10

THE INDIA-EU PARTNERSHIP: STRATEGIC ALLIANCE OR POLITICAL CONVENIENCE?

Madhavi Bhasin

The post cold war global scenario has created a conducive atmosphere for astronger India-EU partnership. We do not have any fundamentalpolitical disagreements, which could impede the dynamic growth ofour economic cooperation. On the other hand, there is much thatunites us, and provides a firm basis to construct a strong edifice of a long term, mutual reinforcing economic relationship.¹

From being the ThirdWorld’s Trojan Horse into the Community² toemerging as a ‘key partner’³ in thepresent century, India’s relations with the European Union (EU) has undergone a qualitative transformation. Since theEuropean Union has emerged as a powerful economic and politicalforce in today’s world,⁴ relations with the EU as a group and with individual countries of the European Community (EC) occupy a significant place in India’s foreign policy.The traditional partnership between India and EU assumed greatervitality and substance after the thaw in the Cold War. With thefall of the Iron Curtain and the emerging solidarity within the EU after a prolonged phase of internal adjustment, the European countries have become more favourably inclined towards building extra-continental relations. At the same time, the Indian foreign policy was preparing to adapt to the new international environment where it had lost a favourable ally—the USSR—whereglobal trends were moving towards multipolarity and openregionalism, where security threats were more inclusive andemanating from non-state actors. One of the vital features of theIndian foreign policy in the post-Cold War era has been the greater emphasis on multilateral networking. India has been enthusiastic in seeking entry into groupings like the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM); strengthening links with EU, Mercosur, Organization of African Union (OAU) and rejuvenating the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) and the Indian Ocean Rim Association. The convergence of these orientations in India and the EU has set the stage for a durable and dynamic partnership between the two.

The present study attempts to analyze the India–EU relations in the post-Cold War context and seeks to examine its influence on the current dynamics of international politics. The objective of the study is to understand the manner in which India’s partnership with EU would respond to global concerns of economic growth, political stability, military security and social cohesion. How far can the India–EU relations affect the power equations of international politics? Is there a possibility for graduating the partnership to a higher and more significant level? The current trends in India–EU partnership are analysed to evaluate its catalytic potential in determining the future orientation of international politics.

The first section provides a brief historical context of the India–EU relations since the inauguration offormal diplomatic links in 1963. The following four sections analyze the economic, political, strategic and sociocultural dimensions of the India–EU relations with specific reference to current global trends. The final section evaluates the potential, actual and realized, of the emerging India–EU relations and its ramifications on the global scene.

The Historical Context

The relations betweenIndia and the member states of the European Union have a longhistory. India–EU relations began to assume shape in 1963; Indiawas amongst the first developing countries to establish diplomaticrelations with the European Economic Community (EEC). Institutional links between India and the EU⁵ evolved through three broad phases each covering about a decade. In the first phase from 1962 to the early 1970s, India’s relation with the EC was strongly influenced by the possibilities of UK joining the EC. Consequently the relation remained fairly low key during this period. The second period between the early 1970s to early 1980s saw the establishment of a network of institutional links providing the framework for a regularly functioning dialogue and the start of a modest aid programme. The third phase from the early 1980s onwards has seen a gradual intensification of dialogue and an expansion of institutional links as wellas increases m.the at bprogramme.⁶

In 1965, the EuropeanParliament unanimously voted for the opening of bilateralnegotiations and ensuring an extension of trade relations betweenthe countries of the Community and India. Subsequently, theCommercial Cooperation Agreement (CCA) was signed in 1973 andthe joint commission held its first session the following year.The CCA was concluded in response to the loss of Commonwealthpreferences, under which Indian exports enjoyed preferentialaccess to the UK market. The CCA was the first of a wholegeneration of agreements and was an advance on, and differentfrom, classical trade agreements. The two principal objectives enshrined in it were,‘the development and diversification of theCommunity’s imports from India and India’s importsfrom the Community.⁷ Christopher Soames, the then EC Commissioner for external relations remarked that, ‘the CCA provides the juridical basis for two demographic configuration inAsia and Europe to make a contribution to a new phase ofinternational economic cooperation commensurate with theirhuman, intellectual and material resources’.⁸ In June 1981, the existing trade provisions and economic cooperation were extended with the signing of the Commercial and Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA).

Over the years, India and the EU have developed a close relationship that covers key areas such as political ties, trade and investment, economic and development cooperation as well as cultural exchanges. A strong impetus came from the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development, which was signed between the EU and India in December 1993 and came into force in August 1994. The 1994 cooperation agreement provided for an EC–India joint commission as the central guardian mechanism to oversee and inspire the entire range of cooperation activities between India and the EC. Three separate sub-commissions, ontrade; economic cooperation; development cooperation, covered a detailed agenda and was expected to report directly to the joint commission. In July 1996, the European Commission presented a communication, ‘EU-India Enhanced Partnership’ which suggested a number of steps to reinforce this relationship. The council as well as the European Parliament subsequently endorsed the recommendations of the Commission and stressed the importance of developing relations between the European Union and India efficiently, through regular ministerial meetings, systematic exchange of information, and by using the instruments provided for in the framework agreement.

India–EU Summits

A quantum leap occurredin the India–EU relations in June 2000 in Lisbon with thefirst-ever India–EU summit. On this historic occasion, both sidesexpressed their resolve to build in the 21st century a newstrategic partnership founded on shared values and aspirations,characterized by enhanced and multi-faceted cooperation. Duringthe summit both sides decided to work more closely to promote peace, stability and security in their respective regions and beyond through bilateral dialogue and confidence building measures among the countries concerned. A decision was also taken to hold regular summit meetings in future.⁹

In an attempt tobroaden institutional contacts the second summit in 2001 favouredregular interaction between the Indian Parliament and the EuropeanParliament in promoting bilateral relations. According to theassessments made at the summit, the first round of ‘India–EU Joint Initiative for Enhancing Trade and Investment’ contributed immensely in the sectors of food processing, engineering, information technology and telecommunications. During the summit both sides resolved to strengthen their bilateral economic cooperation with the aim to enhance trade and investment flows between India and the EU. Experts on trade defence were to meet for the first time to discuss economic issues critical for both sides. A decision was taken to expand cooperation in new areas through an agreement on cooperation in science and technology, India–EU joint vision statement on ICT, exploratory talks on the feasibility of having an agreement on maritime transport and creation of an ‘EU–India’ Cultural Forum in 2002.

A decision was taken at the third summit to implement through an action plan the joint recommendations made in the first round of the ‘EU–India Joint Initiative for Enhancing Trade and Investment’. Both sides decided to intensify cooperation to promote the reconstruction of Afghanistan. Emphasis was laid on building the EC-India trade and investment development programme and taking steps for the speedy implementation of the ‘EC–India Partnership for Progress’.

The fourth summit in 2003 commended the successful conclusion of an Indo–EU Customs Cooperation Agreement, India’s imminent participation in the development phase of the Galileo Project and the launching of negotiations for an Indo-EU Maritime Agreement. A decision was taken for an early launch of the EU scholarship programme for the masters and doctoral level and a Euro 10 million disaster preparedness programme.

The fifth summit in November 2004 officially endorsed the launching of an EU–India strategic partnership and decided to prepare an action plan forits implementation as well as a new joint EU–India political declaration, to be presented at the sixth summit in Delhi in 2005. This was a qualitative transformation in the way India and the EUwould engage as equal partners and work together in part nership with the world at large. According to British Prime Minster Tony Blair, the India–EU strategic partnership sets relations between the two at ‘a new, higher and more intensive level’.¹⁰ The first-ever EU–India cultural declaration was also adopted, a proof that the relationship extended well beyond politics and trade and paved the way for deepened interaction in this area.

In addition, the fifth summit produced the following ‘deliverables’:

• creation of an India–EU energy panel;
• launch of an EU–India environment conference;
• €33 million Erasmus Mundus Window for some 1,000 Indian students to receive a scholarship for post-graduate studies in Europe;
• joint workshops in automotive engineering, genomics and life sciences and nanotechnology;
• cooperation between the European Space Agency (ESA) and the Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) in developing the country’s unmanned lunar exploratory mission, Chandrayaan-1;¹¹

Table 10.1 India–EU Strategic Partnership: Joint Action Plan, 2004

At the sixth summit, both sides committed themselves to strengthened dialogue and engagement as strategic partners. In acknowledgement of the strategic partnership and shared responsibility to contribute to international peace, security and prosperity, India and EU adopted a comprehensive and forward looking action plan.¹²

The seventh summit in 2006 presented India and EU with another historic opportunity. In pursuance of their common fight against terrorism, India and EU during the summit proceedings welcomed the adoption of the first UN Counter Terrorism Strategy by the General Assembly. Energy emerged as an important area of on-going and future policy dialogue and practical cooperation between the EU and India. Review at the summit level reflected the significant progress being made within the framework of the EU–India energy panel and its working groups. Both sides agreed that the first EU–India energy business conference was an important step in bringing together various stakeholders in the process. They also expressed satisfaction over the establishment of a fourth new working group on petroleum and natural gas. Within the broad context of the EU–India economic cooperation, the leaders supported the establishment of a regular macro-economic dialogue, which would allow both parties to discuss economic developments and policy challenges in their respective economies as well as developments in the world economy at large.¹³

Political Dialogue

India–EU political partnership is consolidated by their common commitment to the values of democracy, the respect of human rights and fundamental freedoms, shared endeavour to promote peace, stability and security and the collective encouragement of socioeconomic development and prosperity in their respective regions and beyond. The deepening of the political partnership is embedded in a strong institutional architecture which consists of annual summit level meetings; annual ‘troika’ ministerial meetings; interactions between senior officials and experts on specific issues—twice yearly meetings of COTER Troika, a political working group on antiterrorism, consular affairs working group; regular exchanges between parliamentarians and biannual meetings of the India EU Round Table.

The political relations between the two sides received a major boost with the initiation of summit-level meetings in 2000. Peter Ludlow, the director of The Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), emphasized the need for India and EC to build a political understanding on global issues like poverty, environment, narco-terrorism which would provide a context for cooperation.¹⁴ The current EC–India cooperation agreement provides for a political dialogue and commits both sides to defending democracy, human rights, peace and a stable, just international order in line with the UN Charter.

Based on their common shared values, both sides recognize the need to build a coalition of interests in order to meet the challenges of the 21st century. They view each other as important partners in shaping the emerging multi-polar world. It is in this context that efforts are made to enhance political dialogue, to promote mutual understanding and to improve coordination on political and economic issues of bilateral, regional and multilateral dimensions. Both sides seek to pursue regular contacts, within the framework of the political dialogue and to address security issues of common concern.¹⁵ In order to broaden institutional contacts, the Indian Parliament and the European Parliament are encouraged to cooperate in promoting bilateral relations.

Economic Interaction

Trade and investment remains a cornerstone of the India–EU relationship. The European Union is convinced that the process of economic reform and liberalization in India and the gradual integration and enlargement of the EU provide an excellent opportunity to launch a new phase of a constructive and mutually beneficial partnership. In the 1990s, attempts were made to have an upgraded economic relationship. The European Union has emerged as India’s first partner in terms of trade and actual investment inflows and is in the front rank of its partners in the fields of development cooperation. The total FDI inflow from the EU into India is about $8 billion. India is the second most important Asian investor in Europe. These facts dearly highlight that both sides enjoy a mature relationship.¹⁶

A new India–EC agreement was signed in December 1991. Its main objective was to ‘enhance and develop the existing cooperation programme, through dialogue and partnership, in order to achieve a closer and upgraded relationship’. The new agreement differs from the 1981 agreement in several ways. It puts much greater emphasis on the private sector, recognizes India’s continuing need for development aid¹⁷ and expresses support for infrastructure development in India including telecommunications, energy, transport, roads, airports and ports. The EU has pledged to extend its cooperation to enable India to unlock the full potential of its economy, induce better returns on its vast economic assets through regulatory reform, privatization and fiscal reform.¹⁸

Both sides share the commitment towards an open, equitable and non-discriminatory rule-based multilateral trading system and sought to work on ways and means to strengthen India–EU traditional cooperation within the WTO.¹⁹ In 2003, an Indo–EU Customs Cooperation Agreement was signed. The India–EU summit the same year announced the launch of a Euro 14 million ‘Trade and Investment Development Programme’ (TIDP) to enhance bilateral trade and investment.²⁰ TIDP aimed to enhance mutual business by addressing day-to-day problems concerning sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards, intellectual property rights, investment facilities and customs procedures encountered by traders from both sides. A large majority ofEU investors in India consider their experience to be a success, whatever the undeniable difficulties. India is a key location.²¹

The sixth India–EU summit in 2005 decided to create a high level trade group to report to the next summit in 2006, including the possible launch of negotiations on a broad-based trade and investment agreement.²² India and the European Union were expected to begin negotiations in December 2006 for an ambitious and comprehensive bilateral trade and investment agreement though the gest tion period for the pact may be approximately two years. Moreover, the EC is currently drafting a country strategy paper 2007–2013 for India, which outlines priorities and provides the financial framework for funding cooperation activities in India. In this context an action plan support facility is being established to kick start activities in selected areas of priority. Modalities are being worked out to launch a macroeconomic dialogue between India and EC.²³

Strategic Partnership

The bilateral relations have further matured as India–EU strategic objectives have converged. An important element of its security strategy where EU has decided to put greater emphasis is efforts to work with partner countries around the globe. As things stand now, neither the Union nor any member state is alone capable of addressing the threats. Multilateral cooperation and bilateral partnerships with key actors are a priority and a necessity. The EU has recognized India, among others, as a major partner in this quest.²⁴ At the first summit in 2000, both sides agreed to address security issues of common concern within the framework of the political dialogue.

More than a year before the 9/11 attacks, when terrorism became a ‘global’ concern, India and the EU had condemned terrorism in all its forms at their first summit and had proposed a comprehensive convention on international terrorism. India and EU have laid down the basic principles and objectives of their joint campaign against terrorism in the Declaration on International Terrorism, 2001. Terrorism is recognized as a threat to peace and stability and a major challenge for open, democratic and multicultural societies. The fight against terrorism is not a crusade against any community or religion. India and the European Union supported the adoption on the basis of international law of decisive measures against aU states, individuals, and entities, which render support, harbour, finance, instigate or train terrorists or promote terrorism. Denying any religious ethnic, ideological or any other justification of terrorism they pledged to fight against international terrorism, wherever it occurs and regardless of its motives. Both sides favour the strengthening of the international legal basis for effectively combating the global menace of terrorism.²⁵

The EU welcomes India’s current voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing and its willingness to move towards a de jure formalization of this basic obligation of the CTBT. India is engaged in discussions on a range of issues including CTBT. India remains ready to bring these discussions to a successful conclusion based on the creation of a positive environment as it works towards building the widest possible consensus domestically. India and the EU reiterated their resolve to jointly work to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery.²⁶ Emphasis was laid on promoting universality, full implementation and—where needed—the reinforcement of multilateral instruments relating to the nuclear issue to which India and EU member states are party, and start negotiations on Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT), banning future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in early 2002 as well as to address the issue of ballistic missile proliferation.²⁷.

Both sides welcomed the adoption of UN Security Council resolution 1373 on 28 September 2001 and called for its full implementation by all member states. Both sides favour the central role of the UN in a wide framework of international consultations to promote peace, stability and reconstruction in Afghanistan. A joint commitment was expressed for the people of Afghanistan and its long-term reconstruction needs after the return of peace. EU favoured the development of a bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan which could lead to ‘positive developments’ on non-proliferation. The EU warmly welcomed Prime Minister Vajpayee’s extending the hand of friendship to Pakistan in April 2003 and the following peace initiatives. According to India and the EU, the nuclear tests by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea jeopardized regional peace and stability and highlighted the importance of countering proliferation.

The EU and India launched a strategic partnership in autumn 2005 and agreed to a senior-level meeting for a security dialogue. The first meeting of EU–India senior officials security dialogue, held in New Delhi on 22 May 2006, saw a useful exchange of views on global and regional security issues, disarmament and nonproliferation. Contacts have been established between Indian officials and representatives of EU Secretary General Javier Solana for non-proliferation. The two sides are considering the possibilities of exchanging views on the respective export control systems.²⁸ India’s defence cooperation links with the EU strength ened as France has oflate emerged as India’s major alternative supplier of defence equipment and hardware—Russia being the most important source in this field.

Socio-Cultural Collaboration

As the two largest democratic entities in the world, India and the EU share a common respect for ethnic, linguistic and religious diversity, a vibrant civil society and a commitment to sustainable development. These are common values that both sides seek to jointly promote in all parts of the world.²⁹ The India–EU Round Table of eminent non-official personalities and a network of EU and Indian think tanks has been initiated since January 2001. Several round tables covering diverse areas of mutual interest have been successfully held, promoting cooperation between political parties, trade unions, business associations, universities and civil society (including think tanks and NGOs); developing the India–EU Civil Society Internet Forum, enabling enhanced exchange of ideas between civil society actors; continuing to work for the integration of the round table into the institutional architecture of the India–EU relationship.³⁰ These are important steps for preparing the grounds for better people-to-people contact and understanding, which is an essential element of a dynamic and durable partnership³¹.

The aim of development cooperation is to intensify India–EU collaboration in key areas including elementary education, health services and environment. The EU has been closely associated with two important social projects—Sarva Siksha Abhiyan and the National Rural Health Mission of the Government of India. Educational cooperation is also increased through the facilitation of academic exchanges, such as Erasmus Mundus, and encouraging the development of EU studies in India and Indian studies in the EU.³² Cultural, academic and media exchanges are fostered under the EU–India Economic Cross-Cultural Programme.

Referring to the 2004 joint EU–India Declaration on Cultural Relations, India and the EU during the seventh summit in 2006 stressed the importance of cultural diversity and of the early ratification and implementation of the UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, as well as the growing importance of dialogue among cultures and civilizations in the new millennium.³³ In the context of the opportunities and challenges flowing from the large-scale movement of people between India and the EU, dialogues on migration and consular issues are held by both sides.

Shared Principles with Distinct Perceptions

The EU and India have upgraded their relations in both quality and depth in the last few years. In a rapidly evolving international environment, India and the EU have to play intelligently on the basis of their many common interests. The emerging global concerns demand ambitious common responses in the framework of a multilateral system to which India and the EU are committed. The future depends on their capacity to work together with shared determination to deal with all the common challenges that they face.³⁴ In response to these exigencies, the Commission proposed in 2004 a strategic alliance to enhance relations with India and promote an effective multilateral approach.³⁵ Hence, the influence of global realities on India–EU bilateral relations are an important dimension of their emerging partnership.

The EU and India have developed institutional mechanisms to exchange ideas on regional issues. With India’s support EU has been granted observer status in SAARC in August 2006. EU’s experience in regional cooperation could prove beneficial to SAARC as the organization ushers in a new era of ‘controlled open regionalism’. On the other hand, the ASEM enlargement in September 2006 opened doors for India’s entry into the group. India’s participation is expected to further increase the representativeness, dynamism and innovative character process, which is the main forum for dialogue and cooperation between Asia and Europe.³⁶

Terrorism, issues of comprehensive security, strains between unipolar and multi-polar trends, threat to multiculturalism given the emerging popularity of the clash of civilizations doctrine are defining features of international relations in the present century. It has been asserted that India and the EU need to develop and strengthen a framework in which both would confront and eventually overcome these global challenges. It is important to assess the manner and degree to which India–EU multi-dimensional cooperation responds to these wider global developments.

The two sides recognize the fact that terrorism constitutes one of the most serious threats to international peace and security, and reaffirm their condemnation of aU acts of terrorism in a Uits forms and manifestations as criminal and unjustifiable, irrespective of their motives. Logistical bases for Al Qaeda cells have been uncovered in the UK, Italy, Germany, Spain and Belgium. India has since long been the centre of terrorist activities. Whether it is the 7/7 attack in London or the 7/11 Mumbai blasts, India and the EU are victims of terrorism. As part of their joint efforts to fight terrorism, contact has been initiated between the Indian and EU counter terrorism coordinators, and efforts are being made to block access to terrorist financing and cooperate in the fight against money laundering. Political dialogue between India and the EU has been intensified in order to address the consequences of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. In 2005, India and EU decided to work towards blocking access to terrorist financing.

The two sides share a common belief in the fundamental importance of multilateralism and in the essential role of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security, promoting the economic and social advancement of people and meeting global threats and challenges. The most visible specimen of India–EU collaboration in promoting UN reforms and greater multilateralism is the common bid by India and Germany for the UN Security Council permanent membership recently. India and the EU have sought to promote effective multilateralism and strengthen UN peace keeping and peace building through exchanging best practice and engaging in joint training.³⁷ Both sides sought to ensure that the fight against terrorism is conducted in accordance with the rule of law³⁸ thereby reemphasizing the central role of the UN in the antiterrorism campaign. While reviewing the developments in Iraq both sides stressed the importance of the central role to be played by the UN in restoring peace and normalcy and the reconstruction and rehabilitation of that country. The joint declaration emphasized the urgency of the adoption of a clearly laid-out political process within a realistic time frame in order to allow the Iraqi people to determine their own political future and retain an effective control of their economic resources.

With the current global crisis over religious extremism and the alleged ‘clash of civilizations’, India and the EU stand out as success stories of synthetic cultural and social coexistence. India is a microcosm of the globe with a population that accounts for nearly one-sixth of the humanity and the second largest Muslim community in the world. India is an example of how various religions can flourish in a plural, democratic and open society. The EU, with its expanding geographical boundaries and diversifying demography, is one of the most demographically diverse entities in the world and yet able to synthesize the diversity of its member states into a coherent whole. India and the EU can in communion popularize the doctrine of social and cultural coexistence. Realizing this fact India and the EU initiated a dialogue on pluralism and diversity with a view to sharing experiences and enhancing mutual knowledge of the cultural and linguistic diversity existing within them.³⁹

With the increasing democratization of foreign policy and constrained political will, Track Two is gaining greater prominence around the globe. From issues of conflict resolution to environmental projection; from the World Economic Forum to the World Social Forum, the civil society and NGOs are redefining agendas and implementing projects. The creation of the Round Table in 2000 by India and EU was recognition, at the highest political level, that civil society has an important contribution to make to the official decision-making process. The Round Table has direct access to India–EU summits, and its recommendations form nonbinding inputs for decisionmaking by the Government oflndia and European institutions. The range of subjects discussed at the Round Table is vast and includes issues like contribution of the civil society in coping with globalization and sustainable development in a multipolar world, cultural and religious pluralism in democratic societies, barriers to trade and investment flows between India and the EU, cooperation in training and education.

The EU is closely involved in various issues of India’s regional security concerns. The alignment oflndia and EU policy objectives in South Asia has in many ways helped to dilute apprehensions about India’s alleged hegemony in the region. India and the EU support the process of seeking a negotiated settlement acceptable to all sections of Sri Lankan society, consistent with democracy, pluralism and respect for individual rights, within the framework of a united Sri Lanka and called for an early resumption of negotiations.⁴⁰ EU is involved in the Sri Lankan crisis as a cochair peace process and calls for a political solution within the framework of a united Sri Lanka. In December 2006, former French Minister Bernard Kouchner was nominated as the EU ‘Eminent Person’ on the International Inde, pendent Group of Eminent Persons (IIGEP) in Sri Lanka. The IIGEP is being established to observe the work of the national Commission oflnquiry into recent human rights violations. Though all members will act in their independent capacity, it is important to note that the group will be chaired by Justice Bhagwati from India.

The European Parliament has recently passed a resolution which states that in view of the parliamentary elections scheduled for late 2006–early 2007, systemic reforms in Bangladesh were necessary to reestablish the principles of good governance so that the election commission and the caretaker government could operate independently. Although it remains nonintrusive, India supports free and fair elections in Bangladesh. In Nepal, both supported a settlement of the crisis, based on multiparty democracy and constitutional monarchy. From branding the LITE as a ‘terrorist’ organization to banning the Lashkare Toiba, the EU is extending the anti-terrorist campaign into South Asia. In the words of Mr Vicenzo Giummara, leader of the European parliamentary delegation to India, ‘India is a factor for the stability and protection of democracies and human rights in the South Asian region’⁴¹

India is yet to develop a coordinated approach with regard to EU’s strategic regional objectives. Whether it is the case of peace-building in the Balkans or responding to the European neighbourhood policy, Indian response has been found to be lacking and incoherent. The evolution of the Barcelona process for engaging EU’s Mediterranean partners and concerns over problems of Southern Caucasus barely managed to capture the attention ofindian foreign policy-makers.

It is important to realize that the India–EU strategic partnership is not bereft of obstacles. A strategic partnership depends on common values and interests and can withstand ups and downs in the relationship. It also implies coordination and a highlevel of interaction before taking any major decision. The EU–India relationship has a long way to go before it can be termed strategic.⁴²The EU has not yet emerged as a single political union following a common foreign and security policy. For instance, deep divisions were evident within the EU on the issue ofiraq, with the UK and Spain backing the United States and France and Germany emerging as staunch critics of the US action in Iraq. With such divergences, India finds it difficult to evolve a common politico-strategic approach towards the EU as a bloc. Moreover, in several areas of mutual and global strategic concerns, the Indian foreign policy objectives contradict those of either the EU or some of its members. According to Prof. R.K. Jain of JNU, ‘the post-modem EU is of marginal importance to us on security issues’.⁴³

The immediate response to India’s nuclear tests in 1998 reflected the underlying schism in strategic concerns. According to the EU the tests posed a grave threat to international peace and security and were a serious setback to global efforts towards nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. The EU appealed to India and Pakistan to refrain from any further nuclear tests, to sign and ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty as it stands and to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.⁴⁴ Several EU countries like Germany continue to be critical of india’s nuclear programme.

On the issue of nonproliferation there is a trend of convergence between the EU and the Indian approach but still there are some open questions. India is considered to have had a better record than Pakistan on horizontal non-proliferation and has acceded to other treaties on non-proliferation of chemical weapons and biological weapons. Unlike India, all the EU member states support the nuclear non-proliferation treaty and want stronger export controls on nuclear equipment and technology. While recognizing India’s refusal to accede to the non-proliferation treaty, the EU considers that ‘it is important that now India supports multilateral export control regimes and is ready to comply with the guidelines’.⁴⁵ During the first summit in 2000, both sides expressed their resolve to work together to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. The summit declaration also voiced an unequivocal commitment to the ultimate goal of a complete elimination of nuclear weapons under strict and effective international controL It is interesting to see how this resolve will translate on the ground in the face of Pakistan’s involvement in the proliferation network, Iran’s alleged nuclear programme and North Korea’s recent nuclear tests.

The vote on the resolution sponsored by EU3 for a referral of the Iran nuclear programme to the United Nations Security Council in mid-September 2005 was an unexpected event of convergence in the EU–India strategic objectives. Though 12 countries, including China, Russia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan abstained from voting, India unexpectedly voted in favour of the EU resolution. Pakistan’s involvement in assisting the Iranian nuclear programme has been established beyond doubt and its covert as well as overt nudearization has remained an issue of great concern for India. Going by the Iranian case and EU’s commitment on non proliferation, democracy and human rights, India could expect support from the EU in putting pressure on Pakistan. The EU observation mission had reported serious misgivings about some aspects of the October 2002 general elections in Pakistan. But the emerging EU–Pakistan relations reflect how realpolitik can create a compromise in strategic partnerships. Despite noting Pakistan’s failure in the areas of non-proliferation, democracy and human rights the European Union has concluded a new ‘third generation’ Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development with Pakistan in 2003. The agreement would seem to serve the EU’s strategic interests in Pakistan, in trade terms, as an ally in its war against terrorism and for its regional role, including with Afghanistan and Kashmir. A dear justification of the EU action was reflected in the statement of the chair of the foreign affairs committee, Elmar Brok: ‘Pakistan’s support in fighting terrorism overrides the EU’s human rights concerns, serious though they may be.⁴⁶

In December 2006, the UN Security Council voted unanimously to impose sanctions on Iran, targeting Tehran’s trade in sensitive nuclear materials and technology in order to stop enrichment work that could also be used in making bombs. India’s response to the resolution was the reassertion of the central role of the IAEA in the process of dialogue and negotiations for resolving the issue. With the Iran nuclear issue approaching a crisis stage, India’s foreign policy will have to respond to simultaneous compulsions of traditional friendship with Iran and strategic partnership with EU; its commitment as a champion of nuclear non-proliferation and ardent supporter of developing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Any decision that India takes will have a major impact on the India–EU strategic partnership.

On seeking the EU support for the Indo–US civilian nuclear deal, Indian efforts are similarly handicapped by the absence of a common EU stand on the issue. While Britain and Italy have supported the Indo–US civilian nuclear deal, Germany despite softening its stand has refrained from extending wholehearted support for the deal. Nordic countries, including Finland which held the EU Presidency till December 2006, have expressed grave anxieties over the deal. The EU does not view the India–US deal as recognition of India as a nuclear-weapon state. EU seeks to disconnect the two issues and refuses to ‘recognize a specific status for India as a nuclear weapon state’. The EU wants to see what kind of safeguard agreement India will conclude with the IAEA. It is also important for the EU that civilian nuclear cooperation does not free up further capability for nuclear military programmes.⁴⁷ This is despite the EU support for India’s membership in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER). The ITER project is expected to provide cheap and abundant power by around 2050, but fusion reactors involve tritium—which is also an ingredient in nuclear weapons. The ITER was expected to enable New Delhi to establish a new benchmark for its participation in international civilian nuclear initiatives. The EU will have to reconcile its divisions on the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal with its support to India in the ITER programme.

In terms of the UN, India has pushed hard for a permanent seat on the Security Council but, given EU divisions on that subject, it has not been able to support India. Though India and Germany were members of G-4 that pushed for gaining UN Security Council permanent membership in 2005, no concerted efforts were made on the lines of the India–EU partnership to support the claim. Given the ambitions ofltaly and Germany in that direction, some observers think that an EU consensus on Security Council permanent membership is difficult to emerge. The EU has also not been able to agree to India joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). India’s interest to diversify its nuclear supplies to benefit from nuclear energy is being considered vis‐à‐vis EU’s commitment to non-proliferation programme which received a major setback given North Korea’s nuclear tests. Though Britain and France supported India’s membership of the NSG, the EU was not able to evolve a consensus till October 2006.

Contradictions are also evident on the issue of promoting democracy. India and the EU have adopted opposite stands with regard to the military junta in Myanmar. India’s regional security sensitivities demand engaging the authorities in Yangon; while the EU seeks to exert pressure through isolating the regime. EU’s compromise with regard to Pakistan on its campaign for democracy has been highlighted above. India is also critical of the EU’s assessments on violation of human rights in the India administered Jammu and Kashmir. More recently, the EU is jointly campaigning with the Amnesty International seeking the abolition of death penalty in India. The proposal to establish an International Criminal Court finds India and the EU on different sides of the fence. The EU is a staunch promoter of the International Criminal Court, a critical milestone in the evolution of international human rights, and does not share India’s fears on sovereignty abridgement.

Despite the growing economic interaction India accounts for just 1.7 per cent of the total EU exports and imports. India has been pressing since long for ensuring that the EU provides greater access to its market by dismantling non-tariff barriers. India’s commercial relations with the EU were strained given EU’s textile quotas, which have been phased out since January 2005. But the psychological impact of these differences along with the continuing disagreements on how to bring the Doha Round to a successful conclusion still challenge EU–India relations. The Indian press has also been critical of what they see as scarcely veiled racist European reactions to an Indian tycoon’s bid for the Arcelor steel company. India feels that a range of issues from anti-dumping measures to manufacturing standards need to be looked at with a sense of proportion.⁴⁸

The divergence in India-EO socio-cultural concerns is also unavoidable. Whether it is the decision to ban the use ofheadscarves in schools or sending the French ship Clemenceau to India for scrapping, the differences in approach by India and EU are evident. India’s historical experiences of nurturing socio-cultural harmonization and status as a developing economy have resulted in a perceptional difference with regard to the EU’s sociocultural agenda. India still follows a soft policy to achieve the socio-cultural objectives of its foreign policy while relying on the harder military options for securing its strategic goals. In contrast, the EU follows a softer human security approach, while taking harder decisions on the social and economic agenda of its foreign policy.

India and Europe face common challenges on a global scale which require them to work together as partners and emerge as poles of stability in an unstable world.⁴⁹ Bilateral relation between India and the EU undoubtedly draws strength from their common commitment to the values of democracy, the rule of law, human rights and security. But evolving a comprehensive partnership beyond the realms of enhanced economic and scientific interaction, may land India and the EU in trouble. The EU is seen in India as an important global player in trade, financial and economic matters. When it comes to issues of security policy, India focusses on developing bilateral relations with countries such as Britain, France and Germany, partly because of a continuing lack of clarity in the European strategy in this area.⁵⁰ However the relationship between India and Europe cannot be built solely through bilateral cooperation. A further test is how they will work together in addressing global issues.⁵¹

India–EU relations areased on multifarious institutional structures and certain agreed principles as discussed above. Given the shared democratic culture, the global vision of both sides encompasses social, cultural, political and economic commonalities. But with dissimilar historical experiences, different levels of economic development and specific regional strategic compulsions, India and the EU cannot be comfortably dubbed as ‘natural partners’. India–EU relations are a unique example where both protagonists agree on the basics of their partnership but disagree on the specifics. Nevertheless, by banking on the basic synchronization of political values, an impressive India–EU partnership can be cultivated through sustained and prudent efforts.