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INDIA’s NUCLEAR POLICY

Rajesh Kumar Mishra

For almost five decades, the Cold War–steeped world, which witnessed a race for development and deployment of nuclear weapons faced a grand dilemma—whether or not to use nuclear weapons in a severe military crisis. Had there been no review by major nuclear weapon states on the doctrines simply based on mutual assured destruction, there would have been no need for alternatives like limited, flexible or proportionate deterrent capabilities. The process of review in diversifying the role of nuclear weapons led to changes in the size and nature of nuclear arsenals worldwide. Though the phase of bipolar rivalry between the Warsaw Pact and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has ended, stocks of their nuclear arsenals still exist, though reduced. The efforts of P-5 states (USA, Russia, China, France and Britain) are now being channellized to develop cuttingedge technologies. The emphasis is on enhancing the credibility of individual deterrent capabilities. The continuing rationality for possession of nuclear weapons is still premised on the unpredictability of threat vulnerabilities. Threat perceptions and force projections still remain as significant dimensions to validate the existence of deterrence. The complexity in conceptualizing nuclear deterrence arises due to the changing nature of security perceptions of states in the context of their own force capabilities.

‘Why do states want nuclear weapons?’— this remains a contested question among analysts and policy-makers throughout the world. The political decision by states to develop and improve the sophistication of nuclear weapons makes the disarmament issue even more complex with the changing security dynamics in the international system. The concepts of international security are now being redefined with the end of Cold War, and, hence, the associated role of the institutions. Issues like globalization, economic development and technological innovations are being woven or integrated into discourses on security challenges, including those of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

With the objective to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons beyond P-5 states, the parties to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) agreed to an indefinite extension of the treaty at the 1995 NPT Review Conference. The treaty was opened for signature on 1 July 1968 and came into force from March 1970. However, in the run-up to the NPT 2005 Review Conference, the regime was facing challenges to its own surviva¹ Although the treaty has been in existence for more than three decades, there are apparent concerns about the failure of the nuclear weapon states (NWS) under the NPT to make exemplary progress on disarmament.² Today, the credibility of the treaty itself has been called into question as it is evident from recent disclosures that A.Q. Khan’s proliferation network had clandestinely facilitated the nuclear programmes of NPT member states like Libya, North Korea and Iran. According to the United Nations General Secretary’s high level panel report, ‘We are approaching a point at which the erosion of the nonproliferation regime could become irreversible.’³ The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) also admits that ‘it’s absolutely essential that we amend the treaty’.⁴ While the concerns for controlling proliferation are growing, the demand of equitable cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear power is also expanding across the globe. The nuclear energy demands in the world are projecting high hopes for the future.⁵

In the quest for new mechanisms and institutions for international nuclear order that pertain to both security and development related issues, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and President George W. Bush declared in the joint statement of 18 July 2005 ‘their resolve to transform the relationship’ between the two countries and ‘establish a global partnership’.⁶ The new initiative is intended to create more space for India’s participation in the new emerging international nuclear and security order. In the joint statement, the US President acknowledged ‘India’s strong commitment to preventing WMD proliferation’ and stated that ‘as a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology, India should acquire the same benefits and advantages as other such states.’⁷ For its part, India claims that ‘in the four decades since NPT, our record contrasts favourably with NPT members, even of the weapon-state category, some of whom encouraged and abetted proliferation for political or commercial reasons. Our export control performance during this same period also contrasts favourably with those of many developed nations who could not stop their companies from supporting clandestine WMD programmes’. Now, the Indian foreign policy is motivated by ‘national aspirations’ while expressing ‘confidence as an emerging global player’.⁸

As a country with an exceptional non-proliferation record, even without being a member of the NPT, India maintains a policy of non-transfer of enrichment and reprocessing technologies. Even as it maintains its commitment to work on global nuclear disarmament and a more equitable world order, India believes:

The end of the Cold War had provided the opportunity to reduce the salience of nuclear weapons but we saw instead that most of the world acquiesced in the maneuvres to perpetuate forever the right of a handful of nations to retain their arsenals…. The search for unilateral advantage has led to measures that undermine the principle of irreversibility of committed reductions. There is no move towards collective renouncing of ‘first-use’. Instead, there are prospects of advocacy of pre-emptive use and a move towards developing new types of arsenals justified by new rationales.⁹

In fact, the Indian nuclear policy embraces the defence and disarmament aspects of nuclear security in a broader global perspective. The regional and international security imperatives provide impetus to India’s national security formulation. Strategically, India finds itself placed

…at the centre of an arc of terrorism between North Africa and South-east Asia, its close proximity to a key source of nuclear proliferation and the continuing acts of terrorism from across her western borders … [in close proximity with] China, [who is] pursuing a policy of rapid military modernisation.¹⁰

China itself says that its ‘military improvements are part of the country’s overall modernization and economic expansion’. The effort will continue apace, it adds, seeking to ‘lay a solid foundation’ by 2010, make ‘major progress’ by 2020 and ‘reach the strategic goal of building informationized armed forces and being capable of winning informationized wars by the mid-21st century’.¹¹ The mutually contested security perceptions of the US and China, along with the modernization efforts by Russia, France and Britain, significantly influence India’s own threat perceptions for future. There is also a debated viewpoint prevalent in India that if it becomes the third largest global economy in next 20 years, then its global status itself so will bestow upon India global responsibilities and make it vulnerable to global threats. Therefore, its military power and nuclear weapons power must be of global orientation.¹²

Both in practice and theory, nuclear weapons have been a central element of international security discourse. Possession of nuclear weapons by a state beyond the P-5 club (the US, Britain, France, China and Russia) is commonly described in Western academic and strategic communities interchangeably as the ‘spread’ or ‘proliferation’ of nuclear weapons and they call states that have acquired them ‘new nuclear weapon states’. In the course of the last five decades, a complex theology has evolved about the extent to which nuclear deterrence preserves or endangers world peace and security. Despite lacking universal acceptance at policy-making levels, ‘the debate over nuclear proliferation’ ¹³ in the Western world remains interesting because of the immense intellectual input. However, there appear two significant limitations in the prevailing debate. First, the lack of universal appeal is apparent in the inherent criticisms brought forth by each rival theorist group against the other over mutually contested assumptions and applications of each theory. Second, academic formulations on proliferation, which may have policy applications as well, do not adequately proffer a comprehensive nuclear disarmament approach against the existing discriminating non proliferation regimes. By and large while discussing ‘deterrence’ in the context of the ‘new nuclear weapons states’, most of the academic works legitimize the nuclear weapons of P-5 states and remain deeply suspicious of the rationality of the others. Cohen and Frankel sum it up succinctly: ‘There is little in the literature to tell us how a country should plan to use its nuclear weapons to deter its adversaries while denying the possession of these weapons’.¹⁴ In the prevailing complex dynamics of academic discourse, the existence of nuclear weapons in different parts of the world is a reality today and therefore requires the appropriate attention in the security calculus of all countries, those with or without nuclear weapons.

In India’s neighbourhood, the strategic triangle comprising India, Pakistan and China defines the contours of security stability of the South Asian region. The term ‘stability’ is generally related to its synonyms—like solidity, substantiality, strength and firmness.¹⁵ The nuclear dimension of this triangular strategic stability syndrome has its proportionate bearing on the India’s nuclear policy too. By conducting nuclear tests in 1998, ‘India altered its status from a nuclear capable state to a declared nuclear weapon state’.¹⁶ Subsequently, the salient features of country’s nuclear policy have been reflected in its doctrinal formulations. The proposed doctrine is still to attain a final shape. Dynamism of the doctrine means scope for amendments with the changing needs of time and threat perceptions. The Indian threat perceptions in terms of the security challenges can be examined through three significant but closely inter-linked factors. First, vulnerabilities against Pakistan remain the immediate concern for India. Second, China stands against India as the long-term strategic challenge. The third factor arises from the Indian disarmament perspectives, especially how the country views the prevailing global non-proliferation regime as discriminatory and unpredictable for a world free from nuclear weapons.

For India, the country faces a unique security challenge from the two neighbouring countries—Pakistan and China—who possess considerable nuclear strength. No corner of the world is as unique as southern Asia in terms of the dynamics of international insecurity. The outstanding bilateral disputes between India and China have further given rise to a China–Pakistan collaboration against India. The regional adversaries separately and jointly pose a challenge to Indian peace and security.

The Pakistan Factor

Pakistan’s Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz has said that ‘Pakistan’s strategy of credible minimum deterrence’ guarantees ‘peace in the region’ and Pakistan’s active nuclear weapon programme is moving ‘from strength to strength’.¹⁷ Pakistan is considered to have as many as 50 nuclear weapons and enough highly enriched uranium (HEU) stock for 50 more, including the additional capacity to produce five to ten bombs a year.¹⁸ According to a relatively more recent estimate, Pakistan is said to possess 55–90 weapons of highly enriched uranium and 20–60 plutonium bombs.¹⁹ No definitive information at official levels is available on such speculative assessments. The possible delivery systems for weapons are aircraft and missiles.

When talking about his nuclear capability of this country, President Pervez Musharraf said: ‘Our strategy on defensive deterrence, both in conventional and unconventional fields, is in place, in strength, and is growing from strength to strength every year’.²⁰ Commenting on the possibility of any apprehensions that Pakistan might have on account of the growing proximity between the US and India, Musharraf stated at a high-profile meeting with Lahore’s media: ‘There is no need to worry about it. We are quite capable of defending ourselves, and will improve it if we need to’²¹ Musharraf has gone on record to say that the weapons are in a ‘disassembled state’.²² Few other terms have also been used to project the deployment status of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, such as ‘operationally deployed’²³ or ‘in the component form’²⁴ While the term component form has not been spelt out, it seems that ‘the situation in Pakistan may be murky and may in fact best be described as partial deployment’.²⁵

Pakistan has not announced any comprehensive nuclear doctrine. However, two basic elements that emerge from statements made by the country’s leaders are ‘a rejection of the NFU [No-First Use] policy, and the role of nuclear weapons as minimum credible deterrent’.²⁶ Realizing the gap between military strength in conventional terms, there is a view prevalent in Pakistan that an NFU posture could provide India the leverage in a conventional attack. By seeking a ‘no-aggression pact’, Pakistan seems to preclude even an Indian reprisal for Pakistan’s misadventures like the one in Kargil in 1999 and support to cross-border terrorism against India. Some experts reckon that another factor complicates the security environment for India: Pakistan’s ‘chief patrons, principally the US and China, are bound to try and right the inherent imbalance in power by assisting it in ways inimical to Indian interests’.²⁷

Pakistan’s ambassador to the United Nations argued: ‘We have to rely on our own means to deter Indian aggression. We have that means and we will not neutralize it by any doctrine of no first use’.²⁸ Pakistan’s doctrinal policy is kept deliberately ambiguous.²⁹ In terms of ability to ensure survivability, Pakistan wants to have a sufficient number and variety of assets to create ‘reasonable doubt’.³⁰

Relevant to the current discussion is Pakistan’s bottom line for the use of nuclear weapons. This has been spelt out by General Khalid Kidwai, head of the strategic planning division (SPD) under the national command authority, to a delegation ofltalian scientists. He said: ‘Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. In case that deterrence fails, they will be used if:

• India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part of its territory (space threshold);
• India destroys a large part either of its land or air force (military threshold);
• India resorts to economic strangling of Pakistan (economic strangling); or
• India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates a large-scale internal subversion in Pakistan (domestic destabilization)’.³¹

In other words, without defining any limits, Pakistan intends to use its nuclear weapons to counter even a primarily conventional conflict situation if it feels threatened with military, political or economic defeat. However, there is a feeling in Pakistan that a nuclear response cannot be involved to deal with the local contingencies and nuclear threshold should be maintained at high level.³² A former foreign minister of Pakistan has said that the destruction of even a single city would be an unacceptable risk for another country that contemplates a preemptive strike.³³ In an interview to CNN on 1 June 2002, Pervez Musharraf tried to allay the growing international fear of nuclear war in the subcontinent by saying: ‘I would even go to the extent of saying one shouldn’t even be discussing these things [nuclear war], because any sane individual cannot even think of going into this unconventional war, whatever the pressure.’³⁴

While chairing the meeting of the National Command Authority (NCA) in October 2001, Pervez Musharraf reaffirmed the Pakistani strategic assets as the cornerstone of country’s national security and said that there would be no compromise on the nuclear programme.³⁵ The statement was made in the light of increasing international concern about improving security and installing new safeguards for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in America. Musharraf assured the world that the country’s strategic capability was fully safeguarded.³⁶ Such assertions need further examination, especially when Pakistan is considered as a potential source for terrorists to gain access to nuclear technology and materials.³⁷ A.Q. Khan’s televised statement in February 2004, when he confessed to his involvement in the international nuclear black market, drew unprecedented media attention.

However, ‘A.Q. Khan got off lightly, sending disturbing messages about US and Pakistani attitudes toward proliferation’.³⁸ It also raised the most troubling question of ‘how and to what extent Pakistan’s free-market approach to proliferation has allowed terrorist groups like Al Qaeda to acquire nuclear materials and technology[?]’.³⁹ The mounting speculation thus terrorists are trying to gain access to the nuclear establishments of Pakistan cannot be ignored. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and Ramzi bin Al Shibha, who were caught in Pakistan, had earlier revealed in a secret interview to AlJazeera television that Al Qaeda had planned to strike American nuclear plants, but dropped the idea as it feared it could go out of control.⁴⁰ Moreover, Pakistani scientists Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid, who were arrested on 23 October 2001, had disclosed during the interrogation that they had held extensive meetings in August 2001 with Osama bin Laden, one of his top lieutenants, Ayman Al Zawahiri, and two other Al Qaeda officials in the Afghan capital of Kabul.⁴¹

American officials believe that Abdullah Al Muhajir, alias Jose Padila (who had alleged links withAl Qaeda and was arrested on 8 May 2002 in Chicago’s international airport) was intending to return to Pakistan with reconnaissance information before proceeding for attacks in the USA with dirty bombs.⁴² Intelligence sources were quoted as saying that during his earlier stay in Pakistan, Al Muhajir had at least two meetings with Al Qaeda operatives in Karachi.⁴³ It is also believed that there were plans to provide diverted radioactive material to Al Qaeda recruits and have them trained by Pakistani nuclear scientists to build dirty bombs.⁴⁴ The US authorities were tipped off about Al Muhajir by Abu Zubaida.⁴⁵ A few weeks before Muhajir’s arrest, a news report had mentioned that Abu Zubaida, a key lieutenant of Osama bin Laden who was arrested in Pakistan on 8 March 2002, had provided interrogators with alarming information pertaining to Al Qaeda’s ability to build a radiological device and smuggle it into the United States.⁴⁶ The threat of nuclear terrorism has different dimensions that stem from

…the theft and detonation of an intact nuclear weapon; the theft or purchase of fissile material leading to the fabrication and detonation of a crude nuclear weapon (an improvised nuclear device); attacks against and sabotage of nuclear facilities to result in radioactive emissions; and the acquisition of radioactive materials to the fabrication and detonation of radiological dispersion device (dirty bomb).⁴⁷

Therefore, the threats from Pakistan are multifaceted (including both deliberate and inadvertent) and they require appropriate Indian strategies to tackle the potential vulnerabilities in Pakistan. For India, nuclear confidence-building with Pakistan, would considerably deal with issues like accidental use of nuclear weapons and the possibility of anti-India fanatic groups gaining access to Pakistan’s weapon material or technology that can be used against India.

The China Factor

China maintains that the size of its nuclear arsenal is ‘small’ or ‘limited’, but there have been different estimates available in analyses by Western experts. These speculative estimates suggest the total number of warheads in China’s arsenal in between 350 and 600.⁴⁸ Ever since China acquired a range of missile capabilities, including inter continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), its deterrence has been based on quantitative ambiguity over the size of its strategic forces. China continues to deploy missiles capable of targeting India and virtually all of the US and the Asia-Pacific theatre.⁴⁹ China has already deployed solid-fuel mobile DF-21 missiles capable of hitting targets in India. The range of the Chinese short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) covers significant parts oflndian territory, from the northwest to the northeast regions. At the same time, the rate of increase in the production of SRBMs raises the vulnerability of missile proliferation from China to other countries, mainly Pakistan, as had been witnessed in the past. Despite a phenomenal rise in trade with India and a flurry of visits by senior Chinese leaders to India, China has yet to give up its strategic nexus with Pakistan.⁵⁰ India can hardly afford to ignore these realities concerning its own security vulnerabilities.

India had to face Chinese aggression in 1962 and, since then, both view each other with mutual mistrust. Pakistan has taken advantage of the prevailing situation by hitching its interests to China against India. As a matter of strategic alliance, Pakistan considers China as ‘all-weather’ friend in South Asia and the two countries are united in their rivalry against India. For example, Beijing provided Pakistan generous shipments of arms in the run-up to the 1965 and 1971 wars with India. After Pakistan’s defeat in 1971, China deferred for 20 years payment on a 1970 loan of $200 million and wrote off another $110 million in earlier loans to support the modernization of Pakistan’s military.⁵¹

Many experts in India and outside view the Chinese policy of creating mystery and fear for competitors and adversaries at international forums as a challenge to future Sino-Indian relations. Beijing desires to remain the sole unchallenged power in the Asian region. China sees India as a potential power that could threaten its hegemony in the region.

Despite international condemnation, China has relentlessly supported and assisted the Pakistani nuclear and missile programmes. On 6 August 2001, the Washington Times reported that ‘a US spy satellite detected the latest shipment as it arrived by truck at the mountainous China-Pakistani border on May 1’. Quoting US intelligence agencies, the report said the China National Machinery and Equipment Import and Export Corp. (CMEC) supplied the missile components for Pakistan’s Shaheen-1 and Shaheen-2 missile programmes. It was one of 12 missile component transfers sent by ships and trucks detected by US intelligence agencies since the beginning of the year.⁵²

Despite its protestations of innocence, the fact remains that China has consistently provided Pakistan with wide-ranging assistance to enable Pakistan to develop nuclear weapons and a wide variety of missiles, ranging from short-range M-11s to medium-range M-9s and intermediate range M-18s.⁵³ China had signed a contract with Pakistan in 1988 under which Beijing committed to supply 34 complete M-11 missiles by 1994.⁵⁴ Another news report mentioned that China provided ballistic missiles and launchers, upto 30 M-11/DF-11 missiles to Pakistan’s Sargodha Air Force base near Lahore in 1992 and M-11 transportererector-launcher in 1991.⁵⁵ Also, Pakistan has acquired blue prints and equipment to build a factory on turnkey basis for M-11 missiles in addition to the M-11 missile assembly kits from the Chinese Ministry of Aerospace Industry. China has linked the M-11 transfers to Pakistan with the US sale of F-16s to Taiwan.⁵⁶ To oppose the US policies, Beijing has drawn a reciprocal route to proliferate regionally and internationally. India’s peace and security is, thus, also indirectly challenged by the contending postures of China and the US.

China has been helping Pakistan for a long time to help it emerge as a nuclear weapon state. Back in 1983, US intelligence agencies had reported that China had transferred a complete nuclear weapon design of 25 KT nuclear bomb to Pakistan⁵⁷ and it has also been extensively aiding the Pakistani nuclear weapons programme. In 1986, it was revealed that China sold tritium (which is used to achieve fusion in a nuclear device) to Pakistan, and that Chinese scientists had assisted Pakistan with the production of weapons-grade fissile material (uranium) at Khan laboratory, Kahuta.⁵⁸ Apart from the controversial Chinese sale of 5,000 ring magnets, China has also been supplying Pakistan with the facilities for reactors, reprocessing, heavy water and technological aid.⁵⁹ Though unconfirmed, it was reported in February 2001 that China’s Seventh Research and Design Institute had supplied 50 ceramic capacitors to New Labs against the payment through a bank account maintained by an official at the Pakistani embassy.⁶⁰

The omissions in the past indicate that China remains fairly uncontrolled even though it is an NPT signatory state. China has long been providing Pakistan with nuclear technology, conventional weaponry and missile systems to keep Pakistan’s ambitions high against Indian defence preparedness. Through logical deduction of events and facts, India might interpret China’s continued technology transfers to Pakistan as a product of Beijing’s intent to provoke conflict between India and Pakistan and that Beijing seeks to increase the capabilities of Pakistan in the hope that Pakistan could pose a greater threat to India.

Apart from the China–Pakistan nexus against India, the larger neighbour also poses a security challenge to India. It is believed that since the 1970s, China has targeted India with nuclear-tipped missiles and about 66 warheads are targeted against the Indian territory.⁶¹ India is facing a ‘two front nuclear war criterion’⁶² in the regional security dynamics. Concerns have also been expressed that China could easily strike Indian military facilities and nuclear weapon production sites with 20 or so nuclear-armed ballistic missiles (mainly CSS-2s and CSS-5s, with a few CSS-3s) and have over 100 nuclear-armed missiles in reserve.⁶³ Further, the deployment of CSS-5 missiles (range 1,700 km), which is reported to have started since early 1990s,⁶⁴ is intended to hit targets in the adjoining regions of China. It can also make India wary of such developments in the bordering country. Chinese support to build Gwadar port in Pakistan and Beijing’s collaboration with the military regime in Myanmar for naval expansion into the Indian Ocean region close to India’s maritime boundaries have had alarming effects in India.⁶⁵ Doubts have also been raised as to whether China is attempting to encircle India strategically.⁶⁶ In fact, China has a long history of creating regional troublemakers; this became evident first with its overtures to Pakistan. Now, the international community is facing a serious threat from North Korea after it claimed to have conducted a nuclear test on 9 October 2006.

India as a Nuclear-Weapon State

India’s nuclear programme is indigenous and progressive. In 1974, India carried out a peaceful nuclear explosion in Pokhran, Rajasthan. As a responsible nation, it has never passed on this technology to another country. The country can indeed boast a comprehensive capability for the design and construction of nuclear power plants and the complete fuel cycle, as well as some pioneering research and development in such areas as the thorium fuel cycle and use of carbide fuel in fast reactors.⁶⁷ India was compelled by national security considerations to establish and adopt a policy of keeping its nuclear option open. The major shift in the philosophy behind the declaration after Pokhran II (1998) which signalled nuclear weapons capability from the Pokhran I (1974) test was the clear manifestation of neighbourhood threat perceptions and the associated global nuclear security complexities. As one commentator pointed out: ‘Several democratically elected Indian governments had taken the decision to keep the nuclear option open, not in abeyance’.⁶⁸ However, the need for a shift in philosophy became evident when Indian government found out in 1988 that Pakistan possessed three nuclear devices.⁶⁹ Since then, New Delhi’s resolve to go into a nuclear weaponization programme would have been strengthened. But the step might have been necessary to prevent potential nuclear blackmail that might emerge out of the hostile China-Pakistan nexus against India.

As a nuclear weapon state, India appears to have set a pragmatic course of action that includes three basic components—the construction of minimum deterrent with an NFU policy, participation in a possible Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) and the pursuit of arms control rather than disarmament.⁷⁰ On 4 January 2003, while approving the establishment of the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) and ‘alternate chains of command for retaliatory nuclear strikes in all eventualities’, the Cabinet Committee on security headed by the Prime Minister summarized the nuclear doctrine as:

1. building and maintaining a credible minimum deterrent;
2. a posture of NFU and nuclear weapons to be used only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere;
3. nuclear retaliation to be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage;
4. authorization of retaliatory attack rests with the political leadership through NCA;
5. non-use of nuclear weapon against non-nuclear weapon states;
6. in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons;
7. a continuance of strict control on export of nuclear and missile related materials and technologies, participation in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty negotiations, and continued observance of the moratorium on nuclear tests; and
8. continued commitment to the goal of a nuclear weapon-free world through global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.⁷¹

According to official pronouncements, the NCA comprises a political council and an executive council. The political council is chaired by the Prime Minister and is the single body that can authorize the use of nuclear weapons. The executive council is chaired by the national security adviser to provide inputs for decision-making by the NCA and to execute the directives given to it by the political council. A Strategic Forces Command (SFC) headed by an Indian Air Force officer has also been established as the custodian and manager of the nuclear assets.

Ever since the nuclear tests of May 1998, India has a robust nuclear capability. Unlike Pakistan, it is inconceivable that the nuclear button control in India would rest in a non-civilian hand given its vibrant democratic institutions and polity. In this light, the decision to declare the establishment of the NCA might have been intended to reassure the international community about India’s civil political command over the country’s nuclear arsenal. By setting up an NCA under civilian control to institutionalize the command structure in the public domain, the Indian government might be pitching for a better public relations game compared with Pakistan’s military-dominated NCA, which was established in February 2000.

As early as in 1994, New Delhi had proposed that India and Pakistan should jointly undertake to state that neither would be the first to use their nuclear capability against each other.⁷² Even after conducting the nuclear tests, India expressed its readiness ‘…to discuss a ‘no-first-use’ agreement with that country, as also with other countries bilaterally, or in a collective forum’.⁷³ However Musharraf thought otherwise. While being interviewed on NBC television in Washington on 23 January 2002, General Musharraf was asked to explain Pakistan’s reluctance to follow India in adopting a policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons. He replied:

When you talk of no-first-use, Pakistan has been offering denuclearisation of South Asia … so we are going far, far beyond them. It is not an issue of no-first-use, but far beyond that…. We want to denuclearise South Asia. We want to sign a No War Pact with them. Isn’t that better? I think the world community should insist on that. Pakistan is offering a much bigger deaal.⁷⁴

India rejected Pakistan’s suggestion for a mutual rollback of their nuclear programmes on the ground that its programme was not Pakistan-specific⁷⁵

The rationale for Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme continuously harped on is that Pakistan has always been quantitatively and technologically weaker than India in military terms. India’s counter-argument is that in terms of the ratio between defence responsibilities and the size of the armed forces, especially in terms of territorial defence from external aggression, this argument is not valid.⁷⁶

As early as in 1974, Pakistan submitted a resolution at the 29th session of the UN General Assembly, which sought to endorse the concept of a nuclear weaponfree zone in South Asia.⁷⁷ At that point of time, Pakistan was already running a nuclear weapons programme. It is worth remembering that the then President, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, had called a meeting of Pakistani scientists in Multan in January 1972 and had expressed his willingness to acquire nuclear weapons for Pakistan. But in the wake of India’s May 1974 tests, it tried to gain an image of a veiled peacemaker.

India itself had proposed a resolution at the same 29th session of the General Assembly in which it recognized that, ‘in appropriate regions and by agreement among the states concerned, the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones could promote the cause of general and complete disarmament under effective international control’.⁷⁸ India also considered in that proposal that ‘the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the appropriate region of Asia should come from the States of the region concerned, taking into account its special features and geographical extent’.⁷⁹ In reality, South Asia could not be treated in isolation for the purpose of creating a nuclear weapon-free zone, as it is only a sub-region and an integral part of the Asia-Pacific region. Hence, it argued, it was necessary to take into account the security of the entire region.

Unlike Pakistan, India’s adherence to an NFU policy and its strategic assets are not country specific. Therefore, any effort towards creating a minimum credible nuclear triad, including qualitative improvement in missile systems or other technological advancements, seems related to India’s national security perspectives beyond, though inclusive of, Pakistan. The Indian perspective is both global and regional in nature. India believes that:

As long as nuclear weapons exist, the threat of use of nuclear weapons, accidentally or inadvertently, will remain. Only global and complete nuclear disarmament, within a time-bound framework, can totally eliminate the danger of a nuclear war. This was the cornerstone of India’s Action Plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons unveiled by late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 at the Special Session of the General Assembly … While pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament, it is desirable to take immediate steps for reducing nuclear danger. These could include measures to de-alert and detarget nuclear weapons, legally binding commitments on no-first use of nuclear weapons and non-use of nuclear weapons against Non-nuclear Weapon States.⁸⁰

By adhering to the posture of no-first-use (NFU) India has taken a preeminent moral position over other nuclear weapon states in the world except China which also holds a similar deterrence doctrine. While creating and maintaining a credible minimum nuclear deterrence, India’s stand of NFU also proves the defensive posture of its nuclear weapons development programme.

Pakistan does not appear to believe in the deterrence value of India’s NFU. Instead, it threatens India with a pre-eruptive first strike. Pakistan’s nuclear strategy includes operationally deployed state of nuclear weapons even during peacetime. By making frequent calls to bring the nuclear threshold down, Pakistan undermines the Indian NFU by provoking conventional arms conflict as in Kargil (1999) and fomenting a proxy war against India. The international community, instead of condemning Pakistan for its irrational behaviour in threatening to nuke India, sees South Asia as a potential flash point. In fact, such an assumption indirectly endorses (and is born out of) Pakistan’s nuclear blackmailing. In reality, it is the Pakistani military that has crossed the Line of Control (LOC) in the past to provoke Indian forces. Since Pakistan does not adhere to the no-first-use principle and keeps making frequent calls to lower the nuclear threshold in the apprehension that India will take reprisal measures to stop Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Indian territory, the Indian military strategists need to take into account all the worst-case scenarios in escalation control planning.

Pakistan insists on Kashmir as the ‘core’ issue of stability/instability between India and Pakistan. India maintains that scourge of ‘terrorism’ in South Asia has ramifications for both the regional and international security systems. In between the two exclusive views, a pertinent question remains unanswered: Who is to guarantee that if the issues related to Kashmir are resolved, Pakistan’s military-Inter Services Intelligence (lSI) sponsored terrorist activities in other parts of India would end forever? In such a complex security environment, bilateral confidencebuilding measures alone would keep the escalation within manageable limits.

India–Pakistan Nuclear Confidence-Building

India has repeatedly insisted on developing confidence with Pakistan. As mandated by the foreign secretaries of the two countries, the expert-level dialogues do continue as ‘consultations on security concepts and nuclear doctrines to develop measures for confidence building’, with their desire to ‘keep working towards further elaboration and implementation of nuclear CBMs within the framework of the Lahore MoU’.⁸¹

A new dimension has been added since 1998 when both countries became nuclear powers. And now it is absolutely essential that we have [the] best of relations. And the Manmohan Singh government has already made it clear that we look forward to continuing the process, we will take it forward and it will be multi-faceted. And the differences we have will be ironed out through negotiations, friendly talks and cooperation.⁸²

At the end of the meeting of the foreign ministers of the two countries in New Delhi on 5 and 6 September 2004 to review status of the composite dialogue, the duo agreed to take further the ‘expert level meetings on conventional and nuclear CBMs, inter alia, to discuss the draft agreement on advance notification of missile tests’.⁸³

In fact, a remarkable step towards nuclear CBM was taken in 1988 when India and Pakistan had signed an agreement on the prohibition of attack against nuclear nstallations and facilities. Under this agreement, both the countries agreed to ‘refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country’.⁸⁴ The term ‘nuclear installation or facility’ includes nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, isotopes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radioactive materials. The two countries also agreed to inform on 1 January of each calendar year of the latitude and longitude of its nuclear installations and facilities and whenever there was any change. This practice continues since 1January 1991 and did not stop even during the crisis of 2002. However, ‘each side has questioned the completeness of the other’s list’.⁸⁵

Subsequently, there was a leap forward in nuclear CBM during the Indian Prime Minister’s visit to Lahore in 1999.⁸⁶ The memorandum of understanding (MoU) signed by the foreign secretaries of the two countries at Lahore in 1999 stated ‘The two sides shall engage in bilateral consultations on security concepts, and nuclear doctrines, with a view to developing measures for confidence building in the nuclear and conventional fields, aimed at avoidance of conflict.’ The two countries agreed to provide each other with advance notification in respect of ballistic missile flight tests, and envisaged to conclude a bilateral agreement in this regard.

In Lahore, India and Pakistan also committed that they would continue to abide by their respective unilateral moratorium on conducting further nuclear test explosions. With a view to reaching bilateral agreements based on mutual deliberations and technical consultations, the two countries included in the Lahore MoU many significant issues such as national measures to reduce the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, notification in the event of any accidental, unauthorized or unexplained incident, prevention of incidents at sea in order to ensure safety of naval vessels and aircraft belonging to the two sides, review of the existing communication links (e.g., between the respective Directors General of Military Operations), and periodical review of existing confidencebuilding measures. The two sides also pledged to engage in bilateral consultations on security, disarmament and non-proliferation issues within the context of negotiations on these issues in multilateral fora. The expert-level talks on 19–20 June 2004 that were led by Dr Sheel Kant Sharma and his Pakistani counterpart, Tariq Osman Hyder, culminated in a ‘joint statement’⁸⁷ on nuclear CBM with some repetition of important issues listed under the Lahore MoU. The joint statement recognized that ‘the nuclear capabilities of each other, which are based on their national security imperatives, constitute a factor of stability.’ This probably implies that the two countries have moved somehow beyond the earlier recognized that ‘the nuclear capabilities of each other, which are based on their national security imperatives, constitute a factor of stability.’ This probably implies that the two countries have moved somehow beyond the earlier differing ambits of threat perceptions for holding nuclear weapons in the respective states. In April 2006, the two sides signed the Agreement on Pre-Notification of Flight Testing of Ballistic Missiles and expressed satisfaction over the operationalization of the hotline between the two foreign secretaries. The two sides held detailed discussions during the expert-level dialogue in April 2006 over the draft text of an agreement whose main objective is to reduce the risk from accidents relating to nuclear weapons.⁸⁸

India and the Global Nuclear Disarmament

Unfortunately, the major powers seem to have adopted an extremely indifferent attitude towards nuclear disarmament. Instead, they are actively engaged in redefining the continuing relevance of the role of nuclear weapons for future security strategies. The major powers either completely ignored or, at best, gave superficial concessions. The commitment of the NPT-defined nuclear weapon states towards nuclear disarmament has not been reflected in actual practice because of the preservation of nuclear deterrence in perpetuity, resulting further in perpetuating the legacy of division within the NPT constituting two groups of the nuclear haves and have-nots. Worse, the NPT-defined nuclear weapon states are continuing to qualitatively develop their nuclear weapon arsenals to dominate the possible escalation ladder.

On a range of issues that relate to different facets of this subject, despite being outside the NPT framework, India holds strongly that: ‘A number of recent developments including the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP), the July 18 Agreement with the United States, the September vote in the IAEA and therecent deliberations of the Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG) have contributed to that. While connecting the common threads, it is our case that India’s approach to nuclear non-proliferation has been a consistent one, a principled one and one grounded as much in our national security interests as in our commitment to a rule-based international system … At a policy level, this was an important component of a larger commitment to disarmament enunciated most notably by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s 1988 Action Plan’.⁸⁹

After getting Independence in 1947, India has consistently pursued the objective of global disarmament based on three rcrimary principles of universality, non-discrimination and effective compliance.⁹⁰ India is against the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and comprehensive test ban treaty (CTBT) arrangements. It perceives the present global nuclear regime as discriminatory, inequitable and non-transparent. The provisions of the treaty allow a certain group of countries to posses nuclear weapons, but deny the option to others. The inequity is perpetuated through the division of the world between nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’. The treaty lacks transparency as it makes the disarmament appeal to the ‘nuclear haves’, but fails to set a time frame to achieve that objective. As far as the P-5 are concerned, they uphold the philosophy of maintaining ‘strategic stability’ only to hold on to their arsenals while preventing others from doing the same. The end of the Cold War and the subsequent acceptance that a nuclear war could not be won and must not be fought have had little bearing on the ‘no-changers’—the believers in the value of political strength behind nuclear assets.

The then Indian ambassador at Geneva articulated the country’s stand on CTBT at the Conference on Disarmament by examining three intricate issues— ‘One, during the CTBT negotiations it became clear that none of the five nuclear weapon states had any intention of ever giving up these weapons, notwithstanding their duplicitous affirmations in the context of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty review conference. Two, nuclear weapons are not ever going to be used as they are civilian targeted and against the Geneva conventions on humanitarian law, which protects non-combatants. Then why keep them? Because they are par excellence weapons of coercion. If any nuclear weapon state does not approve of your foreign policy, these weapons are very persuasive agents. The threat of use of force is forbidden by the United Nations charter, but this is precisely what these weapons do. Three, nuclear weapons are cheaper than the technologically high-level armaments developed not only by the US but also China’.⁹¹

The NPT, as it was adopted in 1968, was flawed and discriminatory, seeking to create a permanent division between the nuclear ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’. India believes that the indefinite and unconditional extension of the NPT in May 1995 has only served to further legitimize nuclear arsenals of the NPT states possessing nuclear weapons into perpetuity. The attitudes of maintaining the monopoly of nuclear weapons were evident even before the NPT came into existence. The 1961 UN General Assembly Resolution that sought to ban the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons was passed by 55 votes to 20, with 26 abstentions, and the US, the UK and France voted against it.⁹²

India firmly believes that ‘only global and complete nuclear disarmament, within a time-bound framework, can totally eliminate the danger of a nuclear war’. This was the cornerstone of India’s action plan for the elimination of nuclear weapons unveiled by late Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1988 at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and continues to be India’s abiding objective even today.⁹³ In 1996, India, along with the members of the Group of 21 countries, submitted a proposal to the Conference on Disarmament (CD) that called for phased elimination of nuclear weapons (1996–2020). The call for the elimination of nuclear weapons was reiterated once again by the then Prime Minister in his address to the UN General Assembly in 1998.

Concerns about nuclear proliferation mounted and drew the attention of the international community after A.Q. Khan’s confession that he had helped supply technology and materials to other countries like Libya, Iran and North Korea. However, nothing has been done as yet to evolve universally acceptable mechanisms to monitor nuclear proliferation. India summed up its position on the issue thus:

There is a growing concern over the threat of proliferation of nuclear weapons, related materials and technology, particularly their possible acquisition by non-State actors. India shares these concerns. We believe States have the responsibility for taking measures to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and related materials and technology to both non-State actors and other States. Aware of its responsibilities arising from possession of nuclear weapons, India has put in place legislative and administrative measures, including export controls, for this purpose. Our record in preventing proliferation is impeccable.⁹⁴

The attitude of the nuclear powers and their justification for retaining their arsenals reflect the same Cold War underpinnings of mutual distrust and international permutations of national self-interest. The advocates of nuclear disarmament and arms control in the West have prescribed a limit under the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), negotiations to reduce the number and deployment of strategic nuclear weapons. However, the limit itself is silent on the questions like—against Whom? Why? How long? And does it have anything at hand to immediately show that P-5 states are really interested in complete elimination of nuclear weapons? Prescription of any self-defining limit to nuclear weapons for security reasons and at the same time showing apprehension over the nuclear deterrence policy of lndia, is seen by New Delhi as the ambiguity of global nuclear regime. Closer to the Indian security dynamics, the Chinese positioning and response to the international nuclear non-proliferation efforts always remains the subject of examination for this country.

Instead of refraining from further nuclear armament, China—an important component of global policy-making on nuclear weapons—has been justifying retention or modernization of its nuclear forces. Although it has signed the NPT and consented to the CTBT, it has conducted nuclear tests even after the conclusion of the NPT Review Conference in 1995 with scant regard to world opinion. Despite espousing ‘no use’ and a ‘no first use’ (against Non-Nuclear Weapon States [NNWS]) policies, China probably relies more on the position of ‘limited deterrence’ (to have enough capabilities to deter conventional, theatre and strategic nuclear war, and control and suppress escalation during a nuclear war). Till now, China has not participated in arms control negotiations like START though it has been maintaining an ambiguous position on comprehensive nuclear disarmament issues. China’s prime intention seems to be to wait for the US and Russia to cut their arsenals through legally bound treaties to a level that matches its own holdings. China with its modernized nuclear holdings may have the intention to dominate Asian affairs and influence security issues in the Pacific region vis-à-vis America.

It is most likely that China will increase the size of its nuclear arsenal in response to American missile defence and change in the US nuclear policy. New Delhi cannot remain unaware of Chinese reaction to the Bush administration’s determination to go ahead with the Theatre Missile Defence and National Missile Defence programmes. Expressing its vehement opposition to American perceptions on missile defence and ABM Treaty, the Chinese white paper on National Defence 2000 indicates ‘a new round of arms race’. China has already expressed its concerns diplomatically for the US missile defence plan as a potential driver of the arms race. In response to the changing strategic planning of the US department of defence, American experts are also of the view that in the direction of implementation of ‘limited deterrence’, one could expect China to continue with the development of more accurate mobile ICBMs, sub-strategic nuclear missile capability, larger submarine-launched ballistic missiles and improving technologies to penetrate warheads in the event of deployment of US BMD.⁹⁵ The continuing quantitative and qualitative expansion of China’s strategic forces may further require India to review its security concerns.

With the emergence of new challenges to nuclear proliferation, India, as aresponsible nuclear weapon state with complete nuclear fuel cycle capabilities, has taken several initiatives in recent years to reassure the international community that it has adopted necessary steps to secure nuclear materials and technology through comprehensive export control legislation and harmonization, and adherence to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) guidelines. India not only submitted the instrument of ratification on 31 March 2005 on the UN ‘Convention on Nuclear Safety’, to address the international concerns expressed in the UN resolution 1540 of 28 April 2004, but also adopted an overarching WMD domestic legislation in June 2004 known as ‘The Weapons of Mass Destruction and Their Delivery Systems (Prohibition of Unlawful Activities) Act’. India also signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005 on 24 July 2006 at the UN Headquarters in New York. In addition, it has taken a conscious decision to harmonize its legal arrangements with international export regulations in order to prevent the involvement of non-state actors in WMD proliferation.

Conclusion

The theoretical construct of international security environment, including India and Pakistan as states with nuclear weapons, is primarily based on the exclusivist assumption on the behaviour of ‘the state’ in times of crisis and peace. The international security discourse is riddled with the Cold War experience. The scope of existing theoretical constructs seems to imply a restriction on India’s stake in global disarmament proceedings. The prevailing international security discourse by the Westerners on the rationale for the possession of nuclear weapons for P-5 seems hesitant to integrate universal application of any change in the global security balance. While the policy projections of P-5 reflect the inclusion of only own security concerns in the international security environment, the new nuclear weapon states face a diplomatic challenge of conceptual contestation. The differ ence of perceptions is largely related to strategic stability and security at both the regional and international levels. American withdrawal from the ABM treaty and review of Washington’s nuclear posture, including the National Missile Defence deployment programme, as well as the Chinese desire to modernize its weaponry have together contributed to the broadening of the concept of India’s national security.

India believes that the discriminatory nuclear regimes can do no good, but would adversely affect any new post-Cold War international initiatives on nonproliferation and global nuclear disarmament. Suspicions are bound to cloud the reorientation of upcoming foreign policies both at regional and international levels. Already burdened with a host of regional and international compulsions, India cannot remain unaffected by this new trend. The nuclear policy of India, thus, looks to address both the past and present security configurations in the context of the larger international security environment. Overall, it is the reflection of an Indian understanding of the world security dynamics. India as a reluctant nuclear weapon state still maintains unequivocal commitment to a world free from nuclear weapons.

Major international actors like the US, Japan and the EU, including strategically challenging China, in due course of time have also realized that India’s nuclear policy is defence-oriented and not destabilizing in nature. The US and Japan have lifted many of the sanctions that India faced because of the May 1998 tests. Even as the two countries agreed to expand dialogue on missile defence, the US and India agreed in January 2004 to expand cooperation in three specific areas—civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes and high-technology trade. This effort of bilateral engagement is known as ‘Next Steps in Strategic Partnership (NSSP)’. To explore as well as to ensure progress in partnership, the two countries have also set up a joint implementation group.

Certain quarters in Pakistan have voiced an unfounded apprehension that the Indo-US nuclear deal of 18 July 2005 has ‘raised serious questions for regional stability’.⁹⁶ In reality, nuclear cooperation between India and the US is restricted to civil nuclear energy development. To emphasize more on the energy requirements of the country, India has agreed to voluntarily place a majority of its nuclear power reactors under an elaborate international safeguards arrangement. Acknowledging the fact that nuclear weapons remain significant to strategic stability between the two countries and that they have to behave in a responsible manner, India has been trying to evolve mechanisms to ensure nuclear security in the region through various nuclear confidence -building measures with Pakistan. Nuclear CBMs are being discussed and debated with increasing gusto in both countries. Efforts are on to work out effective and authentic mechanisms between the two countries to avoid misinterpretation during the crisis period and establish long-term peace in the region.

In addition, India is equally conscious of China’s strong emergence with consistent economic growth, military modernization as well as Beijing’s rising stature in international diplomacy. Beijing is at present ‘seeking peaceful relations with its neighbours in order to consolidate itself politically and economically’.⁹⁷

As far as China’s views on India is concerned, even if China earlier used to regard India as a regional player and hyphenate India and Pakistan, ‘this attitude changed in 2005 when Prime Minister Wen}iabao visited India in the wake of the US announcing its goal to help India become a major world power. The Chinese premier started referring to India’s global role’.⁹⁸ The joint declaration issued in New Delhi on 21 November 2006, during the visit of China’s President Hu Jintao to New Delhi, reaffirmed that

… both sides agree that the relationship between India and China, the two biggest developing countries in the world, is of global and strategic significance… With the growing participation and role of the two countries in all key issues in today’s globalising world, their partnership is vital for international efforts to deal with global challenges and threats.⁹⁹

Not withstanding the apprehensions regarding China’s negative assessments of the Indo-US nuclear deal, the joint declaration of the Indian Prime Minister and Chinese President stated that: ‘Considering that for both India and China, expansion of civilian nuclear energy programme is an essential and important component of their national energy plans to ensure energy security.the two sides agree to promote cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, consistent with their respective international commitments’. ¹⁰⁰ In fact, India has already established a robust economic growth pattern that is sustainable. At the same time, with populations of over one billion each, both countries now need to give primacy to their economic prosperity. Both seem to have realized that they need to ignore the sensitive issues that can derail development of bilateral relations for better economic partnership in the era of globalization and technological advancement.

Editors’ Note

Since the writing of this essay, several developments that have taken place in global politics in general and in the South Asian region in particular might have hampered the process of threat reduction and confidence-building between India and Pakistan. The 123 Agreement, apparently a commercial contract by which the US will provide nuclear fuel for the civilian reactors in India operating under the India-specific IAEA safeguards has been cleared after obtaining the NSG waiver. France and Russia also have similar ties with India. Formal acceptance of a division between India’s civilian and military nuclear facilities means a de facto recognition of India as a nuclear weapon state irrespective of her ‘reluctant nuclear power’ posture. Pakistan looks for greater ties with China for supply of nuclear fuel and technology along similar lines.

The 26/11 terror attacks in Mumbai by terrorists allegedly from Pakistan, and the consequent worsening of India-Pakistan relations, has generated mutual mistrust and suspicion once again. Pakistan’s strategy of brandishing nuclear weapons in times of crises may go against meaningful threat-reduction measures. Under these circumstances, confidence-building is relegaed to the back-stage, though deterrence might still hold, and prevent a major conflict in the region.