9
CHINA’s QUEST FOR MULTILATERALISM
Swaran Singh
It was as part of reaffirming faith in Deng Xiaoping’s thought that the 15th Party Congress, held during September 1997—the first one after Deng’s death—had formally endorsed China’s pragmatism in international affairs by underlining ‘multilateralism’ as the guiding core principle for its foreign policy initiatives and operations.1 This new thesis on multilateralism was further elaborated during China’s 16th Party Congress during 2002 and it has since become the critical premise in the country’s fourth generation leadership’s on-going quest for socio-economic development and nation-building as it seeks to gain acceptance as the next global power. As a result, China has gradually moved from treating multilateralism as supplementary to its bilateral approach in foreign relations to making it complementary and even as the predominant approach in some cases. Since then, some people even have begun to treat multilateralism as synonymous to the foreign policy of China.2
It is in this new context of China’s fundamental shift from once being completely inward-looking and largely conducting its foreign policy either in the communist ideological framework or purely through bilateral channels to its steady march towards a far more broad-based multilateralism as the primary instrument of its expanding activism in international affairs that this paper tries to examine and highlight the emerging contours of China’s new foreign policy thinking and to gauge its future in ensuring a peaceful rise of China.
The New Context
In the new context today, China’s evolving understanding on multilateralism is seen as gradually beginning to fit into the well-developed Western academic industry on multilateralism whose definitions envelop both the theory and practice of international relations worldwide. These may include well-known Western scholars such as Robert Keohane, who talks of it as ‘the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three or more states’, or John Ruggie, who talks of ‘indivisibility’ and ‘diffused reciprocity’ and so on.3 In operative terms as well, China’s relations with ASEAN, for example, remain a visible example where China’s multilateralism pervades much of its foreign policy initiatives and interactions with other players.
As for the proverbial element of ‘Chinese characteristics’ in the country’s conception and practice of ‘multilateralism’, China’s multilateralism remains selective and focusses primarily on the peripheral regions. Starting from its Shanghai Cooperation Organization, and then launching its Bohao Forum, China has been trying to evolve and project ‘alternative paradigms’ of conducting inter-state relations. Indeed, a whole chain of economic and soft-security frameworks in Asia have since come to be the dominant operative foreign policy channels for China’s efforts which remain aimed at discarding the old Cold War mindset of physical security through state-centric military alliances to genuine multilateralism.
Apart from being the key in resolving its external equations, multilateralism remains essential key to China’s need for continued rapid development which is a pre-requisite for ensuring its political stability and internal peace in the long-run.4 This aspect of China’s multilateralism was initially underpinned by its desire to ensure peace on its borders and it then graduated to a larger concern to ensure peace and stability in its border regions, with the process of evolution being formally institutionalized during the 16th Party Congress in 2002. The Bohao Forum perhaps represents one such example of China’s new vision of multilateralism with a special focus on economic development and regional upliftment. At the global level China has become active in seeking space in regional and global economic forums with the World Trade Organization emerging as a major example.
Genesis and Evolution
To understand the evolution of China’s concept of multilateralism, one has to begin with its negative experience with multilateral institutions e.g., it was kept out of the United Nations (UN) and its institutions during its initial decades and was the target of UN censure and sanctions (for the Korean War) during those years. Things started to change after the Sino-US entente and China’s entry into the UN and other multilateral institutions in the 1970s. Another watershed change in the late 1970s was the rise of Deng Xiaoping. Deng’s economic reforms became the driving force behind China’s decisive shift towards multilateral institutions.
According to Zhang Baijia, expert at the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) Central School in Beijing, various internal and external developments during the first half of 1980s influenced Deng’s strategic thinking in three major ways: (a) Deng aborted the long-held view that ‘world war is inevitable’ and instead emphasized on ‘peace and development’ as the central theme for contemporary China; (b) He acknowledged that the contemporary world was heterogeneous in nature and that conflicts coexisted with cooperation and competition with interdependence; and (c) Deng maintained that independence did not equal isolation and self-reliance did not mean rejecting all foreign things as had been the case during Mao’s reign.5 The change in Deng’s worldview was to result in a change in China’s approach towards international institutions and towards the whole concept ofmultilateralism. As a result, the 1980s witnessed unprecedented qualitative and quantitative changes as China not only involved itself in international organizations in the political domain but also expanded its participation in economic and security types of multilateral forums.6
China’s future vision on multilateralism was shaped primarily by its need for (a) undermining the basis of United States’ unilateralism and its global power profile, and (b) making efforts to become acceptable as a benign rising power amongst its immediate neighbours and the world at large. By far, these two remain China’s most important foreign policy challenges though its rise as a major power has already been accepted as a reality. The conditions have also been facilitated by external dynamics, especially after the collapse of the former Soviet Union which has shifted the focus of international relations and led to the widening of the whole understanding of security and strategic equations amongst major players, thus moving the dynamic of international power politics beyond two superpowers to include new actors like China.
New Thinking, New Style
Several commentaries see this shift as a fundamental shift in China’s worldview which has gradually moved from being one that was introvert and focussed on achieving economic progress in terms of independence and ‘self-sufficiency’ of Chairman Mao’s years to gradually reorienting towards strengthening China’s external links and accepting its growing interdependence with the external world. Even though much of this new thinking had been put in place during the life and times of Deng Xiaoping—which had witnessed the opening up of China’s economy—it was further expanded during the tenure of President Jiang Zemin making China’s foreign trade and foreign direct investment as the two key locomotives of its rapid development through the 1990s. The same has seen further expansion under the new leadership of President Hu Jintao and Prime Minister Wen Jiabao who have since provided a whole new style and content to China’s foreign relations.
Nevertheless, China’s thinking and style of operations on multilateralism remain in continuous evolution and has its own shortcomings and pitfalls. China’s evolving focus on multilateral diplomacy, as a result—despite its backdrop of strong military and economic power—remains as yet fairly nascent, fragile and selective. This is, of course, not exclusive to China’s foreign policy and remains true of all other major players. In operative terms as well, this new vision of multilateralism remains largely conceived within their more conventional framework of seeking only regime security through physical forces at the core of their vision though Chinese officials and academics seem to suggest a new emphasis on new paradigms about building regional and internal security with a motive of undercutting the very basis of convention wisdom which underpins the current US-led world order and its incumbent institutions and military alliances as the current basis of ensuring international insecurity.7
As a result, the last two decades have seen China’s leaders engage its Asian neighbours in several regional multilateral forums that range from Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, the annual summits with ASEAN as also several other regional and bilateral forums. Since 2003, US endorsement of China’s lead role in the ‘Six Nation Talks’ on North Korea has catapulted Beijing into a different level altogether. Briefly, nuclear non-proliferation had so far been considered as: (a) a global problem, and (b) one to be handled by superpowers alone with US being on the lead forever. Though these ‘Six Nation Talks’ have not achieved any concrete results yet, they have demonstrated US support of China’s multilateralism as a principle that should guide international relations. However, those who accuse the US of following a unilateral foreign policy, explain this as its ‘socialization’ of China in international relations which is said to have replaced their containment of China policy since the early 1990s.8 Either way, this promises to go a long way in facilitating China’s quest for multilateralism in its foreign policy.
Multilateralism in China’s International Relations
Unlike some of the leading Western institutions, China’s international relations (IR) theory experts are not given to abstract thinking. In recent Chinese tradition, therefore, their academic thinking in IR has not been much different from (or simply follows) its official doctrine that guides its foreign policy-making. Nevertheless, China’s academic thinking has become a critical indicator of the coming changes in its official policy and doctrine.
China’s entry into the United Nations in the 1970s seemed to provide the first visible indication of an impending shift in its official line and vision. This, of course, had its impact on the academic scene as well. China today has over 40 well-known universities with departments for international relations. Though, for a long time, the Chinese experts did not consider the research and teaching in these departments very satisfactory. One fundamental problem often cited was a lack of coordination amongst the different departments with most of them continuing to seek to achieve overlapping objectives and often falling short on relevant infrastructure and expertise in the area of their primary interest.
Research in international relations theory is expected to focus on three things: (a) discover the rules, (b) to explain the phenomena to create explanation for international relations, and (c) to predict according to the rules discovered and explanation created.9 With this shift in foreign policy vision from the early 1980s as also China’s large size and its growing international profile, most IR experts were beginning to underline the need to focus on the larger picture of the country’s national priorities urging its universities and policy research institutions to reorient their research towards areas that were specific to their locale and region as part of the larger national effort.10 For example, Xinjiang University in China’s western regions could look at Central Asia while the Yunnan University in China’s south could look at the South Asian region while some institutions like the National Defence University or Academy of Military Sciences would still keep a generic focus on strategic issues. This was to show its results. For instance, beginning from 1997, Yunnan University was to gradually become the leading force behind sustaining a four nation forum for sub-regional cooperation amongst Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar.
At the same time, however, central institutions like the China Academy of Social Sciences and other Beijing-based institutions were to sustain focus on generic issues, thus indicating the evolution of China’s changing perceptions about the larger picture. This, however, also remains true for the rest of the world, especially the developed world. From that perspective, China’s academics share several other traits with that of the developing world. Chinese IR experts also share severallimitations common to experts around the world. For instance, none of the IR theorists were able to predict the collapse of the former Soviet Union. This showed that despite their rapid and intense evolution during the post-War period, these IR experts have had their limitations. Not only did these theories fail to predict the nature and timings of the end of the Cold War but they were also unable to understand the nature of the post-Cold War world order that has apparently taken a sharp turn away from what had followed World War II. For example, all the IR theories during the Cold War had been exclusively focussed on elements of hard power—military and only marginally the economic component—and did not pay much attention to soft-power elements like ideas and institutions.11
Indeed, it is also extremely difficult to simplity things as different parts of the international system continue to experience different levels in the evolution of international system and it is their respective experience that very often colours the visions of their respective experts. The same also remains true of multilateralism debates among Chinese IR experts. As a result, whether China’s foreign direct investment-driven-rapid-development today seeks to cater to its socialist proletariat or the foreign capitalist remains an inconclusive debate. This becomes far more complicated given their current regional and ideological limitation and biases. Besides, given the fluidity of international system, the variables have been changing too rapidly for the IR theories to grasp and incorporate these into their understanding of global affairs. However, this has also resulted in increasing the interface of Chinese scholars with the outside world and this makes these scholars far more amenable to accept newer paradigms of international relations. Constructivism, for example, has far more influence in explaining China’s multilateralism. It clearly caters to the Chinese tendency to pursue something new, to challenge the tradition, and to reform incumbent international system which apparently favours neo-realism of the United States.12 The United States, on the other hand, perhaps has a greater comfort level with the realism and neo-realism schools of thought in IR theoretical research and in preserving the status quo. But the trends in the academic thinking in the US have influenced China’s theory and practice in international relations.
The New Theoretical Framework
In an interesting contrast, in building its new theoretical framework for multilateralism, China seems to be increasingly following the beaten path of Western powers. While the West, it seems, is beginning to deemphasize the nation-state sovereignty and United Europe has been virtually touted as the best possible example of the new trend, rising power and trendsetters like China continue to increasingly emphasize on the nation-state framework as was evolved by these European states as early as in 1648 at Westphalia. As a result, China’s emphasis on ‘territorial-sovereignty’ and ‘sovereign-independence’ continues to define its national character and policy approach to multilateralism. This is despite the fact that it was founded on the promise of providing a revolutionary alternative to nation-building to be guided by ideologies of Marxism—premised, not on national struggle but on class struggle which was viewed not in a national but global framework. This had once defined the core of Mao’s New China which seems to have since evolved an altogether new contour and character.
This new context seems to contribute a great deal in defining China’s new theoretical framework on multilateralism. To many, this appears to signal that China has shed its vision of being a revolutionary power and adopted a new avatar of being a status quoits power; virtually aping the United States. This has been partly caused by China’s rapid evolution in recent decades, which has witnessed ground realities that have compelled evolution in its political system to keep pace with the transformation in other sectors of its societal existence. There can be several prominent examples on how, over the centuries, the nature of nation-state has been evolved; sometimes beyond recognition. This general principle is clearly reflected in China’s new theoretical framework on multilateralism.
The ever increasing pace of globalization has since been unfolding several newer contours, compelling China to accommodate these changes into its theoretical premises of class struggle. As globalization evolves and expands its influence, a whole set of new global perspectives seem to unfold continuously. This was something that had not been contemplated by orthodox Marxism. Today the US proletariat, instead of becoming anti-US capital, finds fault with China’s cheap labour costs and finds a common cause with US capital, which projects itself as a victim of China’s dumping and undervaluation. This is beginning to unfold the new reality of ‘distinctions between different proletariat’ or intra-proletariat contradictions which have since resulted in China evolving a new understanding of international system and its theories on interdependence which does not believe in irreconcilable differences of Comrade Lenin.
Non-state actors—terrorists, multinational firms and especially NGOs—have since come to represent a new force facilitating and enforcing multilateralism. In fact, they are emerging as the new critical political force in their own right seeking their own place and influence in the international system. Many believe that the era of inter-state violence is soon going to be over as these non-state actors will become the greatest menace forcing states to come together. These non-state forces are beginning to show their influence in the decision-making of nation-states and their influence is perhaps far more in the developed world. In China as well, these non-state forces are beginning to be visible. To some extent, China has also been working to adopt these new trends. The way Beijing had highlighted the international links of China’s SARS epidemic of 2003—which resulted in China obtaining $38 million in foreign aid to deal with this essentially domestic epidemic—was one clear reflection of this emerging new vision of China with its decreasing sanctimonious self image.
More recently, non-traditional threats to nation-state system (ruling regime in case of China) has itself come to be perhaps one most visible threat to the authority and legitimacy of nation-state. This seems to challenge the nation-state’s primacy in the international system that has been the basis of international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 and even before. China is becoming far too constrained and dependent on such new forces and factors than it ever had been even at the height of the US policy of containment. This seemed to confound even their earlier experiments like those with their Comintern-type multilateralism for the contours of new multilateral are determined by national interests and not by ideologies and belief systems. So far, China seems to be trying hard to strike a balance between these two forces.
The progress made by science and the consequent proliferation of new technologies have also created new variables in the international system that fail to fit into the conventional wisdom of international relations’ theories. Most of the conventional wisdom has been based on the primacy and supremacy of nation-state in the international system and this has been the hallmark of international relations over several centuries. Here, the technology-driven information revolution has extended as well as shrunk the conventional sense of both space and time and this shift of focus from territorial space—which has been the cause of most inter-state conflicts—to cyber space is bound to transform the conventional thinking and reality of the international system. China’s new foreign policy also seems to gradually grapple with these new forces and factors.
But for many Chinese experts the reverse also remains equally true. They believe that conventional wisdom of the state being the most fundamental unit of international system continues to be at the rock-bottom of international relations. Especially, in the wake of the 9/11 experience, these scholars in China are debating the thesis on whether the world has finally entered into a new phase of neomedievalism.13 Realist understanding of the international system seem to have been re-enforced both by these terrorist attacks as also by the global (read US) response to these new threats. This return of focus to the physical security and military means of national power and use of violence in terms of inter-state equations have indeed revived realist perspectives of international relations though there had been brief periods of debates about the alternative approaches and peace dividends following the collapse of the former Soviet Union. But in some ways, this has also generated serious thinking in China’s academic and policy circles to evolve a more thorough basis for its multilateralism though some of these issues have been debated in the West at least since the early 1980s.14
China’s Policy Formulations on Multiiateralism
To begin with, unlike most other countries, China’s policy formulations and even, to some extent its academic debates have often been a reflection of as also strongly guided by theories and thoughts propounded by its great leaders. While most times the visions of these leaders have been the guiding light for China’s policy formulation, sometimes these have also been circumscribed by these leaders’ more immediate political compulsions. But more often these have been a response to China’s internal and external conditions. For instance, all three of China’s paramount leaders—Mao, Deng, Jiang—have propounded their own theoretical understanding and explanations about China and its location and role in the international system, thereby also alluding to their understanding of the nature of international system.
It is in this evolutionary nature of China’s theoretical interpretations of their worldview that its academics have found opportunities to not only elaborate but also suggest how to cope and accommodate changes. Consequently, this has provided China with far more flexible and evolving policy formulations both in its internal sphere as well as in its interface with the international system. Even China’s fundamental ideology of socialism has witnessed transformations and displayed extreme flexibility to accommodate new challenges. This has facilitated changes in its specifics like foreign policy or policy on multilateralism. These changes have been symbolized by the expression ‘Chinese characteristics’ which has been a suffix for most policy formulations of Beijing.
In terms of providing theoretical understanding to multilateralism in the international system, the Chinese formulations have since moved from treating international politics as a zero-sum game in class-struggle terms to talking about peaceful ‘co-existence’ (gong cun) and these theoretical formulations have since moved to ‘winning-together’ (gong ying).15 This shows how, pragmatism in supporting the status quo has since completely transformed China’s original ethos and virtually replaced its old idealism about creating a world revolution without facing any internal contradictions. But many in the country still believe that this accommodation of Western discourse and leadership may be only a tactical compromise while China’s strategic goals remain the same of promoting revolutionary socialism. It is in this context that Deng Xiaoping’s pragmatism has become the guiding principle of China’s induction of multilateralism as an instrument of its foreign policy operations.
But, in operative terms, China’s current phase of multilateralism can be traced not earlier than to mid-1990s. Before that China was not really interested in issue-based and national interest-guided multilateralism. In the past, China had either been a subject of containment and boycott by multilateral institutions or had suffered from its own regional divisions especially in the case of Macao, Hong Kong as also much ofits western provinces ofXinjinag and Tibet. It was only in the wake of new regionalism and globalization that China finally became more comfortable with multilateral forums from where this was to become its ‘strategic choice’ making it synonymous to its foreign policy vision.16
Operative Policy Still Selective
In actual operations, China’s theoretical formulations have found their own new challenges which have further re-defined its multilateralism. While at global forums like the United Nations or the World Trade Organization, China has been pursuing the principles of democracy and equality amongst nations, it has used this principle primarily to ensure restraint on the behaviour of the United States which is seen to increasingly negate international norms and institutions. But at the regionallevel China’s multilateralism seems to become less consistent with these values and vision and has become more region specific as also guided by its interests and leverages and by the changing ground situations.
Multilateralism, for example, remains effective as well as original in Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). This is one organization that was evolved by China—along with Russia and three Central Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan—and has shown impressive results in resolving border disputes and inter-state equations in this region. China has always projected it as an ‘alternate paradigm’ of achieving security and peace and this has evolved mutual confidence to such an extent that SCO now debates evolving common forces and joint strategies for exploitation of resources and so on. This has since been possible also as the new Russian Federation had been busy evolving its new profile and equations giving China the leeway to lead. The SCO has since been joined by Uzbekistan as its sixth member and is likely to expand further.
China’s equations with the ASEAN represent another success story of its multilateralism. This is partly because ASEAN itself has been the guiding light for promoting multilateralism in this region. The best part is that China’s transformation towards multilateralism since the last decade or more has facilitated China–ASEAN ties thereby eroding their confrontations though some of the irritants like claims on South China Sea remain critical in defining their relations. Unlike China’s engagement in SCO, China’s multilateralism with ASEAN remains restricted to promoting confidence-building measures and a common security agenda. This has also been guided more by China’s desire to limit the US influence on ASEAN and to ensure that the US does not dictate decisions in this region. Therefore, China has often been urging autonomy of ASEAN from that perspective. However, it still remains largely a talking shop and China has been reluctant to take any hard decisions. In the end, this has since transformed China–ASEAN ties which remains a positive outcome.
In comparison, China’s multilateralism remains almost non-existent in its ties with either West Asia—where it has stayed at a safe distance knowing fully well the US interest and influence in that region—or South Asia where for a long time Pakistan had been its main partner and their aim was to keep India tied down to South Asian politics. Though, China’s policy towards India has since moved from supporting insurgencies to evolving state-to-state ties and evolving a series of confidence-building measures, China’s interest in South Asia’s multilateral forum like SAARC remains minimal and sporadic. China, however, continues to put a premium on bilateral relations with both West Asian and South Asian countries.
But China’s leading the six nation talks on North Korea has lately been seen as a shot in the arm for China’s fourth generation leaders’ vision of multilateralism. Amongst others, this is seen as a US endorsement of China’s commitment and competence in leading the multilateral discussions on the nuclear proliferation crisis. Beginning from November 2002, these talks have been repeatedly hosted by Beijing. Even when this recent period has witnessed North Korea becoming more difficult to deal with and bolder (even reticent) about its nuclear capabilities, this period has witnessed US not yet backtracking from its expressed faith in Beijing continuing to lead these negotiations. Following the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the US is also willing to cooperate with China’s multilateralism. But the expanding US military presence in China’s periphery during this period has also made China circumspect about how far it should proceed in accommodating the US and this has since seen new emphasis in multilateral forums like the strategic triangle of Russia–China–India and Beijing becoming far more active in coordinating their joint responses at the United Nations and on other issues-all being aimed at putting a restraint on the US.17
China’s ‘Alternative Paradigm’ Thesis
At the most fundamental level, beginning from the early 1980s, China has gradually retreated from its old habit of confronting the West. Taking a cue from Khrushchev’s ‘peaceful coexistence’ but more particularly from Gorbachev’s perestroika and ‘new thinking’, Beijing had gradually come to accept supremacy of the United States in the international system. China today seem to have little discomfort in accepting the US power, and in many ways China is now trying to compete with it by using the same instruments and institutions. But, at the same time, China has also been working gradually to undermine the institutions and norms that make US the sole surviving superpower of the 21st century.
China continues to strive in order to ensure that it is able to contribute to the popular desire to put restraints on the manner in which the United States has come to use its power. And, China’s expressed intent of providing the world with alternative paradigms for building security and peace seem at least partly driven by this deep-felt need to undermine the US supremacy. For this purpose, China has been trying to dig at the very premises that make United States such a powerful country. For example, it has sought to gradually and imperceptibly challenge the very understanding and relevance of power-politics of military alliances and sought to replace this zero-sum game of inter-state relations with new alternative paradigms based on mutual accommodation and benefit.
In this, China’s approach of multilateralism has since come to be recognized as its primary instrument of re-organizing international relations for the coming times. It is this interpretation of China’s multilateralism that seems to make it quite a revolutionary proposition as the status quo seems to be one of US unilateralism. External realities of the collapse of the former Soviet Union, Russia’s close relations with China, Russia’s sporadic enthusiasm to build bridges with Asian neighbours and the process of unification of European states all seem to have also facilitated China’s drive towards multilateralism. In fact, the whole new trend of regionalism in international relations also seems to provide favourable groundings for the rise of multilateralism as an effective instrument of foreign policy and several new players seem to be finding their echo in China’s alternative paradigm of multilateralism. This obtains China some confidence to be able to pursue its quest for multilateralism with minimum compromises as also to use it effectively in ensuring its place in international decision-making.
Conclusion
To conclude, therefore, China seems to have had its own share of challenges and opportunities as also its own set of limitations and leverages in dealing with forces guiding its course amongst a whole range of possible alternatives for making its policies. It is in this context that China has gradually moved from the ideology of Marxism to the ideology of pragmatism thus making multilateralism the core of its foreign policy since the reign of Deng Xiaoping.
In operative terms, of course, beginning from China’s entry into the United Nations, a new era of China’s participation in multilateral forums had begun though this was to remain subdued for a long time. It was only later, from the mid-1990s, in the face of US unilateralism, that this was to take shape of China’s quest for multilateralism as a means for achieving its foreign policy objectives. To quote a Chinese scholar:
China believes in a set of principles in international affairs, while consideration of its national interests causes Beijing to make a pragmatic compromise from time to time. Beijing has long been accustomed to dealing with others in bilateral settings while the post-Cold War era is witnessing a rise of mulilateralism in international politics, which is bringing more and more pressure on China’s traditional diplomacy.18
Lately, Russia has been particularly active in promoting multilateralism in order to revive its earlier stature. And, in all its such efforts, China remains its major partner in pushing for strategic partnerships and multilateralism. Towards the end of 2004, President Putin had made several important visits to some of the emerging major power like Brazil, India and China professing Russia’s belief in evolving multilateralism as instrument of achieving peace and order. Amongst several such initiatives, President Putin’s joint statement with Indian Prime Minister had included a whole paragraph on the subject of evolving a strategic triangle amongst Russia-China-India which clearly indicates to this strengthening trends for multilateralism. To quote from that India—Russia joint statement:
The sides note with satisfaction that the trilateral meetings at the foreign ministers level of India, China and Russia have been taking place regularly. These meetings have been useful in promoting an understanding and exploring areas of possible cooperation at a trilateral level and at an international level. The trilateral meetings have also reflected a strong concern against terrorism anywhere and in any form. The sides express their conviction in favour of progressive increase in the trilateral cooperation, which could also result in social and economic development amongst the three countries.19
To sum up, therefore, it is not just the US which has over time begun to endorse certain strands of China’s multilateralism, other powers like Russia and India (also European states) have also come to accept its credentials on multilateralism. Meanwhile, following the return of Hong Kong and Macao, China has also consolidated its internal regional provinces and it feels far more secure in dealing with its immediate neighbours as also with other major players in the international system. All this clearly augurs well for the future of China’s continued quest for evolving multilateralism as the key principle and instrument in its foreign policy. However, how much of this will be a Chinese contribution or how much of it will be like aping the West will remain open to questions and interpretations for a long time.