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INTERNAL DYNAMICS IN SOUTH ASIA: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR INDIA’s FOREIGN POLICY^∗

Nalini Kant Jha

In the contemporary interdependent and globalizing world, domestic upheaval in one country usually produces side-effects that impacts not only its own security and foreign policy, but also those of other countries, especially those which have close geographic, social and historical ties with it. Domestic sources of foreign policy and threat to national security have gained significance in the post-Cold War era.¹ While the end of superpower rivalries, which had complicated regional conflicts in the Third World, contributed to a diminution of these conflicts, the ‘decompression’ effect of the end of the Cold War gave a fillip to linguistic, religious and communal tensions, which were dormant and overlaid with Cold War rivalries and the earlier colonial dominance over the Third World. Their release exacerbated domestic conflicts in developing countries deriving from the plethora of ethnonationalist, socio-economic and communal–religious reasons. This is clear from the enumeration of major conflicts published annually by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) since the Cold War abated; it confirms that intra-state conflicts greatly outnumber inter-state conflicts. The SIPRI Yearbook 2000 on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security, for instance, reports that out of the 27 major armed conflicts that raged in 25 countries during 1999, only two were inter-state conflicts, namely, Ethiopian, Eritrea, and India–Pakistan over Kashmir. The mitigation of rivalries between the two super-powers and the disappearance of block politics thus shifted the focus of conflict from the external to the internal sphere and, more certainly, to the Third World.

In addition, if domestic environment means the situation within the jurisdiction of a sovereign state, then it must be submitted that this sovereignty itself stands compromised in many ways after the Cold War. One can easily notice the shrinking space of state and sovereignty due to both external and internal factors. External factors include globalization of the economy, emergence of strong regional organizations, rise of interdependent issues of terrorism, drug trafficking, environment degradation, and human rights, which need to be tackled with external cooperation. Internal factors, on the other hand, include the rise of sub-nationalism, economic liberalization, the emergence of non-governmental organizations as strong actors, and above all, explosion of knowledge and democratic aspiration due to the revolution in information technology, which, in turn, has led to increasing questioning of traditional authorities including the state. The erosion of the authority and sovereignty of the state thus reflects, to an extent, an explosion of awareness, aspirations, and identities brought about by technological advancements.

All the consequences of this triple explosion of knowledge, aspirations and identities for South Asia,² the most populous region of the world are, of course, not negative. There is, for instance, a creative upsurge to find new answers to lingering questions. People are increasingly asserting their rights and seeking access to the avenues of empowerment to improve their living conditions and change their lifestyles. Institutions are being reformed and streamlined to cope with the pressure generated from below. Not surprisingly, South Asian countries have made considerable progress in their respective process of democratization, though not free from setbacks. During the last decade of the 20th century democratically elected governments emerged in Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan and peaceful transitions of power took place in several South Asian countries. Despite the fragility of the democratic process in these states, including India, and the overthrow of the civilian rule in Pakistan in 1999 and the ousting of the elected government inN epal in October 2002 and declaration of emergency in that country in February 2005, recent trends are refreshing. People have changed the governments in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka respectively in 2001 and 2004 through the ballot rather than the bullet. Fortunately for India, the democratization of politics in some of the South Asian countries has contributed to an improvement in their ties with India.

In the economic sphere, indicators of policy changes have been stronger than ever before throughout South Asia, as all of them have initiated bold and positive measures for economic liberalization followed by some notable steps towards promoting economic interdependence. Nearly every county of the region embarked in a rather big way on the process of privatization and promotion of free enterprise to keep pace with the winds of change sweeping the globe. Culturally, new cultural forms are finding expression that identify with this process of constructive change and transformation.

But as indicated earlier, there is another side to this transformation as well. The above mentioned triple explosion of knowledge, hopes, and distinctiveness has also created new and intensified prevailing social tensions, which have taken the forms of agitations and protest movements, on the one hand, and violent conflicts and organized insurgencies, on the other, along religious, political and ethnic lines. While agitations and protest movements are part of the political process and have to be addressed by the governments within the given framework of political and administrative decisions, the insurgencies and violent conflicts threaten to tear the structure of the state apart.

If the globalization and liberalization of the economy, emergence of interdependent issues such as democracy, human rights, and environment, and the Information Technology (IT) revolution have strengthened the triple explosion of awareness, aspirations and identities, these transformations have also weakened the governing capabilities of weak governments. Consequently, though external or military threats to a nation’s territory have receded and compulsion to seize territory to obtain resources is no longer the driving force, internal dissent and claims to autonomy and ethnic recognition by sub-national entities have intensified. These claims are forcefully being pushed though armed conflict.

This uniquely affects India and South Asia. India is unique in the region by virtue of sharing a border with each of the SAARC states—other than the Maldives—while none of the others share a border with each other. This coincidence is compounded by the presence in each of the states of the region of population segments, which have ethnic and communal linkages with population elements in the other. In other words, the Indo-centric nature of South Asia, i.e., India’s predominance in the region in terms of geographical size, strategic location, natural resources, economic and technological advancement, and political stability as well as India’s close geographical, societal and cultural linkages with her neighbours, means that domestic turmoil in India’s neighbourhood influences her security environment and foreign policy. Unlike the West, where nation-building took place before state-building, South Asian states are trying to build a political nation after forming a state in the post-colonial era. The task of nation-building is therefore still in progress and it is in this sense that that domestic dimensions of security and foreign policy in South Asia assume critical significance.

South Asia: Bridging the Ethnic and Sectarian Divide

We have therefore made an attempt in the present paper to examine the implications of domestic environment in South Asia for India’s security and foreign policy. As explained by this author elsewhere,³ foreign policy capability and security of a state crucially depend upon a healthy and progressive domestic environment. A state plagued with poverty and other indicators of economic backwardness, social conflicts, smaller size, adverse geographical location, lack of a sense of national pride, and poor leadership can rarely play a significant role in international relations. In the real world one can, of course, hardly find a country, which is bestowed with all positive indicators of domestic environment, which are called as elements of national power. On the other hand, one can also scarcely find a country that is plagued with all negative attributes of domestic environment. The issue of linkages between domestic environment and foreign and defence policy of a country must therefore be viewed in relative or comparative terms rather than in absolute terms.

Viewed thus, most of the South Asian states are still plagued with domestic problems of various kinds, degrees and intensity, which have implications across the border. Almost all of them are confronted with the challenging task of not only safeguarding their territorial integrity but also creating a stable structure that can accommodate a bewildering range of ethnic, linguistic and religious groups. Most of them also inherited a legacy of unevenly developed social, economic and political structures upon independence. The process of nation-building in South Asia was from the beginning accompanied by fierce competition for scarce resources, generating uneven political, economic and cultural development among different ethno-linguistic and religious groups. The concentration of economic resources and political power among a privileged few only served to deepen the existing contradictions in all South Asian societies on regional, ethnic and religious lines. Under the circumstances, the task of nation-building was rendered more difficult by an increasing quest by the less privileged groups for more equitable participation in the nation-building process, on the one hand, and the dominant elites’ apathy to the legitimate aspirations of such groups for their share, on the other. Pressures from diverse ethnic, linguistic and religious groups steadily acquired increasing political and economic manifestations. It is thus essentially the political and economic demands of minority groups or deprived sections of the society for political representation and resource allocation, often mobilized on ethnic lines, which lie at the root of a growing polarization in all countries of South Asia, though the assertion of ethnic nationalism, basically a function of complex interaction of politico-economic changes in society, has over the years become more strident with greater incidence of internecine violence between communities, religions and ethnic groups.⁴ Had there been visionary statesmen at the helm of affairs in these countries, they could have retrieved the situation to a large extent. Unfortunately, the inability of selfish ruling elites to mediate conflicts for their narrow and shortterm gains has compounded the problem by eroding the legitimacy of political class in these countries.

This has complicated the task of bridging ethnic and sectarian divides within South Asian countries. The task of nation-building has thus been rendered more difficult by the state’s role in managing the complexities of integrating heterogeneous groups in the mainstream of nation policy. The response of state to diverse ethno-national demands has either been vacillating or inadequate. Misdirected policies of deliberately undermining the ethnic, linguistic and religious identities or minorities in the face of entrenched majoritarian interest/identity have only caused concern to the minorities regarding their own future in the existing political setup. In some cases, short-sighted policies of seeking single national identity by assimilation of disparate identities through suppression of cultural pluralism has led to internecine violence between communities religious and ethnic groups with alarming frequency. Not surprisingly, almost all South Asian states are confronted with challenges emanating from diverse ethno-linguistic and religious groups. Sustained and at times militant assertion of ethno-sectarian forces poses a serious challenge to nation-building in these countries. The quest for identity on the basis of religion and ethnic consciousness is sharpening ethnic strife and conflict.

It is relevant to note in this context that ethnicity per se is not a problem for the security of a state. It becomes a security issue only when it is politicized. In the case of politicization of an ethnic group, which consists of cross-country migrants, security risks are of three types. It may, in the long run, pose a direct threat to the state by initiating ethno-regionalism or creating local political and social tensions in pursuance of their interests. The domination of the migrant ethnic community in a particular region may give rise to conflict between local people and outsiders. The local people may resist the economic and political rights of the migrant community. Since these migrants have a cross-country ethnic affiliation, it may therefore lead to the involvement of their counterparts across the national boundaries or even a direct conflict between the concerned states. In general, the politicization of ethnic groups may lead to disruption of socio-economic and political structures; creation oflaw and order problem and other troubles such as arms and drug trafficking; social and political tensions between migrants and the local people; involvement of politicized ethnicity in local politics; competition between locals and outsiders, thereby disrupting social harmony; and paving a way for the interference of external powers in regional affairs. In the case of South Asia, the situation is quite complex because of ethnic, religious and linguistic overlap between different states of the region.⁵

Not surprisingly, the increasing role of the ethnic diasporas in supporting and funding ethnic wars has assumed critical proportions in South Asia, especially in the case of Sri Lanka’s Tamils and the Kashmiri Muslims. Accordingly, no South Asian domestic conflict is confined internally. Each one of them spills over into the neighbourhood. Depending on the nature of bilateral relations and the phases of evolving conflicts, support and encouragement have flown to the internal conflicts from the neighbourhood. On the other hand, neighbouring countries too have been adversely affected by such conflicts. In addition to external dimensions of ethnic conflicts in Afghanistan, Kashmir and Sri Lanka, insurgents in India’s northeast, too, have got support from external forces. There are, for instance, reports of arms and money flowing to Bodo, the United Liberation Front for Assam (ULFA) and Naga insurgents through private channels from China through Myanmar. On the whole, South Asia is characterized by weak political institutions, internal strife, backwardness, poverty and terrorism, the problem of border management, and illegal immigration, thus making it an unstable region, which in tum adversely affects economic cooperation in the region.

India: The Image of a Soft State

Although India is the tallest among all South Asian countries in many respects, it too is afflicted by internal conflicts and problems, which have a bearing on its security and foreign policy. Though this country has so far sustained a credible democratic federal framework and managed to defuse pressures from diverse and contending religious/linguistic and cultural groups, it is finding it increasingly difficult to do so. Questions of restructuring Union-state relations and demands for greater autonomy for states are gaining salience in the political discourse. Indian federation is getting frayed at the edges as it comes under increasing pressure from diverse quarters. The dawn of coalition era though not an unwelcome development in itself, has considerably weakened the federal authority.⁶ Growing demands by states for substantive autonomy are making for strains on the existing federal structure. Incipient threats to Indian federal polity are increasingly coming to the fore with Kashmir and to extent the Northeast representing the extreme instances of such threats.⁷

Ethnic and religious conflicts in India, for instance, not only erode the foreign policy capability of this country by sapping its attention and energy in managing these conflicts, but these discords also enable India’s hostile neighbours to exploit these internal turmoil to the great detriment of its interests. Internal conflicts apart, narco-terrorism, crime-politics nexus, crisis of governance, erosion of values and a corresponding rise in corruption, and economic dispa rity are other internal sources of insecurity in India. In other words, the domestic sources of India’s security concerns include insurgency, terrorism and religious fundamentalism, communalism and related riots which affect our image outside, caste discrimination that has acquired international dimension especially the conference of the World Social Forum, child labour, lack of women empowerment, AIDS, the role of the press and intellectuals, growing political and social unrest, fragility of successive weak federal governments, progressive decline of political institutions, growing criminal-political nexus, worsening law and order situation across the country, corruption and growing regional disparities. It is also increasingly apparent that the system can hardly cope with the role of the NGOs that lack the required transparency with regard to their sources of funding, but have become an important instrument for interfering in a country’s internal affairs. In addition, the new paradigm that is sought to be imposed can increase external intervention in the name of human rights.⁸

Finally, the image oflndia as a soft state has been one of the significant reasons behind several security problems confronting this country. On the one hand, the state ignores the genuine demand for autonomy and good governance while, on the other, it surrenders to dictates of terrorists and fundamentalists. In spite of having the largest army, we have not been able to manage our borders well. This has partly been because of our inefficiency and partly because of our federal structure.⁹

Pakistan: A General Trapped in His Labyrinth

The domestic environment in Pakistan includes the mindset of the rulers of that country built around the Two-Nation theory;¹⁰ military rule and the weak democracy; Islamic fundamentalism and the terrorist infrastructures; and of course, the centrality of Kashmir in their relationship with India. There has been a perception of Pakistan as a failed state and hence the danger of nuclear proliferation. Traditional sectarian and ethnic conflicts apart, the present Pakistani military ruler Pervez Musharraf’s strategic decision to align with the West to dismantle its own creation in Afghanistan has generated an extremist backlash against the government in Pakistan. As the preoccupation of Pakistani rulers with the politics of sustenance and survival at home, and Pakistan fragile economy have often influenced that country’s policy towards India, General Musharraf too cannot be by tailoring expected to disregard his compulsions of political survival his India policy.

This is evident from his unwillingness or inability to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure in Pakistan, which was created in the period when the US was financing resistance to the Soviet presence in Afghanistan in the 1980s, and that infrastructure was later diverted towards India, especially, Jammu and Kashmir after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and of course after the collapse of the Soviet Union. There is this whole mindset that has developed in Pakistan around the Kashmir issue, very carefully and studiously nurtured by the Pakistani regimes so as not to allow the reconciliation between India and Pakistan.

It is, of course, heartening to note that of late General Musharraf has been talking in a different tone. He has now reciprocated India’s peace initiative and expressed willingness to solve the border dispute between the two counties not by changing the border on the basis of religion but by making the border irrelevant by cross-border travel and trade. The expression of this view, manifested in a joint India–Pakistan statement issued during General Musharraf’s New Delhi visit in April 2005, has however evoked an unusually hostile reaction in Pakistan, in part because of the perception that Islamabad has conceded too much. Changing the country’s external borders has been an article of faith for decades in Pakistan. So, the General’s call for the border to be made irrelevant has understandably caused consternation among many in Pakistan. He has also come under fire for suggesting, while in New Delhi, that the separatist leaders were marginal to the bilateral dialogue process.

Even liberal elements in Pakistan are finding it hard to deal with his declaration that Kashmir cannot be resolved on the basis of religion and that borders have to be made irrelevant for the ultimate solution. While the peace elements have no quarrel with the General’s quest for peace with India, their main worry is over what are increasingly seen as ‘unilateral,’ though much-needed corrections, in Pakistan’s India policy. They are concerned over the sustainability of such a policy without involvement of various stakeholders, nurtured by the establishment for decades.¹¹

Those elements within Pakistan, who have so far been brought up on the staple of slogans like ‘Kashmir banega Pakistan’ (Kashmir will become Pakistan), are feeling restless as the establishment unveils elements of its new approach to India. As a result, there is a growing feeling that the military establishment is in a great hurry to buy peace with India under external pressures. A meeting of the Kashmir representatives chaired by President Musharraf before his India visit in April, best illustrates this point. Most of the Kashmiri representatives at the meeting wanted to know why an impression had been allowed to gain ground that Pakistan was in haste and why ‘unilateral’ concessions were being made to New Delhi. A defensive Musharraf merely appealed to them to have trust in him.¹² This clearly shows the dangers ahead in India and Pakistan’s march on the road to peace.

It is therefore necessary for President Musharraf to educate those elements within Pakistan who have been trained to hate India to revise their mindset in the interest of peoples of both the countries. If he does not do so at the earliest, we can assume that he is not serious about the peace process.

As regards India, her interest lies in encouraging the modernist forces in Pakistani society. It is in this sense that New Delhi’s recent decision to allow General Musharraf to play host to the Hurriyat leaders in Islamabad and other cities of Pakistan for a whole fortnight, needs to be commended. This is likely to help the General to fend off domestic critics whose cries of ‘sellout’ help none. New Delhi’s decision to allow the Hurriyat to visit Pakistan is thus a major and dramatic confidence building measure. It is low in risk and high in symbolism and will allow General Pervez Musharraf to tell the Pakistani public that India too is prepared to display a new attitude to Kashmir. The fact that the predecessor government in New Delhi led by the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) had initiated the current peace process between India and Pakistan and the Leader of the Opposition in India, L.K. Advani, has extended strong support to this peace process during his tour to Pakistan reflect domestic consensus within India about beginning a new chapter in India–Pakistan relations. This should help the General to allay apprehensions in this regard within his country.

The Government of India should also sponsor a study on the psychology of Pakistan’s army, as several factors have made the military in Pakistan to play the most important role in political, social and economic spheres. Such a study can, therefore, provide policy inputs for India to plug loopholes in her dealings with Pakistan.

Nepal: Himalayan Problems

The domestic environment of Nepal is characterized by a poor democratic base; Maoist insurgency; lack of development and low per capita income. This Himalayan state is also plagued with the problems of infiltration: the recent sprouting a number of mosques and madarsas, and thriving smuggling. Nepal is thus passing through a turbulent phase in its history marked by the continuously expanding influence of the Maoists, political uncertainties and growing international interests. While constraints of time and space prohibit us from going into the details about the domestic crisis in Nepal, suffice it to say here that, on the one hand, the Maoists have been successful in gradually pushing their agenda through violence and intimidation, while on the other, the lust for power displayed the former monarch, King Gyanendra, and the disarray among the political leadership have aggravated the domestic turmoil in Nepal.¹³

In fact, the king has been more interested in exploiting the situation in his favour than showing prudence and statesmanship in dealing with the Maoists rebels. First, he dissolved Nepal’s Parliament on 22 May 2002, and then dismissed the Sher Bahadur Deuba government in October that year, accusing him of being incompetent in running the government at a time when it was beset by an increasingly deadly Maoist insurgency. While street rallies and protests organized by the main opposition parties forced the King to repeatedly change his nominated Prime Ministers, the inability of these parties to come out with a consensus candidate for the post of Prime Minster during the interim period strengthened the monarch’s position.¹⁴ He used the inability of the Deuba government (which was reinstalled in June 2004) to tame the Maoists as an excuse to once again dismiss it and impose emergency in February this year. Though the king has announced the lifting of emergency in Nepal on 29 April 2005, i.e., soon after his meeting with the Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, in Jakarta, he did not withdraw the draconian executive orders suspending fundamental rights. The king governed the country directly while the political leaders continued to languish in jails, all in the name of controlling the Maoists. But this enabled them to gain more legitimacy and strength as the authoritarian measures of the king turned the ire of political parties against the king rather than the Maoists.¹⁵

India that shares a 1,500-km long border, which is even more open and porous than that between the US and Canada, as well as close social ties with Nepal, and it cannot remain unaffected by domestic turbulence in Nepal. This is especially true in the context of Nepal’s Maoist rebels, who have an anti-India bias. The document adopted at the third plenum of the CPN (M) central committee in March 1995 declared that the armed struggle was specifically against ‘Indian imperialism’. It also voiced opposition to the recruitment of Gurkha soldiers in the Indian Army. It is alleged that the Maoists are being trained by the ex-Gurkhas in the Indian Army. Further, the Maoists demand the abrogation of the India-Nepal Treaty of 1950 and the Mahakali Treaty.

Moreover, the Maoists, masquerading under various names such the People’s War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), are very active in Indian states like Andhra Pradesh, Bihar, West Bengal, Sikkim and Assam. The other side of the coin is that the Nepali Maoists, when under pressure from the Nepalese Army, try to escape to adjacent Indian territories and seek sanctuary in the hideouts of their counterparts.¹⁶ The arrests of top Maoist leaders in 2004 in Siliguri and Patna clearly indicated their links with Indian militants. The Director General of Police of Sikkim, T.N. Tensing, observed that the authorities were aware that the Maoists from Nepal could enter the border states like Sikkim and West Bengal. This forced these states to sound an alert to check infiltration of these rebels into Indian territory.¹⁷ By establishing its links within India, the Maoists, in combination with the PWG and MCC, are thus in a position to pose a security threat to at least four Indian mainland states.

The Maoist insurgents in Nepal have also forced some Indian companies to move out of Nepal. A host of top Indian firms led by Dabur and lTC temporarily shut down operations in Nepal after Maoist rebels bombed a luxury hotel in August 2004, raising fears about safety of conducting business in the Himalayan kingdom. The attack came on the eve of a deadline set by the rebels to shut down 10 companies including Nepal’s oldest Indian luxury hotel, accusing them of adopting unfair labour practices—a charge that these companies have denied.¹⁸

The socio-political turmoil in Nepal has thus a spillover effect in India. The anti-India sentiments of the Maoist rebels, the unbridled use of India–Nepal border by the Maoists for shelter, training, supplies and arms smuggling, and their deepening links with the Indian left-wing extremist and Northeast extremist groups pose a serious security threat to India. Further, there is an apprehension that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), active in border areas, could forge links with the Maoists to destabilize the region. Not surprisingly, India has had been among the forerunners in extending both moral and material support to the Nepalese authorities in their fight against the Maoist menace. With political turbulence rocking Nepal and political parties decaying, India, under the NDA rule, saw a clear interest in preserving the institution of monarchy as a stabilizing force in the restive Himalayan state. India’s then minister for external affairs and defence, Jaswant Singh, therefore, visited Nepal in August 2001 to establish a personal rapport with King Gyanendra. Besides, India extended diplomatic support to declaration of emergency in Nepal in November 2001 and condemned violence by the Maoists.¹⁹

Soon after the collapse of the ceasefire in Nepal in November 2001, Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, spoke over the telephone with his Nepalese counterpart, Deuba, on 8 December. He assured India’s full support and cooperation to Nepal at all levels in meeting the challenges posed by the Maoists. New Delhi declared that it would include the Indian Maoist groups in its list of terrorist organizations and would step up action against them. India supplied helicopters that the Nepali security forces required immediately in meeting the challenges. The border areas were kept on ‘high alert’ to check the movements of the Maoists. Their possible hideouts in the border districts and towns were searched, and some of the Maoist activists, who were undergoing treatment, were handed over to the Nepali police.

When the then Nepalese Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, visited India in March 2002, New Delhi offered him help to face the ongoing insurgency in Nepal. But at the same time, it clearly expressed its desire to see him address its concerns about misuse of Nepalese territory and hospitality by some forces inimical to India’s national interests. The Nepalese leader reportedly showed his sensitivity to India’s concerns about the Himalayan kingdom’s vulnerability to penetration by some anti-India forces. Both the countries decided to intensify their efforts and cooperation to combat terrorism and cross-border crimes including sharing intelligence and information regarding the terrorists’ movements.²⁰ The National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in India, thus, showed no hesitation in endorsing the steps taken by the Nepalese government to contain the Maoists.

The United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government, which came into power in India in May 2004, continued with the policy of the previous government. The joint statement issued at the end of the visit of the Nepalese Prime Minister, Sher Bhadur Deuba, to India in September 2004, for instance, reiterated the determination of the countries to combat terrorism and further intensify cooperation in curbing the activities of the extremists and terrorists. Prime Minister Deuba thanked the Government of India for the timely and substantive support provided by India in Nepal’s efforts to deal with the Maoist insurgents. In response to India’s expression of concern over the increasing anti-India activities of Pakistan’s ISI and the Dawood Ibrahim gang in Nepal, Deuba assured India of his determination not to allow any anti-India activities in Nepal. This prompted New Delhi to agree on 9 September to upgrade its security assistance to Nepal, including a fresh consignment of military hardware, training to Royal Nepalese Army and intelligence sharing between the two countries.²¹ This prompted the Nepalese Maoists to launch a scathing attack against India. In a press statement posted on their party website (www.cpnm.org), the CPN (M) chairman, Prachanda said that Indian ‘expansionism’ backed by US imperialism was directly impinging on the ‘people’s war’ launched by the Maoists in Nepal.

This government faced a dilemma when the Nepalese king imposed emergency in Nepal in February 2005. Since this step invited the ire of the Maoists as well as all democratic political parties in Nepal, the present regime in New Delhi rightly suspended military aid to Nepal. This was in consonance with India’s longcherished tradition of opposing autocratic rule in India’s neighbourhood. At the same time, this policy enabled India not only to align with democratic parties and intelligentsia inN epal, but also avoided needlessly alienating the Maoists. As the UPA government rightly realized that Maoists could be tamed by military action alone, it did not hesitate to abandon its half-century old policy ofbilateralism in its dealing with Nepal and built a common front with the US, the UK and the European Union to bring additional pressure to bear on the king to restore democracy and allow the political leaders to resume negotiations with the Maoists.²² Within three months of this bold move to use its leverage in Nepal to make the king see reason, the UPA government, however, made a U-tum in its Nepal policy. Not only did Prime Minster Manmohan Singh meet King Gyanendra in Jakarta in April 2005, but he also promised to expedite the delivery of arms suspended at the time royal coup. But what did India get in return? As stated earlier, though the king announced lifting of emergency, he did not annul draconian executive orders suspending fundamental rights. Worse, the two countries learnt about the U-turn in India’s policy only from the king, who chose to make public Manmohan’s assurances to him during their Jakarta meeting. It took the Government of India 17 days to confirm something that the Nepalese monarch had already announced. While constraints of time and space prohibit us from going into reasons for this volte face in India’s Nepal policy, suffice it to point out here that this dangerous flip-flop is a betrayal of the Nepalese political parties’ struggling for the restoration of democracy.²³

India’s ill-advised decision to resume supply of arms to Nepal has provided a shot in the arms for the King. Spurred on by New Delhi’s support, the Nepalese security forces are likely to go all out to find a bloody ‘military solution’ to the Maoist question, and intimidate democratic opponents and critics in the bargain. India’s decision to go back to playing ball with King Gyanendra could increase the disarray in the democratic camp. This is why the king was so eager to go public with the U-turn in Indian policy immediately after his Jakarta meeting with Prime Minister Manmohan Singh. The arms matter less to him than the legitimacy India has bestowed on him and his not-so-secret project to tum the clock back to the bad old days of the Panchayat system.

New Delhi will, therefore, be well advised to be on its guard even as it considers helping the Nepalese military forces in combating the kingdom’s Maoists in their new identity as terrorists. As India’s smaller neighbours, including Nepal, have been confronting the crisis of identity and suffering from the ‘big-neighbour-smallneighbour syndrome,’ it is all the more necessary for this country to be extra cautious in extending a helping hand to Nepal lest it be misunderstood as interference in its internal affairs.²⁴

Despite the direct threat to India by the Maoist insurgents of Nepal, a military intervention by New Delhi is not a real option. India would gain little by getting embroiled in a prolonged anti-guerrilla operation in its neighbouring country. India must not forget the lessons learnt from its ill-advised policy of dispatching the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka in 1987 for bringing peace and protecting the Tamil minority, which invited the ire of both the Singhalese as well as the Tamil groups in Sri Lanka leading to assassination of the Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, by Tamil extremists. In any case, the Nepalese, fiercely proud of their own military traditions, would not like Indian troops on their soil. The manner in which the Palace, which controls the Army in Nepal, reacted to the suggestions of lndian military help to beat the blockade by Maoists in August 2004,²⁵ is a useful pointer to which way the wind blows on this question. Any move to go against this would only give added voice to the anti-India constituency in Nepal. Under the circumstances, India can only insist that Nepal gets its act together to resolve the insurgency as quickly as possible. Since the Maoist insurgency has real economic and social roots and this problem cannot be solved only by the use of force, New Delhi must employ all its diplomatic skills to persuade the king to make up with the political parties and jointly deal with the Maoist menace. Nepal’s fractious political parties must also show greater unity of purpose than they have done so far.

Bhutan: Benefits from Cooperation

Another Himalayan state, Bhutan, too is facing domestic problems in the form of ethnic democratic movement launched by the Bhutanese people of Nepalese origin. In 1990, these Bhutanese dissidents launched a movement against the Royal Government of Nepal. A large number of these people went to Nepal where they stayed in refugee camps. Some of them came to India. Rongthong Kunley Dorji is such a Bhutanese dissident. He claims to be the chairman of the five-party United Front for Democracy in Bhutan. Since the Bhutanese King regards these dissidents as a greatest security threat to his country in the contemporary era, the Bhutanese government requested India to extradite him to face criminal charges in Bhutan for his alleged financial irregularities. New Delhi arrested him in 1997 under the Extradition Act, but he was released on bail due to pressures form the human right groups.²⁶ Apart from creating this dilemma of protecting its friendly country versus honouring human rights, the resurgence of the Nepalese ethnic group in Bhutan, which has alarmed the Bhutanese government by demanding a greater Nepal, has also posed a challenge to Indian diplomacy to find a way to bridge the divide between Nepal and Bhutan on this issue as New Delhi has to maintain friendly ties with both neighbours.

Another important issue in the domestic environment of Bhutan, which has a bearing on India, is the presence of insurgents from India’s northeast, who took shelter there and operated against India. Fortunately for India, the Bhutanese King has shown an extremely positive attitude towards India and its interests. As against the Nepalese kings, who have played the China, Pakistan and US cards against India, the Bhutanese king, for a variety of reasons, including avoiding trouble for him, is very wise in this regard. The Bhutanese king actively acted to expel antiIndia insurgents operating in Bhutan. He thus showed the way to others in the region to cooperate with India and to promote cooperative security in the region. We can only hope at this stage that Bangladesh would learn a lesson from this.

In the case of energy too, Bhutan is setting a wonderful example, which may be emulated by countries like Nepal. Like Bhutan, Nepal too can have a win-win arrangement with India. Nepalese fears that India will exploit that country if it engages with the Water Resources Corporation of India have been thoroughly disproved by the Indo-Bhutan cooperation in this area. Bhutan has been able to derive enormous benefits from its cooperation with India. After the latest hydroelectric project conference, Bhutan has achieved the highest per capita income in South Asia: $1,100–1,200 per month. This is phenomenal and Bhutan’s policy of cooperating with India in the field of water resources has undoubtedly contributed to this impressive growth.

Bangladesh: The Need to Break a Mental Block

Like Bhutan, India’s other next-door neighbour, Bangladesh, has turned into a sanctuary for Indian insurgents in the northeast. However, unlike Bhutan, it has never taken any steps to expel these rebels operating from Bangladesh soil against India. Dhaka has even refused to acknowledge that such a problem exists. Besides, illegal immigration from Bangladesh into India is a matter of grave concern for this country, as it is changing the demographic profile of several border districts in the Indian provinces of Bihar, West Bengal and Assam. India must, therefore, consider amending its laws concerning the verification of the status of immigrants as the present Indian law obliges the government to prove the illegality of immigration into India and, thereby, exacerbates the problem.

Moreover, the Bangladeshi elite uses anti-India feelings to sustain their support base at home. They have to demonstrate that they are not pro-India when in the opposition. When they come back to power, they have to project themselves as anti-lndia.²⁷ It creates a difficult situation for India. The management of Indo-Bangladesh relations is really a big challenge for the makers of India’s foreign policy.

India is also alarmed by the free run that the fundamentalists have in Bangladesh and especially the growing activities of the Pakistan’s ISI; that insurgents operating against India in Assam and other parts of the northeast are receiving millions of dollars of arms and safe haven from Bangladesh; that political opponents of the ruling regime in Dhaka have been killed; and that governmentto-government business has become farcical. India’s pulling out of the SAARC meet scheduled to held in Dhaka in February 2005 was, therefore, not only directed against the proclamation of emergency in Nepal, but was also intended to send a signal to Dhaka to set its house in order. New Delhi feels that this message has gone loud and clear to Dhaka.²⁸

But what is not clear is whether the Bangladesh government will act in a meaningful way, especially on the serial killings of Opposition leaders. According to an official in New Delhi, ‘Bangladesh is not willing to engage with us. If Dhaka does not accept, there is a problem; then, how do you even begin talking about it?’ ²⁹ In fact, Dhaka denies the presence of terrorist training camps in its territory; it denies the existence of even a single illegal immigrant from Bangladesh into India (India estimates the number at 10 million); and it denies a rise in fundamentalism in the country even though the newspapers there have been extensively reporting the phenomenon. What is more, Dhaka denies India transit rights, and it is opposed to setting right trade imbalances through a more spirited trade policy that includes sale of gas to India.

This is surprising in view of the fact that India and Bangladesh really have no fundamental differences, except a mental block in Dhaka, to greater cooperation with India. This is also evident in the field of economic cooperation. They use trade deficit with India to negate economic cooperation between the two countries instead of bridging this gulf by exporting commodities like natural gas to India, which is abundant in Bangladesh. Dhaka cannot sell gas to New Delhi because hardliners in Dhaka are against India-Bangladesh cooperation. Yet, they complain about the trade deficit with India. New Delhi must, therefore, give up its traditional policy of maintaining strong links only with the Awami League, which led the struggle for liberation of Bangladesh. Instead, it must engage in a sustained dialogue with moderates of all significant political formations in Bangladesh, as the removal of the Awami League from the seal of power has denied India of influence in the Bangladesh government in the current situation.

Sri Lanka: Making Rational Decisions

In the southern part of South Asia, the present phase in India-Sri Lanka relations can be termed as the friendliest era in relations between the two countries. Despite domestic problems that leaders in Sri Lanka are facing, they have been able to see the long-term benefits accruing from its economic relationship with India. With all the differences between President Kumarathanga and the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka, they are capable of taking rational long-term decisions, which are beneficial for both Sri Lanka and India. They are very keen to economically integrate Sri Lanka with India. Steps have been taken in that direction and we are going to enter into a comprehensive economic partnership agreement with the island nation. They have also sought guidance and advice on how to deal with domestic conflict.

The internal milieu of Sri Lanka, however, is still a source of worry for Colombo as well as New Delhi. Though the sub-nationalist movement in Sri Lanka has had an indigenous character, which was not influenced by the Tamil Nadu factor in any substantive manner, India cannot afford to be a bystander in the violent ethnic conflict that has erupted in Sri Lanka. The ethnic links between Indian and Sri Lankan Tamils obliges this country to ensure the safety, security and dignity of Sri Lankan Tamils. At the same time, India’s interest lies in the unity and integrity of Sri Lanka as the disintegration of Sri Lanka is bound to encourage numerous separatist movements within India.³⁰

India must also take note of the past record of the Tamil Tigers, which shows that if they were able to create the Tamil Eelam, there would be no honoured place for the Tamil-speaking Muslims and Indian Tamils. The eastern Tamils would be treated as second-class citizens. For all those who consider that multiple identities can and should coexist in a plural state, the goal of a separate Tamil state is a reactionary concept.

New Delhi, therefore, must not remain a silent spectator to the growing military might of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which has flouted the spirit of the peace process with total impunity to strengthen its ability to wage war against Colombo. India must not forget that it was the LTTE, which masterminded and executed with full precision the assassination of former Prime Minster, Rajiv Gandhi, after the Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) pulled out from Sri Lanka. Moreover, Triconamalee is strategically important for us, and the Indian Oil Corporation has invested in Triconamalee in the Sri Lankan oil sector. So, what happens in the northeastern part of Sri Lanka and impacts the peace process is again directly linked to both the security and foreign policy interests of lndia.

Needless to add, whether we like it or not, India cannot escape the responsibility of being the guarantor of peace and stability in Sri Lanka. If things go out of hand in Sri Lanka, one cannot visualize a situation where the Government of India will not be compelled to be more active than it is at present in terms of dealing with the situation. It is, therefore, high time that the Government of India came out with a detailed and unambiguous statement on the various aspects of Sri Lankan issues including the LTTE, the Tamil right to be their own masters in a federal Sri Lanka, and the peace process. Otherwise, the LTTE would only be encouraged to strengthen its armed capability much to the detriment of peace in this part of the subcontinent.

Conclusion

To sum up, South Asia is emerging as a new epicentre of both global trade and, paradoxically and unfortunately, global terrorism and internal conflicts. While countries on India’s periphery are racked by terrorism, insurgencies and separatist movements and are, therefore, inherently unstable, India too is not free from serious domestic troubles.

Much of the regional instabilities in South Asia have emerged from lack of democratic governance leading to severe mal-governance. India perhaps remains, paradoxically so, the only ‘thriving democracy’ within the region. Most of its peripheral neighbours including Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are democracies only in name. The lack of good governance has led to severe resource scarcities leading to acute environmental degradation and underdevelopment in several parts of South Asia. Underdevelopment and related security issues have therefore led to mass borders, has placed India at the receiving end of refugees and economic migrants, which has not only put an acute strain on India’s existing infrastructure, but has also forced her to shape its foreign and defence policy accordingly.

The inability of most South Asian countries, including India, in many respects to evolve into viable nation-states has also serious implications for India’s security and foreign policy. In Pakistan, for example, the emphasis is on Islamic identity, which influences Islamabad’s disposition towards South Asia and has led to a debate within Pakistan whether to project itself as a South Asian or Middle Eastern state. In this context, Pakistan, one of the pivotal states in the region, has unfortunately been unable to articulate a strong sense of South Asian identity and has therefore been perhaps the most reluctant member of the region.

The task of nation-building has been further complicated by the emergence of newer and contesting identities within the region. In India, for example, newer regional identities are emerging. The urge to build a national identity distinctive from an Indian identity that overwhelms the region, partly owing to historical legacies, has also led to sort of a love–hate relationship between India and its immediate neighbours.

As regards Pakistan, the military remains the prominent institution. A paradigmatic shift in Pakistani policy towards India has not been witnessed in the past half-a-century, even under democratic governments. This, therefore, underscores the fact that the challenge to India’s foreign policy-makers lies not in whether there should be a military or democratic government in Pakistan, but whether Pakistan is a strong or a weak state. A careful though on this question reveals that a strong Pakistan would be in the interest of India, as confident Pakistan would be more forthcoming improving ties with India.

Besides, New Delhi must downplay the prominence of Indo-Pak relations in its foreign policy concerns. While discussing internal dynamics in South Asia, lndoNepalese relations for instance, cannot be viewed merely as an outcome of lndo-Pak tensions. Indian foreign policy-makers, therefore have to reconfigure India’s security concerns and foreign policy in such a way that other peripheral states figure as importantly as Pakistan. One way to do is to move both India and Pakistan away from territorial security and arms build-up against each other and to redefine the parameters of security issues in play between the two countries. There is a need to emphasize that national security does not depend merely on military strength and readiness. This also involves social cohesion through more people-topeople contacts and increased trade and diplomatic support. In other words, the levels of analysis to understand India’s foreign policy imperatives and challenges have to be broadened to include the societal, political, intra and inter-regional. Finally, since countries of the region are grappling with intense ethnic and religious tensions, they must embark on a careful path of social accommodation and good governance. India’s success as a modern, powerful, secular and democratic state would inspire its kneeboards to move in similar direction and thereby check the growth of fundamentalism, militarism and authoritarianism, and promote the formation of a cooperative, peaceful and law governed order in the region.