Chapter 8

1. For a detailed study of the impact of the disintegration of the USSR on India’s Security, see Abhijit Ghosh, ‘The Break-up of the Soviet Union and Its Impact on India’s Security’ in Arun Kumar Banerji (ed.), Security Issues in South Asia: Domestic and External Sources of Threats to Security, Calcutta: Minerva Associates, 1998, pp. 132–53.

2. In the second half of the 1980s, India was the leading Third-World and Asian purchaser of Soviet arms. During 1987–91, 79 per cent of India’s arms purchases had come from the USSR. Cited in Ramesh Thakur, The Politics and Economics of India’s Foreign Policy, Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 114.

3. Ross H. Munro, ‘The Loser: India in the Nineties’, National Interest, Summer 1993, pp. 62–63.

4. The order of priorities were: (1) CIS, (2) Arms Control and International Security, (3) Economic Reform, (4) The United States, (5) Europe, (6) The Asia-Pacific Region, (7) West and South Asia, (8) The Near East, (9) Africa, (10) Latin America. See Anita Inder Singh, ‘India’s Relations with Russia and Central Asia’, International Affairs, Vol. 71, No. 1, January 1995, p. 72.

5. Statesman, 20 August and 30 December 1991.

6. Statesman, 30 December 1991.

7. The Soviet/Russian leadership remembered very well who had backed the resistance to the coup and who had sympathy for the hard-line plotters. For example, Andrei Kozyrev, the then Foreign Minister of the former USSR, stated in a speech in Bonn on 6 September 1991, that during the coup only the alleged enemies of the Soviet Union had proven to be true friends (British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1173 A 1/3, 10 September 1991).

8. Izvestia, 2 January and 30 June 1992; and Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 August 1992, pp. 1 and 4.

9. While in India in January 1993, Yeltsin said: ‘We do not at present regard any one in Asia even as a potential adversary of arms, we see only partners’ (Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Sov-93-109, 1 February 1993).

10. T. Shaumian, ‘Russia’s Eastern Diplomacy and India’, World Affairs, December 1993, p. 55.

11. As one analyst pointed out that the major Islamic countries, like Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, were given ‘priority over India by Russia’. Leszek Buszynski, ‘Russia and the Asia-Pacific Region’, Pacific Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 4, Winter 1992–93, p. 490. Another example of Russia’s developing ties with Pakistan was the holding of an international conference on the relations between Pakistan and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in Moscow in April 1992.

12. See Ghosh, ‘The Break-up of the Soviet Union and Its Impact on India’s Security’, pp. 144–45. For details of India’s reaction, see ‘Support to Pak N-proposal: India Conveyed Unhappiness to Soviet Union’, The Statesman, 20 November 1991. Apart from India, this resolution was opposed by Bhutan and Mauritius.

13. For details of the development of Indo-American ties, see especially B. K. Srivastava, ‘Indo-American Relations: Search For a New Equation’, International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, April–June 1993, pp. 215-30; P. M. Kamath, ‘Indo-US Relations During the Clinton Administration: Upward Trends and Uphill Tasks Ahead’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 1, February 1998, pp. 1603–18; and M. J. Vinod, ‘India–United States Relations in a Changing World: Challenges and Opportunities’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 20, No.3, June 1997, pp. 439–49.

14. See for details, Ghosh, ‘Dynamics of India-China Normalisation’, China Report, Vol. 31, No. 2, April–June 1995.

15. Tai Ming Cheung, ‘Loaded Weapons: China on Arms Buying Spree in Former Soviet Union’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 3 September 1992, p. 21; and Jyotsna Bakshi, ‘Russia–China Military Technical Cooperation: Implications for India’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 4, July 2000, pp. 633–67.

16. Jyotsna Bakshi, ‘India in Russia’s Strategic Thinking’, Vol. 21, No. 10, January 1998. pp. 1467–85.

17. Tatiana Shaumian, ‘Thirty-five Years Later’, New Times, Vol. 32, No. 90, August 1990, p. 7.

18. Singh, ‘India’s Relations with Russia and Central Asia’, p. 74.

19. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/1372 A ½, 5 May 1992; British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/WO 230 A/9, 15 May 1992. Also see Far Eastern Economic Review, 14 May 1992, p. 63, and 15 October 1992, p. 16.

20. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/1373 A1/2-3, 6 May 1992; and British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/1375 A 2/2-3 8 May 1992. See also Statesman, 4–5 May 1992.

21. Asian Defence Journal, August 1992, p. 96. On this point see also Thakur, The Politics and Economics of India’s Foreign Policy, p. 137.

22. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1461 A1/4-5, 17 August 1992.

23. For reports on Pawar’s visit to Moscow, see Statesman, 7–10 September 1992.

24. Ibid., 8 September 1992.

25. Ibid., 9 September 1992.

26. Ibid., 10 September 1992.

27. Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, 20 November 1992. See also Ibid., 28 October 1992.

28. Asian Defence Journal, January 1993, p. 154. The Russian offer came as a reaction to Ukraine’s willingness to sell India and aircraft carrier from its disputed Black Sea Fleet.

29. Edmond Dantes, ‘An In-depth Look at the Asia-Pacific Air Forces and Future Procurement’, Asian Defence Journal, January 1993, p. 23.

30. Statesman, 23 November 1992.

31. This was evident in Yeltsin’s statement at the Press Conference in New Delhi on 29 January 1993: ‘No strong eastern policy is possible without India or without taking into consideration India’s interests, its global weight and its authority’. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/1601 C 1/4 February 1993.

32. Statesman, 28 January 1993.

33. Ibid., 30 January 1993.

34. Ibid.

35. Ibid., 30 January 1993.

36. Ibid.

37. Ibid., 16 January 1993.

38. For details on this, see Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘Russia & Asia: Mr. Yeltsin’s New Foreign Policy’, Statesman, 7 February 1993.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid., 29 January 1993.

41. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/1601 C 1/7 February 1993.

42. Statesman, 30 January 1993.

43. Ibid.

44. Ibid., 28–30 January 1993. See also Tribune, 30 January 1993.

45. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, FE/1599 A 1/2, 29 January 1993. Cited also in Singh, ‘India’s Relations with Russia and Central Asia’, p. 70.

46. For a detailed study of the rocket deal controversy, see Thakur, The Politics and Economics of India’s Foreign Policy, pp. 140–44; Singh, ‘India’s Relations with Russia and Central Asia’, pp. 73–75; and Jyotirmoy Banerjee, ‘Implications for Asia-Pacific Security: The Russian Enigma’, Asian Survey, Vol. 34, No.6, pp. 544–55.

47. During 1985–86, America expressed its deep concern about missile proliferation and worked out with its allies a system of export control for missiles and related technology. This resulted in the Missiles Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which was formally announced on 16 April 1987.

48. Cited in Times of India, 26 July 1993.

49. Izvestia, 6 May 1992.

50. Telegraph, 30 January 1993.

51. Izvestia, 2 July 1992.

52. Tribune, 6 July 1993. For detailed discussion on these points, see Jyotsna Bakshi, ‘India in Russia’s Strategic Thinking’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 21, No. 10, January 1998, pp. 1467–85.

53. Statesman, 17 July 1993.

54. Telegraph, 10 July 1993.

55. Ghosh, ‘The Break-up of the Soviet Union and Its Impact on India’s Security’, p. 139.

56. Subrahmanyam, ‘New Russian N-Doctrine’, Economic Times, 8 November 1993.

57. See Yuri Vinogradov, Delhi Declaration and Asian Future, New Delhi: Allied Publishers Private Limited, 1987.

58. For the Soviet position, see Initiatives of the Delhi Six and the Soviet Position, Moscow: Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1987.

59. Subrahmanyam, ‘New Russian N-Doctrine’.

60. See for instance, Peter Ferdinand, ‘Russia and Russians after Communism: Western or Eurasian’,World Today, Vol. 48, No. 12, December 1992, pp. 225-29; Mohamed M. EIDoufani, ‘Yeltsin’s Foreign Policy—A Third-World Critique’, World Today, Vol. 49, No. 6, June 1993, pp. 105–08; Olga Alexandrova, ‘Divergent Russian Foreign Policy Concepts’, Aussenpolitik, Vol. 44, 4th quarter, 1993, pp. 366–71; Bhabani Sen Gupta, ‘Russia & Asia’, and Jyotsna Balshi, ‘Russia Shifts its Policy Gear’, Tribune, 2 April 1994.

61. British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/1451 I, 5 August 1992.

62. For example, Hannes Adomeit, ‘Russia as a “great power” in world affairs: images and reality’, International Affairs, Vol. 71, No.1, London, January 1995, pp. 35–68.

63. Segodnya, 4 February 1994.

64. See ‘Yeltsin Sees Military Sales to China’, Los Angeles Times report, Boston Globe, 18 December 1992.

65. For instance, Matt Forney and Nayan Chanda, ‘Comrades in Arms: Russian Rapprochement Could Boost China’s Clout’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 May 1996, p. 20; Robert Karinol, ‘China to Buy Russian Kilo Submarines’, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 19 November 1994, 1994, p.1. Following Kozyev’s visit to Beijing in January 1994, here was considerable expansion of Sino-Russian economic cooperation. Bilateral trade reached $7.7 in 1993—an increase of 31 per cent over 1992–making China the second most important trading partner of Russia after Germany.

66. Inder Malhotra, ‘US-Russian Nuclear Effrontery’, Times of India, 20 January 1994; Jasjit Singh, ‘The Moscow Message’, Hindustan Times, 24 January 1994 and Bakshi, ‘India in Russia’s Strategic Thinking’.

67. For the text of the Moscow declaration, see Government of India, Foreign Affairs Record, Ministry of External Affairs, New Delhi, Vol. 40, No. 7, July 1994, pp. 121-23.

68. Government of India, Annul Report (1994–1995), New Delhi: Ministry of Defence, pp. 2–3.

69. Reports of Rao’s visit to Moscow have been published in The Statesman, 30 June and 1, 2, 3 and 9 July 1994.

70. Foreign Broadcast Information Service, SOV-94-116, 16 June 1994, and SOV-94-144, 27 July 1994.

71. For details, see Hamish McDonald, ‘The Price is Right: India Turns to Russia Once Again for Arms’, Far Eastern Economic Review, 23 June 1994, p. 29.

72. Bakshi, ‘India in Russia’s Strategic Thinking’.

73. Ministry of Defence, ‘India in Russia’s Strategic Thinking’, p. 2.

74. Statesman, 9 July 1994.

75. Nelson Graves, ‘Chernomyrdin Measured on Relations With India’, Moscow Times, 24 December 1994.

76. Ibid.

77. Hindustan Times, 24 December 1994.

78. Moscow Times, ‘Chernomyrdin Measured on Relations With India’.

79. Anton Zhigulsky, ‘India to Negotiate Russian Arms Sales’, Moscow Times, 27 July 1995.

80. Alexander Golz, ‘Primakov’s Realpolitik’, Moscow Times, 11 April 1996. The writer was originally associated with Krasnaya Zvezda. In the Duma election of December 1995, the Communists emerged as the single largest party, winning 159 seats in the 450-member House. It was necessary for Yeltsin to come to terms with the prevailing atmosphere in the country; and it was against this background that, in January 1996, Kozyrev, the current foreign minister, was replaced by Primakov.

81. Hindu, 31 January 1996. For an elaborate study of Primakov’s foreign policy, see Irina Kobrinskaya, ‘Dangers of Isolationism’ and ‘Foreign Policy After Poll’, The Moscow Times, 19 January and 27 June 1996 respectively. See also Golz, ‘Primakov’s Realpolitik’.

82. Moscow Times, 11 April 1996; and Hindu, 29 March 1996.

83. Moscow Times, 11 April 1996.

84. Jerome M. Conley, ‘Indo-Russian Military and Nuclear Cooperation: Implications For US Security Interests’, INSS Occasional Paper 31 (Proliferation Series), Colorado: US Air Force Institute for National Security Studies, USAF Academy, February 2000, p. 12. Available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/india/doctrine/ocp31.htm

85. Alexander Konovalov, Head of the Russian Institute for Strategic Studies, said, ‘We are not giving weapons for nothing anymore. We are selling arms now only to those countries that can pay for it.’ Moscow Times, 5 January 1996.

86. Moscow Times, 24 February 1996.

87. Asian Age, 21 February 1996.

88. Moscow Times, n. 86.

89. ‘Plane Deal With India Hits Snag’, Moscow Times, 24 October 1996. For reports on Rodinov’s visit, see Moscow Times, 3 December 1996; and Asian Age, 14 and 24 October 1996.

90. ‘India Signs $1.8 Billion Contract for Sukhoi Jets’, Moscow Times, 3 December 1996; and Asian Age, 1 December 1996.

91. Delovoi Mir, 21 March 1997.

92. Statesman, 11 and 12 June 1997. It is interesting to note that according to a top Russian official, ‘the US had tried and virtually succeeded in sabotaging the $1.8 Billion deal for the sale of 40 SU-30 fighter planes to India.’ In an interview to Nezavisimaya Gazeta, Igor Korotchenko, the director general of Roosvoruzheniye, blamed Washington, saying, ‘As soon as we start preparing any major contract with a foreign country, we immediately come across a wall of complications’. However, he said, ‘We overcame all the difficulties and the $1.8 billion contract has now finally been sealed.’ Rediff On The Net ‘US Tried to Scuttle Russia’s Sukhoi Deal with India’, http://www.rediff.com/news/jul/16su.htm

93. For a detailed report, see Statesman, 10 February 1997 and Asian Age, 21 March 1997.

94. Statesman and Asian Age, 26 March 1997. Moscow’s decision reportedly triggered off strong protests from Washington as the latter viewed that the decision violated a 1992 agreement among the nuclear suppliers, and that it would be opposed to the international efforts on disarmament. See Telegraph and Statesman, 7 and 9 February 1997 respectively. See also Ghosh, ‘The Break-up of the Soviet Union and Its Impact on India’s Security’, p. 139.

95. Hindu, 24 March 1997. See the available online,The Hindu, 26 March 1997. Available online at http://www.webpage.com/hindu/daily/970326/01/01260002.htm

96. See ‘Russia Slams Tank Deal’, Moscow Times, 20 February 1997, ‘Russia to Block Sale of Tanks to Pakistan’. See also Rediff on the Net, http://www.rediff.com/news/feb/27 russ.htm.

97. According to an issue of Jane’s Defence Weekly, the Russian proposal claimed that fitting the T-72 tanks with Arena will boost its battlefield survivability. Reported in ‘Russia to Update India’s T-72 Tanks’, Indian Express, 10 May 1997.

98. ‘India, Russia Renew Defence Relations’, Hindu, 7 October 1997.

99. ‘India, Russia Diversify Defence Tie-ups’, Hindu, 9 October 1997.

100. ‘India, Russia to Boost Military Ties’, Hindu, 13 October 1997.

101. ‘India, Russia Agree to Defence Cooperation’, Defence Systems Daily, 24 December 1997. Available online at http://defence-data.com/current/page 1496.htm

102. Speaking to journalists at the IDEX-97 arms fair in Abu-Dhabi, Alexander Kotelkin, Director, Rosvooruzhenie, commented, ‘I believe Russia will catch up with the US with regard to the volume of its arms exports by the year 1999. By that time Russia’s annual volume of arms and military equipment exports will reach $6.5 billion, perhaps even $7 billion. During the last two years our arms exports have doubled. In 1996, Russia exported arms and military equipment worth a total of $3.5 billion. Our contract portfolio is currently worth some $8 billion. In 1997 we plan to export arms and military equipment worth a total of not less than $4-5 billion.’ (Nezavisimaya Gazeta).

103. Izvestia, 2 January and 30 June 1992; and Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 20 August 1992, pp.1 and 4.

104. For Russia’s reaction to the Pokhran-II, see Jyotsna Bakshi, ‘Russia’s Post-Pokhran Dilemma’, available online at http://www.idsa-india.org/an-aug8-4.html

105. Ibid. See also Statesman, 13 May 1998.

106. Summary of World Broadcasts, SU/3226, B/4, 14 May 1998.

107. Statesman, 15 May 1998.

108. Ibid., 16 May 1998.

109. Bakshi, ‘Russia’s Post-Pokhran Dilemma’.

110. See, for example, the views and articles published in Izvestia, 14 and 19 May 1998; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 13 and 15 May 1998; and Rossiskaya Gazeta, 13 May 1998.

111. Izvestia, 2 June 1998.

112. Times of India, 24 June 1998.

113. Statesman, 6 November 1998; and Asian Age, 6, 10 and 12 November 1998.

114. India emerged as the biggest purchaser of Russian defence equipment, including spares, for its armed forces. 45 to 80 per cent of the requirements of the Indian Army and the Air Force come from Moscow. See Afzal Mahamood, ‘The Bear Hugs the Cow’, http://www.defencejournal.com/jan99/bear-hugs-cow.html. See also the various issues of The Moscow Times and Izvestia and other Soviet papers since 1996 for India’s extended shopping list, which includes purchase of 300T-9 Russian tanks, advanced submarines, and a variety of combat aircraft and sea-going vessels on soft terms.

115. The Statesman, 3 February and 28 May 1999.

116. Mahmood, ‘The Bear Hugs the Cow’.

117. One source points out that the S-300V has reportedly shot down over 60 tactical ballistic missiles with ranges of up to 600 km during tests and has demonstrated a single-shot kill probability of 40 to 70 per cent. A Mahmood, n. 114.

118. For detailed report of the test-firing of Agni-II, and the reactions of Russia and other countries, see Statesman and Asian Age, 12 April 1999. Jasjit Singh, India’s leading expert, said regarding the Agni-II that the ‘goal must be a range of 5000 km as intermediate missiles are classified within that’, because ‘we should look to countries which have missile targeting India’ (Ibid.).

119. Asian Age, 15 April 1999. China interestingly remained silent on the test-firing of missile by tits closest ally, but its official news agency described it as a ‘matching response’ to India’s Agni-II trial (Ibid.). For details on Pakistan’s test-firing of missiles, see Statesman, 16 April 1999.

120. Asian Age, 16 May 1999.

121. Ibid.

122. According to the protocol, Soviet/Russian President does not meet any visiting foreign minister. The last time a Soviet President met a visiting foreign minister was in November 1990, when President Gorbachev held talks with Madhav Singh Solanki. The telephonic discussion between Yeltsin and Jaswant had been emphasized by Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov at a press conference with Jaswant after a two-and-a-half hour discussion with him. Telegraph, 26 May and Statesman, 28 May 1999.

123. Statesman, 7 May 1999. These tanks would enable Indian Army to effectively counter Pakistan’s recently-acquired tanks from Ukraine. The Indian Army considers the T-90s capable of firing laser-guided missiles, superior to Pakistan’s T-80s, and would directly challenge the indigenously built Arjuna tanks.

124. The Statesman (15 September 1999) featured an elaborate discussion of this report.

125. For detailed discussion of the developments in relations between China and Russia, in all its dimensions, in the post-Soviet era, see Jyotirmoy Banerjee, Chapter 4 in Nuclear World: Defence & Politics of Major Powers, New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2002.

126. Asian Age, 29 August 1999.

127. Statesman, 2 and 4 November 1999.

128. For a detailed study of Russia’s assistance to Indian Navy, see Statesman, 6 and 26 November 1999; and Asian Age, 16 November 1999.

129. See, for details, Baidya Bikash Basu, ‘Putin’s Visit and the Future of India-Russia Defence Cooperation’, Strategic Analysis, December 2000, pp. 1763–69; and John Cherian, ‘A Strategic Partnership’, Frontline, Vol. 17, No. 21, 14–27 October 2000, pp. 10-12. That Russia’s keenness to further develop its strategic ties with India is not just a logical conclusion of the traditional friendship between the two countries, but a new geopolitical necessity, has been pointed out by A.P.S. Chauhan in ‘Good Old Bear to Be Hugged Tight’, Pioneer, 2 June 2000.

130. Statesman, 4 October 2000.

131. Times of India and Telegraph, 5 October 2000.

132. Statesman, 4 October 2000. See Gulshan Sachadeva, ‘Reviving Economic Interests’, Frontline, Vol. 17, No. 21, 14–27 October 2000. See also ‘Putin Seals Russia–India Ties’, Russia Journal, 7–13 October 2000.

133. ‘India and Russia After the Summit’, Strategic Affairs, 15 October 2000.

134. Statesman, 5 October 2000, and The Telegraph, n. 131.

135. Times of India and Telegraph, 5 October 2000.

136. ‘Putin Shares Concern on Terrorism’, Statesman, 5 October 2000.

137. Telegraph, 5 October 2000; and The Times of India, 6 October 2000.

138. Srinjoy Chowdhury, ‘India Reworks Russian Missile to Make It N-capable’, Statesman, 22 October 2000.

139. Cited in Gurmeet Kanwal, ‘Defence Cooperation: India–Russia Military Equipment Relationship’, Statesman, 26 November 2001.

140. The Statesman, 12 November 2001.

141. The Russian-made surface-to-air missile, OSA, was successfully test-fired on 11 November 2001 from the Interim Test Range at Chandipur. The missile has a 15 km range and is equipped with an on board computer. It was fired to hit its target which had been attached to the Lakshya, the indigenously built pilotless target aircraft.

142. Statesman, 16 October 2001. See also, R. Parthasarathy, ‘Indo-Russian Relations: Winds of Change’, Financial Daily, 12 October 2000.

143. Statesman, 7 November 2001. For full and detailed reports of Vajpayee’s visit to Moscow, see Statesman, 5–8 November 2001. For a critical analysis of the developments in Indo-Russian relations, see Hari Vasudevan, ‘Scripted to Bush’s Dictation?’, Statesman, 10 November 2001.

144. The agreement, signed on 6 November during Vajpayee’s visit to Moscow, is significant not only because it had brought to an end a global nuclear blockade against India of nearly 30 years, but it had also reiterated Russia’s commitment to India in the sphere of nuclear cooperation. For a detailed report on this project, see Jaya Menon, ‘Largest Slot for Koodankulam on India’s Nuclear Map’, Statesman, 27 November 2001. See also Manpreet Sethi, ‘Indo-Russian Nuclear Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges’, Strategic Analysis, Vol. 24, No. 9, pp. 1757–61.

145. Times of India, 4 February 2002.

146. See also J.K. Dutt, ‘India and Central Asia: No Option But to Join an Alliance’, Statesman, 21 February 2002.

147. India Today, 16 December 2002, p. 54.

148. For these and other aspects of Putin’s visit to India, see Statesman, 2–6 December 2002, p. 54.

149. Ibid., 5 and 6 December 2002.

150. Putin said at a meeting that ‘good results can be achieved by investing part of the debt into joint ventures in India’, and that an India-Russia combine could play a crucial role in global markets. Statesman, 5 December 2002. Also see India Today, 16 December 2002, p. 55.

151. For the detailed reports of Musharraf’s visit to Moscow and Putin’s response to it, see Statesman, 3, 5, 6 and 8 February 2003.

152. See Viktor Litovkin, ‘Strategic Partner: New Delhi Will Profit From Moscow’s Proposal’, Statesman, 24 January 2003. According to Litovkin, a Russian military analyst, Moscow and New Delhi are maintaining ‘impressive military-technical cooperation’ between them, with the annual volume of such bilateral cooperation reaching $2 billion. While Russia views India as its ‘full-fledged strategic partner’, India will certainly ‘profit from’ such strategic connection. The nature and extent of Russia’s arms transfer relationship with India is also explained in Nikolai Gulko, ‘Arms Trade: Russia Exporting More Of Its Weapons’, Statesman, 20 February 2003.

153. Cited in Kanwal, ‘Defence Cooperation: India–Russia Military Equipment Relationship.’