4

SEAWARD SECURITY: MODERNIZING THE INDIAN NAVY

Jyotirmoy Banerjee

Our Navy in History

The Navy has been traditionally treated as a stepchild by our defence establishment. This land-locked mindset, persisting since medieval times, is somewhat strange, since British rule over India owed much to its dominance at sea.¹ Indeed, much of European colonization of Asia, Africa and Latin America had begun from the sea. On land, of course, India has to guard against the 2,912 km border with Pakistan, the 740 km line of control (LOC) with it, and the 4,056 km of the line of actual control with China. But it also has to defend the 7,000-plus km of India’s long peninsula jutting out into the Indian Ocean, plus some 1,280 islands and 2.2 million sq. km of exclusive economic zone, or EEZ. India’s territorial waters extend to 12 nautical miles (nm), contiguous zone to 24 nm, continental shelf to 200 nm (but this could be increased to 350 nm), and 200 nm of EEZ. India’s 2.2 million sq km of sea area is equivalent to about two-thirds of its total land area.

India’s Bombay High offshore oil installations meet 14 per cent of the country’s oil needs and account for about 38 per cent of the country’s oil output. Add to this the fact that the bulk of our overseas trade is sea-borne—including oil—and the significance of naval role should be clear. But while the army and the air force have five commands each at their disposal, the Navy has to be satisfied with three. Its major bases are: Mumbai (HQ, Western Command, the Navy’s ‘sword arm’), Goa (HQ, Naval Air), Karwar (under construction in the late 1990s), Cochin (HQ, Southern Command), Visakhapatnam (HQ, Eastern Command and Submarine Command), Kolkata, Chennai, Port Blair (now under unified Andaman and Nicobar Islands Command), and Arakkonam (Naval Air). The Andaman and Nicobar has become the Far Eastern Naval Command, or FENC, but is a triservice set-up commanded by a three-star officer who reports directly to the Chief of Integrated Service Command in New Delhi. A new Coast Guard station has been set up on the Lakshadweep islands. Four more are envisaged in Jafarabad in Gujarat, Ratnagiri in Maharashtra, and one each in Kerala and Pondicherry.

After Independence, India depended on the UK for its maritime security till London decided to pull out of the east of Suez at the tum of the 1970s. The Cold War oriented our Navy, and most of the other defence services, towards the USSR from the 1960s. Problems posed by different technology, naval customs and a for-midable language barrier had to be overcome in the transition from the British to the Russian.²

In the 1965 war, Pakistan surprised us with a daring naval attack on Dwarka, though it was of greater symbolic than strategic value. Six years later, the Indian Navy responded with improvised two huge raids with towed, short-range coastal Osa-class fast attack patrol boats firing SS-N-2 Styx missiles, and devastated Karachi-based oil tanks. India lost the frigate Khukri, and Pakistan’s US-supplied submarine Ghazi was sunk at the Indian attack off Vizag while it was searching for the Indian aircraft carrier, INS Vikrant. The Pakistani destroyer PNS Khaibar, the minesweeper Muhafiz and several merchant ships were also sunk off Karachi harbour.

These skirmishes indicate a key factor: Both Pakistan and India would like to threaten each other’s sea lanes of communication (SLOCs) in war, but neither can afford that threat since both sides depend heavily on their SLOCs for trade, including oil supply. As much as 97 per cent of Pakistan’s trade moves by sea, and the corresponding figures for India and China are also over 90 per cent.

But besides war, the Navy has other enormous tasks. These include policing the 200-km exclusive economic zones (EEZs), protecting our high-value Bombay High offshore oil installations, our aircraft-carrier, joining UN-mandated missions abroad, coming to the aid of neighbouring states like Sri Lanka and the Maldives when they ask for it, and intercepting piracy, smuggling and terrorist transits in cooperative ventures with other navies. As India’s Ministry of Defence Annual Report 2000-2001 observes, Given the size, location, trade links and extensive EEZ, India’s security environment extends from the Persian Gulf in the west to across the Strait of Malacca in the east and from the Central Asian Republics in the north to the equator in the south…’³

The Pakistani Threat

Following its defeat both on land and sea by Indian forces in 1971, Pakistan began to beef up its navy. Pakistan cannot match India in numbers, be it in the navy, army or air force. So, its naval strategy is based on ‘sea denial’, as opposed to India’s more ambitious strategy of ‘sea control’. Islamabad started phasing out its mainly vintage British combatants and some US auxiliary ships like minesweepers. French Daphne submarines had already joined the Pakistani Navy in 1970. After the 1971 war with India, Islamabad started moving towards Beijing, India’s other antagonist.During the late 1970s and early 1980s, six US Gearing (FRAM I) destroyers arrived to form the bulk of Pakistan’s surface fleet. A fourth Daphne arrived from Portugal in 1975 while two French Agosta-class submarines joined the fleet three years later. In the 1980s a County-class UK destroyer, renamed Babur, and two Leander-class frigates were also inducted. By the end of the 1980s, the Pakistani Navy also leased a total of eight Garcia and Brooke-class US frigates. The Brookes were guided-missile frigates. The US also supplied various anti-submarine warfare (ASW) and air-defence systems. China provided Soviet-designed Osa-class patrol boats for better coastal defence. Islamabad was no doubt influenced by the great success of the attacks by Indian Osas in 1971. In 2001, reports suggested that China was also supplying Pakistan with a warship and the know-how to build three others.

The US-supplied Harpoon missiles installed aboard the Gearing destroyers considerably enhanced Pakistani anti-ship capability, much to the consternation of the Naval Headquarters in New Delhi. While US military aid to Pakistan during the 1980s must of course be seen against the backdrop of lslamabad’s alliance with Washington in opposing the Soviet military presence in neighbouring Afghanistan, the anti-ship Harpoons, could hardly be used to fight the Soviets in land-locked Afghanistan; they would obviously have been used against the Indian Navy in any future conflict rather than the Soviets. Islamabad also acquired Bofors wire-guided, electrically powered, and lightweight Tp45 torpedoes for use against quiet submarines in shallow waters.

When these combatants started ageing too, there was an international competition among arms suppliers. The French DCN won the contract in 1994 for delivery of three Agosta-90B submarines, renamed Khalid. The latter class was inducted in September 1999. These were able to launch anti-ship missiles. India did not have sea-borne missile-launching capability at the time. In early March 2001 Pakistan successfully test-fired two different Exocet (anti-ship missile) versions, the air-launched AM-39 and the sea-launched SM-39, the latter from the submerged Khalid. As Dawn (11 March 2001) reports, both reportedly scored successes, sinking a decommissioned destroyer.

The end of the Afghan war and Pakistan’s involvement in nuclear arms development triggered the Pressler Amendment in the USA against it, which banned all arms supply and required pulling out the eight US frigates on lease. But other nations filled the vacuum. The UK supplied six Type-21 frigates, renamed the Tariq-class, which can carry Lynx helos. Their main mission is defensive and limited to a little beyond the narrow continental shelf. They have anti-surface warfare (ASuW) and ASW tasks; given Pakistan’s dependence on maritime oil deliveries, the perceived threat from the Indian submarine force (mostly Kilos), and the utter devastation in the Karachi port area in 1971, this acquisition was understandable. France sold a Tripartite-class mine-hunter and the previously mentioned three Agosta-90B submarines. While the first submarine would be built at the Cherbourg shipyards in France, the other two would be assembled at Karachi dockyards. Pakistan was to gradually acquire the know-how to build these boats, too. Paris ignored Indian protests over the sale.

The Agosta-90Bs, or Khalids, were significant since they were scheduled to have MESMA air-independent propulsion (AIP), replacing the diesel-electric propulsion system, which needs periodic surfacing of the vessel to periscope depth so as to recharge batteries. The AIP system allows the submarine to remain submerged three times longer than the diesel-electric system. The Agosta-90B has the fully integrated SUBTICS combat system and four bow 533-mm torpedo tubes. The Khalid would be carrying the SM-39 Exocet S939 submarine-launched missiles. These are sea-skimming missiles with their own inertial guidance, active radar homing, with a speed of 0.9 Mach and a range of 50 km. The submarine can also carry the Aerospatiale Matra missile. Pakistani sources claim that even their older Daphne-class submarines were quieter than the Soviet-supplied Indian Kilos and Foxtrots. India, rather belatedly, is catching up at the beginning of the 21st century and perhaps even surpassing Pakistani submarines with its French Scorpenes, supposedly a generation ahead of the Agosta-90B.

All Pakistani subs and some frigates were reportedly equipped with Harpoons by the turn of this century. The main targets for these Harpoon-armed combatants are India’s carriers. Two Harpoons can finish off a ‘small’, 28,700-tonne full-load displacement carrier like the Viraat. India’s latest carrier, the 44,500-tonne Gorshkov will probably need a few more to sink.

Further, the Vulcan Phalanx close-in weapons systems (CIWS), MK36 SRBOC (super rapid bloom, off board, and countermeasures) decoy launchers and other electronic suits are being installed on combatants like hthe frigates. These are largely to compensate for Pakistan’s poor air defence capability. Marines aboard the frigates can also fight off an air attack by carrying portable surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) like the Stinger.

The Brown Amendment modified the Pressler Amendment in the USA toreopen the arms flow to Islamabad, including more of the coveted Harpoon anti-ship missiles and the P-3C Orion maritime recce aircraft. At the turn of the century, some destroyers were scheduled to be fitted with the Harpoon Block IC missiles, which had a range of 124 km and greater capabilities than the older Exocet missiles, including the capacity for indirect attack, greater range, and reacquiring targets.

In addition, two new naval facilities were being built in the mid-1990s. Port Qasim at the Karachi dockyard was being modified to accommodate the new Agosta-90B submarines, while Ormara in Baluchistan would also be developed with Belgian and Turkish help to decongest the Karachi naval piers. The cost for the new base would be Rs 400 Crore.lt is unknown entirely certain whether Pakistan would be able to support production of advanced vessels under license where other, more industrially developed Third World states have had great difficulties. Gwadar on the Makran coast of Baluchistan was another potential naval facility, which might be developed not only to take the congestion at Karachi out but also to be relatively safe from an Indian attack. Islamabad will not have lightly forgotten the devastation of Karachi shipyards in the 1971 war with India.

In June 2003, US President George W. Bush granted Pakistan a five-year, $3 billion package, half of which was meant to bolster that country’s defence, though the coveted F-16s were excluded. Bush also overrode Islamabad’s objections and finally approved a long-delayed Indo-Israeli deal for the transfer of the advanced Phalcon radar system, for which Tel Aviv had needed Washington’s clearance as US technology was also involved.

To the Pakistani naval air arm, which had already been operating older Alouette IIIs for recce missions, the US Orions were a godsend. The elderly Alouettes had been given ASW capacity by providing depth-charges. The naval air was also strengthened with Sea King helos. These were armed with Exocet missiles. From 1993 to 1994 the Navy further stepped up its efforts at sea denial. Five Mirage-5 fighter-bombers, armed with two Exocets each, are based in Karachi. These are operated by the Pakistani Air Force but are under Naval Command and have an anti-shipping role. The Navy’s Atlantique aircraft were also being fitted out with more modem gadgets.

The Pakistani Navy also has a small special operations unit based at PNS Iqbal, Karachi. It operates a few 110-tonne Italian-made midget submarines. There is also a para-military Maritime Security Agency, mostly equipped with older craft that patrol the EEZ. A small Coast Guard, with a few patrol boats, is also present, and reports to the Ministry of the Interior. Islamabad has not hidden its ambition to acquire submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM). Its three latest Agostas are also nuclear-capable (The Times of India, 19 June 2001).

At the tum of the 21st century, the Indian and Pakistani naval balance sheet looked like the following, according to a Pakistani Navy source⁴ mentioned in the following chart:

	Pakistani Navy	Indian Navy
Personnel	24,000	45,0005
Aircraft carriers		26
Destroyers/frigates	17	26
Submarines	6	15
Corvettes/missile boats	9	17
Minesweepers	3	18
Maritime patrol aircraft	5	24

The Times of India, on 20 April 2004, reported that the Indian Navy’s long-term plan was to bolster force-levels ‘from the present 140 warships to 198’. These figures seem to add all types of Navy ships, including tugs (Matanga, Ambika), diving support ships (Nireekshak), landing craft utilitiess (LCUs), LSTs and many other types not listed on the Pakistani data sheet on major combatants.

The Chinese Threat⁷

At the beginning of the 21st century, China’s PLA Navy (PLAN) was about six times larger than the Indian Navy. Increasing and long-range Chinese naval aspirations and activities in the Indian Ocean region are a source of concern for New Delhi. The Chinese claim to the Spratlys and Paracel Islands are disputed by several Southeast Asian nations, which worry over rising Chinese naval activities in the South China Sea. Taiwan, it goes without saying, shares similar concern. The South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits are regions where China is most assertive, its interests clashing here with several littorals as well as the US China applies its laws in areas of South China Sea though these remain disputed areas. Beijing also uses Hong Kong as an intelligence-gathering facility.

India’s joint naval exercises with Japan, Vietnam and Singapore, hence, may not be entirely confined to anti-piracy drills but may, at least potentially, have in view the greater potential danger of China’s assertive naval activities in the future. So, from New Delhi’s viewpoint, adequate safeguards must be developed to deter Beijing, and any potential Beijing-Islamabad axis, be it in the arena of nuclearpowered SLBM or submarine-launched cruise missle (SLCM) submarines, or force projection in distant regions.

Sea, air and land power often merge. Hence, air cover for naval fleets is needed as much as amphibious forces are to seize a beachhead, long-range recce aircraft to alert friendly fleets and shore facilities regarding enemy activity far ahead. Longrange maritime bombers like the Backfire TU-22M3, which India wants from Russia, can attack a distant naval enemy formation before it can start damaging our mainland. The US-led wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have shown what today naval forces, which are hardly purely naval is but rather frequently a mix of sea, air and land elements, can achieve. These have only whetted the appetite for a modern navy in many countries.

Chinese naval activities have been on the rise in recent years. This has caused headaches in our naval HQ. There are PLAN activities dedicated to Myanmarese ports and naval facilities in the Bay of Bengal. ‘Cocoa’ is likely a repugnant word in Indian naval circles; the Chinese station to monitor our missile tests from Chandipur-on-sea in the Ganjam district of Orissa is located on Myanmar’s Cocoa Island. The ‘friendly’ Chinese naval visit in 2000 to Tanzania to play football probably unnerved New Delhi. Pakistan also did not exactly contribute to our euphoria when it conducted joint naval exercises with the Myanmarese navy in summer 2001. of course, the Indian Navy has not been inactive either. It sent a flotilla to the South China Sea littorals in 2000, thereby showcasing its blue-water navy ambitions, and not least for Beijing’s benefit.

India also has to take into account China’s potential strategic SLBM-submarine threat, however remote that threat may appear at present. India’s ‘minimum credible deterrence’ doctrine pertaining to nuclear deterrence also includes sealaunched nuclear-tipped missiles as part of the country’s nuclear triad. China’s two or three 8,000-tonne Xia-class nuclear-powered SLBM-submarines, with six 533-mm bow torpedo tubes, are reportedly based at Hainan Island. They are, however, reportedly put to rare use.

The PLAN also launched its second-generation attack submarines in June 2004. This is dubbed ‘Project 093’ and is based on Russia’s 1980s Viktor III-class submarine technology. PLAN, like its Indian counterpart, is also interested in Russia’s very capable Akula-class. It already has four and is expected to acquire eight more of the Kilo 636 by 2007, armed with 288-km Club-S anti-ship missiles. As of mid-2003, India was the only other state to possess these. Five of PLAN’s indigenous diesel-electric Song submarines are also being produced. The figure may hit 10 subsequently. The Songs are superior to the earlier Mings, which number around 20.

PLAN’s Aegis-type, large phased array of 170 radar-equipped destroyers pose a formidable threat too. Forty-eight new vertical-launch anti-aircraft missile systems, either Russian or locally produced, will enable long-range air defence, including against attacking aircraft and missiles. In early 2002, PLAN had ordered two more of Russian-built Sovremenny-class destroyers equipped with supersonic anti-ship missiles like the Yakhont or a newer version of the 200-km Moskit, which was reportedly obtained along with the two destroyers.⁸ The Moskit is a large, supersonic missile with a distinctly anti-carrier role. In stealth frigates, too, the PLAN is moving ahead. ‘Type 054’, which is the French Lafayette-type stealth frigate, is being serially produced. The first one was expected to be launched in 2003. The frigate is superior to the existing Jiangwei-class.

All this is hardly cheerful news for the Indian Navy. The latter simply cannot gloss over their presence or upcoming induction. China’s second-generation ‘09-4’ boats, about 4–6 in number, are expected to deploy by 2010. Each submarine will carry 12 potentially MIRVed (multiple warheads) JL-2 SLBMs with a range of 8,000 km. China, however, faces severe engineering problems with these complicated missiles, but that is hardly much of a consolation for the Indian Navy. Besides the Xias, PLAN has Han-class, nuclear-powered attack submarines in addition to the Mings and Songs. As of early 2001, PLAN’s major naval combat-ants numbered⁹ six destroyers and 10 frigates with anti-air missiles; around 50 destroyers and frigates with anti-ship missiles; six destroyers and 11 frigates with ASW helicopters; and seven destroyers and one frigate with anti-sub torpedo tubes.

However, China’s naval ambitions and growing activities in India’s neighbourhood did not stop the first ever Sino-Indian joint naval exercise scheduled for November 2003, like the exercises with Indonesia and Singapore. This was part of the Indian Navy’s two-pronged strategy of cooperation as well as competition, which will be discussed later. A key mission of these exercises is better understanding of each other’s operating procedures to enhance coordination, be it in missions like intercepting terrorists and smugglers, or search-and-rescue (SAR).

Finally, a white paper entitled ‘China’s National Defence in 2006’, sixth of an annual series and released on 29 December 2006, indicates a significant shift from its long-standing land-mindedness. In the 21st century, Beijing seems to be again interested in spreading overseas influence by sea. Its secretive Central Military Commission aims at laying a ‘solid foundation’ by 2010 and making ‘rapid progress’ by 2020, and ‘informationising’ its entire military apparatus, i.e., application of high-tech communications systems and winning the high-tech war by 2050. The paper states that the Navy would enhance its marine combat and nuclear counterstrike capabilities. Worrisome for the Indian Navy is the emphasis on the importance of the Coco Island (Myanmar) and Gwadar (Baluch coast of Pakistan) for the PLAN.¹⁰ This worry seems to be shared by Tokyo, Seoul, Ho Chi Minh City and Washington.

The Indian Navy Today: Role, Mission and Modernization Drive

A sea change has taken place in our government and its policies with the change of world politics since the 1990s. On the backburner between 1985 and 1995, the Indian Navy is now conducting regular joint exercises with its US counterpart, towards which New Delhi had been outspokenly hostile in the 1970s, especially over the threatening gesture of its Hawaii-based Seventh Fleet in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war, its SLBM-submarine patrols in the Indian Ocean and its growing base in Diego Garcia. A U-turn in Washington since Reagan’s days also facilitated such eventual military partnership.

At the same time, India is trying to modernize its navy. In the pipeline are the burnt-out but now retrofitted Russian carrier Gorshkov (on the anvil for two decades due to its price) and its air complement of MiG-29Ks; advanced French submarine Scorpene and stealth frigates; and the induction of the Indo-Russian BrahMos anti-ship supersonic cruise missile (its range limited to 300 km to comply with the MTCR missile control regime), with an impact nine times greater than subsonic ones like the Russian Moskit, which China had inducted. India already possesses the Russian Club subsonic cruise with supersonic impact; and continues the negotiations for the Dastan heavy torpedo.

Cooperative Missions

Currently, the Indian Navy’s missions include the key areas mentioned earlier, viz., territorial defence, policing the EEZ, and providing protection, with other navies, of maritime commerce from pirates—especially in the Malacca Straits region, which handles forty per cent of world sea-borne traffic. A Jane’s Defence Weekly report dated 28 May 2001 stated that in the year 2000 alone, there were 108 pirate attacks in Southeast Asia. The waters around Indonesia accounted for 47; Africa, 41; and South America, 30. About half the attacks, however, go unreported. The International Maritime Bureau based in Kuala Lumpur monitors piratical activities. While the 114 total incidents reported in the first six months of 2008 is slightly less than the 126 reported in the corresponding period last year, acts of piracy in 2008 are rising quarter by quarter. India and the Gulf of Aden shared second place in mid-2008 after Nigeria, with five reported incidents each. The incidents in India were low-level attacks aimed at theft from the vessel.¹¹

Hence, naval cooperation between the Indian Navy and those of other states involve today the effort to curb terrorism, protecting the sea lines of communication and the EEZs, SAR missions, and others. Add to these the actual and potential threats by terrorists of various political hues, and one immediately realizes the India’s gargantuan task of defending its maritime interests. Joint exercises with a large number of navies have become routine for our navy, as detailed later.

Strategic Role

While such cooperation in an ongoing process in the activity areas mentioned, India at the same time has to prepare for a low profile, yet palpable, Sino-Pakistani naval threat, both separately and jointly. India has to be prepared for Pakistan’s strategy of‘sea denial’. Our navy was reportedly considering the option of SLBM-submarines; after all, the potential strategic threat from China, especially from its Xia-class and later-generation SLBM-submarines (the Xias, as noted, are mostly based in the Hainan Island) cannot be ignored even while exchanging pleasantries and shaking hands. Nuclear-powered and armed submarines seem to be on the anvil. Nuclear reactors enable far longer patrol time and keep the submarine quiet. Our navy already had hands-on experience in running the Soviet-leased nuclearpowered submarine named INS Chakra, leased on 5 Febrary 1988 for four years and returned in 1991.

India’s long, navigable coastline and large overseas trade by sea also demands the ability to project a blue-water force; hence the need for—undoubtedly controversial—aircraft carriers. Our sole carrier, Viraat, is fast approaching its predecessor Vikrant’s fate. Rapid technological changes make induction of stealth technology, cruise missiles, hi-tech radar, missile-defence and satellite communication systems a must. A thorough overhaul is needed. In November–December 2003 the Public Accounts Committee pulled up the Indian government for delays in inducting approved weapons; Prime Minister Vajpayee demanded that our Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) itself be revamped. The Indian Navy has to yet make bold strides despite such red tape.

India’s Aircraft Carriers

India is the only country of the seven in South Asia to boast of an aircraft carrier. It is also one of the few in the world to possess one. Its INS Vikrant, the very first one, was decommissioned on 31 January 1997, after 36 years and 11 months of service. India’s current carrier, INS Viraat, like the Vikrant, was UK-supplied, and had seen action in the Falklands war over two decades ago as HMS Hermes. INS Viraat is expected to serve till around 2014.

The USSR never had a carrier force anywhere comparable to the US carrier battle groups (CVBGs). In the 1970s, however, Moscow did design the relatively small, 44,500-tonne Kiev-class carriers but, according to The Moscow Times (12 October, 2000), these were ‘scrapped’ the following decade. The largest US carriers like the Nimitz-class exceed 90,000-tonnes in displacement. The 1,200-crew Kievs making 32 knots were basically helicopter-carriers, and, unlike their US counterparts, did not have enough deck space or take-off catapults to operate combat aircraft, especially loaded with heavy ordnance. The Yak-38 ‘Forger’ vertical-takeoff-and-landing (VTOL) aircraft they were meant to carry turned out to be ineffective. However, the Kievs carried significant missile capability like SS-N-12 anti-ship, SA-N-3 and SA-N-9 SAM missiles, and its ASW ordnance included RBU-6000 mortars.

But as far as catapults were concerned, even the ‘real’ Soviet aircraft carrier, Admiral Kuznetsov, did not have them. The Moscow Times (12 October 2000) called it a ‘miracle’ if the Gorshkov, renamed after the modernizer of the Soviet Navy, could operate combat aircraft on its deck. The Gorshkov, originally called Baku, was the fourth and last of the Kievs. It was launched in 1982 and served initially as a development platform for various command-and-control technologies. This work delayed its commissioning for a full five years.

Both India and China evinced interest in acquiring the Kievs in the 1990s since they were retired in 1992 due to a fund crunch in post-Soviet Russia. China apparently also eyed the larger Varyag carrier, which was being built in the Ukraine when the USSR collapsed. The result was that the Varyag remained in the doldrums, unfinished, chiefly due to lack of funds. Meanwhile, in 1994, the Kiev-class Gorshkov, rebuilt in 1987, caught fire and became just an empty shell. Itwas retired next year. In July 1995, an Indian team visited Moscow and held talks on acquiring the burnt-out carrier. The Russians offered for ‘free’ the empty shell, provided the Indians paid Moscow for its obviously needed retrofit. It was like offering the mere cover of a book for free but then extracting a price for the pages inside separately. Further, the Kiev-class’s four steam turbine propulsion engines needed purified water—impurities in water could cause clogging, rupture, leaks in the fine copper turbine pipes, and other problems—but the Gorshkov’s on-board water-purification plant turned out to be faulty. The Indian side must have demanded a discount since Gorshkov was essentially a burnt-out shell, and the haggling over price lasted nearly a decade.

A $1.5 billion deal was eventually struck. India was to pay $650 million for the retrofit and another $730 million for the carrier’s air wing, including helos. The air component of the Gorshkov was to consist initially of 16 MiG-29K (naval MiG 29s) supersonic combat jets and eight Kamov Ka-27 and Ka-31 helos¹² These helos could either carry out anti-submarine warfare (ASW) or airborne early warning (AEW) missions, depending on their types. Eventually, 60 MiG-29Ks would comprise the combat air wing of the Gorshkov.

India had insisted that the Russians extend the flight deck of the carrier and also install takeoff catapults. The Times of India reported on 28 June 2003 that the Indian Navy wanted a bow ski-jump takeoff ramp at a 14-degree angle for the MiG-29Ks. Whether with or without the catapults, the flight deck must have been extended to operate the MiGs. In a bid to get the highest price for their carrier, the Russians linked India’s wish to acquire long-range TU-22M3 strategic bombers and nuclear-powered Akula submarines with the Gorshkov deal. While India financed the retrofit, which, along with other Indian naval orders, came as a shot in the arm of Russia’s fund-starved Far Eastern Fleet, New Delhi also tried to negotiate by informing Moscow that India was also considering buying the Israeli Barak or the French Aster anti-missile systems in lieu of the Russian offer of their Kashthan system. Even three months before handing over the Gorshkov to India, Russia stated that the possibility of introduction of foreign anti-missile elements had been causing uncertainty over the deal. However, a deal of Rs 6,900 crore was finally struck. On 9 March 2004, India acquired the Gorshkov at the Severodvinsk shipyards from SEVMASH, Russia’s machine-building plant.¹³

By early 2009 or so, according to Navy Chief Suresh Mehta (The Times of India, 8 January 2007, p. 8), India aims to deploy two carrier battle groups (CVBGs). They would be built around the 28,000-tonne INS Viraat and the 44,570-tonne INS Vikramaditya, the Indian name given to Gorshkov. In January 2007, the media reported that Vikramaditya was undergoing a refit in Russia (The Times of India, 8 January 2007). Each CVBG will include, among warships of various types, two to three guided-missile destroyers, two multi-purpose frigates, two submarines and a tanker. When Viraat retires, our navy expects to have as its replacement a 37,500-tonne ‘indigenous’ carrier being built at the Cochin Shipyard. According to Mehta, ‘The project is on track’. The longer-term goal is to have three carriers, two deployed and a third undergoing refit at any given point of time.

The New Carrier Air Wing

The MiG-29K is the naval version of the MiG-29 combat jet, also known in the West as ‘Fulcrum D’. The naval version is a single-seater, similar to the US F/A Hornet, F-15, F-16 and the SU-27 ‘Flanker’. The MiG-29 is an all-weather, counter-air weapon. Its maximum speed is 2.3 Mach/1,520 mph; ceiling, 18,400 metres; payload, 4,000 kg; range, 1,100 km without refueling; armaments include Gsh-30L cannon and six air-to-air missiles (AAMs). The carrier Vikrant typically carried six aircraft and nine helos; for the Viraat the respective figures were 12 and seven. Initially, 14 aircraft will form the Gorshkov’s air wing but ultimately the target is 60 aircraft. The Indian Navy proposes to counter Pakistan’s US-supplied maritime recce Orions with these MiGs. The Sukhoi SU-MKI is meant for the air force, but has a naval version which may replace India’s ageing Sea Harriers.

Naval Helicopters, Bombers, Reconnaissance Aircraft

The Ka-31 AEW (airborne early warning) helo has a modernized cabin, the Kabris system of global navigation and landing made by the Moscow-based Kronstadt firm at the Kumerstan production plant, with the pilot’s equipment designed by Ramenskoye Instruments. The chopper is effective in sea and coastal patrol missions. Four Ka-31s entered service in 2003, and five more at the end of 2004. However, all nine were grounded after serious defects were detected.

The Navy is also interested in leasing four TU-22M3 long-range bombers, or ‘Backfire-C’. It was introduced in 1984 in the Soviet arsenal. This TU was fitted with ramp inlets for higher dash performance and armed with a single 23-mm Gsh-23L two-barrel cannon in a tail barbette. It can carry an internal rotary launcher for six RKV-500N (AS-15 ‘Kickback’) short-range attack missiles. A further four may be carried under the wings. In naval use, the strategic bomber uses free-fall weapons, including nuclear and high explosive (HE) bombs, and cruise missiles for anti-shipping attacks, besides carrying out electronic recce. Maximum speed: Mach 2 at 36,090 feet, its service ceiling being 59,055 feet. Ferry range: 6,476 nm. President Putin’s early October 2000 visit to India brought in its wake the confir-mation of the TU-22M3 and Gorshkov deals.

Besides, the Indian Navy has evinced interest in acquiring the US veteran P-3 Orion maritime patrol aircraft. Pakistan already has the P-3s, as noted. In mid June 2003 there were reports that some progress had been made by India in acquiring them from the USA. A US team was scheduled to visit India in March 2004 to hold talks on the Orions. The Indian Navy currently it has 11 maritime recce aircraft, mostly Russian II-38 and Bear-D TU-142s, and is looking to make new acquisitions with a long-delayed global tender. According to Navy Chief Madhvendra Singh in February 2004, the Indian Navy was ‘scouting’ the world market for aircraft of this type. India’s Soviet-supplied Bear-D Tupolevs can already fly from the country’s largest naval air station, INS Rajali, off the east coast at Arakkonam, which is located about 70 km from Chennai, to the Persian Gulf and back. Arakkonam has been in operation since 1992 and serves as India’s longrange maritime recce station. Nevertheless, the navy feels it lacks in adequate and effective intelligence, surveillance and recce platforms. The Pakistani Orion-based threat has to be tackled by India’s naval MiG-29K combat aircraft. Since March 2003, however, the USA is supplying our navy with spare parts for its Sea King helos.

Air Defence Ships (ADS)

The day India acquired the Gorshkov from Russia, India’s indigenously designed ADS, or small aircraft carrier, left the ‘drawing board stage’¹⁴. The then defence minister George Fernandes was quoted as stating that India could start operating two of the ADS by 2011. Navy Chief Madhvendra Singh had stated much the same (The Times of India, 3 April2003). Construction is expected to begin by the end of 2004 or early 2005 at Kochi. European firms are entering India’s defence sector. In 2003, the French corporation MBDA received our navy’s orders for air defence systems for the P-17 ships (Nilgiri or Leander-class, 2, 962-tonne frigates), which are being constructed in Mumbai by Bharat Dynamics Ltd.

Stealth and Nuclear Submarines

Though a submarine is by itself a stealthy weapon, sonars from various platforms—under sea, maritime recce aircraft, land, or from surface ships and other submarines—can detect its propeller, vibrations and other underwater noises. When sonar ‘pings’ a submarine, it is operating in the ‘active’ mode. The advantage here is that when the ‘ping’ returns to the transmitting platform, often a submarine itself, the presence of the target submarine is confirmed. The downside is that the submarine ‘pinged’ can become aware via its own sonar that it has been pinged, thereby alerting it to the presence of the pinging sub. On the other hand, sonar may operate in the ‘passive’ mode when it is merely ‘listening’ to the noises generated by the propeller, vibrations, wake and other types of noise of a submarine. If these noises are cut down, minimized, then the hunter-killer submarine will have a hard time detecting a hostile submarine, unless the hunter switches its sonar to the ‘active’ mode. A stealth submarine is built to reduce a submarine’s normal noises, or ‘signature’, to the barest minimum.

Scorpene

Having an ongoing deal with Islamabad on their Agosta-class subbmarines firmly in place since 1978, including the advanced Agosta-90 B, Paris merrily went about rectifying the ‘imbalance’ it helped create on the Indian subcontinent. The French consortium of the state-run DCN and Thales, which had supplied the Agostas to Pakistan, offered New Delhi their most advanced conventional submarine, the Scorpene, supposedly a generation ahead of Agostas. According to a rediff.com report on 16 February 2001, India, the submarine arm of which had been established late on 8 December 1967, had failed to build a nuclear-powered submarine after spending two decades and Rs 2,000 crore in the attempt. In mid-2001 the French sent their most advanced stealth naval units to showcase in India. A deal was struck in June 2001 by a submarine-hungry India, since its mostly Soviet-made underwater vessels were already ageing beyond repair. The deal was expected to be cleared over two years later by India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). The Mazagon Docks Ltd (MDL) in Mumbai would produce at least six of these stealth diesel-electric subs, which have the capability of fitting a small nuclear reactor in their hull as well. This last bit of capability seemed to fit India’s ambition to command nuclear-powered—and eventually armed—submarines as well. In October 2000, India held talks with both France and Russia on indigenous production of the Scorpene and the Russian Amur. As of that year, i.e., at the turn of the millennium, no Indian submarines were equipped with missiles, unlike Pakistan’s Agostas. Hence, to begin with, New Delhi rushed to buy Barak missiles from Israel for the Viraat.

The first of three Agostas had been inducted into the Pakistani Navy in 1999; in December 2003 Pakistan managed to produce its own Agosta at its Karachi shipyards. The Agostas have advanced command, control and communications (C³), torpedoes, anti-ship missiles, anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-surface, intelligence-gathering capability.

But the 1,670-tonne Scorpene boasts of the Tavitac NT, a new combat management system, fully automated, digital radar videos, threat evaluation and weapon assignment. Its Mesma air-independent propulsion system enables it to remain submerged for a longer period than its predecessors, which had to surface frequently in order to recharge their batteries. Its range is 6,400 nm at a speed of 8 knots. Among its armaments are six 21-inch bow torpedo tubes with a total of 24 wire-guided torpedoes. The Scorpene has a number of 21-inch weapons. It also has popup anti-ship missiles. Alternatively, it can carry 30 mines. The submarine has a complement of 32.

India has in place a 30-year perspective plan to indigenously produce state-of-the-art submarines, mostly at MDL. The latter is expected to produce 24 submarines in phases, and of two types. The other type will probably be the Russian submarines. A Far Eastern Economic Review report on 15 August 2002 had already noted that Asian states, including India, Pakistan, Southeast Asian states but especially Japan seemed to be falling head over heels to acquire stealth submarines in a hurry.

Akula, Amur, ATV Submarines

The Navy wishes to lease two nuclear-powered Akula submarines (Type 971), also known as ‘Bars’ in NATO parlance, from Russia for five years from 2004. The Indian Navy had already gathered experience in handling nuclear submarines, as noted earlier, during 1988–91 when operating a Soviet-leased Charlie-class submarine, dubbed the INS Chakra, equipped with SS-N-7 cruise missiles. The Soviet collapse in 1991 did upset the Navy’s plan for building 4–6 nuclear-powered submarines. No blueprint could be expected from Russia for these vessels since such tech transfer would violate the nonproliferation treaty (NPT). As Navy Chief Madhvendra Singh observed on February 2004, any navy today would like to have nuclear submarines. They are quiet, need little fuel, and can remain long submerged, features, which give them a distinct edge over more conventional submarines. Hence, said Singh, India would also like to acquire them, but heremained evasive on the steps India might be taking in that direction. At least two more Russia-supplied nuclear submarines for the Indian Navy are said to be in the pipeline (The Times of India, 21 January 2004).

The Akula II, built at Severodvinsk, is quieter and more advanced than its predecessors, e.g., it has better sonars, can do 35 knots submerged, dive up to 600 metres, and carry twelve 3,000 km-range Granat cruise missiles (SLCMs) which can be fired from its 10 533 mm torpedo tubes even against land targets.

The Navy is also interested in the Russian Amur-1650 submarines and funding two Project 09170 nuclear-powered submarines in Russia with a view to acquire them. The Amur-1650, produced since the 1980s, is a fourth-generation dieselelectric boat designed by Russia’s oldest submarine designer, the Rubin Central Marine Design Bureau in St. Petersburg. It can be converted into air-independent propulsion and keep submerged thrice longer. While earlier Amurs of the Types 530 and 950 had four torpedo tubes, the 1650 has six; it is two to three times heavier than the earlier models, displacing 1,765 tonnes and is equipped with advanced cruise missiles, mines and torpedoes. As already noted, India’s 30-year submarine-building plan was focused on opening, as of 2000, two separate assembly plants for the Scorpene (24 planned) and the Amur (The Times of India, 6 October 2000). The DRDO was engaged in developing the maritime, nuclear-capable Sagarika missile¹⁵ though it remains shrouded in mystery. A similar missile, the Dhanush, had failed an initial test.

It should be noted in addition that the Navy in 2000 was planning to indigenously produce five Advanced Technology Vessels or ATVs, a code name for nuclear submarines. The Times of India quoted Navy Chief Singh on 3 April 2003 to the effect that the strongest arm of India’s nuclear triad should be under the sea, i.e., SLBM/SLCM-carrying submarines. However, Singh skirted all further questions related to that topic.

Moscow is also interested in selling more diesel submarines to India and has already sold Project 977 EKMs. Diesels are more useful than nuclear submarines in inland seas and coastal waters. The late 1998 Indo-Russian cooperation agreement on military technology during then Russian Defence Minister Primakov’s visit to India mentioned the purchase of $10 billion worth of Russian arms between 2000 and 2010, including diesel submarines.

Moscow has no reason to be unhappy with such a ‘strategic partnership’ with India, a phrase used with somewhat alarming frequency by its leaders, not least by President Putin himself during his two visits to India in 2000 and 2001. In fact, Soviet Defence Minister Igor Sergeyev had hurried to India and assured that Indian military personnel would be trained in his country in March 1999. China and India are the two largest arms importers from Russia, which help keep its sluggish defence industrial wheels turn. The Moscow Times since the 1990s have been giving vivid and frequent descriptions of Russia’s defence fund crunch and the pathetic condition of its Far Eastern Fleet and its personnel (26 March 1996 issue, online edition). Since the mid-1990s India bought an average of $400–800 million arms from Moscow.

Stealth Frigates: La Lafayette (Project 17, or P-17)

France showcased her hi-tech navy in India on 22 May 2001 by sending inter alia reportedly the world’s first stealth surface combatant, the 3,600-tonne La Lafayette frigate to Mumbai. Its equipment, including four 5,000 hp engines, is suspended from poles to minimize sonar-detectable vibration. The frigate has advanced automated information and combat-management systems. It is armed with eight Exocet missiles (MM 40 SSM), Crotale SAMs, one 100 mm gun, two 200 mm guns, and one 10-tonne heavy helo called Panther armed with anti-ship missiles. Besides, the Lafayette-class has 3D multi-function and 2D long-range radars. The frigate reportedly can take direct hits, yet remain combat-capable. Highly automated, it can speed at 25 knots, with a range of 9,000 km. It is 125 metres long, with a complement of 164. An Indo-French deal in June 2001 envisaged India building five of the Lafayettes with French know-how, probably at MDL. Paris insisted that while the vessels may be built in India, its weapons and sub-systems must be bought from France. The latter country also suffers from a defence budget crunch, so the deal comes, like with Russia’s deals, as a godsend to Paris. The same holds true of the Indian Navy in general, neglected as it was for a whole decade between the mid-1980s and the mid-1990s, and for MDL.

Krivak (Project 1135.6)

Earlier, in November 1997, India signed a $ 931.5 million agreement with Moscow for the supply of three 4,000-tonne Krivak III-class frigates, to be followed by indigenous production. In June 2003 it received two, the Talwar and Trishul (not to be confused with the latter’s earlier Whitby-class namesake which served between 1960 and 1992). The third, Project 1135.6 named INS Tabar, was commissioned on 19 April2004. Like its two predecessors, it was scheduled to visit foreign ports, about a dozen, en route to India. The Indian Navy wants three or four more of these. The Krivak-IIIs are dubbed Talwar-class in India. Another recent acquisition by the Indian Navy is the Nilgiri-class combatant, also called Project 17, or P 17. The government had approved their design and indigenous production in 1997.

The Talwar is also supposed to be stealthy. It has sound isolators to cut down vibrations and a protective heat shield to defend against heat-seeking missiles and thermal imagers. It is armed with over 200 km-range vertical-launch Club N and Club S anti-ship and ASW missiles. It has a wide array of weapons. The frigate can hit land, sea and air targets. Newer versions are expected to be armed with Yakhont and BrahMos missiles, the supersonic speed of which makes them difficult to intercept. A Talwar frigate can carry either a Ka-28 ASW helo or a Ka-31 AEW helo. The frigate has four gas turbines and can speed at 30 knots. These frigates are expected to tackle Pakistan’s Agosta-90B submarines.

However, there was much delay in delivery, totalling about 18 months. The Russian-supplied surface-to-surface (SSM) Shtil missile was found to be faulty; of 12 test-flights only seven were successful. About 500 Indian naval personnel sent to St. Petersburg to take possession of the two initial frigates, but had returned empty-handed after languishing in sub-zero temperature for months. The Russians had assured the Indian Navy that the fault would be rectified later, but Indian Navy chief Singh refused to accept delivery of the frigates till the problems were corrected. The Talwars are to be inducted in 2005, said Singh. Subsequently, they would be fitted out with the BrahMos missile.

En route to India from builders Baltisky Zavod in St. Petersburg, the Talwar and Trishul (home port Mumbai) separately showcased themselves in the Americas, Europe and Africa by making port calls.

INS Delhi

Three modern Delhi-class destroyers, including the Mysore and Mumbai, were commissioned respectively in 1997, 1999 and 2001. The latest Delhi destroyer should not be confused with its older namesake. The latter had been decommissioned in 1978 after 30 years of service.

INS Shivalik

Meanwhile, on 18 April 2003, the indigenously built, supposedly stealth frigate began trials in Mumbai, according to BBC online. Its speed is 32 knots, has SSMs and SAMs, torpedo tubes, rocket launchers, and indigenously designed sonar. At $140 million, it is expected to be commissioned in December 2005. Navy Chief Singh observed on the occasion of the trials that a developing country like India could not afford to buy warships abroad; hence, indigenous production was a necessity. The Navy had submitted its long-term plans like Vision-2025, 15-year shipbuilding and an aviation master plan to the Defence Ministry. The Navy had already obtained the government’s approval for its 30-year submarine-building plan, including the Scorpenes and Russian submarines. According to the same report, the Navy was expected to soon induct Ka-31 early-warning helos, Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Prabal and Kora-class missile corvettes, and Brahmaputra-class frigates. It also has plans for mid-life upgradation of Ranbir-class destroyers and Godavari-class frigates (The Times of India, 3 April 2003).

INS Jalashva

In March 2007 the Navy is expected to acquire the USS Trenton, ¹⁶ to be rechristened as INS ]alashva (Sanskrit for ‘sea horse’). The two other amphibious warships already in service are the INS Maghar and INS Gharial. With its 17,000-tonne displacement, it will be one of the largest Indian Navy warships, after the two carriers, with the Vikramaditya (the ex-Gorshkov) taking the lead when it is finally commissioned in 2008. Admiral Suresh Mehta observed that such ships would enable transporting troops across the seas and helping land battles of the future. The seaward orientation in the configuration attempts of the Navy is un-mistakable.¹⁷

Naval Missiles

The Russian-built submarine INS Sindhushastra arrived in Mumbai in October 2000 and soon joined the DGX-2000 war exercise in the Arabian Sea the following month. It added a new dimension in the subcontinental warfare with its Club supersonic cruise missiles. The Club is a shorter-range (300 km) version of the Granat, dubbed ‘Tomahawksi’ in the West due to its similarity to the US Tomahawk cruise. However, the missile technology control regime, or MTCR, bars the Granat from export since it exceeds MTCR-permissible limits of maximum 300 km and a 500-kg warhead.

The Club can hit both sea and land targets. This means it can help in land warfare as well, as UK and US cruise missiles had demonstrated in the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq at the beginning of the 21st century. A submarine can fire the Club while submerged. The Club can also be configured to carry a nuclear warhead. The DRDO plans to develop its strategic Brahmastra cruise on the basis of club technology. MDL was scheduled to build three Bangalore-class destroyers in 2002 armed with the Club. The latter missile uses fuel-efficient turbojet engine to approach target, then in the terminal phase its warhead detaches from the fuselage at over 30 km (16.2 nm) from target. A second rocket propels the warhead at Mach 3 speed towards the target, posing great difficulty for the latter to intercept it. The small Club is versatile. It can be launched from torpedo tubes or a warship’s vertical launch cells. The three modem Russian Talwar-class frigates are also equipped with the Club.

The Delhi-class destroyers and newer missile corvettes like the Kora-class, one-helo-equipped INS Karmuk (the fourth and last), built in Garden Reach shipyards (GRSE) of Kolkata are also equipped with Russian-built Uran cruise missiles with a range of 250 km. GRSE is expected to deliver nine more corvettes and frigates over the coming decade.

The anti-ship, supersonic BrahMos is the product of yet another Indo-Russian joint venture. Jointly developed by India’s Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) and Russia’s Mashinostroyenia, BrahMos zooms at supersonic 2.8 Mach with a strike range of 290 km. Production facilities were set up in Hyderabad in 1998. According to the ex-Navy Chief Singh in February 2004, at least one Indian combatant would be fitted out with the BrahMos by the end of 2005. User trials were expected at the end of 2004; a successful launch of the land version of the supersonic cruise missile was reported in February 2007 (The Times of India, Kolkata, 4 February 2007). This was reportedly the 12th successful test of the cruise missile ever since tests started in June 2001. BrahMos, named after the rivers Brahmaputra of India and Moskva of Russia, seems to be a versatile, multirole cruise missile that can be launched from mobile and fixed platforms. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh even laid out the prospect of its exporting potential, e.g. to Chile, South Africa and Malaysia (The Times of India, 29 June 2007, p. 7). The Russian-supplied Talwar-class frigates are expected to be equipped with the BrahMos eventually. Two of the Israel-supplied Barak missile systems have already been installed as of February 2004. More are expected. The Navy has reportedly been holding talks in acquiring these ‘heavy’ torpedoes in (of all places) landlocked Uzbekistan.

The Indian Navy is investing in cruise missiles as weapons of the future.¹⁸ Developmental work of naval cruise and possibly SLBM missiles began late, in 1992, compared to missiles for the other two armed force services, which began about a decade earlier. The ability of naval cruise missiles to hit both sea and land targets, as demonstrated repeatedly in the US-led wars in West Asia in recent years, has been an eye-opener for all navies.

It is known that the Aeronautical Development Establishment (ADE) in Bangalore has been working on naval missiles since 1992. One of its aims is the capability to launch missiles from submerged submarines like the ATY, also under development, as noted earlier. This capability acquires urgency since China’s YJ 8-2 anti-ship and land-attack cruise missile has already been at an advanced stage of development. There is also a land-attack version of the ADE missile. India, as already noted, handled the Soviet-supplied SS-N-7 aboard the nuclear-powered submarine Chakra. This radar-evading missile could fly just 30 metres above the surface, was small, relatively cheap to produce, and difficult to detect—the typical characteristics of a cruise missile.

Dhanush, on the other hand, is marked as an SLBM, the naval version of the Prithvi, and has a one-tonne payload, either conventional or nuclear. Its propulsion system is liquid fuelled. But the first test in 2000 failed due to its unstable sea platform (The Statesman, Kolkata, 2 August 2001, p. 8).

Meanwhile the Indian Navy’s electronic warfare (EW) system for surveillance and combat has deteriorated, restricting its operations in the Indian Ocean. The government is reviewing extensive modernization requests. The Navy’s Kashin-II destroyers, a Brahmaputra-class, three Godavari-class, five Leander-class and two Petya-class frigates are suffering from EW shortcomings. The Russian-built EW systems have outlived their life-cycles. The Navy is in a hurry to replace them, initially with EW systems from Israel’s Rafael Armament Development Authority Ltd. in Haifa. Seven such systems would cost the Navy $107 million. The Navy wishes to spend $500 million for longer-term modernization. DRDO is shifting R&D from tactical electronic support measure (ESM) to more strategic electronic intelligence (ELINT) systems. The latter tracks ships and aircraft passively. But there is criticism also of the DRDO’s piecemeal approach rather than the more desirable integrated development.

The Navy’s procurement problems have been well known. Delays in both domestically built weapons and foreign purchases have been adversely affecting the navy’s ambition to turn into a blue-water force. The media reported in August 2001 that a high-power Defence Acquisition Council (DAC) was being set up to smoothen defence procurement, minimize infighting among the three armed services over allocation of resources, and clear all long-term defence deals. DAC will sit on top of the Defence Production and Defence Procurement Boards. Its members would include the top brass of the three armed services, besides the envisaged Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) meant for handling nuclear weapons, and civilian secretaries from various defence-related branches like Defence Production, Defence Finance and Defence Acquisition.

Joint Naval Exercises

The Indian Navy with a large number of states, including those from neighbouring Southeast Asia, routinely holds a number of joint naval exercises. Between February 1993 and 2001, eight annual exercises took place between the Indian and the Singapore Navies. The one in 2001 was scheduled off Kochi on the Kerala coast. In 2003 there was a joint naval exercise scheduled with the Iranian Navy. The first ever Indo-Russian joint naval exercise was scheduled for two months later, in May, off both India’s eastern and western coasts. The Indo-French ‘Varuna-2003’ exercise took place soon thereafter.

On 4 July that same year a big joint exercise dubbed ‘Summerex’ was planned with the US Navy involving our navy and the Coast Guard along with their helos and aircraft. Both Eastern and Western Commands were to participate off the Chennai coast. India’s helos might have included the indigenous advanced light helicopter (ALH) built by HAL. It was still undergoing tests at Kochi before being inducted into the navy. INS Rajali at Arakkonam, India’s largest naval air station, was to play an important role too. US Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs, were also planning to hold joint marine commando exercises with their Indian counterpart, the Marine Commando Force, or Marcos, off Goa and Mangalore earlier in March 2003. Such joint naval, and other inter-service, exercises have become part of the routine in Indo-US defence relations, a far cry from the earlier decades when New Delhi openly opposed US naval and other military presence in the Indian Ocean. ‘Summerex’ was yet another in a series of joint Indo-US naval exercises. In late September 2002, the US Pacific Command fielded an ultra-modern, Aegis-equipped Ticonderoga-class destroyer and a Spruance destroyer, an SSN (nuclear) submarine and a maritime recce aircraft in an Indo-US naval exercise dubbed ‘Malabar-4’. These exercises often involve sub-surface, surface and air operations. Joint exercises with the US Pacific Fleet, as well as other navies, have become routine.

Even more startling was the first ever-joint naval exercise with China scheduled for November 2003, preceded by Indian Premier Vajpayee’s visit to Beijing beginning on 22 June. This was a three-day SAR manoeuvre but without combat simulation. India had proposed anti-piracy exercise near the pirate-infested Malacca Strait, as it had carried out with the US and the Indonesian Navies. But China had replied that such operations are carried out by its border guard units, not by its navy. Hence, an SAR exercise was chosen instead.

India and China have been exchanging port calls with one another, notwithstanding their silent rivalry. An Indian naval contingent was scheduled to visit Shanghai in November that year. This was in spite of India’s worries about the Chinese presence in the Cocoa Islands of neighbouring Myanmar and growing naval activities in the Indian Ocean. Such worries notwithstanding, joint exercises are also being held with the Pakistani Navy. Talks with Islamabad started on 16 February 2004 on countermeasures against arms smuggling to India’s Gujarat and Maharashtra coasts. India’s Coast Guard is to play an important role here. It has a 15-year plan to acquire 146 vessels and 100 aircraft and helos to discharge its mission of guarding our long coastline against smugglers and poachers. A hotline dedicated to Indo-Pakistani maritime patrolling was also reportedly on the anvil.

The ‘biggest ever’ joint Indo-French naval exercise dubbed ‘Varuna-2004’ involving half-a-dozen warships was scheduled to be held off Goa between 6 and 15 April 2004. Joint naval exercises between Paris and New Delhi had started since 1998. France fields its nuclear-powered attack submarine. In the international fleet review in Mumbai held in February 2001 it had already sent one. Varuna-2004 involves wide-ranging naval activities, including anti-air, ASW, air combat drills and cross-deck-landings of aircraft. Indian and French officers take turns in commanding the vessels. A UK destroyer, HMS Gloucester, was scheduled to join the French contingent.

India’s Naval Operations: At Home and Abroad

In mid-December 1961, the Indian Navy, then in its rudimentary shape barely a little over a decade following Independence, nevertheless successfully carried out its task of backing the army’s land operations against the Portuguese colonizers in Goa. It stood guard over the Bays of Marmagao and Aguada against any Portuguese attempt to send reinforcements. It also sank an enemy warship off Diu and neutralized the Portuguese-controlled airport and its control tower by bombardment. An anti-aircraft Portuguese frigate, the Albuquerque, was damaged and abandoned by its crew off Marmagao. Naval assault teams, under cover fire of 4.5-inch guns from friendly ships, ultimately took Anjadip and forced the enemy garrison there to surrender.¹⁹

Ten years later, again in December, came the Bangladesh war with Pakistan. The carrier Vikrant and its escorts blocked Pakistani sea-borne supply routes to then East Pakistan. Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar and other port facilities were cut off, thereby leaving over 90,000 Pakistani troops to face major Indian land and air assaults with rapidly depleting resources. Vikrant’s Seahawk and Alize (‘Chetak’) squadrons wrought havoc on East Pakistan’s vital installations. The Indian Navy’s Eastern Fleet was soon in total control of the sea and surrounding air space. The Pakistani force had no other option but to surrender. The war had lasted less than two weeks: 3–16 December 1971.

On 29 July 1987 India and Sri Lanka reached an agreement involving our navy’s peacekeeping role in Colombo’s uphill struggle against the Tamil Tigers, or LTTE. Ethnic strife was rampant, especially in the Jaffna region of the island republic. The Indian Navy launched ‘Operation Pawan’ and played a multi-purpose role in this. It monitored movement of vessels carrying refugees and that of fishing boats. Its role of transporting and maintenance of the Indian Peace-Keeping Force, or IPKF, was crucial. The ‘milk run’ from south Indian ports to Sri Lanka involved transporting 200,000 men in both directions, 100,000 tonnes of stores and 8,000 vehicles. Our merchant fleet also chipped in to help. In October the Eastern Naval Command, backed by our Coast Guard, put a cordon sanitaire in place. Ships and aircraft constantly patrolled the 300-mile long line of control. A blockade of all supplies to the militants was implemented. Smaller vessels like landing and coastal craft also played an important role. The navy’s ability to sustain such a large body of troops for a long time attracted special attention in military circles.

More recently, in 2001, the new Indian Marine Special Force and Army commandos denied use of shallow lagoons to the LTTE insurgents. Further, they carried out clandestine attacks on the latter’s hideouts and training camps. Today’s standard operating naval procedure in a Sri Lanka-type situation involves combat landing on beaches, aerial surveillance, and support to the troops by helos and aircraft. Pilots of the ageing Alizes, which have seen service since 1961 (No. 310 Cobra Squadron), nevertheless proved effective.²⁰

Among other Indian Navy operations away from Indian shores was ‘Operation Cactus’ in 1988. When mercenaries overwhelmed Abdul Gayoom’s armed force in the Maldives, the President of the island republic turned to India for help. Within hours the navy flew aerial recce missions over the island, while the army and the air force deployed troops to put down the armed coup there. The mercenaries then abducted a merchant vessel, Progress Light, took hostages, including the Maldives Transport Minister and his wife, and set sail for Colombo. Indian naval combatants intercepted the abducted ship. But since hostages were involved, the situation required more than use of brutal force. The Maldives government’s attempts to negotiate failed. Thereupon two Indian Navy warships fired warning shots and went for what looked like graduated use of force. The rebels finally surrendered on 6 November. The Indian Navy had successfully fought terrorism at sea and was given ‘tumultuous welcome’ at Male.

Between 26 June and 13 July 2003 the Indian navy, upon receiving a request from Mozambique’s president J. A. Chissano in May that year, sent the guided missile cruiser Ranjit and an offshore patrol boat, Sukanya, to Maputo to safeguard the 53-head-of-state summit of the African Union there. The Navy also imparted training to 100 native naval personnel. There are several other episodes involving our navy’s peacekeeping missions under UN auspices.

Since 1995 the navy holds the biennial event called ‘Milan’ with the aim of increasing maritime cooperation among the neighbouring littorals of the Bay of Bengal. In mid-February 2003 Milan-2003 was held at Port Blair, for the first time after the latter acquired its unified Andaman and Nicobar Command. Participating navies included units from Australia, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Sri Lanka and Thailand. Seminars, sports, professional exercises and other elements engaged the attention of all these navies as well as our coast guard. The Indian Navy’s theme for the occasion was: ‘building bridges across the seas’.

Besides scaling Mt. Everest way back in 1965, Saser Kangri I and IV (7,672 metres) in the autumn of 2003 as part of its ‘naval mountaineering’, and flying its ensign in Antarctica in 1981, the Indian Navy was reportedly helping Mauritius in mid-2003 to guard its EEZ. This is billed as being of strategic importance, not least because this operation opens up another dimension of our navy’s activity. There are states like Mauritius, which have large EEZs but inadequate means of guarding them. lflndia starts helping them guard their territorial waters, this can only mean an increase influence over these states in the future.

Conclusion

The Indian Navy, the fifth largest in the world, has to maintain its own in the face of potentially hostile neighbours, and the danger of the two acting in collusion against India’s maritime interests at times of crisis. As noted at the outset, our navy was given the lowest priority among the three armed services. For a decade since the mid-1980s it faced utter neglect. Fortunately, the government has been paying greater attention to its needs, especially to its modernization. In February 2000, Finance Minister Yashwant Sinha had announced a major increase in defence ex-penditure: a huge 28.2 per cent increase over the last financial year.²¹ In 2003–2004 the navy’s share went up to 18 per cent of the total defence budget, amounting to about $357 billion. Percentage-wise, this was a giant leap for the Navy, which had hitherto been allotted not more than 11–14 per cent of the defence budget. In early 2004, Finance Minister Jaswant Singh declared Rs 25,000 crores as a non-refundable grant for defence outlay, a significant share of which no doubt went to the Navy.

India’s long coastline, its central location in South Asia, and far larger maritime assets than those of other South Asian littorals automatically bestow upon the country a significant naval role in the Indian Ocean and beyond. This also includes limiting Islamabad’s role in other littorals. This also means living up to India’s stature as the outstanding South Asian state. Out of the seven states of the region, India easily stands out in size, population, economic, cultural and military prowess. In case a war breaks out on land, for instance, over Kashmir, India’s naval superiority, if the latter can be established beyond dispute, can hurt Pakistan badly by intercepting its sea-borne trade, including oil imports, and its naval forces.

India’s controversial decision to maintain aircraft carriers, ideally three (one for retrofit, and one each for the Eastern and Western Naval Commands), and long-range recce and bomber aircraft have various justifications. Firstly, these assets can intercept hostile forces far away from the Indian coastline. A potential Pakistani or Chinese naval threat cannot be ignored, notwithstanding periodic surface bonhomie. The Chinese, besides supplying Islamabad with naval combatants and technology, and cooperating on nuclear and missile technology, have been helping build Pakistan’s naval base at Gwadar, which would provide the Chinese with access to the Persian Gulf.

Second, by the same token, long-range naval forces, including their air wing, will safeguard India’s trade, especially oil from West Asia, which are of vital importance to the country’s economic well-being. Thirdly, modernization has become a must. According to Jane’s Defence Weekly online on 11 March 1995, nine of the navy’s 36 major ships were due to retire by 2000, including six of 18 submarines. The navy’s declining share of the defence budget, according to Jane’s, was preventing it from replacing these combatants as of the mid-1990s. Today, the modem naval assets will also help keep the peace in the South Asian region, as proven by past experience. Fourthly, a powerful Indian Navy would be a factor of deterrence for Pakistan, given the latter’s vital sea-borne trade. India has a 5:1 advantage over the Pakistani Navy in terms of combat vessels, air assets and manpower. The Indian Navy seems to consider the Pakistani Navy rather as limited in sea-denial capacity, and is more concerned about the growing Chinese influence in the Indian Ocean. It seeks to counter it partly by increasing its own presence in eastern South China Sea.

India is concentrating on developing the much-delayed state-of-the-art naval base at Karwar in Kamataka. It originally was to have been completed by 1995, but became functional as late as 2005. Dubbed ‘Operation Seabird’, the new naval base will come under the navy’s, Western Command its ‘sword arm’. With the naval base moving towards Phase2, Karwar will gain in strategic importance and also help decongest existing bases at Mumbai, Cochin, and even Vizag.

Project Seabird will be allotted 8,000 acres of land along the west coast. It will be designed to handle a large number of warships and aircraft. Besides, it will have a dockyard for repair, retrofit and modernization of surface combatants and submarines. The defence ministry is roping in international firms like Rolls Royce, to lend a hand in developing this hi-tech facility. According to the original estimate in 1995, when the project had been approved by the government, it would have cost Rs 1,294.41 crores (The Times of India, 24 June 2004, p. 6).

India’s blue-water ambitions are obvious. Its size, position in the Indian Ocean with two large water bodies of the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal on either side, along with their critical importance for national and international trade, the composition of its naval force, which includes carriers, long-range recce aircraft and bombers, and the stated ambition to acquire SLBM-submarines, are among the pointers in that direction. Important SLOCs criss-cross the Indian Ocean. Long-haul maritime cargo from the Persian Gulf, Africa and Europe transits it, especially oil. The Southeast Asian chokepoints of Sunda, Lombok and the 960 km-long Malacca Straits had half of the world’s merchant fleet capacity and a third of the world’s ships passing through them as early as 1993. The shipping through the Malacca Strait easily exceeds those transiting through the Suez and the Panama Canals combined. India lies between the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca. Both these choke points can become volatile. While there are alternative routes to Malacca, there are no such alternative sea routes for the Persian Gulf oil except via overland pipelines which, however, would be vulnerable to insurgencies, terrorism and war. So, any crisis in the Hormuz region would impact negatively on India and numerous other states. India’s geographical location dominates the SLOCs from the Persian Gulf before they round off south of Dundra Head in Sri Lanka. This SLOC also runs close to India’s Andaman and Nicobar Islands before entering the Malacca Strait. Merchant traffic thus transit through areas close to India’s milieu of maritime interest. So, like Hormuz, any problem at or near Malacca affects India’s interests as well.²²

Training with nuclear submarines revealed the navy’s ambition for long-range, blue-water operations. By 2010 India is expected to become a strategic force centred on two carrier battle groups, or CVBGs, nuclear-powered submarines, or SSNs, and strategic/maritime strike aircraft—all of which will play a dominant role in the Indian Ocean region. As an analysis from the Virtual Information Center in the USA puts it, the Indian Navy will become primarily an ocean-going navy by the end of this decade, with few ships ofless than 1,200-tonne displacement. Thus, in a nutshell, India’s ‘sea-control’ strategy in the Indian Ocean region is completely attuned to its geographical location and concomitant political and economic factors.²³ It is time that the government keenly monitors the modernization of our navy and attaches the importance to it that it rightly deserves.