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INDIA AND EAST ASIAN MULTILATERALISM

G.V.C. Naidu

Regional multilateralism in East Asia is primarily a post-Cold War phenomenon though the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had been around since the late 1960s as a sub-regional organization. ASEAN’s salience grew not so much because of the economic cooperation it sought to promote but the political role it played, especially since the outbreak of the Cambodian issue in the late 1970s. However, ASEAN became the rallying point of East Asian regional multilateralism that started taking shape as part of an effort to search for viable alternatives to deal with post-Cold War political uncertainties on the one hand, and on the issue of how best to take advantage of buoyant economic conditions on the other. To a great extent, economic and security multilateralism owe their origins to Japan,¹ which, for a variety of reasons, strongly advocated multilateral dialogue and frameworks, though most major powers such as the US and China and even ASEAN were reluctant to support it, albeit for entirely different reasons.

The momentum began in the late 1980s when some felt that regionalism could be promoted by taking advantage of the economic dynamism that the region was witnessing. The winding down of the Cold War came in handy as it removed the political problems that had created suspicions and divisions. If China’s opening up of its economy provided the necessary impetus, countries such as Japan and several ASEAN nations were also concerned about the creation of trading blocs in Europe and North America.

A series of initiatives starting from the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Malaysian premier Mahathir’s East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), the creation of the ASEAN Plus 3 (APT) after the economic crisis of 1997–98 and the more recent East Asia Summit (EAS) are the region-wide mechanisms that have come into being. There are a number of other institutional arrangements built around ASEAN such as the ASEAN meetings with dialogue partners, ASEAN summit meetings with China, Japan, and South Korea, and separately with India. Furthermore, another major trend that is adding to the web of linkages among the countries of the region are the plethora of different free trade/economic partnership agreements involving every country, both bilateral as well as regional and multilateral with ASEAN as a group. While the debate on creating regional multilateral mechanisms was being discussed vigorously in the early 1990s, India hardly figured in the deliberations. However, that has undergone a fundamental change both in terms of India’s involvement as well as the country’s own attitude. The following examines India’s policies toward East Asian regional multilateralism.

An interesting phenomenon in India’s foreign policy in the aftermath of the Cold War has been the growing interest in regional multilateralism. India, which traditionally had exhibited considerable aversion and scepticism towards such regional initiatives, in particular towards those related to political/security aspects, has gradually shifted its position by joining the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). It has now shown greater willingness to take part in regional forums meant purely for economic cooperation such as APEC, dialogue partnership with ASEAN, and more recently the East Asian Summit (EAS).

Since the early 1960s and till the early 1990s, India had been a quintessential follower of a ‘realist’ policy. Notwithstanding India’s new found interest in regional multilateralism, it continues to lay faith in the nature of great power relations and pursue a subtle balance of power. New Delhi’s evolving relations with Washington and Tokyo especially are not simply routine but will have considerable implications for East Asia. Yet, it cannot be denied that East Asian regional multilateralism has impacted India’s policy to an extent. The initial interest could be because of proliferation of multilateral frameworks in the early 1990s, which was seen to be a major trend and main conduit to engage with the region and simultaneous redundancy of the military alliances that were viewed suspiciously earlier. Thus, it is not easy to conclusively prove whether the change in India’s attitude toward regional multilateralism is purely tactical or longer lasting.

Introduction

Regional multilateral regimes are not a recent development; they have been around for a long time. Since the Second World War, a number of them came into existence for a variety of reasons, with varying aims and objectives. While some of them were global, many were regional. It is important to understand the dynamics and the role these organizations play in shaping not only the policies of its member states and others with direct or indirect stakes but also in influencing regional economic and security order and equilibrium. It is true that some of these were created with certain specific objectives and were allowed to decay once those objectives were met, or simply outlived their utility. The second significant aspect is that their survival and success are contingent upon the backing of the great powers. It does not mean all those regimes that have the full support of the great powers will automatically survive.

In the theoretical domain, the international relations theory is dominated primarily by two schools of thought that hold diametrically opposite views: the Realist and the Institutionalist schools.² Although it is beyond the purview of this chapter to undertake a review of the debate between these and various other derivatives of the two schools, it is useful to briefly mention the key arguments.

Proponents of an institutionalized multilateralism argue that states have certain neutral, common interests, for instance the pursuit of economic development, which would be a major incentive for them to cooperate. As economic interdependence grows, webs of overlapping institutions will act as disincentives for nations to resort to force which, in turn, will automatically increase stakes in the maintenance of peace and stability. This would also gradually help foster greater understanding of security concerns and help build confidence. The whole process, if channelled properly, would eventually lead to greater transparency and predictable patterns of relationship and would thus mitigate mutual suspicion and security dilemmas.

On the other hand, the Realists, who believe that the international system is basically ‘anarchic’ and states being sovereign would arrive at their own decisions to regulate their relations with other states to further their self-interests, take a pessimistic view of the role of these institutions and their ability to ‘markedly affect the prospects for international stability’.³ They contend that these ‘are basically a reflection of the distribution of power in the world. They are based on the selfinterested calculation of the great powers, and they have no independent effect on state behaviour’, and hence they are ‘not an important cause of peace’.⁴ On the question of common interests, E.H. Carr argued that these were usually national interests of the strong states in masquerade.⁵ According to the Realists, international or regional institutions can be formed but their success would depend entirely on accommodating the interests of the dominant power(s). Further, there is the issue of ‘relative gains’, that is, a great power’s support is contingent upon how much it gains, and if perceives that the other great power(s) is gaining more from these institutions, it may not have enough incentive to continue the support.

The above debate becomes important in analysing the attitude of major powers towards regional multilateralism since what may appear to be strong support may not necessarily continue on a long-term basis if perceived benefits fail to match expectations. Hence, the supposed support could be simply tactical for short-term political/diplomatic and/or economic gains and not necessarily a long-term commitment.

Post-Cold War Indian Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism

India has participated in only two regional multilateral arrangements during the entire Cold War outside the UN organization: the Commonwealth, and the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC.) India’s decision to join the Commonwealth of nations (that were once subjects of the British empire) obviously had more to do with its long colonial association with Britain rather than any intention of establishing a regional mechanism, since member states are spread out all over the world. On the other hand, SAARC was a local initiative and came into existence in 1984. Founded at the behest of Bangladesh, India suspected that there were external forces behind SAARC but was willing to support it as long as its agenda consisted of only economic cooperation issues with a firm refusal to discuss any political issues.

To understand India’s attitude towards regional multilateralism in general, one should keep in mind the intense security pressures that the country was subjected to and severe political constraints that the Cold War atmosphere imposed. Thus, the end of the Cold War had a considerable impact on India’s thinking, leading to a better appreciation and potential uses of multilateralism. The debate and growth of multilateralism in East Asia had tremendous effect in prodding India to make use of this route to engage with that region.

The changed attitude has also partly to do with the compulsions of a transformed political environment after the end of the Cold War. India had to suitably modify the earlier framework based on the twin formulations of security pragmatism and foreign policy idealism exemplified respectively by New Delhi’s close relations with Moscow and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). Although NAM’s credibility had started withering from the early 1970s onwards, India did not find any contradiction between signing a ‘peace and friendship treaty’ with the former Soviet Union (a different name for a sort of security arrangement) and nonalignment. India had no option but to pursue the above policy given serious security challenges it was faced with after the series of wars it had to fight between 1962 and 1971 and continued tensions in its immediate vicinity, including in the Indian Ocean. Thus, during much of the Cold War era, India’s foreign and security policies were dictated by events not only in South Asia but also in the world.

A close scrutiny of reactions to various developments clearly demonstrate that, except for the brief stint with idealistic activism that Nehru pursued in his initial years, India primarily followed a realist foreign policy. It had been a willing partner in the balance of power at the global as well as regional levels led by the superpowers, although it spurned any move to involve in any formal security alliance or pact. A case in point is New Delhi’s attitude towards events in Cambodia in the late 1970s. India preferred to recognize the Vietnamese-installed Heng Samrin regime in Cambodia in mid-1980 (the only non-communist country to do so) to accepting ASEAN’s offer of a dialogue partnership (made to dissuade India from endorsing the Vietnamese military intervention). India’s wariness regarding Western naval presence in the Indian Ocean and its acquiescence of the Soviet military action in Afghanistan earlier in 1978 are other instances.

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, India pursued a policy of assertiveness in its immediate vicinity in South Asia with occasional military interventions and use of strong-arm tactics. Once India became militarily more confident of defending itself (in particular after the 1974 nuclear test), it started looking for opportunities to expand its role beyond South Asia especially into Southeast Asia where it was perceived that China was using the Cambodian issue to increase its influence in that region. Although these policies served Indian security interests, it was also constrained by them as they imposed certain limitations on its options.

For a variety of reasons, the end of the Cold War came at a very opportune time for India, enabling it to suitably adjust and re-orient its foreign and security policies as it opened up new opportunities to reinvigorate its activist policy. The foreign exchange crisis and poor economic performance forced India to radically change its economic policy from the earlier self-reliance socialist model to market orientation. In a way, they were also instrumental in effecting changes to external policies. As a result, a number of changes were brought about in the foreign policy domain. As it is beyond the purview of this chapter to elucidate and enumerate all those changes in detail, it is pertinent to mention the prominent ones. First, an earnest attempt was made to delineate security concerns with foreign policy priorities. Second, economic aspects—to attract foreign investments and promote trade—became a significant dimension of foreign policy.⁶ Third, all out efforts were made to increase interaction with the East Asian countries through the newly initiated Look East policy. This policy, as it progressed, was instrumental in influencing India’s thinking on multilateralism.

India’s change of heart from previous reticence to subsequent interest in regional multilateralism is to a large extent dictated by the exigencies of dealing with ASEAN and the other newly created regional organizations that have been sprouting in the region. In order to appreciate India’s forays into the East Asian multilateralism, it is necessary to keep in mind the post-Cold War developments that took place in this region.

East Asian Multilateralism

Notwithstanding the fact that some nations of East Asia were (and to an extent still are) involved in some form of arrangements or organizations within the region, they had been mostly exclusive in nature and related primarily to the Cold War, such as SEATO and the Five-Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA).⁷ ASEAN, which came into being in 1967 after two failed attempts in the form of Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) and MAPHILINDO, ostensibly for economic and cultural cooperation, was a political initiative with strong Cold War overtones and remained a sub-subregional venture till the mid-1990s when it became a subregional organization with the inclusion of the rest of countries of Southeast Asia.

Thus, the East Asia region, unlike its counterpart in Europe, never had a genuine multilateral mechanism encompassing a majority of countries as members.

Surprisingly, the interest to promote multilateralism in the region in the post-Cold War period came not from ASEAN, an association through which its member states gained considerable political and economic mileage, but from close American allies such as Japan, Australia and Canada. The two regional multilateral institutional arrangements that came into prominence are the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), both owe their origins to Japan. It was argued that given the nature of complex security environment in Asia along with the end of the most ubiquitous bipolar order that kept the region fairly stable, it would be beneficial to create region-wide institutional structures on the lines of those in Europe to maintain and manage regional peace and security. Yet, APEC and that ARF have widely divergent backdrops that made these initiatives possible.

Although Japan put across a variety of ideas to promote regional economic cooperation starting from the 1960s, political circumstances came in the way during the Cold War. The early 1990s trends towards economic integration especially in Europe and North America (mostly in the form of free trade agreements) engendered Japan into action to create an Asian version of a free trade area. However, it was Australia that pursued the idea and strongly pushed the concept in 1989 by convening the economic and trade ministerial meeting under the banner APEC—comprising countries from the Pacific Rim region—which was followed by similar meetings elsewhere. A proposal by Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia in 1992 in the form of the East Asia Economic Grouping (EAEG), which had explicitly excluded not only the US but also Australia and New Zealand, indicated that attempts were being made to create a ‘yen bloc’ in Asia. Fearing that it might be left of the most dynamic region in the world, President Clinton quite unexpectedly convened the first ever APEC informal leaders meeting (Malaysia boycotted this for obvious reasons) in November 1993 in Seattle. Based on lofty ideas that were proposed in the subsequent summit meetings, it appeared APEC was poised to take off in a big way with the larger goal of economic integration rather than simply promotion of intraregional trade.

As it turned out, there was no uniformity of views and objectives: the US seemed to use APEC to expedite the process of ending the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations: Japan, worried that it might be shut out of the European and North American markets, was hoping to create its own niche in the Asian region, while the ASEAN countries were looking forward to taking advantage of economic benefits that might accrue with greater economic cooperation. By the time the Asian financial crisis hit Southeast Asia in 1997, it became apparent that APEC was not making much progress.⁸ The promised concessions, especially those by the US were not only not forthcoming, on the contrary it was looking to prise open the markets of Asia through APEC. Whatever little significance that APEC had had virtually disappeared with the onset of the WTO and the financial crisis that battered many economies of East Asia.

From an Indian viewpoint, APEC was created a time when India was frantically looking for greater interaction and integration with this region. It was frustrating for New Delhi that despite its best efforts, it could not obtain membership in APEC for some reason or the other, though not entirely for economic reasons. This was probably the first time that India had shown enormous interest and desperation to get into a multilateral mechanism⁹ as compared with the earlier Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC) and the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), where India had showed absolutely no interest whatsoever.

When Australia and Canada strongly backed the Japanese idea of creating a regional multilateral structure to promote dialogue and regular interaction on security issues in view of enormous uncertainty that East Asia was facing after the end of the Cold War, most countries—including ASEAN, the US and China—were sceptical about its viability in the Asian context. However, a number of developments, especially the American withdrawal from its largest overseas bases in the Philippines, the growing contest for the disputed islands in the South China Sea, the rise of new power centres and growing aspirations of regional great powers, concerns about a possible power vacuum consequent to superpower withdrawal from Southeast Asia, and the re-emergence of a number of longdormant territorial disputes prompted many countries to recognize the need for an intra-regional institution to deal with security matters, or at least a regional platform where views could be exchanged and differences discussed, thereby reducing the chances of open conflicts. Although East Asia did not have any previous experience, and despite lingering suspicions, support started growing because, it was argued, that there were certain common, neutral interests which would be major incentives for cooperation.

When a regional security institution finally materialized in 1993 in the form of the ARF, there was no common understanding among participants as to what its actual role would be except to create a congenial atmosphere for a regular dialogue among the members. The ARF received a major boost when the US showed interest, followed by China. Concerned by the prospect of getting pushed to the margins, ASEAN took the mantle to lead the forum. It should be kept in mind that all the major participants had their own expectations, which were not necessarily congruent with others. If the US viewed the ARF as a supplement to its alliance system, China was keen to promote its political interests in Southeast Asia, Japan wanted to enhance its political/security role through the ARF, and ASEAN had the twin motives of enhancing its own strategic significance and engaging China in what was called its ‘enmeshment’ strategy. Of course, it would be foolhardy to overlook some of the inherent contradictions in the ARF right from its inception. In any case, based on the concept paper that was approved at the 1995 ARF meeting in Brunei, a three-staged time-table was set for the forum, i.e., promotion of confidence-building measures (CBMs), development of preventive diplomacy mechanisms, and eventually evolve conflict resolution mechanisms. It thus became clear that ASEAN in particular (because the concept paper was its idea) did not want the ARF to remain simply a talking shop but emerge into a dispute settlement mechanism. It was indeed an ambitious plan, and it is a different issue that it was an unrealistic proposition.

New Delhi’s eagerness to join the other multilateral frameworks was also evident from the way it put its diplomatic machine in top gear starting from the enunciation of the Look East policy in the early 1990s. The objectives right from the start had been to become a dialogue partner of ASEAN and later to join regional multilateralism, especially the ARF, a multilateral security forum that was conceived around the same time that APEC was created. It was understandable why India was trying to seek some sort of formal links with ASEAN to advance its principally economic interests, but attempting to get into the ARF was a different issue altogether.

What is salient is that India for the first time was willing to not only become a part of the ARF, but also abide by its decisions by fundamentally changing its longheld position on regional security multilateralism. Previously, India was willing to consider economic multilateralism but had opposed outright any institutional mechanism for security purposes. As part of its commitment to the ARF in terms of providing greater transparency to defence and strategic policies, India for the first time produced and submitted a national security paper (equivalent to a defence white paper.) The official justification for India’s participation in the ARF was articulated in this manner

We see in the ARF, an experiment for the fashioning of a new pluralistic, cooperative security order in tune with the diversity of the Asia-Pacific region and in consonance with the transition away from a world characterised by poles built around military alliances. We remain ready to contribute to it. Though the ARF covers a broader region, India believes that it is built around the nucleus of ASEAN and is ASEAN driven. Our participation in the ARF demonstrates India’s increasing engagement in the Asia-Pacific region, both in the politico-security and economic spheres and underlines our commitment to the objective of sustaining regional peace and stability.¹⁰

It is quite possible that before committing itself to joining the ARF, India must have ensured that its own bilateral problems with its neighbours, most notably the Kashmir problem, would not become part of the agenda. Once that hurdle was removed, it was much easier for New Delhi to go along with the ARF decision as they pertained to the East Asia region where India did not have any border or territorial claims. By joining the ARF, India had also underscored its own growing stakes in the East Asian security and reiterated that developments in that region could adversely affect its interests. The ARF was symbolic of not only India’s shift in policy on regional multilateralism, but also its awareness about China’s growing stature in the region.

The same eagerness could also be witnessed with regard to other frameworks led by ASEAN. India unleashed a diplomatic offensive to become a dialogue partner of ASEAN in 1995 and a summit partner from 2002. Unlike the EAEC, by the time the East Asia Summit (EAS) idea was conceived it was not easy to keep India out despite the reservations of China and some ASEAN countries. It is true that India is yet to become a member of another crucial mechanism around which the regional integration process is beginning to take place—the ASEAN Plus Three (APT). The APT in fact can be claimed as the first tangible step towards regionalism in East Asia.

Other Multilateral Initiatives

The successes in establishing institutional linkages with ASEAN and a membership on the ARF, in fact, prompted New Delhi to undertake several initiatives towards creating and/or supporting other similar initiatives that included India. These are briefly discussed below.

Ganga–Mekong Initiative (GMI)

The GMI idea originally came from Thailand, which wanted to enlarge the scope of the earlier Suwannaphum (Suwamabhumi in Sanskrit, meaning the land of gold) comprising five Buddhist countries of Southeast Asia sharing the Mekong river—Thailand, Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia—to promote cultural tourism. When Thailand sought Indian support to GMI, Indians proposed to join it by renaming it as the Ganga-Mekong Initiative justifying it on the grounds that Mekong itself was a derived from Ma Ganga (meaning Mother Ganga.) Thus, Suvannaphum idea became GMI in 2000. It was envisaged that the project would enable greater cooperation in a transport, education, tourism, science and technology, roads and rail links, etc. Unfortunately, it has not made much progress so far.

The Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral, Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC)

BIMSTEC is an ambitious proposal that India has strongly supported. It was initiated in 1997 and comprised Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand at the instance of Thailand. Unfortunately it failed to take off as Thailand was hit by the 1997–98 financial and economic crises. Since the holding of the first summit meeting of the member states in July 2004, BIMSTEC has come a long way to promote the idea of sub-regional cooperation comprising a region that has enormous untapped potential. This is a unique initiative in the sense its membersconsist of nations from both South and Southeast Asian regions. When Thailand mooted the idea, it, on one hand, was looking at tapping the vast economic potential of lndia and, on the other, was beginning to understand the growing Chinese economic clout in Southeast Asia and excessive dependence on it.

BIMSTEC received a major boost with the signing of a clutch of wide ranging agreements on certain critical areas. Understandably, much of the emphasis has been on promoting economic cooperation while downplaying the politicostrategic dimensions. Aside from endorsing the framework agreement on free trade area (FTA) that was decided upon during the commerce ministers meeting of the member states in February 2004, another agreement on counter-terrorism was also signed.

A variety of factors prompted India to enthusiastically welcome the idea despite strong reservation from certain industrial quarters that an FTA of this kind with Thailand as part of it will have serious ramifications for certain sectors in India. One that has been highlighted prominently is with regard to auto components. It is argued that at a time when the Indian auto spare-parts industries are beginning to consolidate buoyed by strong growing automobile market domestically, the Thai companies that have far greater capacity would swamp the Indian market with their products. Similar fears have also been expressed with regard to air conditioners, refrigerators and other consumer durables. In fact, it was widely anticipated that the new government would insist on modifications to the framework agreement so that the Indian industries are not unduly affected. There is also the danger of Chinese products flooding the Indian market through Thailand. Significantly, India has fully endorsed the framework agreement and is looking forward to finalizing another bilateral free trade agreement with Thailand.

It appears New Delhi is taking a holistic view, taking into account the whole gamut of other political and strategic aspects and the gains that would accrue if BIMSTEC became successful. One, it would form another bridge to Southeast Asia thus further strengthening its Look East policy. Two, it was in tune with its newfound interest in multilateral initiatives to promote greater political and economic cooperation. Three, with the SAARC framework failing to make much headway in terms of greater economic cooperation, New Delhi had been looking for ways to evolve other mechanisms and BIMSTEC came quite handy. Four, in particular the northeastern parts of India would be major beneficiaries if the new initiative becomes successful, a region for a long time felt alienated from the mainstream and has remained relatively under developed. Judging from the fervour the member states have shown, it appears BIMSTEC is likely to become a major facet of India’s Look East policy in the coming years.

From an Indian viewpoint, while the ostensible motive is to promote economic cooperation, there are several factors that weigh in propping the BIMSTEC initiative. One, India’s northeast has been mired in insurgent activities for a long time and these in the past were sustained in part because of the strained relations with countries such as Myanmar. The changed policy towards Yangon since 1992 prompted partly due to security consideration has resulted in regular high-level exchanges and signing of a number of bilateral agreements by the two countries particularly with regard to the movement of insurgents who used to take shelter across the border in Myanmar. With Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan under its fold, it becomes all the more easy to tackle the issue of insurgency and extremism through BIMSTEC.

Two, drug smuggling (and money laundering) from the famous Golden Triangle into India and beyond has been a major concern. In fact, it is no secret that the drug money sustains several of the secessionist movements in the region. This problem could not be addressed because of a lack of a multilateral mechanism.

Three, in a way related to narcotics is the trafficking in light weapons. One of the world’s largest black markets for small weapons (consisting of mostly leftovers of the Cambodian conflict) is in the mainland region of Southeast Asia. The movement of weapons can be traced all the way up to Sri Lanka and leftist armed struggled in India and Nepal. Large caches of arms have been interdicted and much of the smuggling has been curtailed with close cooperation between Myanmar and India in recent years. The BIMSTEC will constitute an appropriate forum in the coming years to deal with this issue in a multilateral fashion.

Four, parts of the BIMSTEC region are also rich in proven hydrocarbon and hydroelectric resources. Bangladesh already has huge gas deposits and the Indian public sector companies, the ONGC and GAIL, have discovered vast reserves of gas in Myanmar. Along with the massive hydroelectric potential of the Himalayan states of Nepal and Bhutan, and Bangladesh agreeing to allow laying of pipes in its territory to transport gas from Myanmar to India, the creation of a sub-regional energy grid becomes a feasible and viable proposition in the BIMSTEC region.

Five, a number of proposals have also been discussed to bolster the infrastructure in this region through the development of highways and rail links. India has already initiated this process by constructing a road up to the border of Myanmar and the Myanmarese have promised to connect that road all the way up to the Thai border. Thus, it is possible to have a motorable road from India up to Singapore. Similarly, agreements are also likely to be signed soon to extend the rail links from India to Thailand via Myanmar.

Six, if BIMSTEC becomes a successful venture, it will further bolster India’s relations with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Not only do these two organizations complement each other but will also help India and other South Asian countries to further consolidate their links with Southeast Asia. India has already signed a framework agreement with ASEAN to create an lndia ASEAN free trade area in a decade’s time, has FTA in place with Sri Lanka and Singapore and is in the last stage of finalizing a bilateral FTA with Thailand. Further, India is also engaged in talks with Malaysia, Indonesia, and Vietnam to explore the possibility of signing similar agreements.

Conspicuous by its absence is Pakistan. BIMSTEC obviously raises questions about the future of SAARC, since five of the seven SAARC members would be actively cooperating with each other through BIMSTEC. In a way it will force Pakistan to rethink its attitude toward SAARC, lest it remain on the margins of the dynamics of the free trade area agreements that crisscross the entire Asian region. Exclusion of Pakistan is justified on the grounds that it does not fall within the geographic footprint of the Bay of Bengal Rim. In any case, it appears BIMSTEC will usher in a new era and remain a major priority area in India’s foreign policy in the coming years.

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

India’s love affair with multilateralism seems to be continuing even with a relatively remote organization such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, India has evinced considerable interest in Central Asia for two reasons. First, India did not want this region to become a hotbed of radical Islam by becoming an extension of Pakistansponsored Taliban and Al Qaeda, which could further undermine the security situation in Kashmir. Second, the region has vast energy reserves that India is keen to tap. Nonetheless, when China came up with the Shanghai Five in 1996 which was later renamed as SCO in 2001, India surprisingly somehow did not evince much interest in it. Among the several reasons why India was cool to the idea could be the fact that geographically, Central Asia was not in the vicinity of India. Further, India was not overtly concerned about China dominating this region because of active Russian participation. In any case, it was probably assumed that China would not support India’s candidature even if it was keen. The interest in SCO is a recent phenomenon that has resulted in India becoming an ‘observer’ in the SCO in 2005.

South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)

Where does the new Indian policy on regional multilateralism leave SAARC? After the bilateral agreements such as the one signed with Sri Lanka on creating a free trading zone between the countries, and the reinvigoration of BIMSTEC with ambitious plans in 2004, it appears India’s interest in SAARC is waning because of the excruciatingly slow progress on the trade and investment liberalization front. In any case for a large and fast-growing country like India, SAARC cannot provide the kind of economic and political space that it would look for. It does not, however, mean India is about to abandon SAARC altogether. Despite all odds, SAARC has served one important purpose—to facilitate periodic interaction among top political leaders. There are several other reasons why SAARC was doomed from the start unlike its counterpart ASEAN.¹¹ In the two decades of SAARC’s experience and the current trends are any indication, India is not likely to change its policy radically. On the contrary, India would look to East Asia regional institutions to strengthen its links. If economic integration plans as envisaged in the East Asia Summit (EAS) meetings were to materialize resulting in the creation of a massive common market comprising economic powerhouses such as Japan, China and India along with the vibrant ASEAN nations, India’s interest in SAARC may further decline. On the security front, despite repeated attempts, India has thwarted Pakistani attempts to place the Kashmir issue on the SAARC agenda. India has also adopted a similar approach with regard to other bilateral political or disputed border issues.

Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC)

Originally a brainchild of South Aica primarily comprising major countries of the rim such as Australia, India, Kenya, Mauritius, Singapore and South Africa, it was known initially as the Indian Ocean Rim Initiative. It was later launched as the IOR-ARC in 1997 by broadening the membership base.¹² Its principle objectives are: ‘(i) to promote sustainable growth and balanced development of the region and member states; (ii) to focus on those areas of economic cooperation which provide maximum opportunities, develop shared interests and reap mutual benefits; and (iii) to promote liberalisation, remove impediments and lower barriers towards a freer and enhanced flow of goods, services, investment, and technology within the Indian Ocean rim.’¹³ This is another regional multilateral initiative in which India has been involved. Right from its inception, India had been very categorical that IOR-ARC should remain confined to economic cooperation activities. India firmly rebuffed Australian attempts to expand the activities of the organization to include security aspects as well. India’s attitude once again reiterated its previous policy that India was willing to partake in multilateral activities provided they were strictly for economic purposes and not for security reasons. It is a different issue though that the IOR-ARC has hardly made any headway in terms of forging greater economic cooperation.

Conclusion

What is the meaning of these mixed signals that India has been showing with regard to its attitude towards regional multilateralism? On the one hand, it is showing enormous interest in certain initiatives, while it is reticent with regard to the most immediate one in South Asia. In the case of SAARC, it can be argued that India’s disinterest has to do with lack of progress on economic cooperation issues and the Pakistani factor. At the same time it is going out of its way to join others in East Asia. It is true that it would be in India’s interest to use the SAARC platform purely for the promotion of economic cooperation and to keep security issues out of its purview, but that is not necessarily congruent with the interests of other member states, especially countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh, who feel that greater SAARC cooperation would invariably lead to their dependence on India.

In any case, India’s changed attitude does not mean that it has effected fundamental changes to its foreign policy, which has been by and large premised on the ‘realist’ logic. In order to understand the dynamic of lndia’s policy, it is essential to segregate economic and security-related multilateralism. India had all along strongly advocated multilateralism for region economic cooperation while remaining staunchly opposed to politically motivated organizations. For instance, when the ASEAN idea was being discussed in Southeast Asia, then Indonesian Foreign Minister Adam Malik was on a visit to New Delhi and the issue was discussed. India apparently was keen to fully support and, if possible, join it if the proposed organization was meant to foster economic cooperation purpose and not defenceoriented. It seems Adam Malik maintained total silence on the issue.¹⁴

When Bangladesh came up with the SAARC proposal, India joined it not because it had a change of heart but it did not wish to be seen as a spoilsport and that it was not acting as a ‘big brother’ in South Asia. However, by the time several multilateral ideas started sprouting and in fact began to take shape in the East Asian region coinciding with the end of the Cold War, India was worried that it might be left out. There were serious concerns that the post-Cold War era would be marked by trade blocs and economic battles and it was imperative to be a member of some bloc or the other. India had no choice but to get into East Asia; hence, the desperation to join APEC.

Right from the beginning and during the entire Cold War era, India has made a clear distinction between regional multilateral ventures that were meant to promote economic cooperation and security aspects. While unequivocally extending support to the former, New Delhi had always been wary of those that were, explicitly or otherwise, designed for security. With this policy, not only India refused to join but also steadfastly opposed any move to introduce security aspects into those organizations where it was already a member. This policy underwent minor modifications in the aftermath of the Cold War when it decided to join the ARF in the mid-1990s, which so far has been an exception. If ASEAN wanted India in the ARF to provide a strategic balance to China, India obviously would not be averse to it as long as its own relations with ASEAN improved. It is not that India has been averse to dealing with others in security matters, but it has exhibited a greater degree of comfort at the bilateral rather than at a multilateral level.

The interest in the ARF, as noted, was driven by a different set of factors. By the mid-1990s the Look East policy was beginning to take some concrete shape and India’s stakes, especially in Southeast Asia, started to grow. It was argued that a peaceful and stable Southeast Asia was in India’s interest. Throughout history, India’s relations prospered as long as this region remained peaceful and devoid of external intervention or presence. India was also concerned about Southeast Asia coming under the influence of China after the superpower military withdrawal. From a Southeast Asian perspective, however, India was hardly a factor in the regional security calculus in the early 1990s. That was the reason why India was conspicuous by its absence during the entire debate on the creation of the ARF as well as at the time of its launch in 1994. India was admitted only in 1996 and that had much to do with growing anxiety about China. India for the first time was seen as a possible counter balance to China because of its military capabilities. Just like China, which ensured that the territorial disputes that it was party to would not become part of the ARF’s agenda, India too made sure that the Kashmir issue would not come up for discussion. Moreover, India lobbied hard till 2004 to deny Pakistan entry into the ARF. Only after Islamabad gave an unequivocal assurance that bilateral disputes would not be raised did India allow it to get into the ARF.

Yet, it is difficult to conclusively demonstrate that India’s policy towards multilateralism has undergone a fundamental change. India appears to mimic other great powers’ changing attitudes, especially that of China, i.e., make use of these mechanisms to advance its interest. However, it is erroneous to infer that India is adopting a ‘me too’ kind of a policy following the Chinese example. Recent Indian attempts in forging different kinds of strategic relationships, in particular, with the US and Japan and its readiness to take part in the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s idea of a quadrilateral (US–Japan–India–Australia) dialogue¹⁵indicate that its faith in the balance of power has not withered away.