The Postrevolutionary Iran
Before the Islamic revolution, Iran was a member of the Western alliance against the Soviet Union and communist ideology. It maintained cozy relations with the Western countries, enjoyed their military and technological support, and defended their interests in the Persian Gulf region.1 Shortly after the revolution, Iran’s Islamic regime rejected the regional and international status quo and called for an Islamic uprising. The postrevolutionary Iran actively sought to export its ideology to other Muslim and Middle Eastern countries and as a result, clashed with the so-called corrupt and pro-Western regimes in the region.2 Iran’s revolutionary ambitions did not involve territorial claims, rather they were purely ideological. Iran supported revolutionary groups in Iraq, Lebanon, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait, and denounced the pro-Western regimes as corrupt.3 As a consequence, Iran increasingly distanced itself from the international community, took a defiant approach to the world and neighboring countries, and fell into isolation. In its early days, the Islamic Republic used to have a strong tendency toward an ideologically-planned foreign policy, but in the recent years, it has become gradually pragmatic and rational. The new generations of Iranian policy makers are more pragmatic and less committed to the revolutionary ideology.4 For instance, Iran cooperated with the United States in Afghanistan and Iraq as it viewed the stability of the neighboring countries in its own national interest.5 Furthermore as a major energy producer, Iran should interact carefully with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ members and oil customers, which are the industrialized or emerging countries. This importance of oil implies that even though it is a revolutionary country, Iran should operate within the existing international political and economic frameworks.6
In general, it is possible to distinguish two important orientations in Iran’s behavior toward the international community: Revolutionary Islam on the one hand and national interests on the other. The advocates of the first orientation aim at exporting the revolutionary doctrine to other Islamic and even non-Islamic countries and underline the importance of revolutionary rhetoric in international relations.7 Accordingly, they suggest that the Islamic Republic should refrain from rapprochement with Israel, the United States, and other imperialist or Western countries.8 By contrast, the proponents of the second orientation argue that Iran as a nation-state should maximize its own national, strategic, and economic interests. They emphasize rational decision making instead of confrontation and inflammatory approach and they seek international trade and cooperation.9 In practice, Iran’s foreign policy is a mixture of both ideologically planned and nationally-motivated concerns.
Iran’s diplomatic decision-making apparatus is very complex and includes a large number of institutional and noninstitutional actors and influential personalities.10 To implement its foreign policy, the country utilizes a wide range of mechanisms and tools including oil, pipelines, Shia and Islamic ideologies, anti-imperialist rhetoric, financial aid, trade, populism, and public diplomacy.11 In the past three decades (1990–2010), Iran has had tense relations with most of the Western countries, the United States, Israel, and its Arab neighbors. Iran’s increasing ties with the principal competitors of the United States including China, India, Russia, and Europe has undermined the American hegemonic power.12 At the same time, Iran has reinforced its links with Syria and has increased its position in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Lebanon.13 Additionally, Iran has taken advantage of the neo-Bolivarian tendencies to develop relations with some Latin American countries such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia.14
The Middle East and Neighboring Countries
Israel
Israel has a special place in the Islamic Republic foreign policy. Under the Pahlavi regime, relations between Iran and Israel were very friendly and the two countries were involved in close commercial, technological, and military cooperation. However, the postrevolutionary Iran has viewed Israel as its number one enemy and has shown a staunch opposition to peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians.15 For the past 35 years, Iran and Israel have had no diplomatic and commercial relations. The Islamic Republic labels the Israeli regime as “occupier” and argues that because of occupation of the Palestinian territories, Israel has no political legitimacy on the world stage. The Iranian leaders have often taken a harsh stance toward Israel, have promoted anti-Israeli discourse, and have offered moral and material support to the opponents of the Israeli regime such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Hizbollah.16 Among these groups, Hizbollah is politically and ideologically close to Iranian leaders. Hizbollah maintains both political and military branches and holds many seats in the Lebanese parliament and government. The use of anti-Israeli discourse has been a deliberate strategy of Iran’s postrevolutionary foreign policy. By choosing an antagonistic position toward Israel, the clergy hoped to bridge the Arab-Persian divides and take the leadership of the Muslim community across the world.17 However, this confrontational approach has proved to be inefficient in building trust with Arab nations and instead has led to Iran’s international isolation.
The Gulf Cooperation Council States
The ideology of postrevolutionary Iran was considered as a threat to autocratic and pro-Western regimes in the neighboring states such as Iraq, Bahrain, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).18 In fact, the Islamic Revolution created a high level of insecurity among Iran’s neighbors as they were afraid of the expansion of the revolution to their countries.19 In 1981, the United States backed the creation of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), consisting of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and the UAE. The GCC aimed primarily at creating a balance of power against the influence of Iran20 and to this end, it supported Iraq during the eight-year war against Iran. The relations between the GCC’s members and Iran have been mostly bitter and unfriendly, but in 1997, when the moderate Khatami took office, Iran tried to normalize its relations with neighboring countries.21 During the past decade, the GCC’s countries have maintained normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Iran. While they have been concerned about the increasing political and economic influence of Iran, they have not openly supported the United States’ conflict with Iran.22 Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia are especially complex since the two countries are seen as ideological, religious, economic, and political rivals.23 Saudis are anxious about the growing influence of pro-Iran forces in Iraq and in Lebanon and are fearful of Iran’s nuclear program. In addition, Saudi Arabia is very concerned about the influence of Iran among Saudi Shia minorities.24 The UAE has some territorial disputes with Iran over three strategically located islands in the Persian Gulf. Nevertheless, the UAE has significant trade and cultural relations with Iran and is hosting a large community of Iranian businessmen.25 For instance, around 450,000 Iranians reside in the UAE; there are more than 200 flights per week between the UAE and Iran, and the two countries trade more than $10 billion worth of merchandise per year.26 Dubai’s proximity to Iran, its flexible regulatory regime, and large numbers of Iranian residents make it similar to what Hong Kong once was to China; a safe haven for both business and pleasure.27 Among the GCC’s members, Oman has maintained very warm relations with Iran. Kuwait’s relations with Iran can be described as satisfactory, but there have been sporadic tensions over the operations of Iran’s spies inside Kuwait’s territory.28 Qatar shares a huge natural gas field with Iran in the Persian Gulf and generally is not seeking any confrontation. Bahrain is the only Arab state that is home to about 60 percent Shias of Persian origin and the Bahrain government is especially fearful of the Iranian influence in its internal affairs. In 2009, a high ranking Iranian official created some tensions when he mentioned that Bahrain used to be an Iranian province.29
Overall, the GCC countries have an ambivalent attitude toward Iran as they are very concerned about their long-term security in the Persian Gulf. Indeed, formation of the GCC and Washington’s alliance with the Gulf States were due to Iran’s provoking behavior after the Islamic Revolution. While the GCC states view a revolutionary Iran as a threat, they fear that with a more moderate regime in Iran, their alliance with the United States could be shaken if not broken.
Iraq
The relationship between Iran and Iraq is very complex. The people of these two countries are connected by many social, cultural, economic, ethnic, religious, and family-related ties. Historically, the current Iraq or Mesopotamia has been the cradle of civilization, and for many centuries, it has been part of the Persian Empire. Majority of the Iraqi people are Shia and consequently share the mainstream Iranian religious customs and beliefs. Also, both Iran and Iraq are home to a large number of Kurds who interact with each other across the border. With all these ties, the two countries have fought against each other in a long and bloody conflict for eight years. Less than two decades after the war, it seems that the two nations have already forgotten the unpleasant memories. The United States’ invasion of Iraq has pushed the two nations closer to each other. Thanks to the U.S. military intervention, Iran has gained popularity and influence in Iraq. The Iranian surrogates have built a considerable presence among the Iraqi politicians and religious leaders.30 After the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iranians initially aided some insurgency, but soon they changed their policies and supported the new Iraqi government.31 The removal of Saddam Hussein offered Iran a great opportunity to push its own agenda. Currently, Iran is Iraq’s largest trade partner. Iranian exports to Iraq include fresh and processed food, consumer goods, cars, and electricity. In return, Iraqis export crude and refined oil products to Iran. The volume of trade between Iraq and Iran has been constantly increasing in the past seven years and has reached about $12 billion in 2013.32 The countries are poised to double their bilateral trade in the next few years.
Afghanistan
Very similar to Iraq, the Invasion of Afghanistan by the U.S.-led forces has resulted in an increasing influence of Iran in this country. Prior to the invasion, Afghanistan was ruled by Taliban who were ideologically and politically hostile to Tehran, therefore, the invasion of Afghanistan clearly served the Iranian national interests. The western and northern parts of Afghanistan have close sociocultural ties with Iran by virtue of common language (Persian), commerce, and ethnicity. Iran is mainly interested in expanding its cultural and economic ties in Persian-speaking eastern, central, and northern Afghanistan. The Iranian companies have been involved in a variety of construction and commercial projects in Afghanistan. Despite all their political and ideological differences, both Iran and the United States are interested in a more stable Afghanistan.33 While Iran supports a stable Afghanistan, its policy in this country is greatly affected by rivalry with the United States. As such, it is possible to describe Iran’s policy in Afghanistan as multidimensional, pursuing different and sometimes contradictory objectives. For instance, while Iran is keen to help the Afghan government, it could support anti-U.S. militant groups within the country. Obviously, Afghan officials try to defuse the rivalry between the United States and neighboring Iran. In 2012, Wikileaks documents revealed that the Afghan president has been frequently receiving cash from Iran.
Pakistan
Thanks to their historical and cultural affinities, the bilateral relations between Iran and Pakistan have been mainly friendly. The influence of Iran led to the existence and prevalence of Persianized form of Islam in South Asia and particularly in Pakistan between the 13th to 19th centuries. Likewise, Pakistan’s official language, Urdu, is heavily influenced by Persian. As the Pakistani author, Mujtaba Razvi, pointed out, after Islam, the Iranian cultural tradition exercised perhaps the most decisive and penetrating influence in fashioning the Muslim sociocultural ethos in Pakistan.34 Pakistani politicians such as Zulfikar Ali Bhutto appreciated the help of Iran on many occasions and emphasized the importance of maintaining fraternal relations with Pakistan’s eastern neighbor.35 While both Iran and Pakistan are Muslim majority states, they have different religious perspectives as Pakistan has a Sunni majority while Iran has a Shiite majority. The bilateral relations between the two countries were strained in the 1990s when Pakistan supported anti-Iran Taliban in Afghanistan. In the recent years, Pakistan has moved closer to Saudi Arabia and has moved away from Iran and its shared cultural tradition. While Iran is still suspicious of the links between Pakistan and Sunni groups such as Taliban, it seems that the bilateral relations, especially after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan, have been improving. As a whole, the bilateral relations seem peaceful because the two countries maintain diplomatic connections and cooperate economically and politically. The two countries have been cooperating to build a pipeline that would allow Iran to export 21.5 million cubic meters of natural gas per day to Pakistan.36 In addition, Iran and Pakistan have signed several agreements such as Bilateral Trade Agreement; Bilateral Agreement on Cooperation in Plan Protection and Quarantine; Joint Economic Commission and Defense Cooperation, Preferential Trade Agreement; and most recently, the Joint Ministerial Commission on Security. Despite their intended political and economic cooperation, the bilateral relations have been strained by the pressure of the United States, Saudi Arabia, and the rise of radical Islamist groups.
Central Asia and the Caspian Region
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Iran has made some attempts to strengthen its influence in the new independent republics by means of substantial cultural, religious, and linguistic similarities with them. In this part of the world, Iran has to compete with Russia, Turkey, and the United States to gain influence. Iran was slow to take advantage of the opportunities in the ex-Soviet republics as it was preoccupied by its revolutionary rhetoric in the Middle East. Furthermore, Iran was not willing to support the radical Islamist groups in central Asia for sake of its own security and on the basis of confessional and ideological differences with these militant groups.37
Iran has always maintained important trade relations with the central Asian countries and has often helped the poorer states by offering them road, rail, and pipeline.38 Furthermore, Iran is an observer member at the Central Asian security grouping consisting of Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. The relations between Iran and neighboring Republic of Azerbaijan are particularly important due to their ethnic, religious, and historical commonalities.39 The two countries have large number of Azeri ethnics and share Shia confession. Nevertheless, Iran has held good relations with Armenia, which is a Christian country, and has territorial disputes with the Republic of Azerbaijan. Among the Central Asian countries, Iran had significant achievements in gaining economic influence in Turkmenistan.40 For instance, Iran and Turkmenistan have agreed to construct a gas pipeline between the two countries and to connect their railroads so that goods could be shipped from the Central Asian state through Iran to the Persian Gulf.41 There is rivalry to Iran’s activities by Russia, Turkey, and the United States.42
Syria, Lebanon, and Palestinian Militant Groups
As part of its grand policy toward Israel, Iran has been offering ideological and material support to some Palestinian militant groups. The United States has accused Iran of providing subsidy, weapons, and training to militant groups such as Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Iran’s regional influence was enhanced by Hamas’ victory and its takeover of the Gaza Strip. Similarly, Iran has developed a close relationship with Hezbollah group whose Shia members are greatly inspired by the Islamic Revolution. In the years especially after 2006, Hezbollah has emerged as a powerful military and political player in Lebanon. It is widely believed that Iran supplied Hezbollah with sophisticated weapons via Syria. Both Syria and Iran consider Hezbollah as an effective instrument to put pressure on Israel and achieve their regional objectives. After 1979, Iranian-Syrian relations have been extremely friendly. Iran, a Persian Islamic theocracy, and Syria, an Arab nationalist secular republic, represent quite different ideological orientations; but thanks to their regional interests, they have maintained a strong strategic alliance for more than 30 years.43 Indeed, Syria was the only Arab nation that supported Iran against the Saddam Hussein regime between 1980 and1988, and thus prevented Iraq from portraying the war as an Arab–Persian conflict. In return, Iran provided Syria with cheap energy and invested heavily in the Syrian economy.44 After the eruption of civil war in Syria in 2010, Iran in conjunction with Russia has been providing financial and logistic support to the regime of Bashar Al-Assad.
Turkey
Turkey and Iran are regional powers, competitors, and above all trade partners. The relations between the two countries have been peaceful and stable for more than three centuries. Turkey is a major exporter of goods to Iran and receives a large number of Iranian tourists each year. In return, Turkey receives its energy needs from Iran. The bilateral trade between Iran and Turkey was estimated to be over $10 billion in 2008 and is expected to grow in coming years. It is estimated that over 2.7 million Iranian tourists visited Turkey in 2010.45 In the recent years, Iranian businesses have seen Turkey as an ideal destination for their investments.46 According to the Turkish government data, around 1,500 Iranian companies were active in Turkey by the end of 2010.47 In addition to trade and investment, Turkey provides a convenient road to the European and international markets for importing machinery and products that Iran cannot import through legal channels. After the Islamic Revolution, as a result of Iran’s diplomatic and economic isolation, the Iranian economy has increasingly relied on trade and business with Turkey.48 Iran has seen Turkey as a strong economic and diplomatic partner that can defuse the international economic sanctions. By ignoring the U.S. warnings, Turkey has pursued its national interests in the Middle East and has been instrumental in helping Iran overcome the international sanctions after 2010.49 Despite warm commercial and diplomatic relations, Iran and Turkey have major political and ideological differences. Turkey is a member of NATO and, obviously, is supported by the Western alliance; however Iran has close ties with Russia and opposes the Western influence. With regard to the Syrian conflict, the two countries have significant differences as Turkey openly supports anti-Assad insurgency, while Iran officially backs Bashar Al-Assad’s regime. In addition, Iran and Turkey compete with each other over gaining influence in the Central Asia, the Caucasus, and more recently in the Middle East. While Turkey does not consider Iran a substantial threat to its security, it is still cautious about the Iranian nuclear program and its outcomes.50
The West: The United States and the European Union
The United States
As former secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, said “Here are few nations in the world with which the United States has less reason to quarrel or more compatible interests.”51 Iran was a close ally of the United States under the Shah who returned to his throne in 1953 through a coup d’état engineered by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). The Shah adopted a pro-Western policy, welcomed the American and Western investments, purchased advanced weapons from the United States, and most importantly, secured the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf to the Western economies. At home, the Shah modernized economy very rapidly and aimed at building a strong and stable nation. From the Western perspective, the Shah was a great leader who brought much needed security to the Persian Gulf region and opposed the expansion of the Soviet Union. With the advent of the Islamic Revolution in 1978 to 1979, the American–Iranian relations changed drastically. The Iranian revolutionaries held a grudge against the United States for many reasons, especially because of the extensive support of Americans for the Shah dictatorship and their direct involvement in the 1953 coup d’état. Furthermore, many revolutionaries believed that the United States was seeking to overthrow the Islamic regime like it did in the 1953 coup.52 In November 1979, a group of Iranian students seized 63 hostages in the U.S. embassy in Tehran leading to a diplomatic stand-off and growing tension between the two countries.53 Since then, the American-Iranian relations have been marked by hostility and resentment. On the one hand, the United States accuses Iran of harboring terrorists, discouraging the peace process in the Middle East, and harming American interests around the world. Americans label Iran as a rogue and outlaw country that does not abide by the international rules.54 In addition, the U.S. reprimands Iran for its nuclear program, its military and defense projects, its human rights record, and its system of governance.55 In the recent years, the U.S. government has used the Iranian nuclear program as a casus belli to make military threats and to increase pressure on Iran.56 Some groups of American politicians led by the former Vice President, Cheney, believe that the U.S. policy should focus on using military confrontation with Iran or on changing Iran’s regime.57 On the other hand, Iran accuses the United States of undermining its revolutionary government, supporting dissident groups, helping Iran’s enemies, and setting up harsh trade sanctions against its economic interests.
There are many grounds for the political standoff and bitterness between the United States and Iran: geopolitical, historical, regional, and cultural. From a geopolitical perspective, the U.S. policy toward Iran hinges upon a strategic framework aiming at containing Iran in the Middle East and particularly in the Persian Gulf.58 As president Carter emphasized: “An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States of America, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force.”59 The Islamic Revolution ousted the Shah as one of the closest U.S. allies and brought to power a nationalist-Islamic popular government in 1979. For obvious reasons, instead of satisfying the U.S. economic and political expectations, the revolutionary regime in Iran took an independent trajectory and sought to maximize its own national and regional interests. That is exactly why the United States took a hostile stance toward the Iranian independent and nationalistic regime by labeling it as a rogue state, a threat to U.S. regional interests, a threat to regional stability, and even a threat to international security.60
The postrevolutionary Iran has chosen the opposition to Israel as its ideological trademark. The clerical regime is perhaps the most vocal opponent of Israel; they label Israel as the occupier of Palestine, they publicly condemn any peace attempts or agreements, and by extension they denounce the United States for supporting Israel. In addition to the revolutionary rhetoric, Iran has sponsored several Islamic groups and activities such as Hezbollah movement in Lebanon and Hamas in Gaza. Obviously, this attitude toward a very powerful and influential country such as Israel has created major barriers to friendly relations with the United States and many other Western countries.61
Some of the causes of resentment in the Iranian–American relations reside in the historical events. The United States is a young and optimistic nation; but Iran is an ancient nation and consequently is affected hugely by its long, glorious, and tragic history. Iranians remember their humiliations by the Western powers especially by the British and Americans. In 1953, the British and American secret agencies allegedly facilitated overthrowing of the popular and democratically elected Prime Minister Mosadegh. After the Islamic Revolution, the United States did not respect the new revolutionary regime in Tehran and took multiple actions to undermine its stability. In 1980, the U.S. government incited Saddam Hussein to attack the revolutionary Iran and offered him extensive support by attempting to block conventional arms sales to Iran, providing battlefield intelligence to Iraq, and even by fighting the Iranian naval forces.62 In 1988, the United States shot down an Iranian civilian airliner with 290 passengers over the Persian Gulf and surprisingly prized the captain of the U.S., Vincennes, for these actions.63
While the regional and geopolitical factors are behind much of the antagonistic relations between the two nations, the effects of cultural and ideological causes should not be overlooked. Iran remains a traditional society,64 and part of its hostility with the West in general and with the United States in particular can be attributed to the incompatibility between the modern and traditional values.65 The Iranian leadership and the Iranian society as a whole see the West as a disturbing and corrupting power that demoralizes their pure religious values.66 Iranian intellectuals and leaders frequently have used the terms such as West-toxification, Weststruckness, or cultural invasion to point out the irksome influence of the American and Western culture.
While the diplomatic relation between the United States and Iran was disrupted by the Islamic Revolution, the informal exchange between the two countries has continued to grow in the postrevolutionary era. Due to extensive American–Iranian relations under the Shah, the United States was home to a large number of Iranian expatriates who kept in touch with the motherland. In the past three decades, a growing number of Iranian students or skilled workers have migrated to the United States and have made this country their home. According to Iranian Studies Group at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, in 2004, more than 700,000 Iranians or persons of Iranian descent were residing in the United States.67 In 2007, a survey by the World Public Opinion revealed that while large majorities of Iranians have negative views of the U.S. government, they have favorable attitudes toward the American people and culture.68 It seems that Iranians are particularly concerned about the U.S. foreign policy, which they consider a threat to the stability of the Middle East.69 A large majority of Iranians and Americans support steps toward improving the U.S.-Iranian relations. A recent poll by the state-run National Institute for Research and Opinion Polls showed that 75 percent of Iranians favored a dialogue with the United States. Particularly, they support bilateral relations on issues of mutual concern, cultural, educational, and sporting exchanges, better access for journalists from the two countries, increased trade, and more tourism.70
The European Union
The European countries at first had an ambivalent attitude toward the Islamic Revolution, but rapidly took an antagonistic policy toward the revolutionary regime and offered their support to Saddam Hussein in his war on Iran.71 After the war with Iraq, both Iran and the European Union (EU) tried to normalize their relations. The rapprochement between Iran and Europe was mutually beneficial. From the Europeans’ standpoint, Iran was an attractive large market and a source of energy.72 From the Iranians’ standpoint, EU was a source of much needed investment and technology. In addition, the Europeans believed that engagement with Iran could strengthen the moderate elements of revolutionary regime and ultimately reduce the Islamic radicalism.73 Hence, the bilateral economic and diplomatic relations were expanded and the Europeans sought to resolve their ideological and political differences with Iran by a critical dialogue. While the United States had no diplomatic relations with Iran, the European countries took the lead in negotiations with Iran over its controversial nuclear program. In 2003, the Foreign Ministers of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom travelled to Tehran in order to persuade the Iranian authorities to work more closely with the International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors. However, the bilateral relations were stressed after 2010 as the EU joined the United States and imposed some harsh sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program.74
European nations have different views towards Iran, but in general they are more unwilling to get involved in a military confrontation and see Iran’s abundant energy resources and consumer market as opportunities for cooperation and trade. Occasionally, they have sought closer ties with Iran in order to take advantage of economic cooperation and at various points they have tried to promote and exploit reforms in Iran’s political system. The French Peugeot, Renault, Alcatel, and Total, the Swiss Nestlé, the Swedish Svedala Industri, the Norwegian Statoil, the Italian ENI SpA, the German Siemens, and many other European corporations have been doing business in Iran. Overall, the relations between Iran and the EU have been driven by short-term, mutual interests. It seems that while the two parties are interested in expanding their cooperation, the ideological, cultural, and geopolitical differences keep them apart.
Asia, Latin America, and Africa
China
China a communist country and Iran a theocratic regime represent dissimilar and even opposing ideologies but they have maintained very friendly bilateral relations. In addition to cultural and civilizational affinities, the postrevolutionary Iran turned to Asia and particularly to China to offset the standoff with the Western powers. As early as the 1980s, Iran was receiving technological and military help from China. Subsequently, Iran developed strong economic and trade relations with China to neutralize the U.S. sanctions and maintain its geopolitical independence. In the absence of Western rivals, the Chinese companies have successfully penetrated into the Iranian market and gained considerable market share in different sectors such as oil, gas, urban infrastructure, and construction. China has viewed Iran as a stable country in the Middle East that could ensure its huge energy needs.75 As a permanent member of the Security Council, China has regularly used its political weight and veto right to defend Iran’s nuclear program. There is considerable military cooperation between the two countries and, reportedly, China has provided Iran with dual-use technology that could be used for the development of weapons. In short, China and Iran relations are based on solid geopolitical and economic mutual interests.
India
Iran and India have been traditionally bordering civilizations, trade partners, and regional allies. The two countries have significant cultural and political commonalities and have been pursuing mutual interests with regard to regional security, terrorism, and Islamic radicalization. Before the Islamic Revolution and during the Cold War period, Iran and India had good relations, but they belonged to two different geopolitical poles: India developed strong military and economic links with the Soviet Union whereas Iran had close cooperation with the United States.76 After the Revolution, the relations between Iran and India have been strengthened as the two countries have identified their mutual interests and moved to expand cooperation in several key areas including energy, geopolitical and strategic interests, counterterrorism, regional stability, and defense. India is one of the main buyers of Iran’s oil and the two countries have considered some methods to transfer Iran’s energy reserves to India. For instance, the two countries have considered the construction of an ambitious pipeline that would transfer Iran’s gas to India via Pakistan.77 Additionally, the two countries are working on the North-South Transportation Corridor to link Mumbai via Bandar Abbas (Iran) with Europe.
Africa
There are many reasons that Iran is becoming interested in expanding relationships with Africa. In addition to enormous economic and political opportunities, the Islamic Revolution discourse is primarily anti-Western and anticcolonial pretending to defend the interests of oppressed masses across the globe including Africa. Iran is mostly interested in relations with the East African countries as, thanks to their location, they can serve Iran’s regional plans.78 By relying on the Islamic and revolutionary ideology, Iran has been seeking to attract local Muslim populations and gradually has established a permanent presence in the East African countries. Iran can threaten the Western sea lanes at the entrance to the Red Sea. Also, Iran may use the East African countries such as Sudan to transfer military equipment through Egypt to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Strip.79 In pursuing its grand African policy, Iran has been involved in a variety of projects in agriculture, energy, construction, and infrastructure. In 2009 and 2010, Iran’s president visited many African countries such as the Comoro Islands, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Iran has expressed its willingness to help African countries liberate from the Western oppression.80
Latin America
As part of its anti-American strategy, Iran has been developing cozy relationships with Latin American countries, especially those who challenge the U.S. hegemony. Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and even Brazil are among those countries that Iran’s presidents have visited in the past six years. Iran and Venezuela have been involved in many joint projects in banking, oil production, construction, and technology transfer. Hugo Chavez, the late president of Venezuela, visited Iran on many occasions and became one of Iran’s closest allies. To increase its political influence in Latin America, Iran has been opening offices in several countries. Allegedly, Iran has offered Bolivia $1 billion in financial aid and investment and has been looking for new ways to strengthen its ties with Brazil. The Unites States is concerned about the marriage of Iran’s Islamist ideology with Latin American anti-U.S. policy and the ensuing effects on security.
Russia
Due to its proximity and immensity, in the past three centuries, Russia has played an important role in Iran. Russia and Iran fought multiple wars in the 18th and 19th centuries. In the 19th century, Russia annexed the northeastern provinces of Dagestan, Azerbaijan, and Armenia. For more than two centuries Iran was involved in the great game between Great Britain and Russia. In World War II, the Russian forces invaded the northern parts of Iran, and in the 1940s, Stalin made serious attempts to separate the northwestern part of Iran. During the COLD WAR, Iran was a member of the Western Alliance and naturally was protected by the United States against Russian aggression. The attitude of Iranians towards the Soviet Union and Russia has been ambivalent. While the northern neighbor has been a source of threat and invasion, most of the Iranian leftists and intellectuals viewed its geopolitical role as positive. After the Islamic Revolution, the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation gradually established close relations with Iran and, in the absence of the United States, provided Iran with technological and military provisions. The collapse of the Soviet Union bridged the apparent ideological gap between the communist regime and the Islamic Republic. Iran’s rapprochement with the post-Soviet Russia evolved very quickly as it turned to a close security and trade partner of Iran.81 Russia’s proximity and its influence in the international community made it a valuable partner of Iran. In the past two decades, thanks to hostility between the United States and Iran, Russia has continued to develop lucrative diplomatic and trade relations with the Islamic Republic.82 Russia has provided Iran with arms and has been actively involved in the design and construction of Iranian nuclear facilities.83 In return, Russia has opposed a military solution to the issue of Iran’s nuclear program and as a member of the United Nations Security Council, has used its diplomatic weight to neutralize the effects of international resolutions against Iran. Despite the increasing bilateral economic and security cooperation, the two countries have significant conflicting interests. Russia has shown a hesitant support for Iran and supposedly does not like a strong Iran south of its border. Similarly, Iran has been historically concerned about the expansionist intentions of its northern neighbor. The two countries have unsettled and serious differences about naval borders on the Caspian Sea. What is more, the two countries hold the world largest gas reserves and Russia sees Iran as a serious rival in exporting natural gas, especially to Europe.