India to manufacture military spares. This agreement, as Pawar told the Press Trust of India, would ‘greatly’ reduce ‘pressure on the Indian armed forces’.⁴¹ Significantly, this defence agreement provided for licensed production with an eye on sales to third countries.

India and Russia finally formalized—after two years of negotiations—an agreement on the contentious rupee–rouble exchange rate to settle India’s 10 billion rouble debt to the erstwhile Soviet Union.⁴² The two countries also envisaged an increase in bilateral trade. The Russian President was optimistic that there would be a rise in Indo-Russian trade from the then existing level of ‘about $1.5 billion to $3.5 billion in the following year’.⁴³ Yeltsin removed New Delhi’s concern by reaffirming that Russia would honour its commitment to supply cryogenic rockets to India despite US warnings as it would be a ‘shame’ if it was not done.⁴⁴ The Russian President did not seem to be perturbed by the US objections, asserting that there was no room for any third party ‘intervention’.

Although Yeltsin’s visit substantially improved the two countries’ relations leading to the signing of a treaty of friendship and cooperation, it was devoid of any strategic significance, having no clause comparable to Article 9 (the Security Clause) of the 1971 Indo-Soviet Treaty, which provided for holding immediate mutual consultations and taking appropriate effective measures if any of the signatories faced external threat or aggression. In marked contrast, the new treaty did not approve of any action on the part of any of the countries, India or Russia, which might jeopardize the security interests of the other.

In essence, Yeltsin’s foreign policy had implied that Moscow was in search of friendship with all countries and not particularly with a single country. This was revealed in what Yeltsin said that the post-Cold War Russia was against axes, triangles, polygons, and, in general, any blocs.⁴⁵ Indo-Russian relationship now became ‘mutually advantageous’ without any strategic-security yardstick of the previous decades.

Russia Backtracks on the Cryogenic Deal

The improvement in Indo-Russian relations, brought about by Yeltsin’s visit, dissipated after Russia scrapped the Cryogenic rocket deal with India in July 1993⁴⁶ in the face of mounting US pressure. In January 1991, India had signed an agreement with the former Soviet Union to purchase $250 million worth of cryogenic rocket engines and technology for its space programme. On 11 May 1992, the US exerted pressure for the cancellation of this rocket deal and imposed a two-year ban on both the Russian Space Agency (Glavokosmos), and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) for alleged violations of the provisions of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR).⁴⁷

Despite the Russian contention that the MTCR was not opposed to peaceful space ventures and that the sale of equipment and technology for the cryogenic rockets to India was perfectly consistent with it, the US had been adamant in its insistence that the cryogenic engine technology could be diverted for military purposes as India now would be well equipped with such know-how to build inter-continental ballistic missiles. The US imposition of a two-year sanction on Russian and Indian space agencies triggered strong reaction not only in India but also in Russia. New Delhi firmly believed that the US sanctions were motivated by commercial considerations, i.e. to protect its own space industry from international competition. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, a Russian newspaper, known for its independent outlook, severely condemned US meddling in Russia’s relations with India during the past two years and indignantly remarked that during this period, Indo-Russian relations were practically governed by US policy objectives than by Russia’s interests.⁴⁸

The manner in which Moscow scuttled the deal under Washington’s pressure exposed the differences and cleavages within the Russian establishment—between the Russian foreign ministry and the President’s staff, on the one hand and the Russian Parliament and the space agency, on the other. It was reported in the Russian media that if Moscow ignored Washington, it would have been deprived of $4 billion worth of aid. But if it backtracked on the deal, it would lose a profitable contract worth $350 million which would enable it to acquire consumer goods from India.⁴⁹ The Russians were clearly in a dilemma. Yeltsin, during his visit to India in January 1993, assured the hosts that Moscow would fully honour the deal, that it would be a ‘shame’ if they did not comply with it’.⁵⁰ However, Izvestia reported early in July that the Russian President had at last agreed to scrap the deal if the United States provided adequate compensation to Russia.⁵¹ And it was reported that the USA offered to compensate Russia for the financial loss involving the Indian deal, bidding rights for launching nearly a dozen commercial satellites in the coming six years at $40–70 million a piece. The US also promised help in the construction of the international space station ‘Freedom’.⁵² Moscow finally succumbed to the US pressure and announced on 16 July that while the rocket engines would be supplied, there would be no transfer of technology.⁵³ Significantly, Moscow’s decision to abandon its rocket deal came just after its abortive suggestion to New Delhi that they both expressed their willingness to join the MTCR.⁵⁴ Given Russia’s absolute dependence on the United States for restoring its dilapidated economy, and the present impregnable position of the US in the post-Cold War world, Russia’s backtracking on the deal was not really surprising. Thus, in India’s perception, Russia had now become quite an unreliable strategic partner susceptible to the American pressure.⁵⁵

The cancellation of the rocket deal was, however, not unexpected in the light of Russia’s pursuit of a West-centric foreign policy which was revealed in its pro-West stand on Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The Russian policy was in complete consonance with the nuclear doctrine adopted by the Russian Security Council in November 1993, resembling those of the USA, Britain and France. While the Soviet policy since 1982 had been one of ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons, the new security policy authorized Moscow to strike first with nuclear weapons in the event of any aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies, i.e. other CIS countries.⁵⁶

Moscow’s nuclear doctrine marked a clear deviation from the Delhi Declaration, signed by Rajiv Gandhi and Mikhail Gorbachev in November 1986, which banned the use and the threat of use of nuclear weapons, ⁵⁷ and the avowed Soviet position on the peace initiatives of the ‘Delhi Six’ which strongly advocated complete ban on the testing of nuclear weapons.⁵⁸ The Russian nuclear doctrine acquired significance when Moscow, along with the West, started exerting pressure on New Delhi to sign the NPT and CTBT, both of which were condemned by India as being grossly unjust and discriminatory.⁵⁹

Despite the strains imposed on the Indo-Russian bilateral relations by the cancellation of the rocket deal and Moscow’s response to the US pressure, both countries displayed remarkable restraint and maturity in de-escalating tension so that it did not become a major stumbling block to the development of mutually advantageous relations in other areas.

Moscow Changes Its Foreign Policy Orientation

The winds of change in Russia’s foreign policy had started blowing since the end of 1992.⁶⁰ In an interview in August 1992, Foreign Minister Kozyrev observed that it was the most opportune time for Russia to give a distinctive Asia orientation to its foreign policy, to normalize relations with Japan and South Korea, and to take note of China and India within its geo-political framework.⁶¹ The impulse for the change in Russia’s foreign policy posture came as a result of pressure from the Supreme Soviet and the Russian people who felt betrayed by the West for the inadequate aid it granted and accused Russia of kowtowing to the United States, deeming it as a great humiliation for the successor state to what was once a global superpower—the USSR. Search for Russia’s status and identity as an independent and great power in World affairs started among the officials.⁶² Added to this was the emergence of the ultra-nationalists, led by Vladimir Zhirinovsky, as the largest party in the December 1993 elections to the Duma (lower House of the Parliament), which was the first democratic elections held after the break-up of the USSR and break-down of communism, which implied serious curtailment of Yeltsin’s dominant position of the country.

Russia’s Asia-oriented policy was articulated in January 1994 when Kozyrev, in a speech to the Chinese People’s Diplomacy Association in Beijing, clearly spelt out the principles underlying Russia’s policy in the Asia-Pacific region, reflecting the importance of the area in Moscow’s strategic thinking.⁶³

Responding to the dominant and prevailing mood in the country, Yeltsin restructured Russia’s foreign policy by giving it an Asian orientation. By 1994, Russia made great strides in improving its relations with China by settling all the outstanding disputes in the early years of the 1990s. In late December 1992, Russia and China signed an agreement on arms trade.⁶⁴ The subsequent years saw rapid improvement in Sino-Russian relations in military-strategic and economic areas.⁶⁵ Moscow sought to restore its old ties with New Delhi through Yeltsin’s fairly successful visit to India in January 1993. Moscow also sought to restore its friendly relations with Vietnam. The two countries signed a treaty on the basic principle of friendship and some documents when the Vietnamese Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet visited Moscow in June 1994 and met Prime Minister Chernomyrdin. There were also modest improvements in Russia’s relations with Japan and South Korea.

Despite Moscow’s shift in its foreign policy stance, it backed the West on various global, regional and nuclear-strategic issues. Russia joined the ‘partnership for peace programme’ of NATO in June 1994 after initial hesitation, although it was strongly opposed to NATO’s eastward expansion. Second, Moscow was completely supportive of the West on the NPT and CTBT, and vowed with President Clinton, in a joint statement signed in Moscow on 14 January 1994, to take measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. To India’s utter dismay, the joint statement called on both India and Pakistan to sign the NPT while making no reference to Israel which is another country on the nuclear-weapon threshold. The Indian media, therefore, accused the US–Russia joint statement of bias in insisting that India and Pakistan refrain from deploying nuclear missiles, while ignoring the fact that nuclear missiles were already deployed by other powers targeting Indian territory. The joint communique was also indicted by the Indian press for ignoring China as a potential threat to India’s security.⁶⁶

Exchange of Visits

Against this background of Russia’s Asia-oriented foreign policy outlook, albeit supportive of the West on issues like the NPT and the CTBT, Indian Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao journeyed to Moscow for a four-day visit from 29 June to 2 July 1994, and signed with Yeltsin the ‘Moscow declaration on the protection of the interests of pluralistic states’. This document is an affirmation of the common dangers faced by India and Russia in the post-Cold War years which posed serious challenges to the viability and security of large, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual, multicultural and multi-religious states by the ‘forces of aggressive nationalism, religious and political extremism, terrorism and separatism’, and the necessity to counter these challenges through democracy, secularism, tolerance and the rule of law.⁶⁷

There was completely reconciliation of broad geo-political considerations between India and Russia. Both shared the common strategic perception of preventing the wave of Islamic fundamentalism and militancy from spreading in the Central Asian States, which could threaten the secular identity, territorial integrity and border regions of the two states. As developments in Afghanistan or in Central Asia might have a spill-over effect in Kashmir, these regions were regarded as crucially important for maintaining peace and security of India and should be closely monitored.⁶⁸ The Moscow Declaration had, therefore, added a new strategic dimension to the post-Cold War Indo-Russian relationship. Another document signed by Rao and Yeltsin was on ‘Further development and intensification of cooperation between the Republic of India and the Russian Federation’, which constituted an attempt to promote their relationship in the light of their past legacy. Nine other documents were signed relating to different areas like space, science and technology, trade and industry, tourism and the environment.⁶⁹

Rao’s visit to Moscow had led to ascendancy in Indo-Russian military cooperation. In June 1994, Russia expressed its readiness to offer India credits to purchase Su-30 fighters and a promotion licence for the aeroplanes.⁷⁰ Moscow agreed to help New Delhi upgrade its 170 MiG-21 Bis aircraft and T-72, the main battle tank of the Indian Army.⁷¹ India became the first country outside Russia to offer maintenance facilities for Russian aircraft. Clearly, the rationale for such ventures was commercial considerations rather than strategic or political imperatives. This ‘symbolised’, as an analyst observed, ‘a new type of defence relationship between India and Russia from “buyer-seller”, to “participation and interaction”.’⁷² Thus, India continued to be a prospective market for Russia’s defence industry. One source even noted optimistically: ‘The earlier problems of supply of military spares have been resolved. Russia continues to be a dependable source for India’s military modernisation at affordable cost’.⁷³ However, as The Statesman said in its editorial, ‘not much hope can be pinned on joint efforts to overcome disruption of defence spares to India, given the fate of the Glavokosmos-Indian Space Research Organization contract for supply of the cryogenic rocket engine’.⁷⁴ Finally, despite ‘broad identity of views on global and regional issues’, as mentioned by the joint declaration, it did not contain any reference to the NPT, MTCR or the issue of nuclear non-proliferation in the South Asian region.

Russian Prime Minister Viktor S. Chernomyrdin’s return visit to India during 22–24 December amidst Russia’s severe offensive to suppress the secessionist movement of the Muslim-majority republic of Chechnya was another milestone in the developing relationship between the two countries. Rao’s Moscow visit had demonstrated the similarity of views of the two countries on a number of important issues. The Russian Prime Minister’s arrival in India had underlined India’s value in Russia’s foreign policy. Still, ‘there is a vast potential which has not yet been fully brought out’, Chernomyrdin said at a news conference. He went on to add: ‘I think we should step up our efforts’.⁷⁵ A number of agreements were accordingly signed by the two countries concerning the implementation of the long-term programme of military and technical cooperation for the period up to the year 2000, and on several other issues.⁷⁶

Chernomyrdin brushed aside the possibility of Russia’s arms supply to Pakistan in future, saying: ‘As for arms to Pakistan, we have an agreement with the Indian leaders whereby our relations with Pakistan are fully transparent and open. We are not supplying any weapons to Pakistan today and we have no intention of doing that in future’.⁷⁷ Moscow agreed to set up a plant in India for the manufacture of an upgraded version of Russia’s MiG-29 war plane, and also to upgrade the Indian Air Forces’ MiG-21 fleet in return for which New Delhi would buy equipment for its navy and army. In addition, Russia renewed its offer to sell the advanced long-range Sukhoi-30 fighter aircraft and an aircraft carrier.⁷⁸ A long-term deal was signed in connection with sale and servicing of Russian equipment to third countries. Russia agreed further to buy minimum amounts of Indian soybean cake, tea, tobacco and pharmaceuticals between 1995 and 1997, to be paid for with rupees from India’s repayments on its $10 billion debt. Thus, India and Russia’s interests dovetailed into each other and maintained the unity and territorial integrity of both countries. A high-level Indian military delegation went to Moscow in August 1995 to negotiate an arms deal worth $600 million, including the purchase of 20 Su-30 Russian fighter-bombers. India, the largest buyer of Russian arms in South and Southeast Asia, purchased most recently 10 MiG-29 jet fighters worth $320 million.⁷⁹

Defence Deals Intensify Relations

Indo-Russian strategic relations improved and the bilateral defence ties flourished as the then Russian Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, with a pro-West inclination, was replaced by Yevgeny Primakov, a former CPSU Politburo member, in January 1996. The new Russian foreign minister, with a pro-East orientation, believed that Russia must alter its existing pro-West foreign policy and must try to create effective alliances with ‘countries that are running up against similar problems of development and can understand Russia’s foreign policy motives just as Russia can understand their motives’.⁸⁰ This was the rationale behind Primakov’s urge to improve relations with India and China, as these countries, like Russia, faced similar problems like threats to security and ethnic fundamentalism.

With Primakov as the new foreign minister, India’s position was upgraded in Russia’s strategic perception, as evident in the new order of priority areas in the foreign policy of Russia. As compared to India’s seventh place in the 1993 Russian foreign policy, India was accorded fourth place only after the USA, Europe and China, with whom Primakov considered it necessary for Russia to develop relations.⁸¹ During Primakov’s tenure as the foreign minister, there was substantial improvement in economic and military cooperation between the two countries. Visiting India in March 1996, Primakov described India as a ‘global power’ and a ‘priority partner’ of Russia, and emphasized the need to build effective strategic relations on grounds of common concern. He expressed the hope that the strategic linkages between the two countries would be intensified. The issues on which the two countries differed—the NPT and the CTBT—did not come up for discussion as expected.⁸² Along with India, Primakov favoured a policy of improving relations with China, and Yeltsin visited Beijing in April in an attempt to mend fences with that country on common areas of interest.⁸³

Thus, it was after Primakov became the foreign minister that India came into the focus of Russia’s foreign policy, which led to a steady development of arms cooperation relationship between the two countries. This led one analyst to observe that diplomatically Russia no longer appeared to look strictly westwards.⁸⁴ Moscow’s Cold War strategy of backing ideologically-close regimes in Eastern Europe and the Third World was now replaced by an ‘absolutely pragmatic’ policy of selling arms to any country with cash in hand.⁸⁵ With a distinct change in focus in the Kremlin’s foreign policy, the Russian leaders professed to more than double the value of arms deals with India in 1996 to $3.5 billion.⁸⁶ Five major contracts were signed by the two countries in 1996 for the supply of latest warplanes, ships and other military hardware, and modernization of the previously supplied weapon systems.⁸⁷ Moreover, the two countries had signed a long-term military cooperation agreement to the year 2000 worth $7 to $8 billion. It included supplying arms and equipment for the Indian armed forces, modernizing weapons and granting licences to produce existing arms and equipment that were still on the drawing board.⁸⁸ It is significant that while arms deals in the past had been funded by Russian government credits to India, they were now paid for in convertible currency.

Russian Defence Minister Igor Rodinov’s trip to India in October 1996 acquired momentous significance in the development of the military ties between India and Russia, although it did not succeed in its ostensible mission of clinching the long-pending Sukhoi-30 multi-role aircraft deal. The Moscow Times quoted a defence source, who participated in Rodinov’s talks with the Indian leaders, as having said: ‘Nothing materialized primarily because of the low defence budget and the lack of political will in India to upgrade its air force and its navy’.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the two countries reached an agreement to forge closer military and strategic relations and conduct joint exercises and training for intensifying friendly ties between the armed forces of the two countries. The agreement provided for the maintenance of India’s weapons systems and other equipment of Russian origin. Still, the two countries were locked over the issue of the outstanding debts that India owed to the former USSR, with the present Russia now demanding repayments in hard currency before launching other financial transactions.

On 30 November, India signed a landmark deal with Russia worth $1.8 billion to buy 40 Sukhoi-30 MK fighter jets. It was the biggest aircraft deal between the two nations and the single largest defence deal ever signed by India with any country⁹⁰ The Indian defence delegation signing the deal showed interest in buying new frigates, an aircraft carrier, air defence ships and submarines from Russia. The Su-30 deal refurbished the link between Russian arms manufacturers and the Indian military reminiscent of the Soviet era. The long-range Su-30s would replace the ageing MiG-23s and MiG-27s, also of Russian origin, and would be a fitting reply to the F-16s and Mirage-2000s that the Pakistani Air Force Possessed. According to Indian military officials, the Sukhoi jets would constitute the primary strike force of the Indian Air Force. The first two jets were delivered to India within three to four months after the signing of the agreement,⁹¹ while the first batch of eight of the 40 Su-30s had been inducted into the IAF on 11 June 1997.⁹² Moreover, India was reported to have clinched a deal to purchase two Russian Kilo class submarines worth $800 million in order to upgrade the country’s naval defence.⁹³

Indo-Russian strategic and military ties were further strengthened when the then Indian Prime Minister, H.D. Deve Gowda, visited Moscow in March 1997. The major achievement of Gowda’s Moscow trip was that Russia expressed its desire to sell India two nuclear power reactors of 1000 MW each.⁹⁴ Second, Russia agreed to help India in developing a state-of-the-art integrated air defence system estimated at $8 to $10 billion. A major characteristic of the system would be the integration of the indigenously developed surface-to-air missile, Akash, with the top-of-the-line Russian anti-missile system, S-300-PMU, which, according to a Russian defence ministry official, would probably enable India to have a clear edge over the American Patriot missile system.⁹⁵ Third, Moscow’s announcement that it would block the sale of the advanced T-80 UD tanks by Ukraine and its vital necessary components, intensified the military-strategic connection between India and Russia.⁹⁶ Further, Yeltsin expressed his government’s support to India’s claim to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council and keenness to develop cooperation with India in the fields of nuclear energy and defence. However, India’s Prime Minister categorically pointed out that India would not be a part of any military alliance system. In May, Russia had offered to equip India’s T72 Ml main battle tank fleet with the state-of-the-art defensive aid suite—Arena—to counter Pakistan’s newly acquired 320 T-80 UD tanks.⁹⁷

Indo-Russian defence ties reached a new height with Indian Defence Minister Mulayam Singh Yadav’s five-day trip to Moscow in October 1997 when both countries agreed to extend their long-term defence cooperation beyond the year 2000. It was agreed that the bilateral military-technical cooperation agreement between the two countries would extend till 2010.⁹⁸ Another achievement of Yadav’s visit to Moscow was the diversification in Indo-Russian defence ties. A third Indo-Russian joint Working Group (JWG) was set up to deal with land weapon systems, which would deal with joint modernization and development of new land-based weapons systems, such as artillery and rocket guns and tanks⁹⁹ Further, cooperation with Russia involved military supplies, technical collaboration, exchange of specialists and experts and military-to-military ties. According to defence sources, the JWG would hold discussions acquire advanced and sophisticated military equipment from Russia. Moscow had reiterated once more that it would not supply arms to Pakistan.¹⁰⁰ Subsequently, the two countries held defence cooperation talks in December when they decided to develop jointly new weapon systems. Moscow and New Delhi signed a deal for two Kilo class submarines and three Krivatik c1ass frigates.¹⁰¹

Thus, by the mid-1990s, the temporary hiccup in Indo-Russian military cooperation since 1991 was mended. As a matter of fact, the sale of Russian arms in international market in 1995 increased by 60 per cent over that in the previous year as the country shifted to a market-driven approach of selling its military hardware from one in which ideology reigned supreme.¹⁰²

India and China alone accounted for almost two-thirds of Russian sales in 1995,¹⁰³ while Russian exports to India and China amounted to about 41 per cent of the total revenue brought in by Russia’s defence industry. Russia also hoped to more than double the value of arms deals with India in 1996 to $3.5 billion. Thus, by the mid-1990s, India had established itself as one of the principal buyers of the Russian arms. However, apart from the paradigm of arms sales, there were several complimentary factors which cemented strong Indo-Russian ties during this time, e.g., the spread of Islamic religious fundamentalism posing serious threats to the common security of both India and Russia, the prospect of the US world hegemony and the common danger to their security arising from trafficking of drugs (cocaine, heroin, narcotics, etc.) and illegal arms smuggling.

Russia’s Response To Pokhran-II and Beyond

India’s nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May 1998 at Pokhran, which were followed by Pakistan’s nuclear explosions in Chagai hills in Baluchistan on 28 May, created a rather embarrassing situation for Russia. Moscow’s official response was in consonance with its avowed stand on the nuclear issue. Yeltsin expressed his utter displeasure and strongly criticized the tests, standing firmly by the terms of the NPT and the CTBT¹⁰⁴ The Russian President deplored the tests saying that ‘India has let us down’. On 12 May, the Russian foreign ministry expressed in an official statement ‘alarm and concern’ and ‘very deep regret in Russia’ over the Indian action, and urged New Delhi to alter its nuclear policy and sign the NPT and the CTBT ¹⁰⁵

Russia actually apprehended that the Pokhran-II would accentuate the arms race in the subcontinent and provoke Pakistan to follow a similar line of action in order to match India. Russia’s Foreign Minister Primakov condemned India’s action as ‘short-sighted’ and also ‘unacceptable’ from Russia’s perspective. He said, ‘We especially would not want Pakistan to follow in India’s footsteps’.¹⁰⁶ However, Moscow, unlike Washington, was not in favour of imposing sanctions against New Delhi and chose diplomacy as an instrument to try to bring about change in India’s nuclear policy. Rather, Moscow announced that it would continue to cooperate with India in the civilian nuclear sector. It was, thus, clear that Pokhran-II did not have any serious repercussion on the overall relations between the two countries. Only a day after India’s second nuclear test on 14 May, the conference of the joint Indo-Russian council on technical and scientific collaboration began in a friendly atmosphere.¹⁰⁷ On the next day, the Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Navy, Vladimir Kuroyedov, reportedly informed that Russian warships would be participating in joint exercises with the Indian Navy in the coming autumn, and observed that ‘we regard India as a great friendly partner in the vast Indian Ocean’.¹⁰⁸ Reports poured in that Russia would provide India with more nuclear submarines. Thus, the detonation of India’s nuclear devices was not a stumbling block to the development of Indo-Russian cooperation in other fields.

Russia’s official response to Pokhran-II was reinforced by laudatory remarks of senior Russian military officials about Indian action, and the congratulations of important political leaders, e.g., Genady Zyuganov of the Communist Party and Vladimir Zhirinovsky of the Liberal Democratic Party. The Russian media’s opinion was open and frank, and inferred that the Indian action questioned ‘the essentially unfair and iniquitious world order that the West sought to impose’.¹⁰⁹ The views and comments published in different papers reflected both widespread anti-West sentiment and understanding, sympathy and deep appreciation for the international scenario justifying the Indian action at Pokhran.¹¹⁰

What Russia apprehended was that India’s action might induce Pakistan and other threshold states—Israel, Iran, Iraq, Libya and The United Arab Republic (UAR)—to tum nuclear. Bill Clinton and Yeltsin had telephonic discussions on 21 May over how to restrain Pakistan from conducting nuclear tests and encourage New Delhi to join the CTBT On 28 May, Islamabad carried out nuclear tests which escalated tensions in the region. Although Russia had joined the West in expressing concern over the Pakistani explosion, it did not prescribe the imposition of any sanctions and embargo as it did in the case of India. Two days later, Primakov made a three-point proposal, seeking to influence both India and Pakistan to give up their nuclear policies and sign the NPT; make both India and Pakistan ratify the international test ban treaty; and to find ways to deescalate tensions in the relations between India and Pakistan. This was to be discussed at a meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the P-5 at Geneva on 4 June.¹¹¹ In this sense, Russia’s stand on Pokhran-II was almost analogous to that of the US and other P-5 nations. Moscow also supported the G-8 effort at its meeting held in London on 12 June to find common course of action’s so that both India and Pakistan could be effectively persuaded to behave in line with the existing nuclear regime. The deterioration in India-China relations, with worsening of tensions between them following the Pokhran-II tests, compounded Russia’s problem of formulating a response to India’s action in Pokhran.

Russia was clearly on the horns of a dilemma while responding to India’s nuclear tests on 11 and 13 May. On the global level, Russia had no option but to condemn the tests along with other P-5 and G-8 countries in line with the existing international nuclear reality, although Moscow was opposed to the application of sanctions and embargo on India. On the bilateral level, however, Russia assured India that its nuclear detonations would not, in anyway, impair their relations, and that Russia would continue to regard India as its ‘strategic partner’. A deal was signed by Russia’s Minister for Atomic Energy, Yevgeny Adamov, in New Delhi on 21 June to build two light water 1000 MW nuclear reactors at Kudankulam as a supplementary to the 10-year old agreement between India and the former USSR to build a nuclear power plant. The supplementary accord was signed in spite of the US pressure.¹¹² Further, a high-level Indian delegation visited Moscow in November 1998 to hold a meeting of the Indo-Russian Joint Working Group (JWG) on military-technical cooperation. The JWG identified the joint development of radars, submarines, anti-missile and electronic warfare systems as key areas of the cooperation programme, and provided scope for the exchange of views on defence and security-related issues.¹¹³

Primakov’s visit to India in December had great military significance as the Russian Premier was accompanied by eight ministers, the Russian Army Chief Colonel, General Yuri Bukreev, and the three service chiefs. The major outcome of Primakov’s visit was a 10-year defence cooperation pact, involving partnership in research, development and joint production of sophisticated military equipment, and a joint effort to establish strategic relationship between the two countries.¹¹⁴ Primakov’s visit was significant in that he was the first head of a government to visit India since the latter’s nuclear test in May. Second, Primakov’s visit coincided with the increasing American pressure on New Delhi to follow its own nuclear stand. Third, Primakov proposed the formation of a strategic triangle comprising Russia, China and India, although the proposal was nipped in the bud by both India and China as it would mean a return to the Cold War.¹¹⁵

Primakov’s visit revealed the strategic importance of India in Russia’s foreign policy. India became the largest purchaser of Russian arms for its defence needs. Since the mid-1990s, the bilateral defence cooperation was resuscitated and India and China alone accounted for about 41 per cent of the Russian arms sales; and it was estimated that about 800 Russian defence production facilities were kept in operation by Indian defence contracts. A major consideration which impelled Russia to continue close ties with India was, however, the rising trend in bilateral trade from $906 million in 1994 to $105 billion in 1998.¹¹⁶ Another consideration was the shared concern over the rise of fundamentalist tendencies in the neighbouring Muslim countries and the fear of their spread to Central Asia.

The 10-year defence pact—worth $15 billion—signed during Primakov’s visit to India enabled India to acquire from Russia an anti-missile system: the A-300 PMU-1 or the S-300V system, capable of intercepting tactical ballistic missiles.¹¹⁷ Second, India’s acquisition of an anti-tactical ballistic missiles system (ATBM) would act as a counterweight against a nuclear offensive by Pakistan. It would not only give a jolt to the existing nuclear balance between India and Pakistan, but might also serve the purpose of ensuring minimum deterrence between the two nations.

Moscow adopted a favourable attitude towards the testing of nuclear weapons by India. Thus, Russia’s reaction to India’s successful testing, on 11 April 1999, of Agni-II—an upgraded Intermediate-Range-Ballistic Missile (IRBM), capable of delivering a 1000-kg conventional or nuclear payload to a target more than 2000 km away—was extremely favourable to India. While the USA, Britain and Japan censured India for the test, Russia—acting as traditional ally of India—viewed the test as ‘an important component of India’s nuclear deterrence force for self-defence and an attempt to strike a balance with nuclear China’.¹¹⁸ In contrast, Russia reacted sharply to the test-firing of Ghauri-II by Pakistan on 14 April, expressing fear that the ‘test-firing of Ghauri-II in response to India’s testing of Agni-II may lead to the escalation of a nuclear and missile race in Asia which would lead to the destablisation of the continent’.¹¹⁹ In keeping with the prevailing mood of maintaining and increasing the military and nuclear cooperation with India, Russia came out in strong support of India’s candidature for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, which was communicated to India’s Prime Minister by Yeltsin’s special envoy Sergei Prikhodko on 15 May. Further, New Delhi and Moscow found common cause to make a fresh appeal to end the NATO bombings in Yugoslavia as both felt a solution to the Kosovo crisis had to be found through ‘means other than military’.¹²⁰ In sum, Russia’s contrasting styles of response to the testing of missiles by India and Pakistan clearly revealed its support to India’s nuclear policy and the value it attached to its relationship with India.

Indo-Russian Relations in the Post-Kargil Era

Corresponding to Moscow’s favourable stand towards New Delhi’s nuclear policy, Russia’s response to the limited border war between India and Pakistan in Kargil in mid-1999 went substantially in favour of India. A special envoy of the Pakistani Prime Minister went to Moscow in late June–early July urging the Russian president to mediate in the crisis and send a delegation to both India and Pakistan, which would help Moscow in investigating the situation and trying to solve the crisis. Responding to the Pakistani plea, an official of the Russian foreign ministry expressed his country’s willingness to help both New Delhi and Islamabad to tide over the problem, but this was balanced by the ministry’s categorical statement that Pakistan would have to first honour the Line of Control (LOC) and bring back status quo along it by withdrawing its armed forces and the Kashmiri Mujahideens, sponsored by Pakistan itself, from the Indian soil.

Indo-Russian relations were further consolidated when Russia extended full and complete support to India’s claim for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council, describing the claim as ‘strong and appropriate’ during the visit of the then Indian External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh to Moscow in May 1999.¹²¹ New Delhi’s importance in the perception of Moscow was once again demonstrated when President Yeltsin called up the visiting external affairs minister of India in a rare gesture and held ‘important, constructive and substantial talks’.¹²² There was progressive development of military cooperation between New Delhi and Moscow when the latter dispatched three different models of the T-90s main battle tank for extensive trials in the Rajasthan desert during the hottest months from May to July.¹²³ Moreover, Russia began delivering on 7 June the first of the 10 state-of-the-art Su-30K multi-role fighter jets to be delivered to India. Under a $300 million deal signed in 1998, the first batch of four such aircraft was supplied by the end of July.

Meanwhile, the publication of a US intelligence report about Pakistan’s acquisition of China’s M-11 missiles and the fact that this was not denied by the spokesman of the Chinese foreign ministry posed a serious threat to India’s security environment.¹²⁴ India’s fear was compounded by the rapid post-Cold War improvement of relations between Russia and China in all dimensions, leading to the settlement of border differences, increase in trade and Moscow’s massive sale of weapons to Beijing.¹²⁵ India felt terrified and sought to diversify the sources of its arms acquisition. Preliminary negotiations began with France to acquire a squadron of 2000 D Mirage fighter aircraft as part of its minimum nuclear deterrent for around Rs 50 crore each.¹²⁶ As a matter of fact, there was steady growth of defence ties for sometime between India and France. In early 1999, Defence Minister George Fernandes visited France and observed that closer defence cooperation with it would involve transfer of military technology and joint ventures in India. In September, French President Jacques Chirac told Vajpayee that France ‘respected India’s right to conduct nuclear tests’. Moreover, France had recently postponed the transfer to Pakistan of two squadrons of Mirage 5 and the first of the three diesel-electric French Agosta 90-B submarines. According to military sources, France felt more attracted towards India’s ‘substantially larger’ market than Pakistan’s and was surely distancing itself from Islamabad.

Against this background, Russia sent a defence delegation to India in the first week of November comprising Deputy Premier Ilya Klebanov, several army officers, weapons manufacturers and other officials to hold strategic-level talks and discussions on weapons transfers of over $1 billion. A long-term defence agreement was signed, the biggest deal being on the long-awaited purchase of the Russian aircraft carrier, Admiral Gorshkov.¹²⁷

The pact provided scope for cooperation and joint production in several sphere including aircraft, missile systems, naval ships and submarines and other weapons systems. In terms of this treaty, Russia would completely upgrade the Kilo-class submarine of India, hereby increasing greatly the capability the strength of the Indian Navy.¹²⁸

In sum, Moscow and New Delhi signed for the first time a comprehensive document involving all kinds of military cooperation between them. Russian Deputy Prime Minister Ilya lsifovich Klebanov observed that the production and development of several weapon systems would now take place simultaneously in Russia and India, and might be exported to the countries willing to buy them. The defence agreement assumed momentous significance as it brought about tremendous pace in the military cooperation between India and Russia, which not only surpassed the previous level of arms cooperation between them in the initial post-Soviet years but also helped keep the once-mighty Russian military-industrial complex in business.

Putin’s Visits: A New Era of Strategic Cooperation

Russian President Vladimir Putin’s four-day visit to India early in October 2000 has consolidated the traditional friendship between India and Russia and led to the beginning of a new era of strategic and military relationship between them in the post-Cold War world order. Leading a 70-member high-power delegation, which included Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov, Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov and Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev, the Russian President was accorded a warm welcome at the Delhi airport. As a matter of fact, Putin’s visit is really a milestone providing tremendous impetus to the development of the two countries’ relationship at the beginning of the new millennium.

The two countries have signed a number of agreements reflecting convergence of national interests and starting close strategic cooperation, unprecedented since the end of the Cold War, between New Delhi and Moscow. One of the key documents signed was the Declaration of Russian–Indian Strategic Partnership, essentially outlining the contours of the two countries’ relationship in the 21st century.¹²⁹ Both sides have made it clear that the declaration is not a new alliance but a continuation of traditional friendship and close cooperation of the last 50 years. ‘Not directed at any third country’, the declaration binds the two sides to ‘non-participation in any military-political or other alliances or associations or armed conflict directed against the other side, or in any treaties, agreements or understandings infringing upon the independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity or national security interests of the other side’.¹³⁰

The highlight of Putin’s visit was the signing of four defence agreements involving $3 billion, which essentially increased the strike capability of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force.¹³¹ The defence deals included New Delhi’s purchase of more than 300 T-90 main battle tanks along with anti-tank guided missiles with an option to transfer technology and set up a manufacturing unit in the country. Another agreement related to the transfer of technology and licensed production of 140 Sukhoi-30 fighter aircraft which is supposed to be the chief weapon in the IAF’s armory for the next decade. In addition, Russia agreed to lease four Tu-22 Backfire bombers, a maritime reconnaissance and strike aircraft fitted with 300 km range air-to-ground missiles and capable of flying at three times the speed of sound.

Of considerable significance was the establishment of an Indo-Russian intergovernmental commission on military-technical cooperation at a high ministerial level, which would exercise coordination and control of bilateral military-technical cooperation, and assist in accelerated decision-making. The much awaited deal on the purchase of the Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov was clinched. It is expected to join the Indian Navy in three years and will be the mainstay in the navy’s blue water capability. Further, India was provided with ample opportunity to establish effective bilateral trade and economic relations by expanding cooperation in such sectors as metallurgy, fuel and energy, information technology (IT), banking and finance. Several agreements on these were accordingly signed within the framework of the Indo-Russian intergovernmental commission on trade, economic, scientific and cultural cooperation.¹³²

In essence, Putin’s visit has not simply led to arms transfer relationship, it has also focussed on the joint production of Russian systems in India, including the transfer of technology on missiles submarines, fighters and tanks. In the aftermath of the Russian President’s visit, New Delhi has received from Moscow BrahMos, a new supersonic missile, which is virtually impossible to shoot down and can be launched from ships and aircraft with a range of 300 km and having the capacity of carrying a conventional warhead. Although Russia has provided the missile, the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) is ‘fine-tuning’ it to enhance its range and make it capable of carrying nuclear warheads.

Putin’s visit has demonstrated the convergence of interests of India and Russia on several issues. First, Russia and India have found common justification in reviving their once-close strategic and military relations. India will benefit immensely from this as it is largely dependent on Russia for the bulk of its arms requirements. This is also necessary for India as it is flanked by Pakistan, its archrival, on one side, and by China—with whom the border dispute is still lying unsolved—on the other. From the Russian perspective, the emergence of a strong India in a multi-polar world is favourable to Russian interests. The bilateral arms cooperation will constitute a major source of hard currency which is urgently needed for the development of its dilapidated economy. In addition, the new strategic-military cooperation has cemented the interests of a huge Russian defence industry and India’s information technology sector, with its potential in electronic systems and software.¹³³ The Statesman on 13 October 2000 has aptly editorialized: ‘India and Russia are hugging each other because they have only each other to hug’.

Second, Russia and India have found common cause in fighting against terrorism in areas like Kashmir and Chechnya. India had been facing, for more than a decade, the menace of cross-border terrorism, religious extremism, drug-trafficking and separatism, to which the Russian President reconciled in his address to the Indian Parliament on 4 October saying that ‘these dangers do not recognise any borders and affect all. Terrorism can not be allowed to become an instrument of state policy’.¹³⁴

Third, India and Russia have shown the readiness to work together in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) in this regard. Russia is the only country amongst the five permanent members of the UN Security Council (P-5), which has committed itself to support India in the field of nuclear energy. Despite unrelenting pressure from Washington, Mos-cow has agreed to build two large 1000 MW nuclear power reactors at Koodankulam in Tamil Nadu costing $2.6 billion. Putin’s visit to India’s Bhaba Atomic Research Centre at Trombay was directly related to this project, reflecting Russia’s preparedness to provide further aid to India.

Fourth, Putin supported India’s position on Kashmir, emphasizing in his address to the Indian Parliament on 4 October that the issue should be settled bilaterally on the basis of compromise, and fully supporting the Indian leadership on the collective front to fight terrorism.¹³⁵ The joint statement pointed out that foreign interference in Kashmir should be stopped immediately so that dialogue could be resumed between the two nations within the framework of the Lahore Declaration. Putin further said that Moscow’s relations with other countries, Asian or otherwise, were ‘no alternatives’ to its links with New Delhi, nor would they ‘prejudice our relations with our long-term partner and ally’.¹³⁶ India has reciprocated by expressing its support to the steps taken by Russia in Chechnya for protecting the country’s territorial integrity and constitutional order.

Despite complementarity of views and interests between India and Russia, Putin exhorted India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which India refused to sign due to its discriminatory nature. The Russian President observed that ‘we would like to see India participating in CTBT’, although ‘Russia realizes India’s concerns over being a signatory to CTBT which are based on her (India’s) own strategic vision’.¹³⁷ Russia’s stand on nuclear weapons is however understandable, as it is committed to bring about global nuclear disarmament in cooperation and coordination with the United States.

Putin’s visit has increased the level of bilateral defence cooperation, as a result of which New Delhi received from Moscow a new supersonic missile—BrahMos—for its navy.¹³⁸ This has definitely strengthened the two countries’ strategic linkage. A $10 billion long-term defence cooperation agreement was signed during the then External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh’s visit to Moscow in June 2001. The agreement focussed not only on the transfer of technology but also on the joint development and production of future weapons systems. This was aptly pointed out by Russia’s Deputy Prime Minister Ilya Klebanov when he said: ‘Our cooperation has turned toward the joint development and joint production of weapons, which is very important in the relations of the two countries’.¹³⁹ Moscow and New Delhi agreed to work jointly to develop high-tech fighter jets, submarines and ships. The present deal included a Russian plan to help India build an air-defence shield, with the help of two weapons systems the DRDO is seeking to develop: the Rajendra radar and the Akash long-range anti-aircraft missile.¹⁴⁰ Moreover, India would buy some squadrons of the S-300 or S-400 air-defence and anti-missile defence system and integrate them into its present surface-to-air defences against enemy aircraft and Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles (MRBMs), while simultaneously seeking to make indigenous development of the system.¹⁴¹

Klebanov’s trip to India in the middle of October assumed significance in the context of the 11 September tragedy in the United States. His discussion and meetings with the Indian leaders were dominated by the threat of international terrorism and the highly volatile situation in Afghanistan and also the measures of combating terrorism. Other areas of cooperation between India and Russia were in the fields of defence, space and peaceful uses of nuclear energy.¹⁴² Atal Behari Vajpayee’s visit to Moscow in November saw six agreements and four MoUs being signed on various bilateral issues. However, the significant aspect of the visit was the signing of the Moscow Declaration, forging a common front against terrorism. In an obvious reference to Chechnya, Jammu and Kashmir and Afghanistan, the declaration said the violence in all these areas represented in reality the acts of terrorism, and that there could be no ‘double standards’ in tackling this menace.¹⁴³ The two countries also agreed to jointly develop the fifth-generation multi-role fighter aircraft. Another positive result of Vajpayee’s visit was the agreement for technical and financial assistance for constructing the much-awaited nuclear plant at Koodankulam.¹⁴⁴ Ivanov, during his visit, expressed his country’s unambiguous approval of India’s stand on Kashmir and cross-border terrorism.¹⁴⁵ However, India did not enthusiastically respond to, rather declined the Russian offer of trilateral cooperation amongst Russia, China and India.¹⁴⁶ Still, Ivanov’s visit and his expression of strong support to India vis-à-vis Pakistan, at a time when the international community was prone to accept the Pakistani President Musharraf’s comments at face value, was strategically significant to India.

Putin’s second visit to India early in December 2002 further strengthened the strategic linkage between the two countries. As Putin told Vajpayee: ‘We made a lot of progress in our relationship in these two years. And we should not stop. We must keep building on it and make it move even faster’.¹⁴⁷ The two countries signed a declaration on ‘Further Consolidation of the Strategic Relationship’, which shows the depth of strategic relations between India and Russia.

Even before Putin had left Moscow, he expressed grave concern over the chances of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons spilling into the hands of’bandits and terrorists’. In essence, therefore, Moscow supported India’s stand on terrorism and other politico-security issues.¹⁴⁸ The declaration contains a mutual protective clause stating that ‘as victims a particular interest in putting an end to this common threat through preventive and deterrent measures nationally and bilaterally’. However, much to India’s satisfaction, Putin urged Pakistan to dismantle terrorist infrastructure in its territory and completely stop cross-border terrorism as a prerequisite for the resumption of Indo-Pakistani talks.¹⁴⁹ The declaration also condemned any double standards in the fight against terrorism, thereby implying a veiled reaction against the US policy of discrimination between the treatment of its own problem of terrorism, after the 9/11 incident, and its response to the Pakistani-sponsored terrorism, which India had been facing through decades.

Apart from terrorism, a significant aspect of the Putin-Vajpayee summit was the two countries’ commitment to increase the bilateral trade that has been low at $1.4 billion (Rs 6,750 crore) during the last three years. Putin suggested that part of India’s past debt of $3 billion (Rs 14,475 crore) could be used as capital for setting up Indo-Russianjoint ventures in the fields of telecommunication, aluminium and information technology for enhancing bilateral trade ties.¹⁵⁰ The two countries also agreed to improve non-defence related trade which is currently only $1.5 billion.

Putin’s visit has led to the beginning of a new era of strategic cooperation and arms transfer relationship in the post-Cold War global reality. It has demonstrated the depth of Indo-Russian friendship as manifested in Russia’s unambiguous support to India’s stand on terrorism. Unlike the West, Moscow is not inclined to accept at face value the pledges of the Pakistani President, General Pervez Musharraf, with regard to curbing the wave of religious fundamentalism inside Pakistan by reducing the dominance of the fundamentalist leaders, and banning some terrorist organizations. Russia’s pro-India proclivity was clearly revealed when Putin, during Musharraf’s visit to Moscow in the first week of February 2003, called the Vajpayee and had a 12-minute telephonic discussion around the time President Musharraf reached Moscow. In what was purely a diplomatic rebuff to Musharaff, Putin categorically pointed out that New Delhi could resume bilateral dialogue with Islamabad only when cross-border terrorism ceased completely, and that bilateral talks covering all the outstanding issues should be held on the basis of the 1972 Shimla Accord and the 1999 Lahore Declaration.¹⁵¹

Conclusion

There has been a substantial growth of Indo-Russian relations in its strategic and military dimensions especially after Putin’s visits—in October 2000 and December 2002—to India in spite of Washington’s revised policy towards the subcontinent in the post-Cold War period, steady development in US-Indian ties on different issues, joint naval exercises in the 1990s, and India’s effusive support to George Bush’s policy of National Missile Defence (NMD) System with astonishing alacrity in mid-May 2001. However, Indo-Russian friendship has been significantly balanced by the warming of Sino-Russian relations and the settlement of boundary and other differences in the 1990s, the signing of good-neighbourly treaty of friendship and cooperation by China and Russia early in December 2002, and the massive sale of Russian weapons to China. All these have serious implications for India’s security.

Notwithstanding such irritants, India and Russia are forging a long-term strategic relationship which contrasts sharply with New Delhi’s ties with Washington. As The Times of India noted on 30 September 2002: ‘Unlike the United States where the Government is subject to Congressional whims and fancies in regard to arms supplies, Russia has proved to be a steadfast friend’. Moreover, the USA has not followed a policy of cooperation with India in the field of nuclear weapons and the transfer of nuclear energy. Rather, it asked Moscow to half the transfer of cryogenic rocket technology to India in 1993. On the contrary, Russia is the only member of the nuclear club which cooperates with India on nuclear energy despite unrelenting pressure from Washington. The visit of India’s Defence Minister George Fernandes to Moscow in January 2003 to negotiate preparations for drafting a new military-technical contract involving New Delhi’s participation in the Russian fifth-generation fighter research and development programme.¹⁵²

As a matter of fact, India today enjoys warm relations both with Russia and America, although the latter is practising ‘double standards’ in regard to India’s problem of cross-border terrorism sponsored by Pakistan. While improving relations with the USA, India cannot afford to ignore its traditional friendship with Russia, but should try to strengthen it in the post-Cold War international reality. Bramha Chellaney has aptly remarked: ‘Despite Russia’s present fragility, its strategic importance for India has not declined. Rather, the growing imbalance of power in Asia has only reinforced the value of a close Indo-Russian partnership for Asian stability’.¹⁵³

There had been substantive development in the two countries’ relations in the subsequent years following Prime Minister Vajpayee’s visit to Moscow in 2003, President Putin’s visit to India in 2004, and the Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee’s as well as the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visits to Moscow in November and December 2005 respectively. Even after momentous changes in the international scenario following end of the Cold War, there still remains a continued convergence of what makes it advantageous for both India and Russia to maintain close ties. Barring a fleeting hiccup during Yeltsin’s tenure as the country’s President, New Delhi and Moscow have been extraordinarily successful in nurturing a frictionless Druzhba (friendship) in their relationship that harks back to the Soviet era.

During this post-Communist Soviet period, there is a real convergence of perspectives on such issues as the promotion of multi-polarity in global politics, transnational terrorism, nuclear disarmament and various security issues facing South, Central and West Asia.

However, the most important of the commonalities of perceptions of the two countries is, perhaps, the defence ties between India and Russia. Not only is Russia the biggest supplier of defence products to India, but the Indo-Russian defence relationship also takes within its fold various types of activities like joint research, design, development and co-production.

Notwithstanding these commonalities of interests, there are difference in the perspectives of the two countries also. First, Moscow has explicit reservations against New Delhi’s nuclear weaponization programme. Russia today, along with the United States, is involved in a number of arms control programmes. Second, the excellent defence relationship between China and Russia is the cause of some concern to India. Finally, there remains a large scope for improving the volume of bilateral trade which stagnated at around $1.8 billion.

Indo–Russian relations continued to improve in 2005. In May, the two countries agreed to uplift their bilateral defence cooperation from a ‘mere buyer and seller relationship’ to that of technology transfers and joint research and development of weapons system. Manmohan Singh had prolonged discussion with Putin on the issue of civilian nuclear energy cooperation, apprising him of India’s non-proliferation efforts. Further, Russia fully backed India’s quest for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council. India’s External Affairs Minister K. Natwar Singh made a trip to Moscow in early June, and participated in a trilateral meeting on 2 June at Vladivostok with his Russian counterpart Sergei Lavrov and Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing. As a matter of fact, the foreign ministers of the three countries had met thrice before the present one—twice in the UN General Assembly in New York in September 2002 and 2003, and once in Almaty (Kazakhstan) in October 2004. However, India and Russia focused on 16 September on consultation, dialogue and diplomacy rather than confrontation in sorting doubts over Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Manmohan, who had discussions with Putin on various international issues, gave an account of his July visit to Washington and outlined the agreement on civilian nuclear energy with the United States. As to the defence ties, it was reported in The Indian Express (22 August 2005) that Russia was to field its nuclear capable MiG-35 multi-role fighters against US F-16 and French Mirage 2000 in Indian Air Force’s drive to purchase 125 aircraft to replace its MiG-21 fleet.

The same trend in Indo-Russian relations continued in 2006 with Russia evincing a keen interest in the Indo-US nuclear deal. India’s defence relations with Russia intensified in July with the latter giving three more frigates and six submarines with deadly land-attack cruise missiles at a total cost of Rs 6,358 crore. In the same month, Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL) took up the plan to manufacture the Sukhoi-30MK I indigenously.

There was a euphoric spurt in Moscow–New Delhi relations early in 2007 with the visits of the Russian President Vladimir Putin and of the Russian Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov in January this year, following the Chinese President’s visit to India two months ago, assuming great strategic significance. With energy security emerging as the core area of the new strategic partnership between New Delhi and Moscow, Russia had pledged to build four atomic reactors at Kudankulam in addition to the existing two units being constructed there. This reflects the deepening of civil nuclear energy cooperation between the two countries. Putin and Manmohan Singh have also referred to the expansion of cooperation with China within the trilateral format. On 14 February 2007, the foreign ministers of India, Russia and China met in New Delhi. Deciding to boost their trilateral relations, these three countries stressed the need for a multi-polar world through ‘democratisation’ of international relations with the UN having the central role as an ‘effective and transparent’ body. This trilateral meet is expected to produce at least some uneasiness in the US for the latter’s policy on Iran, as reported in major Indian dailies like The Statesman and The Telegraph (15 February 2007).

The best way to end the essay is to quote late J.N. Dixit, India’s former foreign secretary, and a brilliant commentator of India’s external affairs, who, in course of an article in The Hindustan Times on 22 April 2004, observed: ‘Whatever the new orientation in India’s foreign policy may be in developing relations with the US and other important powers, there is a clear acknowledgement in Delhi of the importance of Indo-Russian relations based on deep-rooted tradition and a mutuality of substantive interests’.