14

INDIA AND WEST ASIA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

A.K. Pasha

Brief Historical Background

India’s historical ties with the people of the Nile Valley, Mesopotamia and Dilmun civilizations which flourished in West Asia are well-known. Trade between the Indus Valley cities of Mohenjodaro and Harappa and Babylon in Mesopotamia flourished more than 4,000 years ago. Trade routes between the two regions were influenced by the monsoon winds. The Arab traders have been an important link between Europe and India. The Arabs married local Indians, particularly in Kerala, and their descendents are known as Mopplars. Indian cotton cloth, rice, sandal-wood, spices, perfumed oils, gold and other items were in great demand in West Asia. The commercial, cultural and other relations enabled the people to interact quite vigorously and many traders settled in the two regions. With the rise of Islam in the seventh century AD the Arab traders and Sufi saints spread Islam to the coastal towns of Kerala, Gujarat and other areas of India. Many Indians also converted to Christianity and Syrian Christians (especially monks) settled in Kerala, the west coast and other parts of India. Many Jews also settled in Kerala and else-where in India, especially those who could escape persecution from the Romans in West Asia. ‘The all embracing and accommodating ethos of our society and our benign religious tolerance made it possible for these West Asian religions to flourish’.¹ These spiritual links with Islam, Christianity and Judaism have over the centuries enriched the Indian society and life. Thousands of Indian pilgrims from all three religions visit holy sites in Mecca, Medina, Jerusalem, Nazareth, Bethlehem, Najaf, Karbala, Mashed, Mount Sinai and other holy places forming a human bridge between India and West Asia. Large number of Indian scholars re-sided in the Abbasid Empire (in Baghdad) whose works particularly in mathematics, astronomy, medicine were translated from Sanskrit into Arabic. The stories of the Panchatantra and other literary works were translated into Arabic. Despite the Mongol destruction of Persia and much of West Asia including the Abbasid Caliphate’s capital Baghdad in 1258 and the subsequent Ottoman domination of the region these events did not substantially disrupt the links between India and West Asia. The impact of Arabic and Persian languages on India and the birth of Urdu and Hindi reveal the literary connection between the two regions.

The discovery of sea route to India from Europe by the Portuguese sailor Vasco da Gama (with the assistance of Ibn Majid an Arab Captain) to Calicut in Kerala in 1498 and the subsequent European colonialism disrupted the close interaction India had with West Asia. After defeating Haider Ali’s son Tipu Sultan in 1799 (the last Indian ruler who seriously challenged them) at Mysore, the British consolidated their rule over India.² From Bombay with the assistance of Indian soldiers, the British dominated the Gulf region, Sudan, Egypt, and encroached on the Ottoman territory in West Asia. Most people in West Asia now saw some Indians as collaborators with British imperialism. In order to defeat the Ottoman Empire, the British during the First World War signed many treaties, made many promises and too many pledges to countries and peoples. The Sykes-Picot treaty with France and Russia is by far the most notorious. French influence over Syria and Lebanon was recognized. The Jews were promised a homeland in Palestine through the Balfour Declaration. The Sheriff Hussein of Mecca was promised a United Arab Kingdom over the liberated Arab lands from the Ottoman rule. The contradictory pledges and duplicitous policy of the British lay exposed after the war as League of Nations mandate rule was established in Iraq and Palestine by Britain and France over Syria and Lebanon. The Sheriff Hussein’s two sons were installed as kings of Iraq and Jordan. The Mufti of Jerusalem accused the British of having designs to settle in Iraq ‘many million Hindus from British India’.³ Hundreds and thousands of Indian soldiers died suppressing the Iraqi nationalists (especially shias) opposed to imposition of monarchy and British mandate rule. In other parts of West Asia thousands of Indian soldiers died fighting for the British during and after the First World War.

India and the Genesis of the Palestine Issue

Britain, the mandatory power in Palestine, allowed large-scale immigration of Jews into Palestine with the clear view to colonizing and dominating the country at the cost of the native Palestinian Arabs. Soon after the First World War, due to Nehru’s abiding conviction that India’s freedom struggle was closely linked with the struggle of other colonies, he felt the need to maintain close contacts with other nationalist movements. Soon the Indian National Congress (INC) declared India’s struggle for independence as being a part of the general worldwide struggle against colonialism and imperialism and accordingly established a foreign relations department in the Congress, charged with developing contacts with other National Liberation Movements. In this connection the INC passed a resolution as early as in 1927 demanding the withdrawal of Indian troops from Mesopotamia, Persia, Egypt and other West Asian lands, as well as from all other British colonies. In the following year assurances of sympathy and support were conveyed to the peoples of Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Palestine in their struggle for freedom. Nehru maintained close ties with the Egyptian Wafd Party and invited them to attend INC’s annual sessions. He also extended support to freedom movements in Sudan, Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia and South Arabia (Yemen). His approach against colonialism rested on two cardinal tenets: support for freedom and strict adherence to a peaceful method.

In April 1926, the Palestinian Arabs declared a general strike, which lasted for nearly six months in spite of every attempt by the British authorities, through military force and reprisals, to crush it. Nehru accused the British of pursuing a ruthless policy of destruction and killing thereby seeking to crush the Palestinian national struggle for freedom’.⁴ The Palestinian Arabs uprising during 1936–39 and the ruthless and brutal measures adopted by the British to suppress the Palestinian Arabs were condemned by Nehru. Even though he sympathized with the plight of the Jews in Europe and especially their persecution by the Christians for centuries he strongly believed that ‘we must remember that Palestine is essentially an Arab country and must remain so and the Arabs must not be crushed and suppressed in their own homelands…’⁵ In subsequent years the INC during its annual sessions supported through its resolutions the cause of the Palestinian Arabs. As a mark of respect, the INC observed 27 September 1936 as the Palestine Day by holding meetings and demonstrations throughout the country as an indication of support for the Arab cause. Mahatma Gandhi had similar ideas in 1938 in the background of mounting persecution of Jews in Europe especially by Hitler. Gandhi wrote in an essay on Palestine in 1938: ‘My sympathies are all with the Jews … but my sympathy does not blind me to the requirements of justice … Palestine belongs to the Arabs in the sense that England belongs to the English or France to the French….’⁶ In the early years of independent India, this policy towards Palestine was consolidated under the leadership of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Since Gandhi’s influence on Nehru was deep, the latter shared Gandhi’s concern for the sad plight of the Palestinian Arabs and maintained that within the framework of a pluralistic though Arab state, both Jews and Arabs should peacefully work for the upliftment of the country in a cooperative manner. The British came under pressure from the US to allow immigration of Jews from Europe into Palestine, which was opposed by the Arabs. More and more Jewish groups were using violence against the Arabs and the British. Unable to control law and order, the British referred the Palestine issue to the United Nations.

As a member of the UN Special Commission on Palestine, India vehemently opposed the partition plan for Palestine as a solution and strongly urged that the independence for Palestinians should be the primary goal of any plan for the future stability of the country. Instead India favoured a Federal state in Palestine which would enable full participation of all citizens in the political system. The Indian delegate told the UN General Assembly that partition would merely be a temporary solution for the problem and warned that it would only increase instability in the region for several years to come. India consistently challenged the view that remote historical connection of the Jews to Palestine was not a sufficient argument for creating a separate Jewish state. Ultimately, the UN accepted the majority plan and Palestine was partitioned in November 1947 by the UN General Assembly resolution No.181. The Zionists unilaterally declared Israel as a Jewish state on 14 May 1948 and in the Arab–Israeli Conflict (AIC) that followed Israel increased her territory by military conquest over and above the area allocated by the UN. Soon a large number of Palestinian Arabs were expelled by Israel who became refugees in the neighbouring Arab countries. It is interesting to note that on 23 May 1948 Nehru received a request from Dr Chaim Weizmann, President of Israel, to recognize the Jewish state. Meanwhile the UN in May 1949 admitted Israel as the 59th member. India voted against Israel’s membership as it pointed out that it ‘could not recognize an Israel which had been achieved through the force of arms and not through negotiations’.⁷

Nehru continued to resist the idea of according recognition to Israel but after great reluctance finally decided to recognize the Jewish state on 17 September 1950. However, India assured the Arab countries that it would continue to support the cause of Palestinians and that its stand on the status of Jerusalem remained unchanged and that recognition did not mean endorsement of Israeli position on its borders. It was pointed out that India’s ‘continuing natural non-recognition is not only inconsistent with overall relationships but limits effectiveness of India’s role as a possible intermediary between Israel and the Arab states’.⁸ One should also keep in mind Pakistan’s role in establishing a Pan-Islamic bloc with the help of the US–UK in West Asia, along with the Kashmir issue and advocacy of the rights of Indian Muslims. Israel continued to urge Nehru to establish diplomatic ties. Nehru due to several reasons refused. He finally relented partially when in 1953 an Israeli consulate was allowed to function in Bombay but India refused to post one in Israel. The Israelis, in subsequent years, kept up their pressure on Nehru through numerous ways but nothing concrete emerged out of these Israeli endeavours. India’s empathy with the Palestinian cause and its friendship with the people of Palestine has since then been an integral part of India’s time-tested foreign policy.⁹

India and Egypt: Nehru and Nasser

In July 1952, a fundamental change took place in Egypt with the overthrow of King Farook and the emergence of Gamal Abdel Nasser as the strongman of the new regime. This was an event of momentous significance for Egypt and a landmark in the history of the Arab world. It was to have far-reaching consequences, changing the very basic structure of the region’s politics. The new Egyptian leaders decided to follow a non-aligned foreign policy and opposed the Baghdad Pact in 1955. The pact had divided the Arab world into two hostile camps: progressives and conservatives. By championing the Palestine cause, Nasser assumed the leadership of the Arab struggle against Israel. Nehru also criticized the Baghdad Pact and said it ‘has in fact created in West Asia far greater tension and conflict than ever before. It has certainly put one country against another among countries that were friendly to one another’.¹⁰ Both Nasser and Nehru came to have similar views on numerous global issues. Nehru sympathized with Arab nationalism represented by Nasser as the urge of the Arab people. In supporting Nasser’s Arab nationalism, Nehru cemented the ties between India and Egypt. Nehru made numerous visits to Egypt and both countries signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation on 5 April 1955.¹¹ It must be stressed here that Nehru urged Nasser and other Arabs not to rule out negotiations as a means of settling the Palestinian issue. He also took care not to involve India too deeply in the dispute with Israel and at no time did he endorse the irrational claims of some Arab leaders.

Nehru supported Nasser during the Suez crisis in 1956 when Britain, France and Israel attacked Egypt to regain the Suez Canal and overthrow the regime of Nasser. Nehru publicly branded Israeli aggression as a case of’clear, naked aggression.¹² Through his support to Nasser in the Suez crisis a much closer rapport between the two leaders was established. Whatever little sympathy was left for Israel in Nehru’s heart vanished due to its aggression on Egypt and its alignment with Anglo-French military action. Nehru concurred with Nasser on Israel, which was seen as an outpost of Western imperial interests and as a country that did not have any links in the area. India’s close ties with Egypt to a large extent neutralized the Pakistani offensive against India in the West Asian and North African (WANA) region, especially over the Kashmir issue. Egypt went to the extent of declaring that Kashmir was an integral part of India and that ‘Suez is as dear to Egypt as Kashmir is to India’. Pakistan was branded as the ‘number one enemy of Cairo and Arabs’¹³

Pakistan’s membership in the Baghdad Pact led to its isolation in the WANA region with even Saudi Arabia denouncing the Pakistani decision. In fact, Saudi Arabia’s King Saud (who had visited Pakistan in 1953 and extended Riyadh’s political support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue) was astonished to find that the Islamic State of Pakistan should accede to those who have joined hands with the Zionist Jews. He called the Baghdad Pact as a ‘stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim states’ and urged it ‘to return to the right path’, by withdrawing from the widely unpopular western military pact.¹⁴ Along with Egypt, Saudi Arabia also publicly sided with India over the issue of Indian Muslims. In a now famous public statement, the Saudi king proclaimed in December 1955: ‘I desire to say to my Muslim brethren all over the world with satisfaction that the fate of Indian Muslims is in safe hands’.¹⁵ When Nehru visited Saudi Arabia in September 1956, he was given a rousing welcome with slogans of ‘welcome Prophet of Peace’, which naturally angered Pakistani leaders.¹⁶ A number of factors like the secession of Syria from the UAR in 1961, Egypt’s military intervention in North Yemen after the 1962 revolution, US decision to supply offensive arms to Israel under President Lyndon Johnson, emergence of Faisal as Saudi Arabia’s king and his emphasis on Pan-lslamism to counter Nasser’s Arab nationalism, were significant developments which made an impact on India’s West Asia policy which had come to be identified as Cairo-centric. In order to contain Nasser, the US encouraged a Saudi-Iranian-Pak-Turkish alliance since 1964. Soon, Riyadh termed India as an aggressor in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan war and warned New Delhi not to take undue advantage of its close ties with the Arab and Muslim states.

The End of an Era

Egypt’s defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war and Nasser’s death in September 1970 catapulted Riyadh as the leading Arab state influencing the politics and foreign policies of several Arab states. The Saudis under King Faisal quickly seized the opportunity by asserting their leadership in the area by reacting strongly to the damage done to the Al Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem (under Israeli occupation) the third holiest shrine of Islam, by arson on 29 August 1969. The Saudis called for a conference of Islamic heads of state or government, which was held in Rabat (Morocco) on 22–25 September 1969. The Rabat summit paved the way for the establishment of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) in May 1971. For New Delhi, the Rabat Islamic Conference gave a jolt to Indian diplomacy in the region. After having been officially invited to participate in the conference at Saudi intervention, Pakistan staged a walkout from the conference due to the presence of the Indian delegation led by Industries Minister Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed. This event evoked sharp criticism from several political parties in India towards Indira Gandhi’s inept handling of the entire issue. For India, it had become obvious that Pakistan would use the Islamic gatherings to raise the Kashmir issue and issues related to Indian Muslims, along with its declaration of World Islamic Solidarity.¹⁷

In order to safeguard its interests in WANA, India had extended support to the Palestinian Arabs and other Arab NLMs in the area. In the process, India came to establish close ties with secular nationalist regimes especially with Egypt under Nasser. Soon India also came to befriend, encourage and extend support to those countries, which opposed Western-sponsored military alliances like the Baghdad Pact. India’s friendship with Nasser and other progressive Arab leaders to some extent neutralized the Pakistani propaganda against India, especially over the Kashmir issue, as also during the 1965 Indo-Pak war. Indian leaders were not only concerned about implications of developments in the region on India’s security but also on its secular policy, which came to be appreciated gradually even by the so-called conservative states in the WANA region.¹⁸

New Directions in India’s West Asia Relations

The Bangladesh crisis and the Indo-Pak war in 1971 had a major impact on India’s ties with WANA as Pakistan sought to get closer to the Arab states. With great skill India managed to convince the Saudi and other Arab (Muslim) leaders about its desire to live in peace with Pakistan and respect its territorial integrity. The 1972 Shimla agreement and the release of Pakistani prisoners of war helped the atmosphere as Saudi Arabia’s concern for Pakistan’s integrity had become a major issue in India’s bilateral ties. Moreover, the new Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s preoccupation with the liberation of Sinai from Israeli occupation and his growing friendship with Riyadh, as also mounting differences with Moscow, constrained him to follow a policy of ‘neutrality’ and ‘passive posture’ towards India on the issue. Egypt’s posture during the 1971 crisis in the subcontinent brought home to India the harsh reality that there was little to choose between the so-called progressive and conservative Arabs in their stand towards such a crucial issue affecting Indian security. In the light of new regional developments, India had to reorient its policy from one of heavy reliance on Cairo to other power centres, which had emerged in the region, particularly Iraq, Algeria, Libya, Iran and the Arab Gulf monarchies.¹⁹ Iran continued to give diplomatic and political support to Pakistan after the latter’s defeat and division in the Indo-Pak war of 1971. The dismemberment of Pakistan was perceived by the Shah as part of a larger conspiracy aimed at Iran.

Subsequent developments like the Soviet-Iraqi friendship treaty signed in April 1972, overthrow of the monarchy in Afghanistan (of Zahir Shah) in July 1973 and the secessionist movements in Baluchistan and Sind provinces of Pakistan confirmed the Shah’s fears about Soviet attempts to encircle Iran. It must be mentioned that notwithstanding Iran’s resistance to Pakistan’s pressure to activate the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and provide a legal and institutional basis for its clandestine assistance revealed Iran’s desire to keep contacts with India. Moreover, Iran refused a Pakistani request for US-made planes on the premise that Pakistan could not provide sufficient logistical support.²⁰ Israel’s refusal to withdraw from occupied Arab lands compelled Egypt and Syria to launch a surprise military attack on Israel on 6 October 1973, crossing the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights respectively. India supported the Arab military initiative. India declared that the cause of tension in the area ‘is due to Israeli aggression and refusal to vacate territories occupied by armed force. This intransigence on the part of Israel is clearly the basic cause leading to the present outbreak of hostilities. Our sympathies are entirely with the Arabs whose sufferings have long reached a point of explosion’.²¹ India refused to call the Arab action as aggression. JustifYing India’s support to the Arab cause, it further said the Arab cause was based on justice and demanded ‘immediate implementation’ by Israel of UN Security Council Resolution 242 for peaceful solution of the Arab-Israeli Conflict (AIC). Moreover, India’s traditionally close ties with the Arabs required India to ‘stand by its friends in the time of their travail’.²² Israel’s refusal to withdraw from Arab lands made several of Israeli supporters abandon it just before and after the 1973 AIC and the subsequent oil embargo by the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) against USA and other supporters of Israel. India did not have to make such utterly opportunistic changes in her foreign policy towards the Arabs. The Arab states due to India’s unequivocal support for the Arab and Palestinian causes assured New Delhi of uninterrupted supply of oil and treated India as a ‘friend’.²³ Thus, India due to its consistent support to the Arab causes managed to get assured oil supply. Moreover, the above policy also opened up significant possibilities for Indian exports. It also soon led to a large presence of Indian workers in the Gulf area. So far India’s economic interaction was mainly with Egypt, Iran, Iraq and Sudan and at a low key with other Arab countries. But after the 1973 AIC, India’s economic and political contacts widened especially with the oil-rich Gulf states. This partly alleviated India’s balance of payments situation caused by the increase in oil prices.²⁴

India and the GCC States

The Gulf crisis that was precipitated when Iraq marched into Kuwait, the oil-rich emirate, on 2 August 1990 posed a major challenge for India. Due to India’s close political and economic ties with Iraq, an impression was created in the initial stages of the crisis that New Delhi tended to support Baghdad. This led to misunderstandings between Kuwait (and also with other GCC states) and India. To be correct, India strongly disapproved the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and called it illegal and said it should be vacated, but stopped short of condemning the invasion. Since India did not openly take sides, Kuwait and other GCC states assumed that India’s sympathies lay with Iraq. The Kuwait crisis affected India in many ways. New Delhi, mainly due to domestic turmoil, displayed no apparent enthusiasm to resolve the crisis. The minority government of V. P. Singh appeared to be primarily concerned with the evacuation of more than one lakh Indian citizens from Kuwait and 25,000 in Iraq. Public pressure mounted along with the decision of MPs from Kerala to sit on a day-long fast at the Parliament House on 16 August 1990 to protest against the inaction of the government regarding the plight of Indians in both the Gulf states.²⁵ This forced the government to accord top priority to the safe evacuation of Indians.

It partly explains India’s decision not to condemn the Iraqi action as it could have jeopardized the repatriation of Indians from the Gulf. India was also faced with the loss of crude oil supplies from both Kuwait and Iraq, which compelled New Delhi to look for alternative supplies. During 1990, Kuwait had agreed to sell India about 1.5 million tonnes of oil and Iraq 6.25 million tonnes, which included about 4.5 million tonnes that Iraq was transferring to India on behalf of the USSR against rupee payment. Before the crisis began, India had received only half the oil from the total of about 7.75 million tonnes and it was difficult for it to immediately procure the rest. Moreover, increase in oil prices in the spot market from about $16–17 per barrel in July 1990 to $35 per barrel upset India’s budget.²⁶ According to a conservative estimate, India lost nearly $3 billion in foreign exchange alone. This includes $2.36 billion for extra import of oil, $200 million to evacuate Indians from the Gulf states, $200 million as loss of exports to these two states and about $200 million as loss of remittances sent by Indian workers from both the countries. All of these economic compulsions pushed India to seek an IMF loan where US support was crucial. The Indian government partly shared the fear of the West, in particular the US, that Saddam Hussein would control 50 per cent of the world’s oil reserves if he were not pushed out of Kuwait. No wonder India allowed the refuelling of US military planes and went along with the sole superpower at the UN. According to K. P. Fabian, who was joint secretary, Gulf, ministry of external affairs (MEA), ‘We did not join the US-led coalition as we were engaged in finding a non-military resolution. The US resented this. Its friends outside India told us that we were getting isolated. Since our principled position conveyed the impression of a pro-Iraq tilt, the decision was taken at the highest level under pressure to agree to US request for refuelling facilities’.²⁷ In reality, India became isolated due to an acute domestic crisis and also because of the regional and global factors. It had no worthwhile role to play in most of the UN resolutions which were passed before it became a non-permanent member of the UNSC. Under the leadership of Yugoslavia, NAM went along with the West and UN Resolutions and, unfortunately, India’s role was marginal. Many have attacked India’s approach to the Iraq-Kuwait crisis as ‘malleable’, ‘deliberate ambiguity’, ‘wait and see’, ‘opportunism’, and so on. Undoubtedly, getting back Indian workers and their welfare and safety in other Gulf states was uppermost in the minds of the policy-makers, besides securing oil supplies, but New Delhi was equally concerned over the escalation of the crisis and its probable spillover effects. On the other hand, India was committed to adhere to the UN resolutions on Iraq, but at the same time, took care not to openly condemn Iraq’s aggression. This was in line with India’s policy to seek friendly ties with all states in the WANA region. India by neither condoning nor condemning the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait justified its position by saying that ‘condemnation is not part of the Indian nature’. By simply ‘regretting’ the invasion, India did not win the gratitude of either party. It was in fact misunderstood by both the parties and by others as well. Room for India to manoeuvre in the Gulf crisis was rather limited, given the resolve of the West and the GCC to contain Iraq. India on its own could not take any peace initiatives to resolve the crisis because, as mentioned earlier, the Indian government was beset with serious domestic problems. But as a leading member of NAM, it did take some feeble initiatives, but these came too late, partly because of deep differences within the movement, especially Yugoslavia’s one-sided stance. India’s economic links with the GCC had increased during the 1970s and 1980s especially due to the growth in oil imports. Moreover, the oil-rich GCC states with their massive oil revenues embarked on ambitious economic development, which led to demand in GCC states for labour. India with its surplus labour became a major source of supply. The rapid modernization of GCC states generated demand for goods and services and India seized the opportunity. Over four million Indians currently in the GCC states send about $10–12 billion as remittances. Gulf Indians pumped money into the Resurgent India Bonds that were floated by the State Bank of India in August 1998. Other Indian banks have mobilized deposits and investments from Gulf Indians.²⁸

The GCC and the Babri Masjid Issue

On 6 December 1992 at the 13th summit in Abu Dhabi (UAE), the GCC described the Babri mosque destruction by the BJP and its ideological allies as a sacrilege and unpardonable act. The council adopted a resolution titled ‘aggression against the Babri mosque’ in which it expressed its ‘deep condemnation of the Babri mosque demolition’ which was described as a ‘crime against Muslim holy places’. The resolution called upon the Indian government to uphold its responsibilities and to take further measures to protect the Indian Muslims, their religious rights and places of worship. It urged the Indian government to rebuild the mosque as promised. Clearly, the GCC had gone beyond the expected condemnation of the demolition already voiced by some of the members, the severest, of course, from Saudi Arabia and the most moderate stance from the UAE. India reacted sharply to the GCC resolution on the Babri masjid demolition and voiced its unhappiness. An Indian government spokesman said: ‘These matters pertain to internal affairs of India and concerns expressed from abroad in this context, however well meaning they may be, are not helpful in meeting the challenge posed by communal elements’. What upset India over the GCC stand was that it had expected the summit merely to deliberate on the Babri events and in view of the earlier condemnation by individual members, it would not mention the issue in the final communique. In view of Iran’s tough stand on the Babri mosque, even moderate members of the GCC like UAE had to fall in line because no GCC member wanted to be charged with being soft on India. The UAE deplored the Babri event as a shameful act. In a statement, it said actions causing damage to places of worship were against the spirit of harmony and coexistence among various sections of society. Further, the UAE called upon India to ‘take urgent steps to end such acts and protect the sanctity of places of worship’. In the UAE, hundreds took out several protest processions in various parts, expressing anger and outrage over the Babri masjid demolition. In Dubai, the protesters stoned an Indian temple and surrounded the Indian consulate and raised slogans against the Indian government and some resorted to looting and stone pelting. The worst-affected area was Al-Ain, 250 kms east of the capital Abu Dhabi, where angry protesters set fire to the girl’s wing of an Indian school and a church which was attacked and ransacked. Several policemen were killed in violence who tried to control the riots, ‘without use of force’. Of all the GCC states, it was only in UAE—perhaps due to the large presence of immigrants from the Indian subcontinent—that riots broke out over the Babri masjid, especially after the call for a protest day given by Pakistan. The Pakistanis, who attacked a Hindu temple and some Indian business houses, were deported by the UAE. Many Indians were also deported. The UAE acted with unusual firmness against those who indulged in violence. The Commander-in-Chief of Dubai Police, Brigadier Dhahi Khalfan, said: ‘Those who want to create unrest here should go back to their countries and launch a protest against what annoys them. Our country should not be used as a place to settle the differences that exist between different communities, group and faiths.’²⁹

India–GCC Trade Ties: India and the UAE

Among all the GCC states, India enjoys the strongest economic and political relationship with the UAE since the latter became independent on 2 December 1971. India’s exports to the UAE, import of oil and the presence of Indian workers in the Emirates have been economically very significant. India’s first ambassador to UAE, Mr Said E.H. Rizvi, was appointed on 1 March 1973. India’s economic ties with the GCC increased during the 1970s and 1980s, especially due to the growth in oil imports. Also the oil-rich GCC states with their massive revenues embarked on an ambitious economic development programme, which led to a demand in GCC states for labour. India with its surplus labour became a major source of supply. The rapid modernization of GCC states generated demands for goods and services for which India seized the opportunity. Indian banks have also mobilized deposits and investments from Gulf Indians.³⁰ The GCC states provide good market for India’s exports. During 1999–2000, India’s exports to GCC were nearly $5 billion and imports from GCC totalled $7 billion. The bilateral two-way trade exceeded $12 billion. Information technology exports to GCC currently are at $170 million and are poised for a significant upswing. India’s exports to the UAE in 1976–79 stood at Rs 1,670 million and imports at about Rs 775 million. In 1979–80, it was Rs 1,307.7 million and Rs 2,088 million. With a trade turnover of $4.4 billion in 1999–2000, the UAE was India’s biggest trade partner in the GCC. India’s exports to the UAE in the same year were $2 billion and its imports were $2.3 billion. Some of it is for and from third states and Pakistan imports via Dubai some Indian products. UAE was the first GCC state to provide aid to India through the Abu Dhabi Fund for Arab Economic Development (ADFAED). During 1974–75, it gave Rs 375 million and in 1975–76 Rs 150 million. Since 1976–77, ADFAED started directly giving aid instead of the UAE government. It gave Rs 129 million in 1976–77, Rs 525 million in 1977–78, Rs 59.4 million in 1979–80 and Rs 17.3 million in 1980–81. The aid has been given to Garhwal Rishikesh Chila Hydro-electric project in Uttar Pradesh and other projects. A large number of India’s public and private companies have taken active part in the industrialization of the UAE. They are either contracts or joint ventures. Some of them are the refinery in the Ruwais area in Abu Dhabi by Engineering Projects (India) Limited (EPI), a tube blending plant and a turnkey project by the Balmer Lawrie Group, consultancy works for the Abu Dhabi National Oil Co. by ONGC, the laying of a multipurpose pipeline by Engineers India Limited (EIL) and civil construction work for the airport at Abu Dhabi by Engineering Construction Corporation (ECC). Dubai now allows ownership of real estate by foreigners. Reputed Indian companies like the Tatas, the Kamanis, Dastur and others have taken part in the industrial development of the UAE. In the Jebel Ali free trade zone, about 160 Indian companies—the largest number from any one country—have taken part. About 56 are joint ventures. The Sadiyat free trade zone is attracting many Indian companies. Software is the new field in bilateral trade with firms like Satyam and Infosys active in business. The UAE has about 20 joint ventures—mostly in the private sector—in India, especially in Gujarat and Maharashtra. The offshore and onshore oil drilling platforms plant in Maharashtra is the most significant.³¹

The stand adopted by the UAE on Kashmir at all meetings until recently had been remarkably restrained. But since the Babri masjid event and Bombay bomb blasts, the UAE appears to have shifted from its earlier position. At a meeting of the OIC foreign ministers at Karachi in 1994, the UAE called for guaranteeing the national rights and the Islamic identity of Kashmiri people. The UAE minister of state for foreign affairs in his speech expressed concern over the situation in Kashmir and called for a settlement of the problem. He said: ‘The situation in Kashmir is still tense and could flare up unless tension is defused, before it is too late’. He further added:

We appeal to all parties concerned to work for resolving this problem through wisdom and objectivity and we hope to see a peaceful solution that is acceptable to all parties within the framework of international resolutions and bilateral agreements that will guarantee the national rights and the Islamic identity of people of Kashmir.

A change had certainly taken place in the UAE’s stand towards India since the demolition of the Babri masjid and this was obvious when it took a series of steps to express its displeasure, including its disagreement to immediately receive India’s minister of state for external affairs, R. L. Bhatia, its attempts to cold shoulder the goodwill Indian naval visit and its lack of enthusiasm to specify dates for a visit by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. Some have linked the UAE’s attitude with extradition-related issues. R. L. Bhatia finally visited the UAE on 25 May 1993 where he rejected any mediation bid by a country to resolve the Kashmir issue. He said, people can advice on friendly basis, but we cannot accept any mediation. He also said that ‘the Kashmir issue is a bilateral matter and we do not want any outside interference’. But the UAE gave every possible support to India in connection with the Bombay bomb blasts. It condemned all sorts of terrorism and violence which resulted in the killing of innocent people. It agreed to work with India to curb terrorism and step up cooperation in security measures.

The former Indian ambassador to UAE, Ranjit Sethi, said: ‘There has been no adverse impact on our relations in any manner. We have been given every assistance by the UAE authorities, at every level’. Moreover, he added that the UAE was ready to help in every possible way in matters vital to the security of India. The refuge given by the UAE to Indian nationals whom the ‘government of India wants for crimes committed’ in India has become an issue in bilateral relations. In this connection the then home minister, L. K. Advani, visited UAE on 13 July 2001 for issues related to the extradition treaty. He called on the President of the UAE and discussed with him regional and international issues of mutual interest. Some in the government bureaucracy and the Indian media continue to portray the UAE, especially Dubai, as a haven for Indian terrorists. The UAE also gets negative publicity in India. This image needs to be corrected as this might lead to unpleasant problems in future.³² In order to further improve ties, Mr Natwar Singh visited the UAE in 2004 and signed an agreement to boost economic cooperation by reviving the joint commission. In 2003–2004, trade was $7.2 billion which increased from $4.2 billion in 2002–2003. India exported goods worth $5.1 billion to the UAE and the latter exported $2.1 billion to India. Thus, the UAE has become the second largest trading partner of India after the USA and is India’s largest trading partner in the GCC. The non—oil imports from UAE increased to $1.78 billion from $850 million (2003–2004). The UAE held its first exhibition in Mumbai at the end of 2003 where contracts worth $140 million were signed. Dubai and Sharjah Chambers of Commerce and Industry in March 2004 signed an MoU with India for investments in Indian infrastructure worth $20 billion. Many information technology (IT) firms are heading to the UAE and IT exports to it in 2004 were $149 million, an increase from $100 million in 2003. Dubai Ports International (DPI) won a $450 million contract to manage, operate and develop the Rajiv Gandhi Container Terminal in Kochi (Kerala) on a build, operate and transfer basis for 38 years. This will get 33.3 per cent revenue to Kochi Port Trust annually. This is DPI’s second contract after the 30-year contract for the Vishakhapatanam port.³³

Kuwait and India

It must be mentioned that India expressed serious reservations about ‘the right to interference’ in the internal affairs of a member nation (Iraq) on humanitarian grounds, especially in the case of Kurds and Shias in Iraq. This was on UN Resolution 688 of 5 April 1991. Moreover, India is a member of the 35-nation United Nations Iraq–Kuwaiti Observer Mission (UNIKOM) to patrol the demilitarized zone along the Iraq–Kuwait border. India is also associated in the monitoring commissions and teams meant to supervise Iraqi payment of compensation and elimination of weapons of mass destruction.³⁴ Due to the ambiguous stand taken by India on Iraq’s aggression towards Kuwait, its ties with the Kuwaitis became strained. India was asked embarrassing questions: why did it take Iraq’s side during the Gulf War? Why did it refuse an audience to Kuwait’s ambassador in New Delhi? Why was India the only country in the world to move its embassy from Kuwait to Basra during the war? Did Kuwait cease to exist as a nation in 1990? These questions were very difficult for Indian officials to answer. Kuwait’s foreign minister expressed the hope that India would rebuild the Babri masjid and hand it over to the Indian Muslims. He said: ‘We hope that Prime Minister Narasimha Rao who had earlier promised to rebuild the structure will stick to his resolve’. In an interesting development, the Kuwaiti government blocked a decision by a community-run supermarket to dismiss Hindu employees from India in protest against the Babri masjid demolition. The Kuwaiti minister of social affairs and labour Mr Jassem Mohammed al Qun, ordered the Al Sabaahiya al Ahmadi Cooperative Society supermarket to rescind its decision of 15 December 1992.

In a related development, in a letter to the editor of Kuwait’s Arab Times, writers requested GCC states not to recruit Indian Hindu workers and send back those who were already in the country. It was also reported that many in Kuwait were very keen to organize demonstrations and close shops to protest against India, but the Kuwaiti government’s tough opposition prevented such activities. India’s External Affairs Minister Madhavsinh Solanki visited Kuwait in mid-February 1992, the first ministerial visit to Kuwait since the 1990–91 Iraq–Kuwait War. The visit was primarily aimed at building bridges with Kuwait after India’s ambivalent attitude during its occupation by Iraq. As seen earlier, relations between the two had deteriorated and Kuwaiti leaders publicly expressed anguish and surprise at India’s stand during the Kuwaiti crisis. After the talks with the Kuwaiti leaders, Solanki said Kuwait wanted India and Pakistan to resolve the Kashmir issue through peaceful negotiations in accordance with international norms. L. L. Mehrotra, secretary in the MEA, who accompanied the minister claimed that the visit was a ‘diplomatic triumph’. Apparently, both were impressed by Kuwait’s support to the Shimla agreement and India was also satisfied with Kuwait’s explanation about its criticism of India at the OlC meeting.³⁵ In protest against the demolition of the Babri masjid, a proposal was tabled by two Kuwaiti independent MPs, Khalid al Adwah (an Is-lamist) and Mohammed Sharar, in the Kuwaiti National Assembly, in January 1994 calling for the boycott of Indian Hindu workers and a ban on their entry and recruitment in Kuwait. On 15 August 1994, the Kuwaiti government rejected the proposal saying such a move would worsen Kuwait’s relations with ‘friendly India’ and stressed that the proposal violated political and religious norms.

State Minister for Cabinet Affairs Abdul Aziz al Dakheel said Kuwait was not solely responsible for Muslim affairs around the world. ‘Defence of Muslims should be made in a collective way through Islamic organizations concerned especially the OIC,’ he said. Dakheel also said, ‘Only a small group of Hindus were terrorizing Muslims in India and this should not be generalized. By taking a decision to ban Hindus, the ties between the two countries could worsen and India may decide to ban the Kuwaitis from visiting India, he added. Dakheel stressed that Muslim countries like Pakistan, Bangladesh and Indonesia had not even thought of taking such a measure. He felt the proposal was likely to convey the impression that Islam was a racial religion and, thus, harm the cause of Muslims rather than serve them. He felt that the adoption of the proposal would spoil Kuwait’s image and its human rights record. Moreover, Kuwait is still subject to criticism on several issues, including that of human rights, Dakheel said. Acceptance of the MPs demand would also have encouraged the Islamic fundamentalists groups in Kuwait, the minister pointed out. The Kuwaiti government’s firm stand in rejecting the call by the two MPs to punish the entire Indian Hindu community for the wrongs committed by a fraction of the community is commendable and demonstrates the progressive character of the Al Sabah regime in Kuwait. Moreover, any acceptance of the MPs demand would have weakened Kuwait’s struggle against Iraq as several groups in India would have publicly called for an end to the UN sanctions against Iraq from which India had been suffering in terms of lost export opportunities, stop in remittances and the need to find alternative sources to offset loss of oil supplies from Iraq. The total turnover of Kuwait-India trade during 1999–2000 was $2.07 billion. India’s exports to Kuwait were $154 million while imports were $1.91 billion. Kuwait’s imports from India during April 2001–March 2002 were $73.69 million and during April 2002–2003 $179.5 million. Exports during April 2001–March 2002 were $206.25 and during 2002–2003 (April–March) were $250.56. Total trade in 2001–2002 was $279.94 and during 2002–2003 was $430.07 million. This data pertains to non-oil trade only.³⁶

The Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development (KFAED) has been economic aid to India on low interest rate since it started in 1975–76 when it gave Rs 315 million. In 1975–79 it was Rs 1,974 million and in 1980–81 Rs 61.2 million. The fund has tried to limit the impact of political considerations on its lending operations. Most of the studies regarding operations offered have noted a lack of discrimination on political grounds in loan disbursements. In 1981–82, it gave Rs 525 million, in 1982–83 Rs 300 million; 1985–86 Rs 1,470 million; 1988–89 Rs 360 million; 1990–91 Rs 10 million; 1992–93 Rs 60 million; 1993–94 Rs 90 million; 1994–95 Rs 40 million; 1995–96 Rs 170million; 1996 Rs 1,340 million. Kuwait has given aid to the following projects in India: Kalinidi hydro-electric project; power projects I, II (Rs 290 million and Rs 315 million); Kopli hydro-electric project (Rs 200 million); Anpara thermal power projects (coal handling and transport) (Rs 33 million and 190 million); Kerala fisheries development project (Rs 360 million); and Thal Fertilizer project (Rs 360 million).

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, India through its skilful diplomacy succeeded in clearing the misunderstanding with the GCC states and in particular with Kuwait. Nevertheless, ties between India and Kuwait had deteriorated since Kuwaiti leaders publicly expressed anguish and surprise at India’s ambivalent attitude during its occupation by Iraq. The Kuwaiti foreign minister, during his visit to India in February 1992, had said, ‘We will forgive, but not forget’. Not surprisingly, Kuwait, at a number of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) meetings after the war, had launched a scathing attack against India and had supported Pakistan’s stand on holding a plebiscite in Kashmir. Even though ties between India and the GCC states improved gradually, the Kashmir and Ayodhya issues continued to bedevil relations to some extent even now.³⁷

Despite Kuwait’s unhappiness over India’s ambiguous position during Iraq’s invasion, a number of Indian firms were given contracts in rebuilding of Kuwait. India has shown interest in Kuwait’s downstream petrochemical sector whereas Kuwait has evinced interest in the Indian petrochemical complexes. India has also shown interest in a gas-based fertilizer plant in view of the huge quantities of gas in Kuwait and a refinery on the west coast of India. There is also a $1 billion joint venture proposal between Indian Oil and Kuwait Petroleum Corporation (KPC) to build a refinery in Orissa. A 14-member delegation from Power Loom Development and Export Promotion Council visited Kuwait from 23–27 May 2001 and organized a buyer-seller meet. An Indian jewellery and gold exhibition was held in Kuwait from 2–6 June 2001. Lt General R.K. Sawhney DCIOS-(T&C) MOD paid an official visit to Kuwait on 29–30 April 2001 and met senior Kuwaiti defence officials to discuss defence-related issues. A Bilateral Investment Protection Agreement (BIPA) was signed between India and Kuwait on 27 November 2001. In 2004 the two countries signed three agreements during the visit of Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Mohammed Sabah Al Salem Al Sabah—an extradition treaty, a pact on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters and an agreement to bolster bilateral trade and economic links. The kidnapping in Iraq of Indian truck drivers (in 2004) employed by a Kuwaiti company was resolved amicably.³⁸ The new Kuwaiti Emir visited India in 2007 and ties have improved substantially.

India and Saudi Arabia

Soon after independence, Pakistan tried hard to mobilize Arab and Islamic states to its side on the Kashmir and other issues. In this, Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia were to prove most rewarding. But soon India established close ties with Egypt’s Nasser. Many Arab states resented Pakistan’s attempt to raise the Kashmir issue in Islamic meetings. Pakistan’s membership in Western-sponsored military pacts was also denounced. Saudis attacked Pakistan’s decision to join the Baghdad Pact. In fact, Riyadh was astonished to find that the ‘Islamic state of Pakistan should accede to those who have joined hands with the Zionists Jews’ and spoke of the pact as a ‘stab in the heart of the Arab and Muslim, states’ and urged it ‘to return to the right path’, by withdrawing from the widely unpopular Western military pact. Pakistan, which had launched a campaign against India on the issue of treatment of the Indian Muslims, also received a setback when Riyadh publicly sided with India on the issue. In a now famous public statement, the Saudi King Ibn Saud during his visit to India in November-December 1955 said: ‘I desire to say to my Muslim brethren all over the world with satisfaction that the fate of the Indian Muslims is in safe hands’. When Nehru returned the visit in September 1956 he was given a rousing welcome with slogans of ‘Welcome Prophet of Peace’, which obviously angered Pakistan.³⁹ In the aftermath of the 1956 Suez crisis, Riyadh–Pakistan ties became closer. The result was a Saudi-Pakistan alliance that was established in the mid-1960s with Riyadh terming India as an aggressor in the Indo-Pak war of 1965 and warning India not to take advantage of its close ties with the Arab and Islamic states. Saudi criticism of India was due to the close Indo-Egyptian friendship and Nasser’s support to the Indian position at several forums. An Islamic conference to discuss the Al Aqsa mosque was held in Rabat on 22–25 September 1969. India was officially invited to participate in the conference at Saudi request, but Pakistan staged a walk out from the conference to protest against the presence of the Indian delegation, which was led by Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed.

The Bangladesh crisis and the Indo-Pak war of 1971 had a major impact on Indo-Saudi ties. Riyadh’s position on the crisis at the UN was that the developments in East Pakistan were Islamabad’s internal affair and that no other country had any right to interfere in the same. However, India managed to convince the Saudi rulers of New Delhi’s sincere desire to live in peace with Pakistan and respect its territorial integrity. The 1972 Shimla pact and the release of Pakistani prisoners by India helped the atmosphere, as Saudi concerns for Pakistani territorial integrity had become an issue in India’s bilateral ties. The 1979 Iranian revolution, Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and the Iran–Iraq war brought about closer Saudi-Pak ties, which the US obviously supported. It made General Zia ul Haq, Pakistani ruler, say, ‘If Saudi Arabia’s security was threatened and help was sought from Pakistan he would personally lead Pakistani forces in the defence of Saudi Arabia. Saudi military aid to Pakistan became a major irritant in relations between New Delhi and Riyadh. It is in this backdrop one should see Mrs Gandhi’s visit to Riyadh in April 1982 which ended the 26-year-communication gap between two states. Her visit paved the way for better relations and heralded a new era. It must be mentioned here that despite a lack of political understanding Indo-Saudi economic ties had flourished. Mrs Gandhi’s visit to the kingdom paved the way for a new chapter in economic cooperation. The most tangible gain was the setting up of an Indo-Saudi joint commission to promote economic and technical collaboration. It was inspired by the assumption that a combination of Indian technology, skilled manpower and Saudi money could work to strengthen South-South cooperation. The joint commission was established under an economic and technical cooperation agreement in April 1981. The commission met in 1983 in Riyadh, in 1986 in New Delhi, and again in New Delhi from 13–15 November 1991 and in 1996 and 2002.⁴⁰ India’s trade with Riyadh has increased since Nehru’s visit and risen steadily since 1973. The two-way trade in 1963–64 was a mere Rs 243 million. India’s exports to Riyadh have always been less than its imports. In 1990–91 imports were valued at Rs 28,977.3 million and exports at Rs 4,184.2 million. The trade turnover during 1999–2000 was $3.75 billion. India’s exports were $741 million and imports $3 billion. These figures are among the highest between India and an Islamic country. However, much of this adverse balance is made up by the flow of remittances by the over 1.7 million Indian workers in the kingdom. Moreover, Indian companies both public and private, have taken and completed numerous lucrative projects in the kingdom and earned huge profits. The Saudis have given loans to India through the Saudi Development Fund as follows: In 1977–78 Rs 750 million; 1981–82 Rs 177 million; 1983–84 Rs 172.3 million; 1985–86 Rs 287.2 million; 1987–88 Rs 500 million; 1988–89 Rs 60 million; 1989–90 Rs 430 million; 1990–91 Rs 300 million; 1991–92 Rs 270 million; 1992–93 Rs 20 million and in 1996 Rs 1,520 million. These loans were given at low interest rates for the following projects: Sirsailam and Nagarjunasagar power projects (Andhra Pradesh, 1977, Rs 750 million); Rajasthan Canal Project; Koel Karo power project in Bihar (1981, Rs 177 million); Koraput-Rayagad Railway project (1983, Rs 172.3 million); Ramagundan Thermal Power Project II (AP) (1985, Rs 500 million); Nhawa Shiva Project (T&C, 1987 Rs 500 million).⁴¹

Saudi Arabia’s position on Kashmir now emphasizes the bilateral process with a dialogue with Pakistan on the basis of existing agreements like Shimla and Lahore. It condemned all forms of extremism and made a fervent appeal for peace, between India and Pakistan. The appeal was made during Crown Prince Abdullah’s meeting with Najma Heptullah, deputy chairperson of Rajya Sabha in Jeddah. It also sent aid to the victims of Gujarat earthquake (2001) and it condemned the attack on India’s Parliament as an act of terrorism. Despite the growing Indo-Saudi economic ties, the political ties have not progressed. Mr Jaswant Singh, India’s foreign minister, visited the kingdom in January 2001. Saudi Arabia is not only a major economic partner of India it is also a major power in the Gulf region, with substantial influence on other GCC states and is a major producer of oil. Saudi Arabia’s financial power gives them enormous ability to influence many groups, parties and states worldwide, the location of Islamic holy places in the kingdom as also Riyadh wields considerable influence in the OIC-being the leading state in its establishment, giver of a major portion of the OIC budget and with the headquarters being located in Jeddah. Mr Omar Abdullah, India’s minister of state for external affairs led a delegation to the kingdom to sign the hajj agreement in Jeddah on 22 August 2001. A five-member delegation led by the chairman of Indian Oil Corporation visited Saudi Arabia from 6–8 April 2001 to renew a term contact with Saudi Arabia for the supply of crude oil and other petroleum products to India for 2001-02. A 12-member team from the National Defence College paid a five-day visit to the kingdom from 21 May 2001. This was the first visit of an NDC team after a gap of 10 years. The team visited major defence and economic institutes and held discussions with Saudi officials in Riyadh, Dammam and Jeddah. Saudi Arabia has emerged as the 13th largest market for Indian exports with GCC states and source of 5.5 per cent of India’s total imports. India is the fourth largest market for Saudi exports and ranks 10th in Saudi imports list. Riyadh is the largest source of crude oil to India supplying 0.5 million barrels per day and annually 23.55 million tonnes, which is 23 per cent of the total crude requirements of India. Saudi-Indian bilateral trade in 2002–03 was $5 billion and Saudi exports were of $3.65 billion while India exported one billion dollars goods to the Saudi kingdom. The new Saudi law which allows 100 per cent foreign owned projects has been utilized by Indian companies. The Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority has so far awarded 63 joint ventures to Indian companies with total investments of about $360 million. India’s IT exports to the kingdom are rapidly increasing and are poised to grow further.⁴² King Abdullah was the guest of honour during India’s 2007 Republic Day parade, and ties have improved rapidly since.

In a smaller or larger measure, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman have either expressed disinterest or toned down their earlier stance on Kashmir. Bahrain is now allowing Indians with more than 15 years of experience and a healthy bank balance to reside in the country even without work permits. Bahrain which takes a balanced view of UN resolutions and framework of Shimla position, has removed UN resolutions and kept the Shimla framework from its published text in the context of Indo-Pak relations for a number of reasons. Indo-Bahrain trade turnover in 1999–2000 was $435 million. India’s exports to Bahrain were $60 million and imports $375 million. But bilateral trade at the end of 2003 stood at $186 million. Bahrain’s Prime Minister Sheikh Khalifa bin Salman Al Khalifa’s visit in January 2004—the first to India—boosted the cooperation between the two countries. Both signed an extradition treaty, mutual legal assistance and judicial cooperation in civil, criminal and commercial matters, bilateral investment promotion agreement and avoiding double taxation. The ICICI and SBI were given offshore banking unit licence and a restricted full commercial bank licence. The Electronic and Computer Software Export Promotion Council of India sent a 15-member delegation to Bahrain in May 2001. They signed an MoU with Bahrain Economic Development Board for Development of the IT sector.⁴³ The Emir of Qatar and other leaders have visited India, and ties are rapidly improving.

Indo-Qatar trade turnover in 1989 was $38 million and in 1995 $130 million and in 2001–2002 it was $209 million and in 2002–03 $220.67 million in non-oil trade. India’s exports to Qatar increased from $22 million in 1989 to $32 million in 1995. In 1999–2000 the trade turnover was $245 million. Indian exports were $35 million and imports $209 million. There is a wide gap in the Indo-Qatari trade and this is reflected in the adverse and growing deficit in the balance of trade for India. Qatar’s Ras Gas has also tied up with Petronet LNG for supply of 7.5 million tonnes per annum of LNG for Petronet’s plants at Dabhol, Maharashtra and at Cochin. There are about 200,000 Indian workers in Qatar who send valuable foreign ex-change, which is quite helpful in reducing the balance of trade deficit faced by India in its trade with Qatar. The Qatar minister of energy met with the Indian petroleum and natural gas secretary on 16 May 2001 at Seoul and discussed import of LNG by India from Qatar. A two-member delegation from Indian Oil Corporation visited Qatar from 23–25 June 2001 to discuss cooperation in the areas of technical consultancy and training manpower. M/S Bharti Shipyard of Mumbai signed a contract worth $4.6 million with Halal offshore services company of Qatar in July 2001. An Indian shipbuilder, ABG Shipyard, entered into a $100 million contract with a Qatari company for four identical supply vessels. Petronet LNG, India’s first LNG venture with a capacity of 5 million tonnes (mt), received its shipment from Qatar’s Ras Gas in January 2004 as part of a 25-year deal worth $859 million annually. For the last five years both countries had been building the necessary infrastructure to receive the LNG. Petronet imported 2.5 million tonnes in 2004 and in 2005 about 5 million tonnes of gas from Qatar. India hopes to get 25 per cent of its gas requirements from Qatar.⁴⁴

India’s relation with Oman is very old and historic. It dates back to the Indus Valley civilization with archaeological findings indicating regular maritime navigation especially to Omani ports like Sur, Muscat, Qalhat and Qurayyet and the Omani’s frequented Indian ports in Gujarat and Malabar in Kerala for trade. Despite European colonialism since 16th century especially after Portuguese occupation of Oman, maritime contacts between Oman and India continued. Among the Indian rulers Haider Ali and Tipu Sultan of Mysore maintained good political and thriving economic ties. These came to an end with the assassination of the Tiger of Mysore by the British in 1799 and domination of the region by the British. Both countries saw British imperial rule. After India’s Independence both countries signed a Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation on 13 May 1953. Diplomatic ties were established in 1955 and the first Indian consulate was opened in Muscat headed by G.L. Puri. India’s first ambassador to Oman Shri Nirmal Jeet Singh started work in Muscat from 18 April 1973. It is only since 1970 Oman has been following an independent foreign policy under Sultan Qaboos. During the 1971 Bangladesh crisis, Oman was the only Arab (Muslim) country that did not completely side with Pakistan.

The first MoU related to defence cooperation was signed on 12 December 1983 which envisaged deputation of medical personnel to the Omani ministry of defence. Starting from the first high-level visit by External Affairs Minister Swaran Singh in January 1973 a large number of Indian leaders have been to Oman including Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi in November 1985, Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao in June 1993, President Dr Shankar Dayal Sharma in October 1996, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee in August 1998 and former Prime Minister I.K. Gujral in October–November 1999. Sultan Qaboos visited India in April 1997 when H. D. Deve Gowda was the Prime Minister. From the Omani side the most frequent visitors to India have been Maqbool bin Ali Sulka, minister of commerce and industries and Yusuf bin Alawi Bin Abdullah, minister responsible for foreign affairs. All of these visits over the years have led to the establishment of close political, economic and cultural relations. On the occasion of completing 50 years of diplomatic ties both organized a number of events to mark this milestone. With the signing of an MoU for establishment of Oman India Strategic Consultation Group on 7 February 2002, bilateral ties began to scale new heights, especially in the strategic dimension. Oman has decided to participate in two oil refineries in India. Oman-India Fertilizer Company (Omifco) is a $1 billion project and is producing 1.65 million tonnes of granulated urea and 0.25 million tonnes of surplus ammonia per year.

There is a modest military-security cooperation between the two states. Indo-Oman trade has improved from $96 million in 1990 to $134 million in 1996. India’s exports to Oman increased from $56 million to $114 million in 1996. India’s imports from Oman declined from $40 million in 1990 to $20 million in 1996. Among all the six GCC states Oman is the only state in the GCC with which India has a balance of trade surplus. In 1999–2000, Indo-Oman trade turnover was $194 million. India’s exports to Oman were $132 million and imports $62 million. In 2001–2002, imports were $8.48 million and in 2002–2003 they were $13.84 million and during 2001–2002 exports were $148.99 million and $198.61 million. Thus, the total trade was $157.47 million in 2001–2002 and $212.44 million in 2002–2003.⁴⁵ India and Oman are working to establish a fertilizer plant in Oman worth $1 billion. The Indian minister for chemicals and fertilizers visited Muscat on 4–5 December 2001 and signed key agreements relating to the Oman-India fertilizer project in Qalhat south of Muscat during the visit. There are a number of joint ventures which Indian companies have taken up in Oman. A delegation from National Defence College visited Oman from 20–25 May 2001. The delegation called on the ministers of defence and foreign affairs and interacted with the Omani defence officials and visited defence institutes in Oman. Also, an Indian military delegation led by Vice Admiral M. J. Singh visited Oman from 27–31 October 2001 to observe the Oman-British joint exercises at the invitation of Oman and had extensive interaction with their Omani and British counterparts. George Fernandez, Indian Defence Minister, visited Muscat in September 2002 and both countries are exploring the possibility of joint ventures related to defence production. In 2005 both India and Oman celebrated 50 years of diplomatic relations and a number of programmes in both the countries were held. E. Ahamed, minister of state for external affairs, Natwar Singh, minister of state for external affairs and Minister of State for Overseas Indian Affairs Jagdish Tytler visited Oman in 2004. Both sides signed an extradition treaty. Both agreed to intensify cooperation in information technology, tourism, education and HRD, health care and small and medium industries sectors.⁴⁶

The first major step towards defence cooperation with India was taken by Oman when Sultan Qaboos sent Sayyid Badr bin Saud bin Hareb Al Busaidi Oman’s Defence minister to have talks with India’s then Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee in Delhi on 6 December 2005. He led a high-powered military delegation. An MoU was signed between the two defence ministries on joint military cooperation on 7 December 2005. The areas of cooperation include exchange of expertise in military training and information technology, utilization of military and educational courses and programmes, exchange of observers attending military exercises and exchange of formal visit. The other areas of cooperation include providing assistance in identifying technical specifications of military equipment to facilitate direct agreement with manufacturing companies of both countries. The agreement also includes maintaining quality assurance by the Indian ministry of defence for contracts signed within the framework of the MoU and collaboration in other mutually agreed spheres of defence cooperation. To conclude the year long celebrations to mark the 50th anniversary of India–Oman diplomatic relations, India sent ‘Pride of the Indian Navy’ INS Mumbai warship in early March 2006. The Guided Missile Destroyer is a 6,700 tonne, 165 meter-long ship and was commissioned in January 2001, has surface-to-air missile (SAM) launchers and other sophisticated guns and rockets. Admiral Arun Prakash, chairman of chiefs of staff committee of the Indian armed forces, visited Oman and held talks with senior Omani officers in Muscat. Oman’s assistant chief of staff, Brigadier Saud Suleiman al Hobsi, underlined the excellent defence relations enjoyed by Oman and India, which he said, are going on the right track. An example of this is the INS Mumbai’s visit to Oman, apart from the exchange in training programmes and joint exercises, he said. Arun Prakash met with the Omani defence minister and other top Omani defence officials on 5 March 2006. Admiral Prakash outlined the potential for further cooperation between the Omani and Indian navies, citing the long maritime histories of the two countries. ‘The future lies in the seas—as a source of energy and mineral resources as well as for furthering trade and commerce. But the seas also hold hazards in the form of piracy, terrorism and illegal trafficking of human beings. Both our navies should work together to confront these challenges’ he said. He also said that the Indian diplomatic ties is the only ‘blip’ in the 5,000 years of friendly interaction between the two countries. ‘Nothing exemplifies the historicity of our relations than our maritime ties. Intrepid sea farers went across the Indian Ocean and the Arabian Sea with a hand of peace and friendship, sensing not intimidation but only invitation from the mighty waves’, he said. Brigadier Saud described Oman-Indian military relations as ‘excellent’. Close cooperation in economic, social and cultural cooperation and exchange of visits by senior officials has helped to further strengthen these ties, he added. While seeking to improve military cooperation with Oman in the future, India has to be sensitive to Saudi Arabia and Iran the two big powers in the Gulf Region.

The Indian Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee visited Oman on 11–12 March 2006 and said in Muscat: ‘We want to expand defence cooperation, especially between ordnance factories and their counterparts in the field of spares and equipment. Oman and India maintained strong cooperation in economic and commercial fields and the same experience could be replicated in the defence field. The two countries hold regular military exercises and India welcomes joint defence training programmes.’ The visit of the defence minister and the prime minister to Oman should also be seen in the back drop of the growing ties between India and the US especially the nuclear deal and military cooperation, as also the mounting US pressure on Iran over the latter’s nuclear programme and India’s vote against Iran in IAEA over referring Iran to UNSC. Since the US–Iran conflict is likely to escalate in the future, due to determined US efforts at regime change in Iran, Indo-Oman military cooperation is significant as Oman is very near to the straits of Hormouz, where Iran might disrupt maritime traffic in retaliation to any US or Israeli attack on it.

One must also keep in mind the regional implications of developments in Iraq on the GCC states especially if Iraq gets embroiled in a civil war and this leads to fragmentation of Iraq. Sectarianism, which is already an issue, might assume a greater dimension if Iran is attacked by the US or its allies. We must also keep in mind Oman’s growing population especially the fact that 40 per cent of the population is under 15 years of age. Despite announcements of new ‘Omanization’ targets and creation of job opportunities, unemployment figures are as high as 25 per cent. Few private companies are willing to employ Omani nationals due to a lack of skills. For instance, South Asian expatriates in Oman are available for as little as 60 Omani riyals ($200) a month, whereas the minimum wage for an Omani secondary school graduate is closer to 200 Omani riyals ($650). This large young population, lack of job opportunities and the absence of measures to usher in a democratic process have given the Islamists the opportunity to foment trouble and mount a challenge to the existing political order. It is in this backdrop that one should view the 1994 challenge in which a large number of Omanis were arrested many of whom were accused of forming an illegal political party procuring arms and conspiring with foreign fundamentalists to undermine state security and topple the regime. Defendants included people like the designated ambassador to the US, undersecretary at the ministry of commerce and industry, businessmen, school principals, engineers, entrepreneurs and merchants. It’s interesting to note that the pamphlets of the accused called for reforms on major foreign policy issues as well as radical changes in the economic policies.

The second challenge came in late 2004 and early 2005 when Omani police arrested more than 300 suspects and seized arms. Apparently, the popular Muscat festival was the target. Bombings were also planned for Eid al Adha celebrations in Rustaq province, where Sultan Qaboos was to attend. It was reported that among those arrested were professors at the Sultan Qaboos University and religious officials affiliated with the Theology College as well. Later it was reported that several lecturers, ministries of health and education staff members, Petroleum Development Oman (PDO) engineers, ministry of religious affairs consultants and managers at the Diwan of the royal court and several military officials were also apprehended. Most were thought to be from the Nizwa region but no connection existed with Al-Qaeda. On 2 May 2005, the state security court delivered the final verdicts. Thirty men were convicted of plotting to ‘overthrow the regime by force of arms and replace it by an Imamate, by setting up a banned underground organization’. It was reported that the Sultan commuted these judgments on 9 June 2005, just as he did for those convicted in the 1994 plot. It seems that a few hundred supporters of the group staged a peaceful march in Muscat a few days before sentences were announced, demanding full acquittal.

India’s old historical ties with GCC states coupled with the current presence of over four million Indian workers in the region, increasing imports of oil (over 70 per cent) and gas, growing trade (16 per cent of exports), aid and investment opportunities are vital interests of India. From the strategic point of view, both India and the GCC states share the need for political stability and the need to reduce the role of non-regional states whose policies are undermining peace, security and stability leading to the periodic threats of military invention. The common political and strategic concerns of India and GCC and the desire to work for peace, security and stability in the Gulf region and South Asia and the emerging common threat perceptions will create opportunities in future. The past two decades have seen the reassertion of regional and local identities in the face of outside interference. The GCC states are going through important changes and the process of reconciliation and understanding is maturing. It is in this context that India and the GCC states can create opportunities for mutual benefit not only in the oil and gas sector, trade and commerce, sharing and development of human resources, but also for mutual security and jointly prepare to meet emerging domestic and regional challenges.

Pakistan’s attempt to use the crisis in Kashmir to put pressure on India and isolate it in the Gulf region is nothing new. India’s growing ties with Israel was also sought to be used to undermine its links with the GCC countries, but it has not worked as the GCC states led by Saudi Arabia are themselves willing to normalize relations with Israel as made clear by the Saudi peace plan of Crown Prince Abdullah in the Beirut Arab summit in March 2002. India by continuing to support the just causes of the Palestinians and other Arabs and also to work for closer ties with Israel and the US has shown the unique balance one can maintain by having good ties with both parties. Many argue that India’s ardour for the Arab cause has waned and become muted. Most Arab states including the GCC states despite having very close ties with the US and the EU have been unable to restrain the US and others in blind support to Israel. Israel’s continued defiance of UN resolutions, violation of inter national law, contempt of world public opinion and opposition to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state is mainly due to this support. Not only due to the collapse of USSR and the Kashmir issue, but also due to a variety of other factors India has been working hard to improve relations with the US. If the US has become India’s largest investment and trading partner and cooperation in military and security matters is increasing it is due to the desire of both the states to achieve it, which is helped by the growing role of the private sector in this relationship. Despite the overwhelming opposition from the public in the GCC states, the US is looked upon by the GCC leadership as a security and defence partner. India in cooperation with such like-minded states has been striving hard to remove the factors creating instability in the Gulf region. It is with this objective that India had been urging Iraq (before it was invaded and occupied by the USA) to implement the UN resolutions and at the same calling for the lifting of UN sanctions. Both the GCC states and India face the menace of terrorism and religious extremism and the need to combat such forces.

A modest beginning has been made for cooperation in the field of security with the GCC states which has a rich potential field ahead. Many also emphasize the need to fulfil the growing aspirations of the Gulf people to play a greater role in the sphere of political participation and decision-making process. Political systems which allow more space for civil society and work for enhancing their legitimacy would prove to be more enduring as also develop stake in peace and stability. Of course, outside support will continue to be a major factor in Gulf politics but it is internal support, which will eventually decide the final outcome especially major issues concerning peace, security and stability. Important developments in India’s domestic affairs like the Rath Yatra of BJP leader L. K. Advani from Somnath to Ayodhya and the destruction of the Babri Masjid (1992) which followed have shaken the confidence of the religious minorities in India. There is need to show greater tolerance towards them. Some issues like the inept handling of the Kashmir issue and a soft attitude towards some religious (Hindu) groups are spreading communal hatred. Crackdown on select groups, the partisan role of the state government in the infamous Gujarat riots (2002) and the killings that were especially directed at one community send a wrong message. There is an urgent need for the early resolution of the Babri masjid issue, and the unsettled conditions in Kashmir and on the Indo-Pakistan border, call for greater care and caution as such domestic issues invite adverse global reactions.

The reach of the present day mass and electronic media is far and swift inviting instant reactions and complications. Unlike our food security the issue of energy security makes us vulnerable to outside pressure. As Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee said: ‘A situation should not be created at home which forces us to bow our heads in shame before others (abroad)’.⁴⁷

So far Indian diplomacy has been fairly successful in containing the negative impact flowing from domestic issues on the country’s relations with the GCC states, but things are rapidly changing in the region. India should do some hard thinking on how best to keep its house in order and not give others the chance and opportunity to harm its interests. It would be foolhardy to assume that things would remain the same despite serious domestic developments and that any disturbance of status quo would hurt the GCC more than India. Domestic developments should not be allowed to get out of hand due to electoral politics and posturing and outside interference should not be encouraged.

Indo-Iraqi Ties

When Iraq nationalized the Iraqi Petroleum Company in June 1972, the US and the UK threatened to impose economic sanctions against Baghdad and India supported Iraq on this issue. Since then, India came to have close ties with Iraq until the latter invaded Kuwait in 1990. When pursuing a Cairo-centric policy (1950s and 1960s), the Iraqi connection provided openings for Indian diplomacy in the region. This link led to a major breakthrough particularly in the Indo-Iranian relations. As one writer puts it: ‘It was also a lesson for Indian policy makers that it was not necessary to make an “either/or” choice between two contending countries and that it was quite feasible to have good relations with both on the basis of mutuality of interests. India’s success in cultivating Iraq without alienating Iran was ample proof of this. India’s deepening relations with Iraq also facilitated the subsequent process of political understanding and fruitful economic cooperation between India and various Gulf states.’⁴⁸

The 1970s saw close political and economic ties between India and Iraq. However, the Iran–Iraq War (1980–88) strained the Indo-Iraqi ties due to a number of reasons. India described the war as an ‘unfortunate development’. Moreover, Iraq did not like the shifting of the venue of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit from Baghdad to New Delhi. Iraq also expressed its dissatisfaction to India over NAM’s role in ending the Iran–Iraq War. It was reported that Baghdad sent a low-level representation to Mrs Indira Gandhi’s funeral to register its unhappiness. In view of the significance of Iraq to Indian interests in the region, New Delhi strove to maintain good bilateral ties in both political and economic spheres based on mutuality of interests. Under such circumstance, an impression was created in the initial stages that India supported the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait. This led to deep misunderstanding amongst Kuwait, the GCC states and India. In reality, India called for Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, but stopped short of condemning Iraq’s invasion. Since India did not openly take sides, Kuwait and other GCC states assumed that India’s sympathies lay with Iraq. However, India voted in favour of the ‘mother of resolutions’ passed by the UN Security Council (687) on 3 April 1991. In fact, India played a role in drafting and adopting the 21-page resolution, the longest in the UN’s history, imposing very harsh conditions on Iraq. It was because of India that the emphasis on bringing an end to the military presence in Iraq was included and adopted. Again it was at India’s insistence that a paragraph was added whereby the UN Security Council decided that the UN Secretary General would take into account ‘the requirements of the people of Iraq in particular their humanitarian needs. Iraqi payment capacity as assessed in conjunction with the international financial institutions, taking into consideration the external debt service and the need of the Iraqi economy’.⁴⁹

India helped adopt a measure whereby the prohibitions imposed against Iraq ‘shall not apply to foodstuffs and to materials and supplies for essential civilian needs as identified in the report of the secretary general and in any further findings of humanitarian needs by the Sanctions Committee established by Resolution 661 of 1990’. It must be mentioned that India expressed serious reservations against the right to interference in the internal affairs of a member nation on humanitarian grounds, especially in the context of Kurds and Shias in Iraq. In this connection, India voiced reservations as the Dutch expert on human rights, Max Van Der Stoel, appeared before the UN Security Council and warned that thousands of innocent lives were imperiled by the Iraqi authorities disregard for human rights. Stoel, a rapporteur for Switzerland, asked members to bear in mind that many thousands are in grave danger. India’s UN envoy, Chinmaya Gharekhan, said: ‘My delegation has reservations about the appropriateness of the Council inviting Van Der Stoel.’ He stressed that India has always held that various UN organs and bodies should restrict their deliberations and actions to their respective spheres of competence as defined under the UN Charter. But he warned: ‘deviation from the Charter in which the nations of the world have reposed their faith and support, could erode the confidence and have great consequences for the furtherance of the organization as a whole’. He said the Security Council could focus its legitimate attention on the threat to peace and stability in the region, but it could not discuss human rights situations or make recommendations on matters outside its competence. Matters pertaining to human rights should appropriately be discussed by the Human Rights Commission or the UN General Assembly, which were the competent organs to do so. Gharekhan noted the sponsor’s explanation that Stoel was being invited in his personal capacity, not in any representative capacity. In his presentation, Stoel accused the Iraqi authorities of denying humanitarian assistance to victims, especially the Shias and Kurds. He said the poorer sections of the Iraqi society were the hardest hit. This was on UN Resolution 658 of 5 April 1991.⁵⁰

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, India through its skilful diplomacy succeeded in clearing the misunderstanding with the GCC states and in particular with Kuwait. Ties between India and Kuwait had deteriorated since Kuwaiti leaders publicly expressed anguish and surprise at India’s ambivalent attitude during its occupation by Iraq. Even though ties between India and the GCC states improved gradually, the Kashmir and Ayodhya issues continued to bedevil relations, especially with Saudi Arabia.⁵¹ Reacting to Iraqi troop’s movement near the Kuwait border in October 1994, the official spokesperson of the ministry of external affairs expressed concern over the situation in the Gulf region and hoped that no posture would be adopted ‘to threaten the territorial integrity of any state’. Responding to questions on the events on the Iraq–Kuwait border, the spokesperson said ‘India had been taking note of recent developments in the Gulf with concern.’ He also said India has always believed that there should be no use or threat of use of force in international relations. This principle, he stated, applied to the present situation in Iraq and Kuwait. He added: ‘India supports sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of all the states in the Gulf.’ And this should be seen in the context of the relevant UN resolutions on the subject. He stressed the need for compliance with these resolutions.

When Iraq decided to withdraw its forces amassed near the Kuwaiti border under US pressure, India welcomed Iraq’s decision. In a statement, the external affairs minister, Dinesh Singh, hoped that this would lead to full compliance of the relevant UN resolutions by Iraq for settlement of outstanding issues in the region. Interestingly, on 17 October 1994, several youth organizations held a demonstration outside the US embassy in New Delhi to protest against continued economic sanctions against Iraq. The demonstration was organized by the Falah-e-Milat Action Committee and Indo-Iraqi Joint Youth Forum.⁵² The demonstrators, besides carrying placards, also denounced the US for its massive military and naval build up in the oil-rich Gulf region. The organization also submitted a memorandum to the US ambassador to India, Frank Wisner, stating that imposing of unwarranted sanctions against innocent people of Iraq has caused deep hardships. In a related development, a spokesperson of the external affairs ministry said, on 2 November 1994, that Indian claimants had not received any payment as compensation against their claims for losses during the Iraqi takeover of Kuwait in August 1990. Responding to questions on the status of claims for compensation arising from the invasion of Kuwait, the spokesperson said that no payments had yet been received by Indian claimants from the United Nations Compensation Commission. It is likely that some category B claims would be settled by March 1995, he said. He added that the UN Compensation Commission Fund was actually short of money to make payments for the claims ranging from categories ‘A’ to ‘E’ from numerous countries. In this connection it must also be mentioned that, according to the Overseas Construction Council of India (OCCI), 24leading construction companies had not received as much as Rs 3 billion by way of payment for work done in Iraq since July 1990. This outstanding amount was under different heads like equipment, machinery costs, and retention money and interest dues in Iraq.

Soon after the Iraq–Kuwait War, in early 1991, all the exporters account receivables were transferred to the Government of India whereby the Indian government was to collect all dues from the Iraqi government on behalf of the exporters. In view of the economic sanctions on Iraq and its inability to pay in US dollars, full payment had been received by the Indian Government. Under the circumstances, Indian companies were not paid for the projects executed in Iraq. Harshvardhan J. Shah, chairman of the Shah Construction Company, said: ‘Our accounts have gone bad, we cannot bid for any new contracts’. The scene today is more like export and perish, Shah said. India’s options in the ‘mini’ Gulf crisis appeared to be extremely limited given the insistence of the US–UK alliance, egged on by the GCC, to maintain economic sanctions on Iraq. The Iraqi Shia leadership in exile (supported by Iran and others) under Ayatollah Hakim worked hard for a takeover of at least the Shia-dominated southern area. Iraq was seen as one of the few states that seemed virtually immune to the spread of Islamic revivalist influence.⁵³ During the Iraqi troop movement Russia had sent its foreign minister to Baghdad and was gradually reasserting its independent international role. Along with Russia’s stand, the position taken by China and France, in addition to an avoid NAM role enabled India to play a constructive role in the area. No doubt, the room is limited to manoeuvre, but clearly US domination of the Gulf region is otherwise marginalizing India’s influence in the area. This is not to deny the benefits from low oil prices (for some time) resulting from Iraq’s defeat. However, the US has been going about defending its interests in a rather aggressive manner. But India must neither blindly endorse the US strategy in the area nor suspect it at every issue. It should redouble its diplomatic efforts to quickly assert, protect and promote its interests in the region which are mainly related to oil, immigrants and security, Once the present tension is removed, the huge Western naval presence, which is a cause for concern, may decline in the neighbourhood of India.

Since 1991 the US failed to dislodge Saddam Hussein despite its best efforts. In October 1998 the US Congress enacted the Iraq Liberation Act to replace Saddam and a sum of $97 million was allocated for carrying out the task through covert operations. The emergence of George W. Bush in 2001 and the 9/11 attacks have enabled the US to play a more permanent role in the Gulf region. The unresolved conflict with Iraq made the US more strident in its demand for the return of UN inspectors to Iraq, who were withdrawn in 1998. Iraq had accused the UN inspectors of being mere tools of the US and also of provoking spying and assassinations. US interest in prolonging UN sanctions on Iraq was, among other reasons, to prevent foreign investments in Iraq as also rehabilitation of the country’s oil industry. Thus, sanctions became an instrument for the US to prevent other powers from getting a foothold in Iraq. Since Iraqi oil was outside US influence so the aim was to make Iraq conform to the dominant requirements of the capitalist exploitation. The war over Iraq was a war over oil and also for the continued control of the global oil economy through the US dollar. The issue of WMD, democracy and human rights were pretexts. The fall of Baghdad to the US forces on 9 April 2003 has led to total chaos in Iraq. The Iraqi resistance to US occupation has not only intensified but the US has confirmed that from sporadic attacks by the remnants of the old Ba’athist elements, a full scale guerilla warfare and now a well organized resistance is going on against its US forces. The US had hoped to achieve quick victory over Iraq and then to reorder the map in the strategically important Gulf region, but due to mounting resistance in Ira, the US is now facing new and entirely unexpected challenges to its objectives.⁵⁴

India under the NDA government was initially considering the idea of sending Indian troops to Iraq to help bring about stabilization but due to opposition from the Congress and the Left parties it had to drop the idea as the Parliament enacted a resolution opposing the war. India’s special envoy to West Asia, C. R. Ghare Khan, visited Iraq in May 2004 and offered assistance in the drafting of the Iraqi Constitution. He also offered help in the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure. India is a member of the Donors Group for Iraq and has made a modest contribution to its fund. India has also helped Iraq in setting up of field hospitals and in other infrastructure projects.⁵⁵ It can be argued that there appears to be a drift in India’s policy towards the Gulf region. The GCC states overreaction to the plague situation was an indirect message to India over its attitude towards Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait and on the issue of Kashmir. Since bringing order in Kashmir is a long-term process, India ought to be cautious with the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia. In fact, there is an urgent need for closer ties with other GCC states in the context of normalization of ties with Iraq. In fact, this ought to be India’s priority. At the same time, India should make its interests in Iraq clear to the GCC.

India and the Arab-Israeli Peace

The outcome of the 1973 Arab-Israeli conflict (AIC) convinced Egypt’s President Anwar Sadat, that, in the prevailing international situation, a limited success in the war was the maximum that the Arabs could achieve and he visualized that only through diplomacy the AIC could be solved. He calculated that the US alone could compel Israel to vacate Arab lands, hence his famous saying that 99 per cent of the cards in the AIC are with the US. This led him initially to conclude two disengagement agreements with Israel in 1974 and 1975. He visited Jerusalem on 19 November 1977 and concluded the Camp David accords in September 1978 and a bilateral peace treaty with Israel (with US mediation) in March 1979 ending 30 years of armed confrontation with Israel. India’s response to the Camp David accords was ‘uncritical but guarded’. In fact, New Delhi did not openly endorse or condemn the peace accords. Both US President Carter and Anwar Sadat of Egypt sought India’s support for the peace accords. The then Indian Prime Minister Morarji Desai reminded both leaders that only a comprehensive solution would prove to be durable. Towards this end Mr Desai felt Israel must withdraw from all Arab lands and Palestinians must be granted their just rights. He also underscored the need to resolve the issue of Jerusalem and Golan Heights. Shortly, the Janata government extended qualified support to the accords saying that it ‘cannot but commend the efforts to bring about a peaceful solution to the problems of an area which has seen dangerous conflicts’. One reason cited for the incoherent Indian response to the accords was the Egyptian factor. Although India wanted to steer clear of any inter-Arab disputes, but New Delhi still valued friendship with Cairo and all efforts were directed towards preventing Egypt’s isolation. No wonder India went to great lengths to prevent Egypt’s expulsion or suspension from NAM, but could do nothing in the OIC and the Arab League. Earlier, the emergence of the Janata Party in India after the defeat of the Congress in 1977 elections raised the question of a review in India’s West Asia policy. This was mainly due to Atal Behari Vajpayee of the Jan Sangh becoming the minister of external affairs who had been a vocal critic of India’s support to the Arabs and who advocated closer ties with Israel. It was during this period that Israeli Foreign Minister Moshe Dayan paid a secret visit to India in August 1977. But the Israeli leader achieved nothing concrete as Prime Minister Moraji Desai refused to establish ties with Israel unless the latter withdrew from all occupied Arab lands. To the surprise of many, but especially the US and Israel, Atal Behari Vajpayee reiterated India’s traditional policy towards the Arabs when he said: ‘There is no change in India’s stand. Israel must vacate all occupied Arab territories and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people must be restored.’⁵⁶

To sum up, what is significant to note is the dilemma India faced over the Camp David accords. On the one hand, the Janata government was soft towards Israel as evidenced by the secret visit of Moshe Dayan and its desire to see an early end to the AIC. On the other hand, domestic political constraints pushed the country to reiterate its traditional and committed stand towards the Arabs. These conflicting pulls and pressures worked throughout the period when the Janata government was in power. But its tilt towards the Arab Israeli Peace Process was obvious towards the end of its rule when India firmly opposed the attempt by some Arab countries and others to expel Egypt from NAM. Mr Desai told the Cuban leader Fidel Castro that he would stay away from the NAM summit at Havana if any effort were to be made to exclude Egypt from the conference.

Growing Cooperation with Israel

To his death, Nehru remained convinced that his decision not to exchange diplomatic personnel with Israel was the correct one. Since then, successive Indian governments highlighted the absence of full diplomatic ties with Israel as evidence of India’s support for the Palestine cause. Apart from other reasons, it must be emphasized that the Kashmir problem propelled India not to establish diplomatic ties with Israel as perhaps that would have provided Pakistan an additional lever to undermine India’s interests in the WANA area. In the wake of the Kuwait crisis, end of the Cold War, disintegration of the USSR and the Madrid Peace Conference in October 1991, India decided to establish diplomatic ties with Israel on 29 January 1992 under the Congress government led by Prime Minister Narasimha Rao. Things changed dramatically after 1991 when the Arabs and the Israelis, after more than 40 years of hostility, wars and boycotts decided to sit down and negotiate their problems. With this new development India was encouraged to break the ice with Israel. The Jewish state was no more a pariah as before. There were also major changes as far as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was concerned. After Yasser Arafat (PLO leader) appeared before the UN General Assembly in 1974 and the PLO was recognized by Arab states at the Rabat Summit as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, the PLO went on a peace offensive under Egyptian influence after it moved from Lebanon to Tunis in 1982–83. In 1988 Arafat accepted UNSCR 242 and renounced violence and recognized Israel and the result was that in 1991 PLO had more than 92 embassies and 28 lower level foreign representations. India was the first non-Arab country to recognize PLO in 1975 as the sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and gave the office of the PLO in New Delhi full diplomatic status of an Embassy in 1980. In 1988, India was one of the first countries to recognize the State of Palestine.⁵⁷

Under the changed atmosphere India voted in favour of resolution 46/86 in December 1991 at the UNGA which rescinded its 10 November 1975 resolution No. 3379 equating Zionism with racism. This was the first indication of a change in India’s West Asia policy (after the end of Cold War and the disintegration of the USSR) especially towards Israel. Soon thereafter, meetings between Israeli and Indian officials at the UN, US and elsewhere took place. Apart from India’s support to UNSCR 687 of 3 April 1991 imposing terms of ceasefire on Iraq, this was a major shift. Some have even called this a ‘reversal’ in India’s policy towards Israel. India’s decision on Israel was accompanied by many statements highlighting the benefits India stands to gain with its new policy towards Israel. India’s defence minister, Sharad Pawar (on 23 February 1992) said it paved the way for ‘drawing on Israel’s successful experience to curb terrorism.⁵⁸ He said that such an exchange would be of mutual advantage to the two states, adding that India would also like to get acquainted with the Israeli experience in developing technology for anti-terrorist operations. It was also mentioned how India could play a significant role in the Arab–Israeli peace process. Additional areas of cooperation were also cited, i.e., defence and agriculture. India’s trade with Israel has increased manifold. Israel has emerged as a major supplier of weapons to India. Major bilateral agreements have been signed in almost all fields and high-level visits have taken place. Initially Indian chief ministers and other state ministers visited Israel. From the Israeli side, former Prime Minister and foreign minister Shimon Peres has been to India several times followed by Ezer Weizmann the Israeli President. However, the most controversial has been the visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon during the BJP-led NDA rule. L.K. Advani (home minister) and Jaswant Singh (external affairs) also visited Israel and generated a lot of controversy over cooperation in nuclear field, terrorism and internal security. There was no doubt about the NDA government giving priority to Israel and US in its foreign policy. But the emergence of the UPA government under Manmohan Singh has apparently made not much of a difference to the Indo-Israeli ties. They remain more or less as warm with India importing arms from Israel. Although the MEA is cautious but the defence ministry has been receiving delegation after delegations from Israel. Although the Left parties called for a review of ties with Israel in view of the continued occupation of Palestinian lands by Israel the Congress appears to continue the ties started by P. V Narasimha Rao in 1992. The Indo-Israeli relationship is flourishing with a two-way trade surpassing the $3 billion mark and with no end to military exchanges.⁵⁹

After the Madrid Conference and the Oslo Peace Accords of September 1993, between the PLO and Israel, UN members and people all over the world expected Israel to withdraw from Arab lands leading to peace between Israel and its neighbours and the formation of a Palestinian state. But the assassination of Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995 and the emergence of Benjamin Netanyahu as Likud Prime Minister of Israel and his opposition to the Oslo peace process including a Palestinian state and acceptance of US neo-con agenda calling for a ‘clean break’ with the Oslo process while addressing the US Congress on 10 July 1996 gave a severe jolt to the peace process.⁶⁰ Many accused Arafat of rejecting Israeli peace offers in Camp David talks with President Clinton and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. There are no reliable reports as to what was offered to Arafat. But what is clear is that Arafat was willing to concede 77 per cent of historic Palestine and wanted Israel to withdraw from the 23 per cent of Palestine i.e. Gaza, West Bank and East Jerusalem. Israel offered Gaza and parts of West Bank but refused to dismantle Jewish settlements and rejected the right to return of the Palestinian refugees and reiterated its stand that Jerusalem will remain the eternal and undivided capital of Israel. The US proposed Tenet and Mitchell Plans and later the Road Map for Peace with UN, EU and Russia but so far no progress has been made. Meanwhile, Israel has reoccupied the Palestinian territories, carried out indiscriminate arrests and killings of the Palestinians, imposed curfew on most towns and cities, carried out house demolitions, and humiliating check points to prevent free movement of Palestinians. The result has been that deprivation, destruction and death rained on the Palestinians. The Al Aqsa Intifada since September 2000 continues and suicide bombings and Israeli use of excessive force continues unabated.⁶¹

Israel, Palestinians and the Future

In 2003 the Israeli cabinet under Prime Minister Ariel Sharon decided in principle to remove the veteran Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat. Since he became Prime Minister of Israel, Ariel Sharon publicly threatened Arafat. He regretted not having killed Arafat in Lebanon when he invaded the neighbouring Arab country in 1982 due to which the Israeli Prime Minister Begin had removed him from the post of defence minister. Although he could not crush Arafat and the PLO in the streets of Beirut 22 years ago but on 15 September 2004 he told a leading Israeli daily in an interview that he saw no difference between Arafat and Hamas leaders like Sheikh Ahmad Yassin and Abdul Aziz Al Rantissi. ‘I don’t see any difference. They all follow a policy of murder. Just as we have done with the other murderers so shall we do with Arafat, said Sharon. He also said: ‘Arafat will be expelled from the territories’.⁶² A week before Sharon’s interview, the Israeli foreign minister Sylvan Shalom said Arafat’s expulsion is ‘closer than ever’ and that the Palestinian leader had no place in the region. The remarks were broadcast on Israel Radio. A week before this statement, Israeli Defence Minister Shaul Mofaz said the Israeli government remained committed to a cabinet decision from last year to remove Arafat.⁶³ Israel painted Arafat in the darkest colours since the Al Aqsa Intifada started in September 2000 due to the visit of Ariel Sharon to Islam’s third holiest shrine in Jerusalem. Arafat was called an ‘unscrupulous terrorist’, ‘incorrigible terrorist’, ‘responsible for the murders of thousands of Israeli civilians’, ‘a liar’ who used the Oslo Peace Process as a ‘strategic deception’ in his goal to destroy the Jewish state and who alone scuttled peace talks in order to wage a terror war against Israel. Israel declared him, hence, irrelevant and an obstacle to peace. Efraim Karsh, an Israeli scholar called Arafat a ‘bigoted and megalomania-cal extremist blinded by anti-Jewish hatred … and profoundly obsessed with violence’.⁶⁴ Such negative assessment of Arafat was sold to US President Bush and his neo-con dominated team. The result was the US President refused to meet and deal with Arafat, whom he described as an obstacle to peace. Soon after Arafat left Ramallah to Paris for treatment Israeli leaders and dailies were beaming. Arafat would have perhaps lived longer, but for his shameful treatment at the hands of Sharon and his US supporters, which surely contributed to his sad condition. Since Arafat was confined to the Muqataa (Ramallah) compound for nearly three years, Israeli army bulldozers had been regularly coming in to smash up more of the compound complex. As Ahmad Samih Khalidi, a former Palestinian negotiator, wrote: ‘The unjustified incarceration for the past three years of the democratically elected leader of an oppressed and occupied people is an indelible stain on the record of those who proclaim their faith in democracy while happily propping up assorted despots around the world’. He further said: ‘Sharon’s refusal to grant Arafat dignity in death by denying him burial in Jerusalem symbolizes Israel’s rejection of both the man and his cause. US support to Sharon encouraged him to commit excesses against the Palestinians without fear of sanctions or restraint.⁶⁵ One must recall a similar situation which prevailed in the region more than 35 years ago.

The Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser was forced to remain as president due to popular demand even though Egypt had been roundly defeated by Israel in the 1967 war in which Israel occupied Sinai, Gaza, West Bank, East Jerusalem and Golan Heights. Nasser accepted UNSCR 242 and the Rogers Plan despite Palestinian protest but refused to sign a separate peace agreement with Israel in return for Sinai and Gaza. Being committed to Pan-Arabism and the Arab cause, he was denounced by Israel and the US as an obstacle to peace exactly as Arafat was denounced. Nasser’s successor, Sadat, initially was ready for a separate deal which the US and Israel rejected. He had to launch the 1973 October war with Syria before he could resume peace talks with Israel under US mediation. This culminated in his visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the Camp David Accords in 1978 and a bilateral peace treaty with Israel in March 1979, which led to Egypt’s isolation and Sadat’s assassination in October 1981.

Nasser died on 28 September 1970 while mediating between PLO and King Hussein of Jordan during the infamous Black September killings of Palestinians with the help of General Zia ul Haq of Pakistan. Soon, the US and Israel and others saw ‘great opportunity’ for peace in the region after the demise of Arafat. In order to appreciate Arafat’s central role in the Palestinian national movement for over four decades one must briefly peep into history at least since Israel was created in 1948 and more particularly after the 1952 Egyptian revolution which propelled Nasser to power in Egypt. The 23 July 1952 Revolution in Egypt was a great land-mark in the history of the region and it was to have far reaching consequences changing the very basic structure of the region’s politics. Nasser wrote to US President Eisenhower that the ‘establishment of Israel in Palestine was the gravest imaginable challenge to the peaceful preoccupation of the Egyptian and Arab people’. The Israeli leader David Ben Gurion was alarmed at the Egyptian revolution, as he feared the emergence of a strong Egypt that would in the long run pose a danger to Israel’s security. Nasser realized the designs against Egypt and its wider implications for the Arab world. He concluded that the ‘Zionist’ challenge backed by the West was massive and Egypt was in no position to defend its interest alone. He presented this threat to Egypt as a threat to the entire Arab world and made it a pan-Arab issue. Nasser said: ‘Egypt must not live isolated from the rest of the Arabs, because once we are isolated, we shall be defeated separately’. Soon Egypt assumed the leadership of the Arab world and Nasser emerged as its spokesman and since then the Arab world expected Egypt to help the Palestinians recover their right for their homeland. The Anglo-French attack in 1956 on Egypt in which Israel played a leading role confirmed Nasser’s fear that the West is using Israel to suppress the Arabs. He saw Israel as serving imperialism and its objectives of domination and exploitation. That Israel had to withdraw from Sinai under US pressure in 1957 clearly proved that it cannot survive without imperialism—whether British since the 1917 Balfour Declaration or American since 1948 when President Truman decided to come to its aid. Nasser strongly defended Palestinian rights in world councils. He spoke about a ‘permanent’ struggle against Israel to regain the lost Palestinian territory. Nasser created a radio station—the Voice of Palestine—in Cairo (October 1960) in order to propagate the cause of the Palestinian Arabs. Gaza Egypt administered after the 1948 war was preserved with its identity and Palestinian character.

Egypt refused to annex Gaza and never staked its claim for sovereignty over the strip compared to Jordan that annexed the West Bank. He spoke repeatedly about Palestinian rights whenever he went abroad and took Palestinian leaders including Yasser Arafat to introduce them to world leaders. He also realized the need for the Palestinians themselves to play a significant role to further their cause and work for the recovery of their homeland. Although he was aware that the primary burden was on Egypt and other Arab states, he was anxious for an independent voice of the Palestinians. In the 1964 Arab summit in Cairo, Nasser supported the creation of PLO along with its army and it was to be based in Cairo. It was Nasser’s determination and unqualified support which led to the emergence, survival and success of the PLO since 1964. This was truly a historic step. The creation of Israel, defeat of the Arabs in the 1948 war at the hands of Israel, expulsion of the Palestinians by Israel and their sad plight as refugees led to complete disarray of the Arabs. Nasser’s efforts to help the Palestinians by creating the PLO was the first step to-wards the recovery of the Palestinian rights. For Nasser ‘the honor of the Palestine people is the honor of the Arab nation’. The immediate reasons which prompted Nasser to work for creating the PLO were the following: First, the report of UN Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold in June 1959 to the UN General Assembly in which he recommended the absorption of Palestinian refugees by the Arab states. Second, massive immigration of Jews to Israel was expected from the USSR and other East European states. It would have meant ‘doubling of Israeli manpower and strengthening of its military power and the reinforcement of Israel’s motivation for territorial expansion. Nasser was convinced that Israel with Western aid was determined to eliminate the Palestinian issue and project the conflict as one between Israel and the Arab states and that the Palestinians are not a party to it. He felt ‘the aim of the establishment of a Palestinian entity is to frustrate Israel’s efforts to eliminate both the Palestinian problem and the rights of the Palestinian people. The hopes of Palestinians and other Arabs in Egypt’s leadership to recover Palestine were shattered when Israel defeated Egypt in the third Arab-Israeli war. The road to the 1967 AIC lay in a series of miscalculated moves and counter moves that ultimately culminated in the crushing defeat of Egypt, something that Nasser never visualized. Nasser was taunted by his Arab rivals for his cautious response to increasing Israeli threats to Syria in May 1967. Egypt’s disastrous defeat was basically due to Nasser’s inner compulsion to live up to his Pan-Arab image abroad. Nasser was overwhelmed by the intensity of the disaster and soon was preoccupied with the recovery of the captured Arab territories. All his efforts were frustrated by an unyielding Israel backed by the USA.

The defeat of Egypt and other Arab states brought a great dilemma to the Palestinians. The defenders of the Palestinian interests found their territories occupied by Israel and the war and its consequences convinced the Palestinians to carry on the struggle on their own because they became aware of the fact that the Arab governments were too pre-occupied with the recovery of their lost lands. This explains the launching of the guerilla war by the PLO since early 1968 against Israel. This independent action which brought some spectacular successes, especially PLO victory over Israel in the battle of Karameh near the Israeli–Jordanian border, was a ‘grave challenge to Egypt’s sense of pre-eminence and confronted the Egyptian leader with a set of thorny problems. The decision of Egypt and Jordan to accept Resolution 242 implicitly meant recognition of Israel that further drove the PLO to act independently now under the leadership of Yasser Arafat. Soon Nasser accepted the Rogers Peace Plan which was interpreted by the PLO and other Arab states as an attempt by Egypt to give priority to the recovery of Egyptian territory (Sinai) over the Palestine issue. Although Egypt’s decision was attacked by the PLO and Nasser in retaliation closed the Palestinian radio station in Cairo, but soon it became obvious that Nasser remained committed to the Palestine cause and was in no mood for a compromise with Israel which meant giving up Palestinian rights or their territory. Even after accepting the Rogers plan he refused to accept Israel unless it first evacuated the occupied Arab lands and resolved the problem of the Palestinians to their satisfaction. In late 1970, Nasser said: ‘We reject its (Israel’s) insistence on denying the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people in their country.⁶⁶ When Jordan too accepted the Rogers Plan, PLO opposition took the form of a civil war and Jordan’s King Hussein crushed the Palestinians with his military. Nasser was dismayed at this event but he found himself helpless. Libya, South Yemen, Algeria and others criticized Nasser for his silence over the massacre of Palestinians and urged him to send the Egyptian army to rescue the helpless Palestinians. Eventually in September 1970 he died meditating this cause so very dear to his heart.

To sum up, it must be stressed that although Nasser’s plan to recover Palestine was shattered by Israel in 1967, but his adoption of the Palestine cause gave it a fully political dimension. It was Nasser who projected the Palestinian problem as a world issue, or it would have certainly remained a mere refugee problem. Nasser’s concerted efforts (which brought him into open confrontation with Israel, the West and several Arab states) kept the Palestinian national movement alive and burning when sustained and energetic efforts were made by Israel in league with the West to bury it. No Arab leader so vigorously espoused the Palestinian cause as Nasser did in the 1950s and 1960s and Nehru strongly supported Nasser in this endeavour not only bilaterally but also in world councils. India is one of the few countries in the world which has consistently supported the Palestinian cause ever since the Balfour Declaration was issued in 1917 by the British and the latter’s mandate over Palestine. The harsh treatment of the Palestinians (by the British) who opposed Jewish colonization of Palestine was criticized vehemently by Nehru, Gandhi and the Indian National Congress, identified itself with the Palestinian and other Arab cause for liberation and freedom.⁶⁷

The Future of Palestinians

Three brave West Asian leaders—two Arabs and one Israeli—who led their states in war initially and subsequently in peace and reconciliation with the enemy met with violent deaths. They are King Abdullah-I of Jordan on 20 July 1951 at the hands of the Palestinians in Al Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, Anwar Sadat of Egypt on 6 October 1981 at the hands of his own military men and Yitzhak Rabin on 4 November 1995 at the hands of an Israeli Yigal Amir. Yasser Arafat avoided a violent end to his life. Although Sharon wanted to eliminate Arafat in 2002, the destruction of his headquarters and virtual confinement had a telling effect on Arafat’s health and he died of illness. Many Arabs of course believe that the Massad might have poisoned him. The fact that over 50 heads of state, government and delegations descended on Cairo to attend Arafat’s funeral and thousands who surrounded his coffin in Ramallah testify to his immense popularity and mass appeal. Perhaps he would have been killed in 2000 if had accepted a deal with Clinton, Ehud Barak at Camp David in July. By rejecting the proposals Arafat became hugely popular among Palestinians. Since then Israel made him the target and Sharon’s visit to Al Aqsa Mosque in September 2000 led to the Intifada since when suicide bombings and Palestinian opposition to Israeli occupation resumed.

The election of George W Bush and the domination of his administration by neo-conservatives, together with the 11 September 2001 attacks, gave Sharon a golden opportunity to crackdown on the Palestinians. The result was reoccupation of Palestinian territories. Soon it led to indiscriminate arrests, killings, curfew, and house demolitions, closure of Gaza and West Bank, and humiliating checkpoints. There were general shut-downs that prevented Palestinians from landing jobs in Israel to far-reaching restrictions that prevented the Palestinians from leaving their own villages and towns for schools, hospitals, jobs, so on. The result was deprivation, destruction and death for the Palestinians. The huge security wall targeted killings and total break down of peace talks led to despair, frustration and anger against Israel. Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Palestinians even loyal to Arafat resorted to suicide bombings and killings and sustained the Al Aqsa intifada to exact a measure of revenge. There are conflicting statements as to what was offered to Arafat at Camp David in July 2000. But what is abundantly clear is Arafat was perhaps willing to concede 77 per cent of historic Palestine which is over and above what the UN General Assembly Resolution No.181 gave to the Jews in 1947 when Palestine was partitioned. Like Sadat who wanted complete withdrawal of Israel from Sinai, Arafat also wanted Israel to withdraw from the 23 per cent of Palestine, which Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol occupied in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Although Israel offered Gaza and parts of West Bank and only nominal parts of East Jerusalem, Israel refused to dismantle Jewish settlements on West Bank, rejected the right to return of the Palestinian refugees and reiterated its stand that Jerusalem will remain the eternal and undivided capital of Israel. Since the US was already obsessed with its war on terrorism and success in ousting the Talibans in Afghanistan, Sharon managed to convince Bush that Arafat supported Palestinian terrorism against Israel, hence was denounced as a terrorist and projected as an obstacle to the Arab-Israeli peace. Under the circumstances, the UK and the US were telling others that the road to peace in Palestine runs through Baghdad. Iraqi WMD’s and toppling Saddam Hussein’s regime became top priority for US President George W. Bush. The result was the US-UK invasion and occupation of Iraq in March 2003. Israeli Prime Minister Begin had bombed Iraqi nuclear reactor in June 1981 and since then Israeli policy had been to destroy Ba’athist Iraq which was perceived as a threat to Israeli security.⁶⁸ Soon after, the quartet—US, EU, UN and Russia—announced the road map for peace between Israel and Palestine calling for a ‘viable and independent Palestine’. Sharon raised 14 objections to the plan and the US insisted on political reforms. Arafat reluctantly appointed Mahmood Abbas as Prime Minister and agreed to limit constitutional changes. In May 2002 he had already signed the Palestinian Basic Law (a temporary constitution) and the Law of the Judiciary. He agreed to the appointment of a reformist finance minister, Salam Fayyad, that took PA revenues away from Arafat and under the control of the finance ministry.

The most important change was the creation of the office of the Prime Minister—giving most of PA president’s power especially public finance, civil service, law and order and internal security. Many PA agencies were now to report to Prime Minister Mahmood Abbas rather than Arafat. Mahmood Abbas could not get concessions from Israel on any major issue. The Israelis undermined his position by continuing their repressive policies designed to humiliate the Palestinians. Only some Palestinians were released by Israel who were illegally held. Arafat’s popularity decreased from 47 per cent before the intifada to 35 per cent by the end of its third year. But in late 2003 and 2004 Arafat became popular by 50 per cent mainly due to Israeli threats to kill or expel him. Arafat seeing Abbas ineffectual, both on the internal front and on issues concerning peace with Israel, sidelined the reforms. Citing this and Israeli stubbornness, Abbas resigned in September 2003. Again Israel and US called for reforms in PA and accused Arafat of heading a corrupt PA and demanded delegation of power to further isolate Arafat. Ahmed Qoraei replaced Abbas as Prime Minister but Israel continued its policy of relentless killing of Palestinians in Gaza and West Bank, demolition of houses, confiscation of land and construction of Jewish settlements on Palestinian land. Hamas and Islamic Jihad and young Palestinians took to violence. Unable to remove Arafat, whom more and more world leaders came to meet in his battered Ramallah compound, suicide bombings continued from the Palestinians. Ahmed Qoraei stuck to the agenda set by Arafat. With growing opposition from his Likud members and ultra Right wing parties for his policies, Sharon told the Israelis that the ‘cost of occupation’ is proving to be unacceptable and hence his decision to unilaterally withdraw from the Gaza in the last quarter of 2005. He announced this decision of withdrawal from Gaza in April 2004. Soon after the plan’s announcement, a survey found that three-quarters of Palestinians welcomed Sharon’s plan, while two-thirds viewed it as a victory for the intifada. Now more people feared that the withdrawal from Gaza would not be complete and that Gaza would become a ghetto, without access to the world. Only a third of the Palestinians now welcomed the Israeli plan. Most of the Palestinians are now convinced that Israel will not give up West Bank or East Jerusalem except for minor changes.

It is here that the US factor comes into the picture. There is the 1956–57 precedent when the US President Dwight D. Eisenhower ordered Israeli Prime Minister David Ben Gurion to withdraw from Sinai (which Israel had occupied in the Suez War) despite his announcement to the Israeli Knesset that Sinai would forever remain an eternal part of Israel. The US is the life line of Israel. For strategic and other reasons the US gives huge financial assistance to Israel along with military aid and diplomatic support. Only the US can put meaningful pressure on Israel to implement the several (over 50 UNSC Resolutions) agreements of peace to withdraw from Arab lands. Arafat in good hope signed the Oslo Accords in September 2003 with Yitzhak Rabin and US President Clinton but Rabin was killed in November 1995. Although Arafat made a triumphant return to Gaza from his exile in Jordan, Lebanon and Tunisia and shared the Nobel Peace prize with Peres and Rabin in 1994 but Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accepted the neo-cons idea to affect a ‘clean break’ with the Oslo Accords in 1996. Since then the Israeli-Palestinian peace broke down and Likud opposed the creation of a Palestinian state in 1998 and wanted to postpone it indefinitely. Since the US was facing heavy resistance in Iraq perhaps it could seize the opportunity to end the sufferings of the Palestinians and enable them to get justice. Tony Blair was also strongly urging Bush to work for implementation of the road map. Elections, unity and sharing of power seem to be new mantra of the new post-Arafat leadership. Democratic institutions, negotiations and giving up violence may help the Palestinians to end their suffering. Although Arafat was seen as an obstacle to peace by the US and Israel, it remains to be seen how sincere and serious their efforts would be to end the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands.

In any assessment of Arafat one must acknowledge his role in laying the foundation for a Palestinian state living side by side with Israel and resolution of the conflict. In this connection, his decision in 1988 for a peaceful settlement and the two state solutions is remarkable. Despite opposition, Arafat gave up the liberation of all of Palestine and chose to push for a Palestine state which was achievable and globally acceptable. For this he accepted UNSCR 242 and 338 renounced violence and opted for diplomatic compromise. This meant giving up 77 per cent of their homeland occupied by Israel in 1948 in return for an independent sovereign state of Palestine in 23 per cent occupied in 1967–comprising Gaza, West Bank and East Jerusalem. But for this giant step by Arafat there would never have been a chance for any peace settlement. Unfortunately this magnanimous step has been largely ignored by the Israelis, the West and the US. Yasser Arafat, despite opposition from within PLO, Syria, other Arab states, Iran and others, demonstrated rare courage in showing readiness to stake everything in pursuit of this objective and this political courage in the face of Israeli military occupation, devastation and all-round oppression has not been sufficiently appreciated. Yasser Arafat’s image was tarnished due to the corruption charges levelled against him and his unwillingness to share power. It was also said that Arafat used the Israeli military occupation of most cities/towns in West Bank and Gaza and their checkpoints and sieges which prevented the movement of the Palestinians as a pretext to postpone elections. Here again one should keep in mind the chaotic conditions created by Israel and in all fairness it must be mentioned that Arafat acted with wisdom and worked slowly to regain the confidence and trust of the Palestinians. With the exit of Arafat, one may argue that the chances of reaching a lasting settlement based on the 1967 lines may be slim given the determination of Israel to retain much of the West Bank. Dov Weisglass had confirmed this. With Israel’s unilateral withdrawal from Gaza planned for late 2005 and nominal removal of some Jewish settlements from West Bank, partial peace with less harsh treatment of the Palestinians could be hoped for. But for lasting and comprehensive peace the Palestinians have to rebuild their democratic structures and organizations both in Gaza, West Bank and also among the refugees in diaspora. Once they put their houses in order and gain the trust of their people and the international community, perhaps some progress can be made. International pressure on Israel and the US has to be maintained so as to ensure justice for the Palestinians. UK Foreign Secretary Jack Straw recognizing that the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was fuelling unrest throughout West Asia said, its resolution was even more important than Iraq. ‘Its effect is so powerful, not just in West Asia but around the whole Islamic world, that solving it satisfactorily would be a huge prize. It is the engine of so much trouble around the World’.⁶⁹

In the 9 January 2005 elections for the post of president of the Palestinian national authority (PNA), Mahmood Abbas was elected with 62.32 per cent votes. Most Palestinians believe that Abbas is the leader who can put the peace process back on track and end the cycle of violence (Al Aqsa intifadah) which has taken the lives of nearly 5,000 Palestinians and 1,000 Israelis. Many thousands have been injured on both sides with the share of the Palestinians being more. From the very beginning Abbas expressed his determination to end the violence. He had already effected substantial changes in the police and security. Some of Arafat’s cronies who were seen as corrupt have been removed. He had engaged the Hamas in a dialogue and persuaded them to support his cease-fire efforts. Egypt also helped him in Gaza. He has had meetings with Israel and the US, among others. Abbas has made it clear that achieving peace remains his priority and in this connection he has been visiting not only Arab countries to heal the rift but has also visited China, Japan, India and others. Russian President Vladimir Putin also visited Palestine in April end 2005 and promised full cooperation in the security field. In the municipal elections Hamas has won 24 councils and made strong inroads in key urban centres in West Bank and has consolidated its influence in Gaza. Abbas has so far shown that he is capable of controlling the security situation but the real crux is how far Israel and US will be honest in implementing their part of the promises. So far, Israel has withdrawn its forces from some key towns in West Bank and released few hundred Palestinians detainees. Abbas visited India on 19–20 May 2005 and met Manmohan Singh who promised Rs 650 million and an additional Rs 20 million in aid for infrastructure projects in West Bank and Gaza. Although India reiterated its support to the Palestinian struggle for self-determination it also called for an end to violence. Fully aware that the UPA government was as keen as the NDA government to consolidate its ties with Israel, Abbas confirmed that India’s ties with Israel were its own bilateral affair. The visit of Abbas could have been used to expose Israeli brutality against the Palestinians and a firm call to end Israeli occupation of occupied Arab lands in a time bound schedule. The continuing violence in Palestine is due to Israeli occupation. But India is toying with the idea of mediating in the AIC. Many in the Arab and Islamic world thought that the UPA government would restore the balance it had pursued in its policy towards West Asia earlier compared to the marked tilt shown by the NDA government towards Israel during its period. Any contention that Israel is a major arms supplier to India and hence the government should soft-pedal any firm stand against Israel will affect India’s credibility in the Islamic world where the bulk of its interests lie. The election of Hamas in the January 2006 parliamentary elections and the boycott by the US and others of the Palestinian government have created chaotic conditions in the Palestinian territories.⁷⁰

Indo-Iranian Relations

Iran is one of the most important countries in the West Asian region with which India has maintained fairly extensive relations in diverse fields. This was especially after New Delhi signed a treaty of friendship with Tehran on 15 March 1950 which called for ‘perpetual peace and friendship’ between the two countries. Despite differing perceptions on a number of issues, since 1947 all Indian prime ministers and other prominent leaders have underlined the strategic importance of the Indo-Iranian ties. Notwithstanding Jawaharlal Nehru’s close ties with Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, India’s first prime minister worked hard to establish cordial ties with the Shah of Iran. This despite the Shah having maintained close ties with the United States and Israel and made Iran a member of the Baghdad Pact later known as Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) of which Pakistan was also a key member. Perceptions of threats to it seem to have induced Iran to join the western military alliance while India advocated and pursued a non-aligned policy. The Cold War, western hostility and more particularly the Iran–China–Pakistan alliance propelled India to have closer ties with the Soviet Union. Despite the Shah of Iran’s visit to India in February 1956 and Jawaharlal Nehru making a return visit to Tehran in September 1959, and a number of other high-level visits, Indo-Iranian relations never matured and, in fact, remained cool and, at times, strained. The 1971 Indo-Pak war conclusively established Indian predominance in South Asia whereas the defeat of Pakistan pushed the United States to look at Iran as the main pillar of its Gulf policy, which resulted in the supply of huge quantities of sophisticated arms to Iran. This, in tum, encouraged the Shah to play an active role in the Gulf and the Indian Ocean areas. The division of Pakistan, the emergence of Bangladesh, increase in Iran’s income from oil, Arab unity during the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC) oil embargo against the USA and others, Pakistan’s tilt towards the Arab states and India’s close ties with Iraq—all of these factors persuaded the Shah of Iran to reassess the significance of strengthening ties with India. Soon the Indo-Iranian ties developed as reflected in several high-level visits, expanding bilateral trade and investments. India saw the overthrow of the Shah and the emergence of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979 under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini as positive developments. Khomeini was described as the ‘father figure of the Iranian revolution’, by Atal Behari Vajpayee (then, India’s minister for external affairs) who also said: ‘We are waiting for the day when we can welcome Iran in the Non-Aligned Movement’. More significantly, ‘India viewed the revolution in Iran as a reflection of Iran’s quest for identity and national self-assertion and a desire to charter an independent course without outside big power influence’.⁷¹ Iran’s preoccupation with Iraq in the eight-year war (1980–88) and the new Islamic regime’s penchant for taking up Islamic ‘causes’ led to a strain in India’s ties with Iran. Iran’s stand on the Kashmir issue, the Babri masjid and Indian Muslims introduced new factors in the Indo-Iranian relations. Indian response to Iran’s attitude was muted because of the importance New Delhi attached to economic ties, Iran’s role in the Gulf, Central Asia and Afghanistan, and also due to the conviction that the realists ruling Iran wanted to do business with India.

The 1990–91 Kuwait crises, Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the disintegration of the Soviet Union together with the end of the Cold War and the emergence of Pax Americana in the West Asian and North African (WANA) region and identical security threat perceptions brought India and Iran closer. US attempts to isolate Iran under its dual containment policy, economic sanctions on the Islamic Republic and American influence over the GCC states and Iran’s bitter experience with Iraq compelled Tehran to strengthen relations with India and China. These common political and strategic concerns led to extraordinary developments in the Indo-Iranian relations, including numerous high-level visits and a large volume of bilateral trade. Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao visited Iran in September 1993 where he told Ayatollah Khameinei that the destruction of Babri masjid was an isolated incident and did not impinge on India’s secular character. He assured him that the Indian Muslims were very much a part of the national mainstream and the decision-making process in India.

The Indian prime minister also made it clear that India was firmly committed to protecting the interests of minorities and that New Delhi could deal with such issues ably and competently without outside help. He also drew Ayatollah Khameinei’s attention to the passage of the Places of Worship Bill in Parliament that became effective in July 1991. The bills main objective was to stop destruction of places of worship, besides ensuring that fresh demands for breaking down other mosques to make temples were forestalled. Meanwhile, a new chapter was opened in the Indo-Iranian ties with Tehran extending full support to India’s concern in this regard and made it clear that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India. Iran’s assurance to India that it had no desire to interfere in India’s internal affairs, including Kashmir, was received by Kashmiri Muslims and Hurriyat leaders with ‘shock and disbelief’ because Iran was considered second only to Pakistan in extending support to the Kashmiris in their ‘struggle for freedom’.⁷² More significantly, during the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) meeting in Geneva in February–March 1994, Iran played a crucial role in persuading Pakistan to withdraw the resolution it had tabled on Kashmir. In this connection, an ailing Dinesh Singh, then India’s foreign minister, had travelled to Tehran to discuss the UNHRC meeting in Geneva with Iranian leaders. He also met the Chinese foreign minister in Tehran. There was considerable speculation of a China–India–Iran axis, which had been advocated by Iranian President Hashemi Rafsanjani while on an official visit to China. He repeated his recommendation when Rao visited Tehran in 1993. Iranian President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, who was to have paid an official visit to India in October 1994, postponed it to April 1995 apparently due to the plague scare in Surat. Some called it a ‘transparent ploy’ ascribing it to the power struggle between President Rafsanjani and Ayatollah Khameini’s so-called ‘politics within Tehran’s Byzantine power structure. As one Indian newspaper noted, ‘as long as Iran remains a regimented society under an Islamic fundamentalist leadership with only the mere trappings of democracy, the relations between New Delhi and Tehran will never quite be free of tension’.⁷³ When Rafsanjani finally visited New Delhi in April1995, he emphasized the need for strategic cooperation to ward off outside interference and domination in the region. He also underlined the significance of cooperation among Iran, Pakistan, India and China. This would cement India’s friendship with Iran that was essential to gain access to the transit facilities offered by Tehran to the newly emerging republics of Central Asia—a region where both countries were eager to increase their influence. The Afghan civil war, the emergence of Taliban, Pakistan’s support to the fundamentalist regime in Kabul and Iran’s desire to involve India in finding a solution to the Afghan crisis brought India and Iran closer.

The election of Mohammed Khatamias President in 1997 and the appointment of Kamal Kharrazi as Iran’s foreign minister and the favourable statements to expand cooperation on the basis of mutual respect augured well for the future of Indo-Iranian ties despite the participation of Hurriyat leaders in the Organization of Islamic Countries (OIC) Summit on December 1970 in Tehran. During the Khatami period the Indo-Iranian relations improved in all fields and concrete steps were taken to push the gas pipeline issue also. It was widely assumed that former president Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani would win the Iranian Presidential election on 17 June 2005. The expected did not happen but in the run off election on 24 June 2005, the unexpected happened. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad won the election. The relatively unknown figure—a former governor of Ardebil in North West Iran (Azerbaijan) and Mayor of Tehran—vowed to make Iran a strong country. His surprise landslide victory over Rafsanjani is attributed to a number of factors. He appeared to have got the support from the bulk of the religious establishment particularly the supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khameini. No wonder Ali Khameini said the election of Ahmadinejad is a profound humiliation for the US. President Bush criticized the election as undemocratic and said, ‘Power is in the hands of an unelected few who have retained power through an electoral process that ignores the basic requirements of democracy.’ British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was sharply critical of the election and said there were ‘serious deficiencies’ in the way it was conducted. The German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer expressed similar concerns. Although the above criticism was expected but what is interesting to note is the welcome and support from the Islamic groups in most of the OIC states to the new Iranian president. To be sure Ahmadinejad’s victory is tainted by allegations of voting fraud and other irregularities. The most serious allegations were made by the former Speaker of Majlis Mehdi Karroubi, who accused the Mullahs (guardians council) of using ‘coup-like measures’ and also manipulation by the Revolutionary Guards. Karroubi criticized Ayatollah Khameini’s son Mojtaba for backing the mayor of Tehran. Khameini criticized Karroubi and said he will not allow anyone to create a crisis in the country. The other criticism came from Rafsanjani who accused regime hardliners of spending millions of dollars to manipulate voters. In addition hundreds of complaints of election violations and irregularities were filed. Most of the complaints were against the powerful Revolutionary Guards. Interestingly, the new president was also a special forces officer in the Revolutionary Guards and an instructor with the Basij religious militia who are fiercely loyal to the late Ayatollah Khomeini’s principles.

The election of Ahmadinejad should be seen in the background of mounting pressure from the US and Israel on Iran especially on the nuclear issue. Moreover, Iran is not only surrounded by the US from all sides but military threats and talk of regime change are mounting from the Bush administration. More than 50 per cent of Iran’s population was born after the 1979 revolution. These young people had voted President Mohammed Khatami twice but were disappointed by his social reform process. Moreover, people are facing major problems like high inflation and unemployment. The new president assured of support from the religious establishment plans to pursue reform and modernization along with tackling the pressing economic issues. He is fully aware of it when he said: ‘The country’s true problem is employment and housing, not what to wear. He has promised to share the country’s oil wealth with the poor who voted for him in large numbers. He said: ‘I will cut the hands of the mafias of powers and factions who have a grasp on our oil, I stake my life on this … People must see their share of oil money in their daily lives.’ He is reputedly closer to the underprivileged class and also managed to capture the hearts of the poor and those who believe the government should fight administrative and economic corruption. He won because he talked to the people in their language and articulated their concerns. Throughout the elections he was dubbed as a hardliner but it may not be true. He has a reputation as a man who challenges wrongs and does not care about protocol. He is known to be efficient in dealing with the entangled bureaucracy. The election is a call up for the long pending domestic problems—voters who are longing for signs of progress in Iran. The victory of Ahmadinejad may mean that Iran’s foreign policy may become even more stubbornly entrenched due to adverse reaction from the US and the EU. He has said: ‘Iran is on a path of progress and elevation and does not really need the US on this path’. He also said: ‘Relations with the US are not a cure for our ills’. He has vowed to continue developing nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. India should have no difficulty with the new president and the policies which will unfold. The gas pipeline via Pakistan may not be affected but what role Iran plays in Iraq, Afghanistan, Gulf and Central Asia has crucial bearings on India. There is no question now of export of Iran’s revolution but India has to continuously watch how the new leadership conducts itself. It has become obvious that the new president will follow the line of Khamenei even more closely than his predecessors. Khamenei has now become the supreme leader. As the new president said: ‘My mission is creating a role model of a modem, advanced, powerful and Islamic society’. This is surely bad news for Iran’s enemies.⁷⁴

The mutual desire for friendship and cooperation seemed to have lessened misunderstandings that had developed between the two countries in the wake of the destruction of the Babri masjid in 1992 and turmoil in Kashmir. Looking at the period especially during 1991–97, the Iranian ambassador to India, Dr Sheikh Ali Reza Attar, undoubtedly has made an outstanding contribution in bringing the two countries closer, building a solid relationship based on mutual respect and understanding, and providing the necessary dynamism and stability to their bilateral ties. However, many in India were concerned about the implications for Indian Muslims of Iran’s support to Islamic causes worldwide. The Cold War between Iran and Saudi Arabia, and its impact on the large Indian Muslim population were seen as likely impediment to mutual cooperation between India and Saudi Arabia. In the backdrop, Indira Gandhi had visited Riyadh in 1982, thereby ending the 26-year long communication gap and paving the way for closer ties between India and Saudi Arabia. These ties had been affected by factors such as India’s support to Nasser’s Egypt and its closer ties with Moscow and its allies in the WANA region. Moreover, Saudi Arabia was looking for friends in the neighbourhood and, notwithstanding the close Saudi–Pak ties, Riyadh was keen on opening a new chapter with India. When Iraq failed to defeat Iran and the latter crossed the international border into Iraq by mid-1982, the GCC states took a series of steps in order to contain Iran. Saudi overtures to India should be seen in this context, in view of New Delhi’s close ties with both Iran and Iraq.⁷⁵

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the Gulf War in 1991 affected India’s ties with some GCC states as India, neither condoning nor condemning the Iraqi invasion, justified its position by saying that ‘condemnation is not part of the Indian nature.’ India, of course, by simply ‘regretting’ the Iraqi move did not win the gratitude of either party. In the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis, through its skilful diplomacy, India succeeded in clearing up the misunderstanding with the GCC states and, in particular, with Kuwait. Subsequent events like the Babri masjid demolition and Kashmir insurgency continued to cast shadows on the ties between India and the GCC. Most of the GCC states (particularly Saudi Arabia) which signed security treaties with the US and its allies in the wake of the Gulf War are now cautious in their dealings with the US and have worked to improve ties with Iran. The formidable Western (especially the US) naval presence in and around the Persian Gulf led to pressures on Iran and India, making it clear to them that both could cooperate on this issue affecting their security. The initiatives taken by Iran and the GCC states have gradually led to normalization of ties. The December 1997 OIC summit in Tehran and the participation of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah, the Kuwaiti and Qatar Amirs and other GCC leaders confirmed the growing rapprochement between Iran and some GCC states. The two-week visit to Saudi Arabia by the former Iranian President, Rafsanjani in February-March 1998, led to talks with King Fahd and Crown Prince Abdullah. Saudi reservations over the use of their territory by the US and allies to attack Iraq, and Iranian opposition to use of force against Iraq revealed growing convergence of views between Iran and Saudi Arabia. As the Iranian ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Mohammed Rez Nuri, said, ‘Iran is opposed to any American military action against Iraq and calls on Baghdad to apply the UN resolution on disarmament’. Nuri added that ‘Iran and Saudi Arabia would share the same position’. The Iranian ambassador said Rafsanjani’s meetings with Saudi leaders focussed on strengthening bilateral relations in economic, commercial, cultural and security areas. Good relations between Tehran and Riyadh are a key to the security and stability in the Gulf region. The Iranian president was invited as chief guest on Republic Day in 2004. But the UPA government led by Manmohan Singh voted twice (September 2005 and February 2006) at the IAEA against Iran’s nuclear programme mainly under US pressure. India urgently needed Iranian gas, but the US portrayed Iran as an unstable supplier. The US’s offer of nuclear technology to India is in exchange for support to stop the Iranian nuclear programme.⁷⁶

Conclusion

Indian interests in the Gulf include the safety and security of over four million Indian migrant workers residing in the GCC states, and continued supply of oil and gas from the region. Besides, political stability is a precondition to ensure mutual cooperation through trade, aid and investment opportunities in the region. From the strategic point of view both India and Iran can work towards reducing the role of non-regional states in the region. Those policies, especially of the US and Israel, are undermining peace, security and stability leading to periodic threats of military intervention either against Iran or to safeguard Kurds, or to prop up threatened fragile regimes against their own population who are demanding political participation (as in the case of Bahrain). US invasion and occupation of Iraq and the continued instability in many parts of Iraq, in addition to US accusations of Iranian interference in Iraqi affairs is used by the US to put pressure on Iran to cease ‘its ideas and programmes’. This is putting pressure on the Indo-Iranian ties. US attempts to reshape Afghan affairs to increase Pakistani influence also strained the Indo-Iranian ties. US determination to stay in Iraq and its attempts to put pressure on Iran for regime change is partly linked to help project its ower into Central Asia, given the enormous oil and gas reserves in that region.⁷⁷ From the Indian perspective, increasing bilateral ties with Iran is not only important due to trade, oil and gas, but also due to the unique proximity of Iran to events in Afghanistan, Central Asia, Iraq and the Gulf region. The common political and strategic concerns of India and Iran in the Gulf area will reinforce and strengthen mutual cooperation. If the two countries can jointly reassure the GCC states of their desire to work for peace, security and stability in the region, outside interference could be contained, which many perceive to be the root cause of much of the problems which India, Iran and the GCC states face. The Iraqi and Pakistani factors will eventually get integrated in the emerging approach. The 1990s have seen the reassertion of regional identities in the face of external interference. The critical space is widening and it is in this context that India, Iran and the GCC states can create opportunities in the oil and gas rich Gulf region for mutual benefit and jointly prepare to meet emerging domestic and external challenges. As violence is increasing in Iraq (with both the US and Iraqi government unable to control it), the calls for US withdrawal from Iraq are mounting even in the US. Not only the Democrats but the Republicans are also calling on US President Bush to present an exit strategy. According to an opinion poll taken in mid-June 2005, 59 per cent of Americans disapproved of President Bush’s handling of the Iraq war, 51 per cent thought the US should not have invaded and occupied that Arab country. As Democratic Congressman John Conyers said: ‘We got into a secret war we hadn’t planned, and now we are in it we can’t get off. Former Iraqi Prime Minister Jaafar Ibrahim who had campaigned during the January 2005 elections to the National Assembly on a platform of working for a scheduled pullout of US troops, said: ‘Can you imagine what would happen if we ask (the US) to leave? This could mean the beginning of a civil war.’ During his visit to the US in early July 2005, President Bush said: ‘I told the Prime Minister that there will be no scheduled withdrawal’. No wonder Iraqi resistance is growing with most Iraqis calling it al-muqawama al-sharifa (the honourable resistance). Even the US apparently has begun talking to some of the resistance leaders. In July 2005, 82 Iraqi National Assembly (NA) members from different political parties demanded in a petition to the Iraqi (NA) speaker swift withdrawal of the US and other occupation troops from Iraq. They also criticized the government for asking the UNSC to extend the stay of the US forces in Iraq ‘until the completion of the political process’. According to Iraqi writer Sámi Ramadani, Iraqis habitually blame the US occupation for all acts of terrorism:

Every day the [US] occupation increases tension and makes people’s lives worse, fuelling the violence. Creating a client regime in Baghdad, backed by permanent bases, is the route that US strategists followed in Vietnam. As in Vietnam, popular resistance in Iraq and the wider Middle East will not go away but will grow stronger, until it eventually unites to force a [US–British] withdrawal. How many more Iraqis… have to die before [the US and the UK] admit [that] the occupation is the problem and not part of any democratic solution in Iraq?

Interestingly, India’s external affairs minister, Natwar Singh, told an international conference in Brussels in June 2005 sponsored by US–EU on Iraq: ‘we condemn the actions of disruptive forces in Iraq and the activities of terrorist’s elements. It is well known that most of the Iraqi resistance to the US is led by the Sunnis and in areas dominated by them. This is also clear by the fact that most Sunnis boycotted the January 2005 elections to the National Assembly. As seen earlier, the US has developed a close relationship with the Kurds since 1991 and now after occupying Iraq it is wooing the Shias. Sunnis have been deliberately targeted and excluded from the new power centers. Can India remain silent to the ruthless policy of killing and destruction pursued by the Americans against the Sunnis in Iraq? Most Sunnis believe they are waging a national liberation struggle for freedom which the US is trying to crush. How can India forget the fact that Iraq is essentially an Arab country as Sunnis, Shias and Kurds speak Arabic? What the US is doing in Iraq is leading to a split between different groups and clearly the Sunnis are being crushed and suppressed in their own areas. The US is going about destroying one Iraqi Sunni city after another and killing hundreds and thousands of mostly Sunnis in the name of containing the challenge of terrorism. Iraqi resistance to the US occupation which is legitimate is being dubbed as terrorism. India’s silence to the US use of military means on an almost daily basis—including planes, helicopters, tanks, napalm, cluster and phosphorous bombs and indiscriminate arrests of hundreds and thousands of Iraqis (mostly Sunnis)—is to be seen in the background of rapidly warming ties with the US. Not only are the Indo-US economic ties growing but defence cooperation is also intensifying. What the NDA government started in 1998, the UPA government is taking forward. India’s decision not to send troops to Iraq was bitterly criticized (secretly) by the US as it desired them badly to stabilize the fierce resistance raging in Iraq. Since that was not possible now it wants Indian support to its policies in Iraq. The UPA government is finding it very difficult to support the US policies in Iraq, hence US pressure on India through the UN Volcker report, which led to the resignation of Foreign Minister Natwar Singh, and pressure on Sonia Gandhi from Iraq’s Oil-for-Food Programme. The Justice R.S. Pathak Inquiry Authority found Natwar Singh as a non- contractual beneficiary of the UN Oil-for-Food Programme in Iraq. Justice Pathak found Natwar Singh a beneficiary because of the ‘role played by him in influencing and facilitating the procurement of the contracts’ for Andaleeb Sehgal, friend of Natwar Singh’s son Jagat Singh and Aditya Khanna, a relative of Natwar Singh. Natwar Singh had written three letters in 2001 to the then Iraqi oil minister Amer Mohammed Rasheed requesting him to assist Andaleeb Sehgal. Another important finding of the report was that ‘there is not a shred of evidence to link the Congress party to the UN Oil-for-Food transactions’ and that ‘the inquiry authority has found no evidence that the Congress party was involved in the contract and that it derived any benefit from the contract’. Due to all this India is indirectly supportive of what the US is doing in Iraq. Once the US fully dominates Iraq and through it much of the Gulf region then in the long run it will have an impact on India. Together with the cooperation of Israel, the US is working for broader domination of the entire WANA area. The day will not be far when the US will apply pressure on India itself. Iran has been identified by the US as a stumbling block hence the pressure for regime change in Tehran. Already the US has plans to supply Iraqi oil from Kirkuk to Haifa in Israel which would add to the complications in the region for India. US opposition to Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline and US Secretary of State Dr Rice’s suggestion to the Indian government to talk to the US for India’s energy security is due to Pax Americana in the Gulf region. In future the US along with Israel and Pakistan are likely to put more pressure on India in all fields. The simple truth is that the US has established itself so close to India in the entire Gulf region that there will be a spill-over of its military presence on India in the coming years. With US facing heavy resistance in Iraq and eager to withdraw from Iraq after the November 2007 elections there, and with growing anti-Americanism sweeping in the Arab-Muslim world and with even Tony Blair urging Bush to work for implementing the road map, perhaps the US may seize the opportunity to end the sufferings of the Palestinians and enable them to get justice. Elections, unity and sharing of power seem to be the new mantra of the new post Arafat leadership. Democratic institutions, negotiations and giving up violence may help the Palestinians to end their suffering. Although Arafat was seen as an obstacle to peace by the US and Israel, but it remains to be seen how sincere and serious will be the efforts of the US and Israel to end the Israeli occupation of Palestinian lands. Instability in the West Asian region poses a greater threat than ever before, as India’s reliance on the West Asian oil is growing. Although the issue of terrorism is also important and imported arms from Israel are vital for India’s security, there is no need for India to place undue emphasis on bilateral relations between India and Israel as the NDA–BJP sought to do as per its notions of grand strategy. India must tackle the threat of terrorism to it by itself, but not in cooperation with Israel, a state with a dubious record in this field, to say the least. Many Indians express their solidarity with the cause of the Palestinians and the larger Arab cause, which is only natural. The BJP tilt towards Israel hurt India’s relations with major Arab countries. India should speak out in favour of the Palestinians and condemn Israeli atrocities. This is essential not only to repair our ties with the Palestinians but also to restore ties with the Arab and the Islamic world. The UPA government’s common minimum programme stated that ‘it will maintain the independence of India’s foreign policy stance on all regional and global issues even as it pursues closer strategic and economic engagement with the US. But the reality is that in the context of West Asia, US policy is actually affecting India in a gradual way. Pax-Americana in West Asia has serious implications for India. The US control of Gulf oil sources may in the future affect our quest for energy security, especially as India imports 70 per cent of its oil from the Gulf. The US support to undemocratic regimes in the region is encouraging the Islamic countries to use violence in the face of reluctance of the rulers to initiate political reforms. The security and future of the Indian workers in the region in the wake of continued wars and instability has become an issue of concern. And the US desire to involve Pakistan in its strategy in West Asia has implications on India’s security and influence in the region. India’s close ties with Iran and Syria may come under pressure if the US intensifies its pressure on these two states, while doing nothing to restrain Israel, which seeks to increase its influence in the region with help from the US. It is imperative for India to maintain close ties with Iran, a country with a very strained relationship with the US, to protect itself against a fallout from Afghanistan, gain access to Central Asian natural gas and deal with Pakistan. This relationship with Iran is also vital for Iraq and its stability in the Gulf region. Apart from the presidents of Turkey, Iran Algeria, and some GCC leaders no other leader has made a state visit to India from this region. Our pro-Israeli tilt has become a burden and it’s high time we pursue a more vigorous policy to strengthen our relations with the Arabs and the wider Islamic world. Peace, security and stability in West Asia are crucial for our own security and prosperity and this calls for new initiatives, dynamism and recognition of the traditionally close historical relationship with the Islamic world. India’s economic ties are unlikely to suffer with the WANA states in the immediate future, but one needs to be cautious in developing closer ties with Israel until the process of reconciliation gets under way between the Arabs, especially Palestinians and Israelis. India should attempt to balance the traditionally close ties with Arab and Muslim states of West Asia with Israel. We have to safeguard our core interests like import of 70 per cent oil and gas, security and welfare of nearly four million Indian workers, over 16 per cent exports to the region, growing trade and investments with the region. On top of these security and stability in the region is linked with early resolution of the Iraq crisis (US withdrawal of occupation forces) establishment of a viable Palestinian state and encouraging political reforms and democratization of political systems which alone can contain the growing slide towards religions resurgence, violence/terrorism and instability in the region. In sum, it is possible to have normal ties with Israel, and at the same time, retain the traditionally close ties with Arabs, Iranians and Turks, provided New Delhi adopts a pragmatic approach both at home and abroad.