A Hybrid and Complex Political System
A Hybrid Political System
In the aftermath of the Islamic Revolution (1979), Ayatollah Khomeini and his supporters proposed that in the absence of the 12th Shia Imam, the clerics are the most qualified to rule the country.1 Based on this idea, the clerics proclaimed an Islamic Republic and assumed control of the state and its institutions. Nevertheless, since the Islamic Revolution was a popular movement, they had to recognize the democratic right of the population in electing representatives for government functions and institutions.2 This resulted in a hybrid political system that hinges upon religion on the one hand and population’s elected institutions on the other. Likewise, the Iranian Constitution is a blend of the theocratic principles inherited from Shia Islam and the republican ideas borrowed from the Western political systems. The Constitution emphasizes the importance of Islam as an all-encompassing ideology that should serve as the foundation of governance, but at the same time recognizes some democratically elected representatives. Another complexity of the Islamic Republic is incorporating Islam and Iranian identity and envisioning the governance over both Muslim community of believers and the Iranian nation.3 This combination seems quite difficult to maintain because the Muslim community is essentially transnational and includes multiple countries, ethnicities, and nations with diverging or even opposing interests.
The Components of the Islamic Republic
The Islamic Republic of Iran is an exclusive state with a high concentration of political, administrative, economic, and military power. As a hybrid political system, it includes both elected and unelected institutions and components.
The Supreme Leader
The Supreme Leader or Vali-Faghih is appointed for life by the Assembly of Experts, sits at the top of the power pyramid, and embodies the spirit of theocratic rule in Iran. In theory, the Supreme Leader assumes the Muslim’s community leadership in the absence of the 12th Imam and as a result, his authority is based on his mastery of religious knowledge. The current Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was selected by the Assembly of Experts upon Ayatollah Khomeini’s death in June 1989. Despite his junior position within the Shia clerical hierarchy, he was suddenly promoted to the rank of ayatollah. Since then he has proved to be quite effective in accomplishing the tasks. According to the Iranian Constitution, the Supreme Leader is responsible for the creation and supervision of “the general policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran.”4 In addition to his spiritual leadership, he holds major executive functions including declaring war or peace, planning the foreign policy, appointing the head of judiciary and the guardian council members, monitoring the national broadcasting organizations, and even reinstating the president. As the commander in chief, the Supreme Leader appoints the high ranking army officers and the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps’ commanders who remain fully accountable and loyal to him. He closely supervises the intelligence and security services.5 He also appoints Friday-prayer speakers and numerous representatives in the government, provinces and towns, universities, and in all religious and cultural institutions across the country.6 The Supreme Leader’s representatives are responsible for scrutinizing their respective institutions and ensuring that the Leader’s decrees are fully observed and properly implemented.
In fact, the Supreme Leader enjoys more power and influence than the former king, Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi. While the function of the Shah was mainly political, the supreme leader benefits from political, religious, spiritual, and even emotional influence altogether. Interestingly, the word Vali in Farsi is used in the sense of tutor of a minor. Therefore, it seems that the supreme leader is an elderly father who is supposed to lead, control, and reprove the Muslim community under his rule. These features seem in accordance with the typical Iranian leader who is a two-faced father: compassionate and stern.7 During the past decade, the power of the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has been contended by many other political players such as the reformist president Mohammed Khatami (1997 to 2005), the reformist fractions of the parliament, and an increasing number of religious and nonreligious thinkers. More recently, the religious and spiritual authority of the supreme leader has been relying on various footings such as financial and economic power, the Islamic Republic Broadcasting Agency, and military and paramilitary forces.8 For instance, the supreme leader directly appoints the directors of the large Islamic foundations (bonyads) that function as powerful economic entities.9
The President
As the head of the executive branch, the president is the second most powerful figure in the Iranian political system.10 While the president is elected directly by popular vote, all the presidential candidates should be approved by the powerful, unelected, and conservative Guardian Council.11 For example, in the 2005 presidential elections, more than 2,000 individuals applied for candidacy, but only eight were qualified. The president holds office for a period of four years and is responsible for executive and economic matters by choosing the ministers and forming the cabinet that must be approved by the parliament. His tasks include the administration of the country’s budget, implementation of the laws passed by the parliament, and supervision of the foreign policy and international affairs. It should be noted that the president’s legitimacy is subject to the Supreme Leader’s and parliament’s endorsements. Therefore, the status of the president is similar to that of the prime minister under the Shah. He should fulfill the Supreme Leader’s and parliamentarians’ demands. While the Supreme Leader remains the most important figure in the country, the president still represents a key political actor especially with respect to foreign policy and economic planning.12 The boundaries between the president’s and the Supreme Leader’s power spheres are not always clearly demarcated, and on many occasions, they might clash with each other. For example, during Khatami’s presidency (1997 to 2005) there were many tensions between the patriarchic and religious rule of the Supreme Leader and the reformist policies of the president office. Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was elected the sixth president of the Islamic Republic in June 2005 and was controversially re-elected in June 2009.13 Ahmadinejad enjoyed the Supreme Leader’s support especially during his controversial re-election in 2009. The current president, Hassan Rouhani, was elected in June 2013 and tried to take moderate and judicious policies that are sometimes at odds with the Leader’s approbation.
The Council of Guardians
The Council of Guardians is a very powerful body in the Islamic Republic. It consists of six clergymen and six jurists. The six clergymen or half of the Council of Guardians are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader for six-year terms. However, the six jurists are appointed by the Parliament at the recommendation of the head of the judiciary who is in turn appointed by the Supreme Leader.14 The Council of Guardians has two major functions: on the one hand, it exerts a complete control over the elected representatives and their legislations; on the other hand, it preselects all the presidential and parliamentarian candidates. The Council of Guardians is responsible for screening all proposed legislations by Parliament in order to verify their compatibility with Islamic law and the Iranian Constitution. The council has the authority to block any legislation under the pretext of contradiction with Islam or violation of the Constitution. In the case of any stalemate between the Council of Guardians and Parliament, an Expediency Council appointed by the Supreme Leader, intervenes. The Council of Guardians has the power to design the elections in such a way that the voters must choose from a short list of preselected and preapproved candidates. Naturally, the Council of Guardians uses this authority to approve only those candidates who are fully loyal to the Supreme Leader. In the past 30 years, a vast majority of parliamentary and presidential candidates have been disqualified. In fact, by appointing the Council’s clergymen, the Supreme Leader and his advisors exert direct control over all elections and legislations in the country. Therefore, the Council of Guardians is often seen as a major obstacle to the democratic process in Iran.
The Parliament
The Iranian Parliament or Majles Shoora Eslami is a unicameral legislative institution that consists of 290 members who are publicly elected every four years. Similar to the presidential elections, all parliament candidates should be approved by the Council of Guardians. In addition to political competency, the parliament candidates should acknowledge their unquestionable loyalty to the Islamic Republic and the Supreme Leader. On many occasions, the Council of Guardians has used its right to preselect the parliamentarians. For example, during the 2004 elections, a large number of parliament’s candidates, especially reformists, were disqualified from participation.15 Despite all these filters, the Iranian parliament remains one of the most democratic institutions in the Middle East where some heated debates take place. Parliament members are representatives of different Iranian provinces or towns and are elected by a popular majority. In addition, the Iranian Constitution has made provisions for the representation of the minority communities of Zoroastrians, Jews, and Christians. The parliament is responsible for drafting legislation, ratifying international agreements, and scrutinizing the effectiveness of the president and his cabinet ministers. The parliament’s legislative function is subject to the approval of the Council of Guardians, which can reject any proposed legislation that is judged in conflict with Islamic law or Iran’s constitution.16 Indeed, while the parliament represents the core of Iranian democracy, its real authority is curbed by the powerful Council of Guardians whose cleric members are directly appointed by the Supreme Leader.
The Assembly of Experts
The Assembly of Experts is a council consisting of 86 religious clerics approved by the Council of Guardians and elected by the popular vote to eight-year terms. The Assembly of Experts is responsible to select the Supreme Leader and has the potential power to oust him. Since the Supreme Leader is an Islamic jurist (Faghih), all members of the Assembly of Experts should be senior clerics. For that reason, the Assembly of Experts represents an extremely conservative body whose values and outlooks are very different from the mainstream Iranian society. An important feature of the assembly is its secretive meetings taking place behind closed doors and not published anywhere. There are little insights into the activity and decision making of the Assembly of Experts.
The Expediency Council
The Expediency Council is a body that serves as a mediator between the Council of Guardians and the Parliament in the case of friction, divergence, and stalemate.17 In addition, the Expediency Council may advise the Supreme Leader on his constitutional responsibilities and domestic policies.18 The Expediency Council consists of around 40 permanent members appointed directly by the Supreme Leader. While the major function of the council is to mediate between the Council of Guardians and the Parliament, upon the request of the Supreme Leader, it can get involved in resolution of other important disputes.
The Judiciary
Under Iran’s constitution, the judiciary is considered as an independent branch of the Islamic Republic along with the executive and legislative branches.19 The judiciary is supposed to execute and enforce the Islamic law. For that reason, the head of judiciary, who is generally a clergy, is appointed directly by the Supreme Leader for a five-year term. As mentioned previously, the six nonclerical jurists of the Guardian Council are appointed by the head of judiciary. Therefore, a close relationship between the Supreme Leader and the judiciary is important in shaping the configuration of the Council of Guardians. Most of the members of the judiciary are ultra conservative clerics. There are three different courts in Iran: the Public Courts, the Revolutionary Courts, and the Special Clerical Courts. All civil and criminal cases except revolutionary or security-related issues are addressed by the Public Courts. Those cases involving crimes against national security, narcotics, and smuggling are sent to the Revolutionary Courts. In addition to regular and revolutionary courts, the Special Clerical Court serves as a powerful instrument for imposing regime’s will on the senior Shia clerics.
Structure, Power Relations, and Decision Making
As shown in Figure 6.1, the formal political structure of the Islamic Republic is very complex and relies on equilibrium between the democratic and the undemocratic forces deriving from the elected and unelected institutions.20 In addition to the official power structure, the Iranian politics is shaped by a complex web of personalities, religious organizations, influential families, and shadowy clubs. This informal structure has a considerable influence on political decision making. To ascend the political ladder, individuals should build strong relationships (ravabet) with influential clubs and get acceptance from power centers. Many ministers, parliamentarians, provincial governors, mayors, and even the Supreme Leader himself are part of these networks and are involved in complex mutual dealings. The political relationships (ravabet) are often reinforced by marriage and family-related links. In this respect, Iran is not different from many other Eastern countries characterized by nepotism and informal power circles. Former president, Rafsanjani, once expressed that Iranian politicians prefer to form informal relationships instead of political parties, because in this way they can escape accountability.21 The Supreme Leader controls many shadowy but influential organizations that have not been mentioned in Iran’s constitution including the Office of Supreme Leader’s representatives, the Association of Friday Prayer Leaders, and the Special Court for the Clergy.22 The representatives of the supreme leader are seen in all state, civilian, and military institutions.23 Other examples include the bonyads (foundations) or powerful revolutionary and religious foundations that control large parts of the nation’s economy and are responsible to protect the Islamic and revolutionary principles. In theory, the bonyads aim at offering charity and social services,24 but in practice, they are engaged in various lucrative business activities including import and export of products, and construction projects.
Figure 6.1 The structure and components of Iran’s political system
Source : National Democratic Institute.
The political parties are not well established, but there is an ongoing power struggle among different revolutionary factions. It is possible to think about two important factions within the regime: conservative principlists and moderate reformists. Both factions fall within the framework of Islamic Republic but have different approaches. In other words, while united under the Islamic Republic, the two factions are ideologically different.25 The conservative principlists literally believe God has delegated his political sovereignty to the Supreme Leader. Thus, they emphasize cultural conservatism, adhere to a highly orthodox interpretation of Shia Islam, and do not regard democratic rule as essential.26 In foreign policy, the conservative principlists distrust the West and prefer isolation or restricted international relations. This faction is more aligned with the Supreme Leader Khamenei and his Representatives.27 In contrast, the moderate reformists consist mostly of technocrats who insist on the importance of popular vote and consider Iran as a nation-state whose interests should be primarily protected. The moderate reformists have a pragmatic approach to political problems and intend to modernize the country. In foreign policy, the moderate reformists seek national interests and search deal-making occasions with the Western powers and neighboring countries.28 The reformists were dominant in the political scene between 1997 and 2005 when they were controlling both the presidential office and parliament.
The complexity and chaotic nature of the Iranian political system are the results of a large number of formal and informal organizations, family ties, personal relationships, overlapping institutions, and most of all, the mixture of religion and politics. Even so, this complexity is often mitigated by a cultural emphasis on harmony and collectivism. While the political debates are often violent, the decision making is largely based on collective agreement and consensus among the leaders.29 This kind of decision making explains why despite their apparent differences and disputes, the Islamic Republic leaders seldom confront each other.30 Due to the apparent chaos and complexity, the outsiders may have the wrong impression that the political leaders are either powerless or confrontational. It should be noted that the Islamic Republic leaders are religious people and are naturally inspired by the Islamic teachings, still their decision making is often pragmatic and realistic. As mentioned previously, the Shia clerics have a good degree of freedom to interpret the Islamic teachings and make concessions on the basis of rationality or self-interest.
The Iranian Regime and the Iranian Identity
In many respects, the Islamic Republic may be viewed as the natural outcome of all forces that shaped the Iranian history. Two fundamental elements of the Iranian history, namely religion and kingship, are extraordinarily incorporated into the fabric of the Islamic Republic. For instance, the idea of a Supreme Leader (Vali-Faghih) is a Shia tenet that is analogous to the concept of Persian Shah and therefore nicely touches on the Iranian psyche. The Supreme Leader, first and foremost, is a spiritual man who is a moral teacher, who guides his kids like a father, who decides for them, and occasionally punishes them. The word Vali in Farsi means tutor and is used mainly for those minor children who are not able to discern their own interests. That is why, Ayatollah Khomeini was seen as a godly Persian father.31
The Islamic Republic cannot be considered as a full-fledged democracy but it relies on the popular support. Indeed, Iran is the only example of an Islamic state established by a popular revolution.32 The fact that despite all international pressures the regime has shown a remarkable resilience that can be interpreted as an indication of its popular support. According to a study conducted for the World Values Survey in 2000, the Iranians rate their political system quite positively, averaging 5.84 on a scale of 1 to 10.33 Over the past decade, especially after the controversial presidential elections of 2009, the regime has taken a harder stance and has distanced itself from the population’s desires, but as a whole, the Islamic Republic has adequately responded to the realities of the Iranian society. Although there is an important element of authoritarianism in internal politics, the Islamic Republic, unlike many of its neighbors, has developed important institutions of participatory democracy. Apart from the 2009 presidential vote, Iran’s elections have been generally fair and free. As a recent Oxford University study suggests, with the exception of Turkey, overall there is more progress toward democracy in Iran than in any other country in the Middle East.34 One may suggest that by the Middle Eastern standards and in comparison with other Muslim countries, the Islamic Republic is a quasidemocratic political system.
Opposition, Resilience, and Survival
Several dissident groups have been seeking to overthrow the Iranian regime. Among them, the People’s Mojahedin is a left-leaning Islamist-Marxist group, which was originally formed in the 1960s, aiming at overthrowing the Shah.35 The Islamic Republic ruthlessly arrested and executed large numbers of People’s Mojahedin members for their role in massive assassinations and terror-related operations in the 1980s. The People’s Mojahedin Organization has lost legitimacy and approval, as people and especially the younger generations are embracing liberal values and are gradually distancing from both Islamic and Marxist ideologies. In addition to this organization, many Iranian elites in the United States and other Western countries like a change of political regime in Iran. These opposition groups are dispersed across the world and include dissimilar and even conflicting viewpoints ranging from royalists, pan-Iranists, and communists to seculars and intellectuals. The Green Movement opposition group was formed spontaneously after the presidential elections of 2009 and led to major demonstrations across the country and ultimately shook the very existence of the Islamic Republic. In the late 2009, it was believed that the Green Movement could pose a serious threat to the Islamic Republic, but the authorities relied on a combination of strategies like counter-demonstrations, show of force, and intimidation to stifle the opposition movement, and ultimately they regained control over the political arena.36
So far the Islamic Republic has successfully battered the opposition groups. We may attribute this success to multiple factors. First of all, it is important to note that the opposition groups have dissimilar political and ideological orientations and cannot cooperate with each other to overthrow the Islamic regime. Second, the Islamic Republic enjoys a high degree of resilience due to its dual legitimacy stemming from both Islamic and republic values. The political system consists of some elected and some appointed functions that supply stability and flexibility at the same time. On the one hand, the Islamic Republic is an authoritarian theocracy characterized by limited pluralism, dominant ideology, and strong and unelected leadership. On the other hand, it is a republic relying on regular parliamentary and presidential elections in which voters have a true but limited choice. The elections in the Islamic Republic aim to legitimize the semiauthoritarian political system while preventing unwanted people from penetrating into the power structure. The elections are instrumental in reducing internal tensions and manipulating the population.37 Ironically, the elected positions enhance the Islamic Republic’s legitimacy and pave the way for an authoritarian rule. Depending on the circumstances, the political leaders have used an effective combination of hard and soft powers to handle critical situations. Another major cause of the regime’s resilience can be attributed to the mounting foreign pressure and the hostility of Western countries especially the United States. For example, the Bush Administration allocated $400 million in 2007 for conducting covert operations against the Islamic Republic.38 These operations included supporting separatist groups, directing terrorist attacks inside Iran, and helping political dissidents.39 Ironically, the increasing animosity of the Unites States has served the Islamic Republic to gain legitimacy, to boost the nationalist agenda, and ultimately to stifle any voice of domestic opposition. The Iraq aggression against the Iranian territory in the 1980s, the international economic and political sanctions, the American campaign for regime change, and the military threat by the United States and Israel have indirectly helped the Islamic Republic represent itself as a legitimate, nationalist, and powerful regime. A very successful tactic of the Iranian regime in suppressing the voice of domestic opposition is to connect them to foreign powers. In that sense, the so-called campaign of regime change advocated and financed by the United States has been a very precious gift to the Islamic Republic. After all, it seems what has not killed the Islamic Republic has made it constantly stronger.
The Islamic Republic sustainability despite the internal opposition and foreign threats confirms that regardless of their Islamic rhetoric, the ruling clerics behave quite rationally. Over the course of the past 35 years, the Islamic Republic has managed to accomplish its key functions in providing order and security in one of the most tumultuous regions of the world.40 While the Islamic Revolution has not fulfilled its lofty aspirations, to some extent, it has offered social development and economic welfare to the underprivileged and rural population. Thanks to these economic reasons and more importantly because of its religious and cultural affinities with the population, the Islamic Republic has continued to rule the country for more than three decades. The current political system may continue to function in the future, unless it cannot meet the socioeconomic expectations of the population especially those of the younger generations. In the past decade, economic problems like inflation, unemployment, and brain drain have posed major threats to the very existence of Islamic Republic. One may suggest that the Green Movement of 2009 and the ensuing popular uprisings were rooted in the socioeconomic factors. Some authors speculate about the possibility of a Chinese model for Iran, consisting of a combination of economic reforms and cultural liberalization alongside political authoritarianism.41 It is hard to predict the future trajectory of Iranian politics, but considering the centrality of a Supreme Leader, it is plausible to suggest that the personality of the next Supreme Leader will be of paramount importance.42