In a two-person, zero-sum game,

1. each person has two strategies.

2. whatever is gained by one person is lost by the other.

3. all payoffs are zero.

4. a saddle point always exists.

A saddle point exists if

1. the largest payoff in a column is also the smallest ­payoff in its row.

2. the smallest payoff in a column is also the largest ­payoff in its row.

3. there are only two strategies for each player.

4. there is a dominant strategy in the game.

If the upper and lower values of the game are the same,

1. there is no solution to the game.

2. there is a mixed solution to the game.

3. a saddle point exists.

4. there is a dominated strategy in the game.

In a mixed strategy game,

1. each player will always play just one strategy.

2. there is no saddle point.

3. each player will try to maximize the maximum of all possible payoffs.

4. a player will play each of two strategies exactly 50% of the time.

In a two-person, zero-sum game, it is determined that strategy $X_1$ dominates strategy $X_2$. This means

1. strategy $X_1$ will never be chosen.

2. the payoffs for strategy $X_1$ will be greater than or equal to the payoffs for $X_2.$

3. a saddle point exists in the game.

4. a mixed strategy must be used.

In a pure strategy game,

1. each player will randomly choose the strategy to be used.

2. each player will always select the same strategy, regardless of what the other person does.

3. there will never be a saddle point.

4. the value of the game must be computed using ­probabilities.

The solution to a mixed strategy game is based on the assumption that

1. each player wishes to maximize the long-run average payoff.

2. both players can be winners with no one experiencing any loss.

3. players act irrationally.

4. there is sometimes a better solution than a saddle point solution.