Chapter 16
1. See for instance Stephen Schlesinger”, The United States and the World: Is a Return to Multilateralism Possible?” in C. Uday Bhaskar et al. (eds), United Nations: Multilateralism and International Security, Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2005.
2. John Gerard Ruggie (ed) Multilateralism Matters, The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.
3. Collective security as a distinct multilateral approach towards global security was the centrepiece of the United Nations Charter. The lack of institutionalized sanction against states that deliberately defied the principle, however, proved to be its major impediment.
4. Muthiah Alagappa, Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998, p 4.
5. See for instance Anatol Lieven, ‘The End of NATO’, Prospect, December 2001, cited from Anar Khamzayeva, ‘Novaya Strategiya NATO? Eyo Posledstviya Dliya Tsentralnoi Azii’, Kazakstan i Sovremennie Mir, No. 1 (2) 2002.
6. It has been argued that the US is not a principalled multilateralist but an instrumental multilateralist whose core is pragmatism. For a detailed analysis of the various visions about multilateralism see Joachim Krause, ‘Multilateralism: Behind European Views’, The Washington Quarterly 27, No. 2, Spring 2004.
7. John Van Oudenaren, “What is Multilateral”, Policy Review 117 and “Unipolar Versus Unilateral”, Policy Review 124.
8. This idea is represented in this quote from a Chinese scholar Huang Zhengji who writes, ‘multipolarity just refers to the multiple forces in the international community that are possessed of certain strengths and are representative of certain interests’. See Hung Zhengji, ‘The Irresistible Multipolarity Trend of the World’, International Strategic Studies 4, 1997.
9. In the Central Asian region the emergence of ‘new’ threats has led to calls for reform of the UN and creation of effective multilateral forums to curb terrorism. See for instance this speech by the State Secretary-Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Kazakhstan, ‘Vestupleniye Kasymzhomarta Tokayeva na Transaziatskom Parlamentskom Forume PA OSCE ‘vorba protiv terrorizma: ucpekhi, noviye ugrozi’, Kazakhstan i Sovremennie Mir 2 (5), 2003, where he clearly notes that ‘there is no alternative to global multilateral cooperation of nations’.
10. See for instance Speech by Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Igor Ivanov at the Joint Session of Federation Council and State Duma Foreign Affairs Committees, February 12, 2004 where he points to ‘assertion of multilateralism in international relations, the strengthening of the role of the UN and International law’, Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.russianembassy.org. Similarly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China elaborating on foreign policy clearly points to the necessity of multilateral options, www.fmprc.gov.cn/en
11. For a detailed analysis of conditional multilateralism see Jing-dong Yuan, Asia-Pacific Security: China’s Conditional Multilateralism and Great Power Entente, Strategic Studies Institute Publication, Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 2000. This however, seems to be changing with regard to at least some multilateral organizations. The SCO for instance is now attempting to institutionalize its activities with the establishment of a Secretariat and the Regional Anti-Terrorist Centre at Tashkent.
12. Uzbekistan is the most recent entrant in the CSTO process. This means that Uzbekistan is now committed to maintaining security in all CSTO member states.
13. For writings that stress on the inevitability of change in geopolitical alignments around Central Asia in the post-9/11 period and the image of the region as ‘liberated’ from the Russo-Chinese condominium institutionalized in the SCO, see Svante E. Cornell, ‘Introduction’ Nordic Newsletter of Asian Studies 3, 2002. See also Stephen Blank, ‘The Shanghai Cooperative Organization: A Post Mortem,’ Nordic Newsletter of Asian Studies 3, 2002.
14. See for instance, S. Neil MacFarlane, ‘The United States and Regionalism in Central Asia’, International Affairs 80 (3), May 2004. MacFarlane argues that the US has actively promoted the establishment of the NATO’s PfPs, rather than seeking to establish free-standing regional security structures. Similarly, in the economic sphere, it has promoted accession to the WTO far more consistently than any regional trading structures.
15. In May 2005, there were demonstrations in Andijan as thousands took to the Streets, attacking a prison to protest the detention of 23 prominent businessmen. The men were charged with anti-constitutional activity and forming a criminal and extremist organization, Akramia, which was accused by the Uzbek government of having links with the outlawed radical Islamic party Hizb-ut-Tahrir. The arrested men formed the backbone of Andijan’s small business community, giving employment to thousands of people in the impoverished and densely populated Ferghana Valley. Armed demonstrators then went to a prison and freed nearly 2,000 inmates, including men accused by the Uzbek government of criminal activities. The severity with which the demonstration was put down by government forces was criticised by the US government, leading to a downswing in Uzbek–US relations.
16. At the July 2005 Summit of the SCO, the following statement was issued: ‘As the active military phase in the anti-terror operation in Afghanistanis nearing completion, the SCO would like the coalition’s members to decide on the deadline for the use of temporary infrastructure and for their military contingents’ presence in those countries’. This was remarkable in that it indicated a possible rebalancing of foreign policy priorities and interests for SCO members. However, assigning the SCO statement its propersignificance is a complicated task. The US maintains important ties with individual members of the SCO and all the observers except Iran. It is unlikely that this relationship will be sacrificed over Central Asia or that Central Asia provides a compelling base of support with which it could challenge US leadership.
17. Mashan Meiirzhan, elaborates on the role of the Central Asian Economic Union in this regard in his article, ‘Regional Security As a System Factor in Central Asian Integration’, in Jasjit Singh (ed.), Peace and Security in Central Asia, New Delhi: IDSA, 2000.
18. For a detailed discussion see Anita Sengupta, ‘Region, Regionalization, Regionalism: The “Myth”of Tsentralnaya Aziia Revisted,’ in K.Warikoo and Mahavir Singh (eds), Central Asia Since Independence, New Delhi: Shipra, 2004.
19. Cited from Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Meeting Report, Vol 2, No 8, November 3, 2000, www.ceip.org/files/events/gulomov.asp EventID==218
20. For a detailed analysis of CICA see Murat Laumulin, The Security, Foreign Policy, and International Relationship of Kazakhstan After Independence, 1991–2001, Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute of Strategic Studies and Freidrich Ebert Shiftung, 2002 and M. Ashimbaev et al (eds), New Challenges and New Geopolitics in Central Asia After September 11, Almaty: Kazakhstan Institute for Strategic Studies, 2003.
21. The term Multivector refers to a policy where choices were kept open for both bilateral and multilateral agreements on particular issues according to specific security perceptions of individual states. In the Central Asian case options for bilateral agreements were kept open with all the major powers, Russia, China and the United States.
22. Ashimbaev et al. (eds), New Challenges and New Geopolitics in Central Asia After September 11.
23. Talgat Ismagambetov, ‘Some Geopolitical Peculiarities of Central Asia, Past and Present’, in Sally N. Cummings (ed.), Oil, Transition and Security in Central Asia, London and New York: Routledge-Curzon, 2003.
24. A security system, as defined by Barry Buzan, is a group of states whose security interests bind them sufficiently closely so that their national security cannot be realistically considered separate from each other.
25. Farkhod Tolipov, ‘East vs West? Some Geopolitical Questions and Observations forthe SCO”, CEF Quarterly, July 2005.
26. Farkhod Tolipov, ‘Multilateralism, Bilateralism and Unilateralism in Fighting Terrorism in the SCO Area’, China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly 4 (2), 2006.
27. Stephen Blank, ‘Which Way for Sino-Russian Relations?’, Orbis, Summer 1998.
28. This, however, did not work since the US changed its cautious policy towards the NATO and Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary became a part of it. For details see V. Zhurkin, ‘Russia and the Enlargement of NATO’, in T. Hayashi (ed.), The Emerging New Regional Order in Central and Eastern Europe, Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, 1997.
29. See the text of the Russo-Chinese Joint Declaration in Sbornik: Rossiisko-Kitaiskikh Dogovorov, 1999, cited from Akihiro Iwashita, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Implications for Eurasian Security: A New Dimension of “Partnership” After the Post Cold War Period‘, in S. Tabata and A. Iwashita (eds), Slavic Eurasia’s Integration into the World Economy and Community, Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, 2004.
30. Krasnaia Zvezda, April 30, 1996, cited from Iwashita, ‘The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Implications for Eurasian Security’.
31. In fact, the idea has been present within strategic think tanks in the region as well. The idea of developing a cooperative mechanism between NATO, CICA and SCO was referred to at meeting that the author had with members of the Centre for Foreign Policy and Analysis in Almaty (an organization under the Ministry of External Affairs, Kazakhstan) in December 2003. It was emphasized that since the three share common concerns, coordination among them would prevent unnecessary overlaps.
32. For a detailed discussion, see Richard Weitz ‘Terrorism in Eurasia: Enhancing the Multilateral Response’, China and Eurasian Forum Quarterly, 4 (2), 2006.
33. For details, see, Zhou Huasheng, ‘The SCO in the Last Year‘, CEF Quarterly, July 2005.
34. Bondarez, ‘Formirovaniye Systemi Collectivnoi Bezopasnosti v Tsentralnoi Azii — osobennosti, itogi, perspectivi‘. However, there are opinions to the contrary. In the course of a conversation with the author on 26 November 2003 at the Institut Vostokovedennia in Moscow, Professor Shaken Nadirov, an ethnic Kazakh associated with the Institut Vostokovedeniia, opined that the SCO was a Chinese creation aimed at dealing with separatism in Xinjiang, and as such it has nothing to do with the Kazakh people.
35. Assylbek Tauasarov, ‘SHOS Priobretaet Realnie Ochertaniya’, Kazakhstan i Sovremennie Mir 2 (5), 2003.
36. Tolipov, ‘East Vs West? Some Geopolitical Questions and Observations for the SCO’.
37. Pan Guang, ‘China–Central Asia–Russia Relations and the Role of the SCO in the War Against Terrorism’, SIIS Journal, 9 (2) May 2002.
38. Ashimbaev et al. (eds), New Challenges and New Geopolitics in Central AsiaAfter September 11.
39. For details, see Amitabh Mattoo, ‘United States of America and Central Asia: Beginning of the Great Game‘, in Nirmala Joshi (ed.) Central Asia, the Great Game–Replayed—An Indian Perspective, Delhi: New CenturyPublications, 2003.
40. Strobe Talbott, ‘A Farewell to Flashman: American Policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia,‘ Speech at the Central Asia Institute, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, July 21, 1997.
41. The idea of strategic co-operation with China and India has long been present in Russia’s foreign policy. E. M. Primakov put forward this idea in Delhi in December 1998 as part of a search for partners to create a greater space for Russian manoeuvre. The idea was also present in Andrei Kozerev’s ‘new approach’ to Asia. On the eve of his visit to India in October 2000, President Putin also mentioned the idea, and it was repeated by Igor Ivanov, the Russian Foreign Minister in November 2001. For a de- tailed analysis see Hari Vasudevan, ‘Russia–India–China Cooperation: The Shaping of a Notion in Russian Foreign Policy‘, unpublished paper presented at a seminar on Building a New Asia: Problems and Prospects of Regional and Pan-Asian Cooperation for Security and Development, organized by MAKAIAS, Kolkata, March 29–31, 2004.
42. Zhou Yuyun, Strategic Triangle of China, India, Russia: Ideality and Reality’, unpublished paper presented at a seminar on Building a New Asia: Problems and Prospects of Regional and Pan-Asian Cooperation for Security and Development, organized by MAKAIAS, Kolkata, March 29–31, 2004.
43. Yuyun, ‘Strategic Triangle of China, India, Russia’.
44. Vasudevan, ‘Russia–India–China Cooperation: The Shaping of a Notion in Russian Foreign Policy’.
45. R.R. Subramanian, ‘Russia-China-India: Strategic Cooperation in a Pan Asian Order’, unpublished paper presented at a seminar on Building a New Asia: Problems and Prospects of Regional and Pan-Asian Cooperation for Security and Development, organized by MAKAIAS, Kolkata, March 29–31, 2004.
46. Ibid.
47. Julie A. MacDonald and S. Enders Wimbush, ‘India’s Energy Security’, Strategic Analysis 23 (5), August 1999.
48. Irina Komissina, ‘India: Cooperation with the Central Asian Countries in Regional Security’, Central Asia and the Caucasus 6 (24), 2003.
49. See, for instance, Atul Aneja, ‘India Asked to Join Central Asian Grouping’, Hindu, February 13, 2002.
50. See Pan Guang, ‘The New SCO Observers: Making a Leap Forward in Cautious Augmentation’, CEF Quarterly, July 2005.
51. Cited in Ibragim Alibekov, ‘India set to Expand Presence in Central Asia’, Eurasianet, Business and Economics, April 7, 2004.
52. Roy Allison, ‘Regionalism, Regional Structures and Security Management in Central Asia’, International Affairs 80 (3), May 2004.
53. Iwashita Akihiro, The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Its Implications for Eurasian Security: A New Dimension of ‘Partnership’ After the Post Cold War Period’, in S. Tabata and A. Iwashita (eds), Slavic Eurasia’s Integration into the World Economy and Community, Sapporo: Slavic Research Centre, 2004.
54. Cited from ‘Vistupleniye Kasymzhomarta Tokayeva na Plenarnom Zasedanii Soveta Ministpov Inostrannix Del Shanxhaiskoi Organizatsii Sotrudnichestvo’, Kazakhstan i Sovremennie Mir 2 (5), 2003.