number of stations.
5
For example, Duncan (2002) estimated that there were 23 viable
radio stations in the Washington, DC market (with another seven marginal stations),
compared to 13 local television stations.
6
In Billings, Montana there were 12 viable radio
stations, compared to only four TV stations, with one viable radio station for every 8736
residents aged 12 and above. In this sense, one might hope for quite competitive eco-
nomic outcomes without regulation.
The costs of providing programming also differ across the media. Television produc-
tion is typically expensive so that smaller stations must rely on large amounts of program-
ming provided by the networks or syndication. In radio, producing local programming is
potentially quite cheap, especially as stations are currently only charged a small propor-
tion of their revenues for the rights to perform music (see
Section 8.9.2 for a discussion of
licensing arrangements). I will return to the question of whether local programming is
necessarily desirable below. One consequence is that stations are able to vary their pro-
gramming in response to the local competitive landscape, and in the last two decades this
has resulted in the emergence of quite narrow programming formats, which may, for
example, offer only a particular kind of rock music or serve listeners with a particular
religious adherence. However, in spite of this cost structure and these patterns, there
is an active debate about whether the types of programming that stations provide is opti-
mal, both in the sense of whether it is of the optimal quality or whether stations offer too
much of the same types of music (
Future of Music Coalition, 2003).
The structure of this chapter is as follows.
Section 8.2 provides a brief history of the
broadcast radio industry in the US, from its inception to the present.
Section 8.3 discusses
the data that has been used in empirical research.
Section 8.4 outlines some of the eco-
nomic theory that can be used to understand the possible effects of mergers in the radio
industry.
Section 8.5, divided into four parts, describes empirical research examining the
effects of ownership deregulation and the subsequent consolidation that took place in the
1990s and early 2000s.
Section 8.6 looks at the question of whether there are too many
stations in most radio markets.
Sections 8.7–8.9 examine strategies that stations use to
make sure listeners hear their commercials, the effects of public radio, and the effects
of radio on political outcomes and its interactions with the music industry.
Section 8.10 concludes.
5
Many interesting questions in television arise from the vertical relationships between content providers and
platform operators (such as cable companies). See
Chapter 7 in this volume for an in-depth discussion.
Vertical issues also exist in radio—with syndicated programming being broadcast on stations owned by
many different companies, and major station owners also producing some of this programming—but it
has not been the focus of attention in the economics literature.
6
Duncan identified “viable” stations as those with signals that reached a large proportion of the market and
had at least a 1% share of listening. Most markets have a number of smaller stations listed in their Arbitron
market reports that can be considered marginal. Additional low-power stations would typically have too
few listeners to be listed by Arbitron at all.
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Handbook of Media Economics